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The issue of terrorism has become one of the topmost concerns of US-Nigerian Foreign policy 
in connection with the Global War on Terror. As a result of the ‘shift’ of the GWOT into Nigeria, 
Boko Haram was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in 2013. Extant research on Boko 
Haram’s terrorism in Nigeria and other parts of Africa is however premised on/driven by some 
essentialist thoughts and thus remains normative. Yet the proscription of Boko Haram reveals 
both continuities and change in relation to earlier constructs of the Nigerian state and non-
state actors since the Cold War. Through the power of discourse, state actors silence 
complicities and ‘fix’ the meaning of the violence of others while excluding other possible 
narratives in order to arrive at discursive constructs which remain self-serving. These 
continuities in identity constructs therefore highlight the need for a post structural thought 
in understanding terrorism in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally. In particular, this thesis 
suggests that the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation in Nigeria reveals the 
continuities of Othering of actors through the signification of ‘crises’ in policy discourse. This 
is premised on the perception of Africa by the ‘West’ as a site of ongoing disorder. The thesis 
uses Homi Bhabha’s concept of Otherness as well as Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to 
understand the construction of the ‘terrorist threat’, and the ‘United States Self’, ‘the counter 
terrorist state’, and the ‘terrorist other’. As no known study has undertaken to show how the 
labelling of Boko Haram works through discursive power and politics as well as the function 
of silence in meta narratives, this research is therefore particularly significant as the focus on 
policy and its implementers in Nigeria helps to unveil the silence in the discursive construction 
of the ‘strong’ state as the state which counters ‘evil’ terrorists. However, unlike Traditional 
Terrorism Studies which highlights the state as a possible user of terrorism, the thesis adds to 
the Critical Terrorism Studies by examining how the production of the discourses within which 
the labelling of acts and actors of ‘terrorism’ have evolved and how practices like counter-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The events of September 2001 justified the ‘shift’ of the Global War on Terror/ism (henceforth 
GWOT) into Africa generally and Nigeria particularly. The discursive shift enabled the 
proscription of Boko Haram1 (and Ansaru2) by the Nigerian government as a terrorist 
organisation on June 4, 20133, followed by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White 
House on November 13, 2013. As a moment, the shift of the GWOT into Africa highlights some 
continuities and change in the U.S-Nigeria policy narratives and draws heavily from earlier 
constructions and/or representations of Africa/Nigeria. The United States is particularly 
important to this thesis because the GWOT was not just championed by the U.S but the shift 
also bring to the fore the importance of Africa and particularly Nigeria to the U.S. Thus, the 
construction Africa/Nigeria shifted from open and/or ungoverned spaces during the Cold War 
to failed states pre-September 2001 to a site of terror/ism after 9/11. The continuities of 
earlier colonial discourse in these pre-9/11 representations exist to shape the post-9/11 
discursive practices in a way that enables the practices of Othering of the terrorists as well as 
the production of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state.  The Othering of Boko Haram and the 
production of Nigeria as essentially a counterterrorist state, in this sense did not represent a 
denial of agency to any of these subjects but to highlight how through discursive continuities 
of earlier colonial rhetoric, the global order and disorder binary became fixed and assume 
permanence instead of the ambivalence congruent to the globe. Nigeria for instance is 
constructed as an economic giant in Africa and an exemplar in West Africa (i.e. order) while 
in the same breath represented as a site of poverty and degeneracy (i.e. disorder) in the policy 
                                                     
1 Though the group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means 
"People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad", Boko Haram will be retained 
throughout this thesis. 
2 It is unknown whether Ansaru is a splinter group of Boko Haram or an independent entity. The Nigerian army 
has however claimed that the group has been completely defeated and it’s no longer in existence. The group is 
however largely unknown in Nigeria (Elden 2014). 
3 It is worthy to note that the proscription of the group as terrorists by the Nigerian government became 
inevitable after high level meetings by the U.S and the Nigerian governments with the former exerting some 
‘pressure’ on the latter to proscribe the group locally. This is after Abubakar Shekau had been on U.S 




documents and official narratives analysed in this thesis.  While this is beyond the purview of 
this thesis, the state of ambivalence in the U.S has also been frequently highlighted by 
scholars like Noam Chomsky and Roxanne Doty. Therefore, the fixity of a state of disorder as 
signalled by the terrorism discourse in Nigeria points to the play of hegemony in meaning 
fixation and the continuation of earlier colonial practices. 
Furthermore, as this thesis aims to show that the discursive change occasioned by the GWOT 
in Africa brought about a ‘‘fixity’’ and ‘’permanence’’ to this ambivalence inherent to the 
globe thereby constructing an Other. The U.S foreign policy therefore changed in the wake of 
the 9/11 from a narrow state-centric policy to an overarching and broad template which 
involves democracy promotion, health and economic drive linked to the GWOT. While some 
of these practices were reflected in the Pre-9/11 Clinton’s presidency, they became dominant 
with the war on terror/ism being the hub of the policy narrative. It is in this light that this 
thesis argues that the GWOT in Africa/Nigeria is premised on a number of assumptions, 
rhetoric, myths and beliefs drawn from earlier colonial discourses and practices. The 
construction of the discourse of terrorism, which according to Zulaika and Douglass (1996) is 
therefore framed in the ‘‘mythology of the Otherness’’ with no idea of the subjectivity, 
historical and social background of the so-called ‘terrorist’. As Stampnitzky (2013) argues, by 
boxing a group into the terrorism myth, their grievances notwithstanding, the rationality or 
otherwise of their actions are considered an impossibility as their actions are then located in 
the realms beyond reasoning; because if it becomes reasonable, it is can no longer be referred 
to as terrorism. Also, the ‘invention’ of ‘terrorism’ poses a moral judgement which among 
other things delineate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence’, ‘justifiable and ‘unjustifiable’ 
violence. Assigning a priori, a moral and rational judgement on the violence as well as the 
identity of Boko Haram then highlights the use of discursive power to create political 
identities through Othering by mobilizing the identity as a fixed construction positioned 
against a perceived threat. Moreover, the possible role of the Nigerian and U.S governments 
in the violence are not only silenced, but also the global hegemony of the U.S and the ‘war on 
terrorism’ doctrine itself become naturalised. Every violence then remains a referent sign 
open to several interpretations, but which could be understood within its context.  Laclau and 




An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the 
sense that it occurs here and now, independent of my will. But whether their 
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘‘natural phenomena’’ or 
‘‘expressions of the wrath of God,’’ depends upon the structuring of a 
discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to 
thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute 
themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence 
On this basis, this thesis will therefore engage with meaning structures through the use of the 
label ‘terrorist’ to delineate the Boko Haram group both in Nigeria and internationally along 
the underlying politics and power connected to it. It will also examine how empty signifiers 
like ‘liberty’, ‘development’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, and ‘order’, all come together in a chain of 
equivalential identity to construct the U.S self as well as re-imagine the Other. 
As a summary, this section has introduced how the shift of the GWOT into Africa reflects both 
the continuity of earlier colonial discourse and also signals a change in the U.S foreign policy 
towards Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The discourse of terrorism therefore 
becomes a moment around which the United States foreign policy became anchored. To this 
end, the use of Bhabha’s’ concept of Otherness and Discourse Theory to understand it 
becomes all the more important as they help to highlight why words matter. It thus matters 
not to produce the Boko Haram movement as a terrorist group not only because it borders 
on the ‘‘self-fulfilling prophecy’’ of the terrorism myth and the silencing of the roles as well 
as naturalising the power and hegemony of the U.S and Nigerian political elites in the Boko 
Haram uprising but also because the label will among other things, normalise the other 
violence not categorised as terrorism. Since the discourse of terrorism as a hegemonic 
political language in Nigeria is yet to receive context specific studies on it, the second section 
will engage with, build upon and add to strands of relevant literature in terrorism studies, in 
order to unveil how the social is constituted by discourse. Key to this chapter will be gaps in 
knowledge that this project aims to fill. This research will address two gaps in the terrorism 
studies literature. CTS scholars like Zulaika and Douglass (1996) has continued to argue for 
the increasing need for context in order to understand disparate political violence and this 
project aims to achieve this by providing context to the Boko Haram movement. Secondly, 




the failed states templates which draws on the metaphor of Africa as ‘‘the sick continent’’ 
while blurring its history. This project will therefore address these gaps by examining how 
terrorism as a hegemonic political language in Nigeria is produced through the analysis of U.S 
government texts (from 1953 to 2017) and interview data from nine Nigerian military officials. 
The interview text will help to give primary empirical evidence to show how hegemonic 
language becomes normalized and/or naturalized. The third section will then discuss the 
methodology: theories, concepts and methods this research will draw on to understand how 
the use of the terrorism language functions as a hegemonic political language. Much of the 
conceptual framework of this thesis comes from Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory and 
Homi K. Bhabha’s concept of Otherness in order to unveil how hegemonic discourses are 
normalized. The fourth and fifth sections highlight the thesis’ structure and its conclusion. 
Foreign Policy: Nigeria and the United States 
Literatures on U.S-Nigeria foreign policy are in scant supply and there seems to be no 
literature examining the discourse of terrorism and Nigeria-U.S foreign relations. Nigeria has 
traditionally considered itself as a natural leader of Africa and its foreign policy has hitherto 
reflected this. The country has played very pivotal roles in the formation of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). For instance, the country spent an estimated $ 13 billion on various peace 
keeping operations across West Africa by 2014 (Ashaver and Teriyima 2014). It has moved 
from a pan-Africanist policy which focuses on the need to eradicate colonialism and its effects 
in Africa during the Cold War to a concentric one during the 1990s, with priority given to 
issues relating to Nigeria, before West Africa, the rest of Africa and then the rest of the world 
(Osuntokun 2007; Akinterinwa 2004). However, the shift of Nigeria’s foreign policy in 1999, 
the year it returned to democratic rule, to focus on Nigeria’s economic development by 
attracting foreign direct investment meant that the international community, of which the 
U.S is a key component, would define the country’s policy focus (McGann 2019). 
While Britain is the official colonizer of Nigeria, the United States and Nigeria has, however 
developed close ties based on significant economic and political interests particularly from 




‘illusion of permanence’ of British-ordered global political landscape gradually and steadily 
diminishes (Hutchins 1967), that of the U.S gained significance in the continent following the 
end of the second World War (Huband 2001; Oye et al 1981). Nigeria became all the more 
important to the strategic interests of the U.S during and after the Cold War due to the 
‘‘critical interests’’ of the U.S in Nigeria’s energy infrastructure, hydrocarbon and other 
natural resources especially after the U.S fallout with the Middle East. Nigeria plays host to 
the largest amount of hydro carbon in West Africa and ranks from the 3rd to the 5th supplier 
of oil to the U.S (Robertson 2012). Following this background, socially and politically salient 
processes in Nigeria also became of importance to the U.S in order for the economic interests 
of the U.S in the country to remain secured through a universalized order (FRUS, Documents 
on Africa, 1976). As will be argued by this thesis, it is this concern for order by the U.S in 
Nigeria that occasioned the crises in the construction of U.S policy towards Africa through 
which the state failure in Africa and the ‘shift’ of the GWOT became a matter of policy concern 
and/or drive. The focus of this thesis on foreign policy as discursive constructions which 
defines for us the identity of states and their actors as well as practices enabled by these 
constructions is in the understanding that a state or nation has no objective essence through 
which its ontological status could be understood. Rather this is made possible through 
discursive constructions (Nabers 2009; Ashley 1986; Weldes 1999; Ashley 1986; Campbell 
1998). According to Campbell (1998:12), ‘’States are never finished as entities; the tension 
between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully 
resolved… states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming’’. Unlike Butler’s theory 
of Performativity used by Campbell to understand how representational practices, rather 
than a pre-given subject, could explain the production of state identity and otherness, this 
thesis considers such effects of identity construct through Bhabha’s Otherness. The U.S 
foreign policy towards Nigeria then as a discursive site helps to understand how both states’ 
identities as well as their actors become fixed following the global order/disorder dyad and 
how practices enabled by these constructions assume their naturalness. Following scholars 
like Baker-Beall (2014); Doty (1993), Widmaier (2007) and Nabers (2009: 192), foreign policy 




governments to assume the role of representative of the nation, thereby creating identity and 
social order’’. 
A word of caution about the usage of Nigeria and Africa used alongside throughout the thesis 
is necessary from the onset. In U.S foreign policy, Africa is sometimes considered in policy 
terms as a seemingly monolithic whole; except in certain instances like official narratives 
where regions like West/North Africa are considered distinctly. Hence, throughout the thesis, 
Africa is considered alongside Nigeria because Nigeria is sometimes implied in U.S policy 
directives on Africa. A further proof of this is how the proscription of Boko Haram is linked to 
its similarities with other groups like Al-Shabaab in North Africa. Hence, except where Nigeria 








Extant literature on Terrorism Studies could be considered as polarized basically into 
Traditional Terrorism Studies (hereafter TTS) and Critical Terrorism Studies (hereafter CTS). 
Being an emergent field that is interdisciplinary in nature, some scholars have questioned if 
Terrorism Studies could actually be regarded as a distinct field of its own (Horgan 2006). 
Terrorism is an ‘‘essentially contested’’ concept (Gallie, 1955-56:168) and lacks a ubiquitous 
definition. The absence of a consensus among scholars about the definition of terrorism 
proves problematic in both theoretical and empirical terms. As Silke (2005: 36) and Wardlaw 
(1986:3) observe, the absence of this ‘‘Holy Grail’’ presents a possible pitfall for the field ‘in 
terms of production of empirical knowledge’ and conceptual development.  Within TTS, 
however, terrorism is regarded as ‘‘’something out there’ that is open to scientific objective 
verifiability’’ (Joseph 2009:93). This underlying assumption which considers terrorism as a 
phenomenon with essence that is distinct from other types of political violence which is 
identifiable and independent of the researcher’s value is grounded within the positivist school 
of thought and has given rise to a litany of projects aimed at defining, analysing and 
countering terrorism (Primoratz 1990; Teichman 1989; Schmid et. al 1988, Hoffmann 1996 
among others). One such project, Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 attempt at synthesizing varied 
definitions of terrorism among scholars  failed to achieve a universal acceptance of the 
definition of terrorism. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988:28), after completing a 
synthesis of academic definitions in the field of terrorism studies, provided a wide-ranging 
broad-spectrum definition which goes beyond the traditional focus on non-state actors. They 
therefore submit that: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to 
assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 




target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, 
or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought 
 
As has been critiqued by Ramsay (2015:214), the definition, among other things, conflate 
several elements and regard them as if ‘‘they were atomic units rather than subjective, 
qualitative codes’’. The rigour and complexity reflected both in the survey and reaching a 
seeming consensus in the adoption of a universally acceptable and applicable definition 
points to the age-long battle of ‘knowing’ what terrorism is. The highly and essentially 
contested nature of this concept is also highlighted by the inability of states and even the 
United Nations to evolve a definition that satisfy the interests of all parties represented. In 
the United States for instance, definitions as well as analytical codes varied according to 
agencies, while the Army for instance considers the targeting of non- combatants, the 
Department of State through ‘‘the Act’’ adopts an open-ended definition within which most 
political violence and even protests could well fit. In Nigeria, the obvious lack of a definition 
for terrorism until 2011 which was done in compliance to the U.S demand for ‘cooperation’ 
against ‘terrorism’ also reflects the highly subjective and value-laden nature of the construct. 
Even after defining ‘terrorism’, through a seemingly endless lists of ‘‘acts of terrorism’’ which 
has hitherto been captured by the general criminal laws, the lists could has well point to the 
use of violence by the Nigerian government itself. However, since arguments abound as to 
whether a state could make use of terrorism as a tactic or become labelled a terrorist state 
thereby delegitimizing it (Wilkerson 2005; Hoffman 1996), the field of Traditional Terrorism 
Studies 
Bereft of sound theoretical, conceptual and ethical grounding, therefore, TTS has continued 
to struggle with conceptual issues with implication for the analytical framework and which 
has produced several definitions from different scholars with divergent voices. What is 
however considered as ‘terrorism’ is defined within ‘‘the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for 
action’’ (Apter 1997:114). This means that existing power structures determine what category 




seminal contribution of Robert Cox (1981) is apt to the field of Traditional Terrorism Studies 
TTS which has as its ‘‘normal science’’ a positivist and objectivist approach based on Cox’s 
problem-solving thesis with its normative search for patterns in a fixed or given world and 
aims to explain and ‘‘to correct dysfunctions or specific problems that arise within {the} 
existing order’’ (Cox 1995: 31-32). Through this problem-solving approach, TTS scholars has 
been able to ‘reduce’ the problem of terrorism ‘‘to a limited number of variables which are 
amenable to relatively close and precise examination’’ (ibid. pg.129); this has provided for a 
macro-level understanding and analysis of the phenomenon with its inherent aim at building 
theory. This background necessitates the ‘‘critical turn’’ of Terrorism Studies by challenging 
dominant discourses which produce terrorism as a dysfunction in the social order that should 
be fixed without a critical evaluation of the social order which produces/defines it. This 
framework obviously works to ‘‘maintain existing social order’’ together with its probable 
hegemonic stance and oppressive tendencies (Cox 1995:31). 
So, in order to challenge dominant narrative of the mainstream scholars, CTS has highlighted 
how the label is political, pejorative, and subjective and a web of rhetoric (Bryan et. al 2011; 
Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Jackson 2005). According to Zulaika and Douglass (1996), prior to 
1960, political violence was not studied in any distinct category to phenomena like wars and 
insurgency and the label was only associated with acts of bombing, assassinations and the 
likes. The concept became relevant in the 1960’s as a result of the Cold War during which 
Western Powers labelled anti-colonial revolutionary groups as ‘terrorists’ in order to 
delegitimize them and produce as well as justify counter-terrorism policy (Winker 2006). 
Hence, the label evolved within the existing power structure as a rhetorical weapon to 
demonize the challengers. During 1989-1992, a period during which only ‘‘thirty-four 
Americans were killed worldwide’’ with no single one on the American soil, numerous books 
were produced under the buzz word ‘terrorism’ (1322 titles) and ‘terrorist’ (121) respectively. 
Zulaika and Douglass then ask ‘‘how, in the absence of a significant number of fatalities, can 
a discursive machine provide sufficient ammunition to sustain the plethora of texts, expertise, 
and conferences that will depict the phenomenon as the ultimate threat to civilization?’’ They 
concluded by asserting that terrorism is nothing but rhetoric that exists to serve some political 




discursive, terrorism is argued to be a ‘social fact’ rather than a ‘’brute fact’’ (Jackson et. al. 
2009). As a social fact the definition of terrorism lends itself to the socio-political context, 
histories, culture, micro-specifics and power differentials involved in a particular political 
violence to shape its meaning and interpretation. 
With the arguments around the ‘’politics of naming’’ (Bhatia 2005), the CTS approach is 
predominantly that of rejectionists or reformists. Rejectionists argue that the concept or label 
terrorism is counterproductive to the spirit of rigour in research as it is too pejorative, 
contaminated ideologically and takes ‘categories of practice for categories of analysis’ which 
leads to reification of terrorism (Stump and Dixit 2011; Waldron 2004; Scheffler 2006). As a 
rejectionist, Bhatia (2005) questions the veracity of the label by highlighting the inherent 
fluidity due to the dynamics employed by the parties to a conflict. In other words, Bhatia 
seems to contend that power does not lie only in the ‘super powers’ so to speak but it is 
presented at every level of interaction and this negotiation of the ‘politics of naming’ should 
be put into perspectives by critical theorists. He further posits that ‘‘Most authors … are not 
confident of the ability of any particular label or interpretative lens to adequately encompass 
the purpose, activities, local relevance or ideology of a given movement’’ (ibid. pg. 8). In 
furtherance to this, some critical scholars have contended that rather than engage in 
seemingly endless efforts at defining or naming, CTS should be more concerned with giving 
clarity to its methodology and what this means for its truth claim (Stump 2013; Stump and 
Dixit 2011).  Reformists however maintain that the use of the concept remains useful 
analytically and should be defined (Finlay 2009). It would not be entirely correct to present 
these approaches in two rigid binaries: Richard Jackson, a prominent CTS scholar has often 
argued that terrorism has no essence and as such could be regarded as a rejectionist, but he 
has almost in the same breath proposed a minimal foundationalism definition of terrorism 
(Jackson 2011).  Though this has been critiqued by Stump and Dixit (2011) as a form of 
ontological cum epistemological imbalance, it remains that the border between both 
approaches might be fluid rather than rigid. This ontological cum epistemological incoherence 
is due to what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985:215) refers to as ‘‘ontological gerrymandering’’ 
between dualism and monism which has implication for conceptual/analytical development 




explanations are used in the social constructivist research on social problems’’ (ibid) which 
undermines rigorous research by manipulating the boundaries of a particular paradigm to 
one’s advantage. In spite of the fact that reformists query the seeming gulf of namelessness 
and wondered how we can relate to a phenomenon if it cannot be named, the rejectionists’ 
model will inform the approach of this thesis. This is because the history of terrorism and the 
shift of meaning it has undergone makes obvious how power structures organise and 
determine what counts as acceptable knowledge and how to interpret this.  This thesis 
therefore follows the Critical Terrorism Framework to contribute to Terrorism Studies by 
giving attention to how discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is a production of existing power 
structures prevalent in today’s world order. As the contestation between TTS and CTS 
continues on whether terrorism is ‘something out there’ or not, this study aims to address 
this contestation by highlighting the Othering character of the label and its implications in 
Nigeria through a post-structural research framework. 
From both definitions, however, the meaning of ‘terrorism’ is intrinsically connected to 
identity, because it is constructed to be as broad as possible in order to accommodate as 
much violent crimes committed by non-state actors. Scholars as well as the media have often 
highlighted the indiscriminate application of the label in the U.S, like other European 
countries, where the problem is perceived as ‘‘foreign’’ rather than ‘‘domestic’’ (Baker-Beall 
2011; Chomsky 2003). The undergirding idea that the ‘terrorist’ is a ‘foreigner’ or an ‘alien’ 
that is mobilized against the collective identity of the state is also drawn upon in Nigeria. 
Chapter 7 examines the Othering of the Boko Haram as a terrorist group based on themes 
identified in the texts under study. The identification of an enemy of the state to which the 
terrorism label is susceptible to meshes well with the aim of this research in asking how and 
why rather than what help to unveil processes and structures within which the discourse of 
terrorism and its practices are constructed and enabled. As Doty (1993: 299) asserts: ‘‘what 
is explained is not why a particular outcome is obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, 
and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made 
possible’’. How-questions enable us to explain the way that ‘‘power works to constitute’’ 
particular actors, identities, meaningful orientations, relations and modes of 




proved useful to the extent to which certain possibilities and modes of being are already 
presupposed in the why-questions. The explanation of certain causes through the use of the 
why-questions therefore takes for granted the constitution of power within modes of 
subjectivities and makes certain outcomes almost predictable.  This, according to Doty, makes 
the why-question ‘‘incomplete in an important sense’’. However, why this thesis is interested 
in the how- rather than why-questions, it does so with the understanding that ‘‘how things 
happen is also why they happen’’ (Tilly 2006:410). What this means is that both types of 
questions (the why-questions being that of causation and the how-question being that of 
constitution) are two variants of explanations (Wendt 1998). Doty which this thesis draws 
heavily from also considers the how-possible questions as another form of explanation. This 
follows that by focusing on how-questions in this thesis, which among other things, highlight 
the play of power through discourse, the explanation for ‘why’ Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ is so 
constructed become implied. CTS scholars like Richard Jackson (2012) has also argued along 
this line by positing that both causation (why-questions) and constitution (how-questions) are 
not essentially separated within CTS scholarship. 
A focus on discourse therefore points to what is spoken and what is left unspoken as it is by 
making political violence ahistorical that its labelling as terrorism became justified.  In this 
light, this research will make an original contribution to knowledge through a critical approach 
that helps to think through the construction of identity in Critical Terrorism Studies which 
according to (Jackson 2007c) has not been one of the core commitments of the field. Being 
‘critical’ in the sense is to: 
Look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world 
because it has become overly familiar. In this way, new spaces are opened 
for thinking about the meaning of the past and the present and, therefore, 
how we construct the future (Fierke 1998:13) 
While Fierke’s critical approach which embraces a diverse range of approaches to 
understanding of security studies generally and terrorism studies particularly, might 
seemingly dislocate their commitment from the Frankfurt School’s emancipatory aim, the 
broad critical template adopted by this thesis is still closely connected to an emancipatory 




to change the world because for a ‘‘reflexivist, knowing the world and changing the world are 
inseparable’’ (Jackson 2011: 160). By adopting a postcolonial approach to understanding the 
discourse of terrorism, therefore, the possibility of change could be envisioned in Nigeria. 
While the approach helps us to challenge and think about the normative understanding of 
Boko Haram, it does not seek to exceptionalize the experience of Boko Haram or that of 
Nigeria nor reify the category ‘nationalism’ or ‘race’. It rather seeks to adopt a critical 
interrogation that unveils normative and common sense understanding in the construction of 
our world. It argues for the complex understanding of our world rather than a simplified 
binary division with both ontological, epistemological and methodological implications. 
Unlike a critical realist methodological approach, the reflexivism of the research highlights the 
interconnectedness of both the researcher and the world as well as the subject and the 
object. It does this from a point of view that ‘terrorism’ is not ‘’something out there’’ and 






A Discourse Analytic Approach to Terrorism Studies 
To begin with, this thesis contends that terrorism is not a materiality. It, therefore, has no 
essence outside of discursive constructions. It is in this light that a discursive approach to 
the study of terrorism will offer the space to critically engage with how the construction of 
terrorism came about and practices enabled by such. With a discursive approach to the 
study of terrorism, therefore, the space to talk about how possible certain constructions 
become productive. It is important to clarify the meaning of ‘politics’, ‘hegemony’ and 
‘power’ from the onset. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 153), this thesis defines 
‘politics’ as ‘‘a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations’’. 
This means that the open nature of discourse makes the articulations of several identities 
possible, however the practice ensures exclusion of alternatives in order to fix particular 
structures of meanings. The discursive practice through which identities and meanings 
became fixed does not only involve the exclusion of certain elements but also the process 
through which these meaning structures became articulated as a structural totality. This is 
how the social is created.  As society does not exist, it is politically instituted. Politics, 
therefore, provides the ground through which the social became a ‘reality’ (Critchley and 
Marchart 2004). It is the means through which certain fixations assume naturalness. It is the 
fixing of certain elements to the exclusion of others that makes ‘hegemony’ possible. 
Hegemonic interventions therefore work by ‘congealing’ the discursive field which is open-
ended and slippery. Through such hegemonic interventions, subjective articulations become 
positioned as ‘objective’ ‘reality’ and thus the social become constituted. Hegemony in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory thus helps to ensure that meaning-making is possible in the 
presence of infinite discursive possibilities.     
To this end, power rather than being construed as something possessed and used by certain 
social actors or entities to oppress and/or repress others, it is posited in this thesis as how 
certain discourses as mechanisms of ‘truth’ became used both to foreclose possible 
alternatives as well as achieve a (total) closure in the fixation of meanings and construction 
of identities. In the words of Michel Foucault ‘‘relations of power cannot in themselves be 




circulation and functioning of a discourse’’ (1976: 93). Power therefore works through the 
construction of discourses by social agents who becomes the ‘speaking’ subject of such 
discourses. Power inheres discourses in that the slippery nature of discourse makes it ‘‘an 
undecided terrain’’ with a continual struggle for integration and closure. According to Laclau 
and Mouffe (2001), the struggle for the integration of a discourse is on a spectrum; at one 
end of the spectrum is full integration while at the other end is total rupture.  Whether a 
partial or total closure is therefore achieved, the accumulation and functioning of such 
discourses will constitute varied subjectivities and realities as the effects of discursive power. 
This thesis will therefore be engaging with how power works through discourse not only to 
constitute certain identities and modes of subjectivities but also to construct certain social 
realities like that of ‘‘crisis in Africa’’ prior to 9/11.  This, as this thesis attempts to demonstrate 
throughout its chapters, helps to produce ‘‘the field of play’’ that works for the subject of the 
discourse. As a result, meanings, identities and varied subjectivities are effects of power 
rather than being given as ontological categories identifiable outside of the discourse that 
produced them. 
Also, this thesis considers Homi Bhabha’s concept of Otherness most suited for the 
understanding of the constructions of the Boko Haram group. Examining the problem of 
terrorism in Nigeria from a post-structural perspective helps to interrogate (dis)continuities 
of the common constructions of Africa/Nigeria in mainstream literature and how these 
constructions enabled the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria. No known publication has hitherto 
employed a discursive approach to the study of Boko Haram within Critical Terrorism Studies 
and this research attempts to fill this gap in knowledge. The theory of Bhabha’s Otherness as 
a fixation which negates the agency of the colonial subject through the discursive strategy of 
stereotyping by the fixity of the ambivalence of ‘‘repulsion’’ and ‘‘difference’’ constructed as 
‘’resistance’’ or ‘‘pleasure’’’ and ‘‘mimicry’’ will help to fruitfully engage with the aims of this 
thesis by examining  how Nigeria and Boko Haram became so constructed. 
Dominant thinkers and theorists of the concept of Otherness are Bill Ashcroft, Gayatri Spivak, 
Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. The origin of the concept relies 




the other. The center relates to the idea of cartography in which differences were mapped 
such that meaning as well as power is fixed metaphorically and not just geographically. Said, 
Fanon and Spivak’s concept of Othering relates to a binary construction of the imperial centre 
and the colonial periphery premised on race. For Spivak (1985: 171, 173), Otherness is “a 
process by which the empire can define itself against those it colonizes, excludes and 
marginalizes. […] The business of creating the enemy…in order that the empire might define 
itself by its geographical and racial others”. Several scholars like Stuart Hall and Kobena 
Mercer have queried the rigid division of the colonizer and colonized as an underwriting of 
the arguments that there are possibilities of varied subjectivities in discourse. It is this critique 
that theorists like Bhabha sought to overcome by considering the colonizer/colonized 
relationship as an ambivalence; for Bhabha the Colonized is both an object of pleasure and 
repulsion to the Colonized. It is an object of pleasure to the extent to which it reflects or to 
put it in Bhabha’s words ‘‘mimic’’ the Colonizer’s exalted values and a source of repulsion to 
the extent of it’s ‘‘difference’’ which is often captured as resistance. The Other, therefore is a 
mode of paradoxical representation that is centred on political, religious, historical or cultural 
difference as ‘’fixity’’ which depicts a permanent/rigid state of order as well as disorder and 
chaos (Bhabha 1997).  It is this ‘’fixity’’ that a totalizing discourse like terrorism represents 
and which this thesis seeks to deconstruct. 
This thesis understands that postcolonial writers and thinkers including Bhabha often accept 
the use of the label terrorism but only contends for context as Bhabha (2002) submits in his 
only article on terrorism: 
When American foreign and economic policy is conducted in terms of the 
civilizational divisions of ‘them’ and ‘us’, the nation assumes that hawkish, 
imperialist aspect that provokes a widespread sense of injustice, indignation 
and fear. The embattled and embalmed narrative of civilizational clash is 
often deployed to justify the reckless destruction of civilians who are 
suspected by virtue of their culture (read second nature), of being terrorists 
or protecting them. 
Rather than accept terrorism as a construct identifiable outside of discourse, this research 
however contends that the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria remains a discursive construct. 




terrorism as a form of hegemonic political language by the U.S and Nigerian political elites 
(especially after September 2001) which has hitherto received no attention in academic 
debate. As I argue, every violence has a history and Boko Haram’s violent activities are no 
exception. As it were, Nigeria has a history of political violence that is not essentially different 
from that of Boko Haram and to label Boko Haram this way is not only to justify militarism 
(and its many abuses of human rights, as is the case in Nigeria) but to also naturalise the 
discursive practices of neo-colonial hegemony and power that produce this discourse. The 
thesis therefore explores how the group is produced as terrorist by American and Nigerian 
terrorism discourses as a threatening ‘Other’ when examined through the lens of postcolonial 
thought within a post-structural framework. A great wealth of literature has argued for the 
implication of European colonialism, imperialism and as well as neo-colonialism in the very 
‘‘colonializing structure’’ (Mudimbe 1988:2) observed in today’s Africa, and Nigeria, in 
particular. These structures, as argued by Olaniyan (2005: 270) is a ‘‘‘structured marginality’ 
by which African ‘societies’ capacities for self-directed evolution’’ is shattered and a seeming 
shifting space, or ‘‘interregnum’’ is created. It is this interregnum that post coloniality seeks 
to unravel as well as understand. It then becomes important to engage with poststructuralism 
as a field of theoretical inquiry in order to understand how Boko Haram is represented as an 
Other by silencing the structures that produce it. By constructing the Other this way, 
American as well as the Nigerian government’s role in the political violence is silenced. As has 
been argued by several scholars, the use of words or to use Bhabha (2005)’s words: ‘‘the 
politics of naming’’ is not value-neutral; words are employed for varied reasons with some 
end in view. Words or labels exist to structure, organise, categorise and give meaning to 
things, among other things (Chomsky and Edward 1988). The use of words is intrinsically 
connected to power and works as the instrument to express and enact the prejudices of the 
one naming (Zulaika and Douglass 1996; George 2001). Through this discursive power, 
‘‘reality’’ is created and certain acts become a possibility and normalised. As Crenshaw (1981) 
and Zulaika and Douglass (1996) argue, the writing of terrorism, like other political discourses, 
are weapons to define the Other by altering perception through the reification of terrorism 




people’s cognition is altered and as well as structured to accommodate dominant 
interpretation in order to make certain selfish interests a possibility. 
Research Problems, Motivations, Aims and Questions 
Research Problems 
The binary division of the world into a global order versus disorder premised on the 
colonizer/colonized divide highlights the focus of official texts and narratives of terrorism on 
the part of the world constructed as disordered. This is why inherent in the construction of 
the terrorism discourse is the idea of the ‘terrorist’ as ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’. However, unlike this 
binary division, the colonial experience presents an ambivalence through which varied 
subjectivities and ‘realities’ could be imagined. It is this understanding that help to interrogate 
how Nigeria could be both a source of repulsion and resistance to the U.S on the one hand 
and also be a source of pleasure and a representation of the U.S self on the other hand, as far 
as the discourse of terrorism is concerned.  Nigeria as a state stands in some diplomatic 
jeopardy if found not ‘‘cooperating’’ with the U.S as it then becomes a ‘‘haven’’ or 
‘‘sanctuary’’ for ‘’terrorist’’. Compliance with the U.S on the labelling of Boko Haram however 
dates back to the Clinton Presidency when Nigeria was ‘‘adopted’’ as an official partner in its 
fight against international terrorism. This focus on state explains why an explicit linkage 
between two hitherto contested concepts, ‘‘weak states’’ and ‘’terrorism’’, became prevalent 
immediately after September 2001. However, the focus on the state as a corporate entity 
only ensures a commitment to fight its enemies, the approach does not provide a leverage 
for the discourse of terrorism to enable practices which touch down on the everyday lives of 
the people. This is why it becomes important to also understand terrorism as being linked to 
democracy and health and economic development in recent times. While all of these 
constructs are not by any means new, the discourse of terrorism as a nodal point helps to 
justify their explicit linkage and thereby justify as well as normalise not just the construction 
but also the normalization of the militarization of the state and democracy. 
Motivations 
My motivation in researching into how and why Boko Haram became known as a terrorist 




Haram’s activities and/or engaging in private discussions through which we simply use the 
label ‘terrorist’ without actually understanding what that means nor why and how they 
became so known. The 14th April, 2014 triggered a deep concern in me because I was heavily 
pregnant and only narrowly escaped a major bombing in Nyanya, Abuja as I was on my way 
to commuting one of the buses which went off in ground-rocking explosions. The BBC counted 
at least 70 bodies however other local newspaper like the Nigerian Punch, counted bodies as 
high as 240. Amidst the confusion and meaninglessness as well as the void of language to 
articulate what just happened before me, I remembered, the words, ‘why’ coming through 
my mouth again and again. This experience motivated me to change my interest in Media 
studies to the studies of terrorism in order to find out the motivations of Boko Haram as well 
as the possible solutions to their violence. My first surprise therefore was to find out 
‘terrorism’ is a value-laden and normative discursive construct with no widely acceptable 
definition. Moreover, the understanding that discursive totalities like terrorism works by the 
strategy of silencing the role of the structures which produce them further livens my interests 
to position this research as a challenge to hegemonic constructions like terrorism which does 
little to understand such violence through an integrated and holistic approach. This is because 
more often than not, the labelling of terrorism comes with foreclosure which limits viable 
options in solving such political issues. 
 
Aims and Questions 
The aims of this research are to unveil silence by highlighting the connection between 
knowledge, power and discourse as it relates to the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. It does 
this by focusing on the U.S government texts on terrorism and/or political violence in Nigeria 
particularly and Africa in general and Nigeria’s government texts including interview text from 
nine Nigerian military officials. The growing body of literature on Boko Haram has often been 
situated within the positivist school of thought which not only understand ‘terrorism’ as 
‘something out there’ but also has excluded the role of the neo-colonial structures within 
which the agency of the Boko Haram group is produced and exercised. This thesis therefore 




which Boko Haram’s labelling as a terrorist group became constructed, justified and 
normalized. It is through this neo-colonial structure that the U.S sense of Self became 
constructed against the Other. The dominant narrative in both governments’ texts is 
constructed to highlight the ‘terrorist’ as essentially the ‘problem’ of Nigeria. The construction 
of Nigeria as the counterterrorist state thus function for the U.S through the continual shifting 
of Nigeria’s subject positions. This is because through a colonial ‘mimicry’ Nigeria represents 
the U.S Self to the extent to which it is a source of pleasure and entrench the U.S values. It is 
however an Other to the extent to which it resists the U.S  As has been highlighted by Doty 
(1996) for instance, the construction of ‘‘Third world’’ countries, enables certain productive 
practices within which the agency of countries like Kenya is understood. As a result, certain 
practices like the militarization of democracy in Nigeria became legitimized. To this end, a 
dominant argument of this thesis remains that the construction of Boko Haram as a terrorist 
group is not a given; it is a discursive construct positioned within other neo-colonial 
constructs. It therefore exists to justify as well naturalize neo-colonialism and its practices. 
Main research Question:  To what extent does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria represent 
a hegemonic political construction? 
Sub Questions: 
I. How does the U.S foreign policy towards Africa, from the 
1970s, enable the construction of the threat of terrorism in 
Africa/Nigeria? 
II. How does the construction of the U.S Self from the 1970s 
enable and justify U.S colonial tropes in Nigeria? 
III. How does the construction of Nigeria as a counterterrorist 
state enable and naturalize discourses/practices of 
counterterrorism in Nigeria? 
IV. How does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria enable and 





The interpretative approach of this thesis is not about individuals or groups who consider 
themselves as ‘terrorist’ or are defined as such by policy makers and implementers. The 
interest of this thesis is to understand how the constructions of a ‘‘particular community or 
set of communities’ interpretations of and responses to events or persons deemed terrorist’’ 
become possible (Stump and Dixit 2013:93). This means that both the U.S foreign policy texts 
and Nigeria’s texts on Boko Haram represent how policy makers and implementers construct 
and fix the meaning of terrorism and thus enable certain dominant understanding of 
counterterrorism and/or practices. The nuances here however, is that in constructing the U.S 
Self, Africa generally and Nigeria particularly are being negatively constructed in order to 
create the space for the ‘location’ of the terrorist Other. This is why subject positions of 
Nigeria is always in a continual flux in U.S foreign policy texts. This is to ensure that the 
discourse function effectively for the speaking subject of the discourse.   
Thesis Structure 
This first chapter as an introduction provides a comprehensive overview of the entire thesis. 
It gives a background to the Boko Haram group, the motivation for this study, its aims, 
argument, research questions, data collection and analysis and the discussion of its theory 
and method. The second chapter, which is the Theory and Method begins by stating the 
relevance of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to the ‘linguistic turn’ of the post 
structural field of theoretical enquiry which this thesis considers best suited to understand 
the construction of the Boko Haram group as a terrorist group. By making a case for Discourse 
Theory, the chapter offers an insight into why an engagement with representation and its 
practices helps to bring to the fore why and how totalizing constructions like terrorism 
became positioned as given and therefore natural. As a theory, it undergirds the proposition 
that knowledge and truth is not an objective category, they are products of power and are 
therefore highly subjective. What is known is only known through discourse. It therefore 
corroborates, one of the central tenets of the ‘linguistic turn’ in not searching for self-evident 
objective truth but an engagement with discursive constructions in order to understand how 




section of the chapter then focuses on how the texts used in this thesis are collected. 
Interview data from nine Nigerian military officials and key U.S policy texts with focus on 
political violence and/or terrorism in Nigeria or Africa and some key speeches on Nigeria by 
high U.S officials were identified on the various U.S public domain. The justification for the 
selection of the interview participants and texts as well as the method of transcription and 
analysis is covered in greater details in this chapter.  
The Third Chapter: Understanding Boko Haram, aims to bring to the fore the dominant 
constructions and narratives of Boko Haram both in literatures and the media. This is done by 
examining discourses both in academic literature and the media on the emergence of Boko 
Haram, Its function in the Nigerian political landscape and how it was proscribed. Chapter 
Four is the literature review which aims to provide context for the evolution of the violence 
of Boko Haram. It does this by examining dominant argument on political violence both in 
Africa and Nigeria before and after the September 2001 attacks. Chapter Five: Constructing 
the Terrorist Threat, is aimed at showing how through discursive move the discourse of ‘crisis’ 
in Africa became articulated in the 1970s and 80s; ‘Crisis’ of state failure in the 1990s and 
early 2000s and ‘Crisis’ of terrorism in post-September 2001. It argues that the threat of the 
terrorist after September 2001 represents some continuities and change of a long-standing 
neo-colonial discourse. Dominant arguments on the understanding of political violence from 
the 1970s, the period of the Cold War, to the period of the Global war on terrorism in Nigeria 
was engaged with to provide a rich discursive background that enables certain practices like 
the explicit linkage of state failure to terrorism. The neo-colonial venture, therefore, 
necessitated the need for construction of ‘instability’ in the 1970s and 1980s and how this 
evolved to the state-centric ‘crisis’ of the 1990s. The state-centric ‘crisis’ of the 1990s then 
witnessed the ‘adoption’ of Nigeria as an official partner of the fight against international 
terrorism and the linkage of poverty and disease like HIV to threat of terrorism during the 
Clinton Presidency. It is also this discourse of ‘crisis’ that warranted the labelling of the Niger 
Delta militias as ‘terrorists’ and witnessed the extra-judicial execution of their leader, Ken 
Saro Wiwa. The shift of the GWOT into Nigeria as with other African countries then, evolve 




Chapter Six, examined how the U.S Self through some colonial tropes became so constructed. 
The official colonizer of Nigeria was Britain and not the U.S. The U.S was, however, known for 
its anti-colonial rhetoric especially during the 1970s. Like Nigeria’s colonizer, the U.S’ need of 
Africa generally and Nigeria specifically was initially for their resources; the independence 
was considered ‘‘dangerous’’ and of ‘’security concern’’ as it might impact on this supply. 
Hence, by constructing the identity of the hesitant colonizer, the need for U.S expansionism 
from the oil-rich southern part of Nigeria to the agrarian northern states which was 
understood under the state-centric ‘crisis’ discourse of poverty and disease became justified. 
As a result, the U.S became constructed as the subject of Nigeria’s democracy due to its 
representation as the exemplar by employing a unity of significations with equivalential 
identity with that of Nigeria. The argument about Nigeria’s agency here is again considered in 
the light of the U.S’ construction of Nigeria’s leadership position in Africa in order to use it as 
a tool for its leadership expansion to other parts of Africa while in the same breath 
constructing the need for Nigeria to accept the U.S leadership position in Africa. Articulating 
this impasse therefore demands a shifting of subject positions to service discursive power. 
Chapter Seven: Constructing the Counter-Terrorist State examines how the identity of the 
state became constructed to fix the state as an anti-terrorist while a cross-section of its 
citizens are positioned as the terrorists.  As the linkage of the military to democracy and the 
economy in Africa has been argued as a dominant feature of postcolonial states, Africom 
represents a major shift in constructing Nigeria as a counter-terrorist state. However, prior to 
the launch of Africom, from the 1970s to the 1980s the launch of African Response Initiative 
(ACRI) later transitioned to Africa Contingency Operations (ACOTA) in the 1990s, among 
others, to the GWOT has signalled how the military has become an integral part of democracy 
in Nigeria. By examining on a thematic basis, the construction of Boko Haram’s violence by 
the military officials, it reveals how the discursive shift to the war on terrorism highlights the 
normalization of violence in Nigeria. The fight against Boko Haram was constructed as ‘crisis’, 
‘war’ and the absence of terrorism became constructed as ‘peace’. The transitioning from one 
construction to the other almost effortlessly reveal, among other things how political violence 




‘war’ but also how other categories of political violence not labelled as terrorism might have 
become synonymous with peace in Nigeria. 
Chapter Eight, constructing the Terrorist Other attempts to reveal the essentially Othering 
character of the terrorism label in Nigeria. Particular modes of subjectivities and 
representations are enabled through the productive use of discourse. The engagement with 
representations takes the focus away from the East versus West divide of Said’s Orientalism 
and bring to the fore particular ‘‘modes of exclusion’’ and kinds of subjects which enables the 
practices examined by Said and others. Considering the neo-colonial template within Nigeria 
and/or Africa has become constructed as a kind of subject, the Othering of Boko Haram 
therefore become located within this overarching discourse. Through the power of discourse 
some things become visible while others is silenced. As an Other, it became important to 
represent them as ‘evil’ worthy of elimination in order to achieve the demand of Progress. 
They became the ‘threat’ to Nigeria’s collective identity, a negation and outsiders while 
mobilizing the identity of the ‘people’ as ‘insiders’. 
Chapter Nine, is the Conclusion of the thesis. In this chapter, discussions on the importance 
of the thesis, the gap in knowledge it seeks to bridge, the aims of the research and the 
research questions were highlighted in order to examine the extent to which they were 
answered as well as how the different parts of the thesis have come together to form a unified 
whole. The core contributions of the thesis which range from the unveiling of silence in the 
structure that produce knowledge and truth (of terrorism and counter terrorism for instance) 
to the politics of naming and exclusion inherent in the discourse of terrorism is extensively 
discussed. The chapter also draws from texts earlier analysed to bring home the main 
argument of the thesis that the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is a neo-colonial discourse 
which evolve from a long background of practices enabled by the U.S neo-colonial discourse 
and it exists to normalise violence in Nigeria. The chapter concludes by examining the 






This first chapter as an introduction to the thesis has attempted to highlight the structure of 
the thesis and how its different parts fit together to form a coherent narrative. One of the 
important elements of this chapter is the review of major contentions in Terrorism Studies 
and how this thesis will both challenge and build upon Critical Terrorism Studies through a 
post-structural theoretical lens. It has introduced that the policy ‘shift’ of the GWOT into 
Africa/Nigeria is not a product of any materiality of an actual terrorist threat as represented 
by Boko Haram to the U.S but that of discursive power through a binary division of the world 
into order versus disorder. The U.S policy shift of the GWOT into Nigeria therefore can thus 
be understood through the production of the Other and how the discourse of terrorism is 
posited as a total closure infused with assumptions, myths and certain associations. By 
critically engaging with the definitional debate in Terrorism Studies, this chapter also brings 
to the fore one of the fundamental arguments of this thesis: terrorism as a discursive 
construct and not a brute fact. The contested nature of the concept both in Traditional 
Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies points to the salience of discourse in 
understanding how policy narratives as instruments of discursive power helps to ‘fix’ meaning 
by normalizing and justifying it.  This has some significant implications for both the 
methodological and theoretical commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies and how these 








Chapter 2: Theory and Method: Laclau 
and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
Introduction 
The Case for Discourse Theory 
This thesis makes use of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to study how the discourse 
of terrorism is a hegemonic political language in Nigeria by focusing on US policy documents 
and key government texts on terrorism in Nigeria and interview data from nine Nigerian 
military officials. As has been set out in Chapter One, using a discursive lens to understand 
representational practices is premised on an anti-foundationalism orientation to the study 
of terrorism and the assumption that there is no pre-given subject outside discourse. As 
research aimed at deconstructing a totalising concept like terrorism in Nigeria, I consider 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985)’s Discourse Theory as the method most suited for the thesis. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory is particularly useful in examining the discourse of 
terrorism not only because it affords the space to interrogate how the social is constituted 
by discourse, but also that it meshes well with the ‘‘textual turn’’ of the post-structural 
approach adopted by this thesis. As Doty (1993: 297-320) explains, 
Texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to still other 
texts. The power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is 
centralised, emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, like the discursive 
practices in which it inheres, power is dispersed and, most important, is 
productive of subjects and their worlds. 
To achieve, hegemony, totalising concepts like terrorism need to be naturalised. Thus, the 
discourse of terrorism, like every other discourse, is a ‘reduction of possibilities’ which 
excludes other possible alternate meaning. As a label, terrorism works by drawing from the 
linguistic elements already present in a culture to construct an essence for the political 
violence of the Other thereby denying not only the complicities of the one naming but also 
its own violence. Moreover, the history of the concept reveals the inherent discontinuities 
and rupture it has undergone overtime. In order to construct this type of discourse, several 




linked together both to conceal and reveal. Like every other discourse, the discourse of 
terrorism is fluid and constantly evolving, however, some recurring themes could be 
highlighted overtime. For instance, during the Cold War, political violence in Nigeria and other 
parts of Africa was understood through the language of resistance, and approached through 
policies of development and containment, albeit with the intent of co-opting African states 
and/or resistant movements to fight the war by proxy, even when it means sponsoring the 
state against resistance movements or vice versa (Adebajo 2010). The main contention here 
is that there is nothing essentially terroristic about the violence of Boko Haram and other 
groups of the likes in Nigeria which is identifiable outside of the discourse that construct it so. 
As a method, Discourse Theory works by exploring how linguistic elements which are 
resources already available within a particular culture (Hall 1985) whose meanings are to be 
fixed through articulation in order to produce a particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). 
An example here is the word ‘jihadists’ which has come to command attention recently and 
could be used to mean ‘terrorists’, ‘freedom fighters’, ‘extremists’ or ‘puritans’’ depending on 
context. It depends on the power of fixation based on the ‘field of discursivity’ that is the 
exclusion of other possible competing discourses to obtain its meaning. A discourse then is a 
‘reduction of possibilities’, ‘a fixation of meaning within a particular domain’ (Jorgensen and 
Philips 2002). Concepts central to the analysis of text using Discourse Theory includes but are 
not limited to Elements, Moments, logics of Equivalence and Difference through the process 
of Articulation. The use of these concepts in analysing the texts will help to unveil how floating 
signifiers, for example ‘violence’, which only derive their meaning when used in association 
with other elements are transformed through an articulatory process into moments, that is, 
linguistic resources which have come to occupy a differential position through the fixation of 
meaning. Also, the use of Discourse Theory as a method offers the space to explore what 
makes a discourse hegemonic or dominant and how dominant discourse like government 
texts are produced through the use of ‘moments’. The discourse of terrorism or war, for 
example are discourses produced through the embellishment of ‘’myths’’ into ‘‘nodal point’’ 
like ‘political violence’ to produce ‘’moments’’. On the other hand, the interview text helps to 
understand the extent to which the dominant discourse has been naturalized through the 




their objectivity, which is ‘‘sedimented’’ power and politics or power without a ‘‘face’’ so to 
speak and become naturalized will be explored. However, to be able to fruitfully engage with 
the data and bring out the aforementioned, the representational practices as analytical tools 





Representation and Representational Practices 
Representation refers to the discursive construct which bridges/connects a thing and what it 
signifies. It is the use of language to constitute an entity/identity, an event, an object and 
social practices through elements which are present within a culture. It is the product of 
articulatory practice which forms part of the process of meaning construction through a 
necessary linkage between ‘things’ and the concept (or meanings) which are signified. This is 
because as there is no necessary connection between a thing and its meaning, as well as an 
identity and the ‘‘embodied individual’’, social actors employ linguistic elements within a 
language structure to fix the meaning (subject to conventions) of a hitherto arbitrary sign as 
it relates to a particular group/event (Hall 1996; Shepherd and Hamilton 2016; Doty 1996; 
Weldes 1999; Mills 1997). In the words of Andersen (2003: 53), representation is achieved 
through ‘‘the sliding of the signifier across the signified [which] forces the signifier to step 
into, or down onto, the level of the signified’’.  This means that the practice of representation 
helps to produce discourse and knowledge of ourselves, others and things through the 
necessary linkage of a particular sign to its constructed meaning. As every discursive 
formation is contingent, representation therefore as the product of articulation, is relational 
and always in a state of flux. 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, the dichotomy between a group and its 
representation does not exist. The discursive representation of a group brings about a whole 
understanding, assumptions and myths of that constituted group and the social practices 
enabled by this representation. Every group/individual is a discursive construct and therefore 
contingent; this background gives it its differential position and its equivalence among other 
possible elements. In the words of Laclau (1996b:27): 
The basic point is this: I cannot assert a differential identity without 
distinguishing it from a context, and in the process of making the distinction, 
I am asserting the context at the same time. 
So, to be constituted/formed is to be represented at the same time. Since every discursive 
subject is overdetermined, fragmented and fundamentally split, so as argued by Said 




possibly have is a‘re-presence’ or representation. This stance thus reasserts the rejection of 
the polar divide between discourse and non-discursive practices and reaffirms the argument 
that every material reality is constituted only within discourse. Again, this is not a denial of 
actual violence of Boko Haram, as is the case in Nigeria, but an assertion that it is only when 
signifiers like ‘’Islam’’ and ‘’American’’ are attached to it that the temporary fixation of its 
meaning as terrorism could emerge. These signifiers as labels, of course, conceals the 
problematic of thinking through what is ‘‘Islam ’‘and/or ‘‘American’’ and what it’s not. It is 
obvious the shift that will take place if the ‘‘real’’ meaning of the group’s violence would be 
linked with signifiers like ‘‘inequality’’, ‘‘elections’’ and ‘’change’’. This section aims to explain 
the representational practices which this thesis will look for in the texts under study to 
examine the extent to which the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is hegemonic. 
Articulation 
Articulation is the practice of meaning fixation whereby (linguistic) elements are modified (or 
transitioned) into moments through the establishment of relations (among these elements) 
in order to produce a ‘‘structured totality’’ called discourse. Meaning is context-dependent; 
so, every meaning is derived from the relativeness of elements as they occupy differential 
positions in a language structure. The relativeness of the elements to each other explains their 
necessity in the ‘‘regularity of a system of structural positions’’. For instance, in order to 
create an identity of terrorist, it became necessary to link together signifiers like, uncivilized, 
irrationality, undemocratic, unjustifiable and hate through the logic of equivalence. The 
systematic linking together of these signifiers is a necessity as far as the ‘‘structured totality’’ 
of the identity of a terrorist is concerned. To take this further, uncivilized for instance is a 
signifier which occupies a differential position with an oppositional logic in the construction 
of identities; it presents to us how the Self is constructed through the Other. Hence, to 
understand what uncivilized means, the oppositional identity civilized would need be 
examined. However, when examined in context, as Doty (1996) did in relation to the US and 
the Philippines, civilized could mean uncivilized and vice versa. This is because the open-
endedness of elements and discourse explains their contingency while highlighting their 




the system of language itself makes certain elements a necessity in order to produce a 
discourse. 
A follow-up argument might then be that if elements are necessary, then articulation and/or 
re-articulation might be an impossibility as the discursive formation is not contingent and only 
depends on the principle of repetition. To attend to this argument, it is necessary to mention 
that the idea of struggle in an undecidable terrain is a central principle of discourse. So, just 
as there is no closure to any discourse, so also elements are open to modification and their 
transition to moments are never fully complete. Therefore, the contingency of discourse is 
‘‘because no discursive formation is a sutured totality’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:106). 
Moreover, as Spurr (1993) points out, the power to construct and fix meaning, which I refer 
to as hegemony, explains why concepts could be moved around to mean different things in 
different contexts. The mobility and interchangeability of the elements themselves does not 
undermine their necessity in the structure but rather highlight the contingency of the 
discursive formation. 
To argue otherwise would mean to deny that ‘‘all values are values of opposition and are 
defined only by their difference’’. This is because ‘‘if language is something other than a 
fortuitous conglomeration of erratic notions and sounds uttered at random, it is because 
necessity is inherent in its structure as in all structure’’ (Benveniste 1971:47-48). The 
structurally necessary character of elements explains the non-arbitrariness of language and 
rejects the notion of discourse as an absolute flux. Thus, ‘‘neither absolute fixity nor absolute 
non-fixity is possible’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:111). It then follows that the very necessary 
character of the structure in the system of language explains why any modification of the 
elements/discourse would have a reciprocal effect on one another. Every discursive 
formation therefore is a construction whose elements are relational, necessary and 
contingent. 
Since the system is only a partial limitation and every elements and discourse remains 
inherently open, every discourse therefore is a contingent which draws from the ‘’surplus of 
meaning’’ refers to as the ‘‘field of discursivity’’. Based on this, the articulatory practice draws 




equivalence and difference in order to fix meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:105). It makes 
possible particular contingent discursive constructions which can be contested or re-
articulated in different possible ways. This simply means constructions are not natural as 
alternate representations are always possible for any object or social action. The non-
naturalness of discursive constructions stems from two reasons: One, the inherent duality of 
discourse whereby discourses are both open-ended (impossibility of a sutured totality) and 
are at the time partially fixed (in meaning creation) reveals how identities are created through 
partial closure so as to fix meanings which then seems natural. During the colonial era for 
instance, the meaning of ‘violence’ as a sign was fixed around the nodal point (i.e. a privileged 
sign) ’Race’; so, violence which could not be justified in terms of progress is constructed as 
pervasive, uncivilized and barbaric. So instead of delimiting violence as an unstable 
ontological category which could present itself in different forms (thereby revealing the 
impossibility of a sutured totality of that discourse), it became partially fixed by linking it 
together with ’Race’ through the logic of difference and equivalence and the meaning of the 
violence of self and the other became fixed through the loading of ‘‘myths’’ into the nodal 
point ‘‘Race’’. This partial closure also explains the discourse of terrorism, as the sign has not 
only gained rupture and continuity in meaning overtime, but has linked certain violence to 
progress through the differential position they occupy. So, while the many violence in Africa 
during the Cold War were constructed as either resistance, insurgency, oppression, 
intervention etc. as the case maybe depending on the context and the meaning fixed, the 
post-cold war discourse creates the ‘‘realities’’ of terrorism from the same social action. 
Secondly, the non-naturalness of discursive constructions is evident in the sense that 
language itself is a ‘‘signifying practice’’ through which meaning is produced. As a signifying 
process, it is ‘‘multi-referential’’ and so different meanings could be created from the same 
social action or objects. This means that meaning derived from a particular social action is 
never self-evident or natural; it is the result of articulatory practice. This is however not to 
mean that articulations are arbitrary rather it is to assert that they could be better understood 
as conventional and are products of social and historical circumstances. As Williams 




The notion [of arbitrariness] was introduced in opposition to the idea that 
the sign was an icon, and it is certainly true that there is in general no 
necessary relation of an abstract kind between word and thing in language. 
But to describe the sign as arbitrary or unmotivated prejudges the whole 
theoretical issue. I say it is not arbitrary but conventional, and that the 
convention is the result of a social process. If it has a history, then it is not 
arbitrary-it is the specific product of the people who have developed the 
language in question. 
The question of the extent to which the contingency of discourse denies the existence or 
otherwise of reality has a simple answer. Nothing can be assessed except through discourse; 
hence discourse itself is material. Just like elements, every social action produces meaning 
when in their differential positions. So, social actions are articulations themselves. Whether 
for instance, the violence of Boko Haram means for us ‘‘terrorism’’ or ‘‘resistance’’ or simply 
‘‘crime’’ depends on the relationship of that action to other actions. The ‘‘politics of 
representation’’ is therefore how some of these competing meanings are fixed through the 
use of nodal points such that discourses which are produced are often positioned as totalities 
until some discursive dislocation (i.e. crisis) occur (van Djik 2002; Shapiro 1998). 
 
Nodal Points 
Nodal points are crucial analytical tools in the articulatory process which function as anchors 
in the ‘‘chains of significations’’ through which associated signs in a specific discourse derive 
their meanings within a complex web of meanings.  An instance of this is how meanings of 
signs like ‘‘democracy’’, ‘’’state’’, ‘‘equality’’ and ‘’freedom’’ are changed when linked to the 
nodal point ‘‘communism’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Žižek 1989; Howarth & Stavrakakis 
2000).  As privileged sign which are fixed and around which other signs are organised, nodal 
points represent ‘‘the word which, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given 
field, constitutes its identity’’ (Žižek, 1989: 95). Through a metaphorical comparison, Philips 
and Jorgensen (2002), consider nodal points to be like the ‘‘knots’’ in a fishing net which help 
to anchor the weaving together of the entire net. Before a sign become a privilege and fixed 
sign, it is transitioned from ‘elements’, which are signs with no fixed meanings, to ‘moments’ 




privileged position. To examine the discourse of terrorism for instance, one of the nodal 
points-privilege and fixed sign- is ‘Progress’ through which lens certain violence become 
justifiable and acceptable while others are not.  Throughout this thesis, signs like Africa, 9/11 
and American liberal democratic imaginary are teased out as nodal points through which 
social practices/realities and events in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally became 
articulated. Nodal Points are however not to be mistaken with the concept of ‘crisis’ used in 
this thesis as the discursive dislocation of a particular narrative through a discursive move by 
social actors (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Nabers 2009; Croft 2006). Crisis in this sense 
represents a collapsing or disruption to a hitherto dominant narrative/meaning (not 
necessarily a nodal point) for the emergence of another succeeding narrative/meaning. Crisis 
as a strategy of articulation, also highlights the ‘‘politics of representation’’ because it enables 
social actors to effect change(s) in meanings and how entities/events/things are represented. 
It therefore ‘hails’ certain discourses while others are collapsed. In the words of Nabers (2009: 
193), ‘’ it is crises of representation, of meaning, which are at the root of any kind of social or 
identity change….Crisis is a constant political phenomenon’’. Hence, while nodal points 
represent a privilege sign which has become fixed within a specific discourse, crisis represents 






Equivalence and Difference 
The ultimately un-sutured character of discourse poses a concern about how discourse 
became partially closed or a ‘‘structured totality’’ in the process of meaning fixation through 
articulation. The partial fixation of meaning or the production of a discourse as a ‘‘structured 
totality’’ which inherently creates ‘‘realities’’ is achieved through the logics of equivalence 
and difference (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). The logics of equivalence and difference are 
derivatives in a system of differential identities. In the process of meaning fixation, the open-
endedness of discourse is thus subverted by the system through these logics as the 
differential nature of identities both assert their difference as well as their equivalence. Laclau 
(2000a:38) puts it this way: 
The identity of each element is constitutively split; on the on the hand, each 
difference expresses itself as difference; on the other hand, each of them 
cancels itself as such by entering into a relation of equivalence with all the 
other differences of the system. 
Both logics are constitutive split on two planes: one, to create an identity from the ultimately 
open terrain of discourse requires a necessary linking together of signifiers drawn from the 
field of discursivity. The unity of these signifiers creates a ‘‘totality’’ considered distinct from 
others. The distinctiveness of each identity is a differential moment premised on its 
relativeness and contingency. This means that every constituted identity is so because of what 
that identity is not i.e. its negativity or the Other (Mouffe 1985). As the system of language 
itself is a system of relations, to assert a differential identity is to acknowledge the presence 
of ‘‘something’’ which lies beyond. This means that every constituted identity though 
expressed in positives, based on foundational essences, are inverted negatives i.e. negativity 
expressed in positive terms. This is because no one knows who a terrorist is until we know 
who a terrorist is not. The transition period between open signifiers in the field of discursivity 
to differential moment like ‘terrorist’ in the process of identity construction is thus loaded 
with myths. Therefore, every constituted identity remains a partial construction. Two, the 
logic of equivalence implies that the differential positions of each element become equivalent 




differences become dissolved and each element became open with no intrinsic meaning. It is 
at this juncture that elements become interchangeable and moveable in the construction of 
identities (Laclau 1996). To consider the instance of the constituted identities of the terrorist 
and anti-terrorist as two differential positions. The very presence of an equivalential identity 
of a ‘terrorist’ makes this construct to lose its specificity as they both cancel out each other in 
a chain of endless signification which refers back to each other in polar divides and bring out 
a ‘‘common something’’. In this instance, these significations could include good/evil; 
justified/unjustified; legitimate/illegitimate; rational/irrational; love/hate; 
civilized/uncivilized and so on. The open element ‘violence’ then becomes the ‘’common 
something’’ to both identities and this is what is loaded with myths to create a privileged 
signifier or a nodal point around which the terrorist/anti-terrorist identity is fixed. To 
reiterate, all of these signifiers are themselves negatives as they have no foundational essence 
but became inverted as positives through the loading of myths for representational purposes. 
This means that ‘good’ as represented in the war against terrorism in Nigeria could mean ‘evil’ 
as foundational essence(s) of what it means to be good not only become elusive but also the 
constructed meaning become interchangeable. Good, in this context, could be argued to 
mean ‘‘violence which could be justified by progress’’. Of course, the idea of progress itself 
has been challenged and considered a myth by many scholars and philosophers like Karl 
Popper, Charles Baudouin and the likes. Even if we agree to the idea of Progress as a grounded 
scientific explanation of social phenomenon, should we then say that the Boko Haram group, 
like many other groups of this nature in Nigeria, do not consider themselves as fighting for 
Progress just like the French Revolutionists? The equivalential signifiers of good/evil thus 
become mobile and interchangeable and reveals the inherent relativeness and contingency 
of every representation via the logics of equivalence and difference. 
Interpellation and Subject Positions 
Just as meaning is constructed through the process of articulation, the subject positions 
occupied by individuals are through the process of interpellation. Interpellation, therefore, 
refers to the process through which discourse construct identities or subjects for the 




words ‘‘hailing’’ is another word for interpellation (1971:174). As individuals have no pre-
discursive identity, to be ‘hailed’ into positions or identities is to accept the discourse at play 
and the whole assumptions and understanding that comes with the discourse. So, the 
individuals become the medium through which the discourse ‘speaks’ based on the identity 
or subject positions such is ‘hailed’ into (Kvale 1992:36). The double effect of interpellation 
means that as the discourse ‘speaks’ through the individual, so the power relations in terms 
of meanings, particular modes of subjectivities and a range of possibilities that particular 
representation brings about become naturalized. 
As discourse is ultimately open so also is subject positions as every position occupied by 
subjects are discursive constructs. Through this, identities are created and individuals are 
interpellated depending on the discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 115). As discourses are 
contingents i.e. there are many possible ways by which a particular object could be articulated 
but the logic of their articulation is not a necessary progression, so also subject positions that 
individuals occupy can be multiple. A particular discourse domain makes possible particular 
subject positions. The subject position is thus a relational construct (Laclau 1990). As a 
relational construct, it has no pre-discursive character and therefore lacks any ‘‘originative 
and founding totality’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:115). This helps to make room for change in 
subject positions and extricate it from essentialism or any ‘true’ determinant of positions 
occupied by individuals beyond/behind the discourse at play. To take the example of the 
nodal point or master signifier, ‘Africa’, as an instance, it is the linking together of other 
signifiers like poverty, disease and violence- which are referred to as chains of equivalence- 
that make possible the image or metaphor of Africa as the problem child and its need for 
‘‘saving’’ (Mamdani 1996). This sort of representation against other possible constructions 
gives Africa its identity and subject position. It therefore makes evident different power 
relations and what social reality could be made possible. Since subject positions could be 
overdetermined i.e. there are many possible subject positions depending on the discourse at 
play, for example a terrorist could be ‘hailed’ into the subject position of a political activist or 
freedom fighter, it means that subject positions as identity constructs could either be 
accepted, refused or negotiated. In the instance of it being accepted, it depicts the 




assumed. The representation of the discourse of terrorism takes it almost as a given that the 
U.S is both the central subject (i.e. the one with the responsibility to designate others as 
‘good’ or ‘evil’ and the one to protect) and object (i.e. the one that needs and receives the 
protection). To this end one can ask to what extent individuals exercise agency since they are 
constructed into identities through articulation. Since Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
draws heavily from Foucault, I will turn to Foucault for some clarification. According to 
Foucault (1998:100-101): 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient or raised to power up against 
it…We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process 
whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but 
also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, 
but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible 
to thwart. 
This assertion helps to shed some light on the how and why the discourse of terrorism in 
Nigeria assumes a seeming natural mode. For according to Foucault here, discourse works 
through people while also acting as structures and thus set the limits for possible actions. 
Since it is impossible to get behind it, it therefore acts as the structure within which possible 
actions are negotiated. So, ‘‘structure both transcends and explains its [constituents] 
elements’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:107). As Hall (1980) has also shown in his 
‘‘encode/decode’’ theory that individuals are not just passive recipients of narratives but are 
also actively involved in the interpretation process. The ‘‘freedom of action’’ question is then 
an uneasy one which is ever open as identities could be negotiated but within discourse. 
Otherness 
Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory together with the interregnum which postcolonial 
theory seeks to investigate offers the space to examine and critically engage with the 
discursive construction of the terrorist as an Other. This thesis follows the thoughts of Homi 
Bhabha on Otherness to understand why and how Boko Haram’s violence became known as 
terrorism. The discourse of the war on terror could now be said to produce a new kind of 
subject position which can be referred to as the Other. The concept of otherness become 




because Otherness ensure the production of a discourse that dictates not only what can or 
cannot be said but also how it is said. It proves useful for this thesis only to the extent that 
the discourse of terrorism through a totalizing and permanent fixation, represents the 
resistance in the ambivalence of the colonizer/colonized dyad. Central to Bhabha’s thought 
on Otherness is the ‘‘fixity’’ and ‘permanence’ that have been ascribed to what otherwise 
could have been an ambivalence. According to Bhabha (1983: 18) 
Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of 
colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and 
an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic 
repetition. Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, is 
a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is 
always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously 
repeated... as if the essential duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual 
license of the African that needs no proof, can never really, in discourse, be 
proved. 
In other words, the construction of Otherness relies on the deployment of stereotype as a 
discursive strategy to make sense of and represent the one who seems the same but not 
quite.  The ‘fixity’ as a sign function by its ability to ensure permanence repetition of an 
identity so permanent as well as so given to change. It’s ‘unchanging order’ as a site of 
permanence relates to the meeting point of the ‘desire’ as well as ‘attraction’ of the colonizing 
subject and the colonized and while its ‘unchanging disorder’ relates to the ‘repulsion’ and 
the ‘resistance’ of the latter and the former respectively. The metaphoric representation 
explains the ambivalent Nigeria-U.S relations through which Nigeria as a site of order and an 
object of desire and attraction is represented as a ‘leader in West Africa’ that is rich in oil and 
as a site of disorder and object of repulsion and resistance, it is represented as ‘traditional’, 
‘unstable’ and ‘poor’. Otherness as a fixity then negates the play of difference which 
ambivalence sorts to highlight by simplifying it through stereotyping. The ambivalence which 
is the constituents of both identities which ideally should function for the U.S as well became 
a dominant representation of Nigeria because the strategy of stereotyping as an aftermath of 
colonialism highlights the meeting point of both countries’ repulsion and resistance in such a 




The stereotype, then, as the primary point of subjectification in colonial 
discourse, for both coloniser and colonised, is the scene of a similar fantasy 
and defence-the desire for an originality which is again threatened by the 
differences of race, colour and culture…. It is a simplification because it is an 
arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of 
difference (that the negation through the Other permits), constitutes a 
problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic and 
social relations (ibid 27). 
To this end, the rigid construct of the Self and Other through the strategy of stereotyping 
works through the power of discourse to produce. It functions through an exclusion, absolute 
and totalizing representation by silencing possible alternatives. Rather than the rigid 
construct of Self and Other which, for instance, cannot account for the agency of Nigerian 
political elites through practices of corruption and oppression, Bhabha’s logic of ambivalence 
describes a complex mix of ‘attraction’ and ‘repulsion’, of ‘complicity’ and ‘resistance’. It is 
this complex and continual fluctuation in discourse as well as practices enabled that helps to 
understand why Nigeria could be represented both as economically viable and in the same 
breath as absent. Another instance that points to this ambivalence is how the representation 
of the U.S as sponsoring violent groups and repressive governments in Africa during the cold 
war while in the same time constructing the corrupt practices of those countries. Ambivalence 
is therefore not a simply construct of the colonial subject as either ‘resisting’ or being 
‘complicit’, it is a liminal space for both where resistance and complicity are both possible. 
Agbigboa (2010), Onuoha (2012) have often highlighted the ‘hypocrisy’ of violent groups like 
Boko Haram while trying to think through their complicity in resisting the corrupt practices of 
the elites. Boko Haram’s hypocrisy is often highlighted through their means of funding which 
includes robbery, drug trafficking and kidnapping as well as the use of western technological 
devices used to further their course. These violent groups have also celebrated a utopian 
democratic representation while also condemning (liberal) democracy with its corrupt 
practices and corrupting influences. As a result, they have imposed one of the strictest version 
of Sharia Law in states like Borno, Yobe and Zamfara (Seyeifa 2009). The Nigerian army have 
however reclaimed most of these states back from them (Premium Times, 2019). What these 
sorts of ambivalence is highlighting is that a rigid, ultimate and permanent binary division is 




other is being re-constructed. The identity of the terrorists as a total permanent fixity 
highlights the prevalence of discursive power through the Othering process. This explains why 
the ‘‘shifting of subject positions’’ becomes all the more important in understanding and 
constructing the Other. 
This thesis therefore follows Bhabha that the representation of particular modes of 
subjectivities and their possibilities as well as limitations is intricately connected to the power 
of discourse to produce meanings and subject identities and not just in terms of their class 
differentiation. Though Homi Bhabha has according to him ‘‘attempted no general theory’’ 
(1990: 170), his thoughts are useful in understanding the liminality of the colonized identity. 
He maintains that no identity (whether that of the colonial state or the colonized) is 
‘‘originary’’ as far as the colonial relationship is concerned. By troubling the traditional 
delineation of the Self and Other between the colonised and the colonizer, he opens up an 
‘‘in-between’’ space or ‘‘borderland’’ or what he later refers to as the ‘‘third space’’. The 
liminality of both identities as he argues exist to constitute each other and critiques Said on 
his presentation of the identity of the colonizer as unitary and powerful. Bhabha asserts that 
‘‘cultural nationalism’’ by the Luso-Hispanic scholars and others who aspire to out-rightly 
discredit Western ontology and episteme might succeed at reversing the structure of binary 
opposition upon which Western canon of racism is based but not displace it. However, Ahmad 
(1992) from a Marxist perspective has critiqued Bhabha of minimizing or even undermining 
the material difference between the colonized and the colonizer and the reality of oppression 
experienced by the Other. The ‘‘third space’’ Bhabha opens up however helps to understand 
that identities are not just rigid construct but are rather contingent and the discourse of the 
‘‘colonial difference’’ has impacted on both the colonizer and as well as the colonized. 
Following Bhabha then, there are two sites of fixities of the discourse of terrorism, one is 
Nigeria, this is because of its resistance, and it has to be understood via its absences (of 
underdevelopment and state failure). The second location of Otherness is the Boko Haram 
group by fixing its violence as different to that of the one naming. The construction of 
Otherness therefore necessitates this negation to drive the project of neo-colonialism. 




the Other, in this case Nigeria and the terrorist, have been constructed by dominant 





Selection of Texts and Collection of Data 
Selection of Texts: The State Department, Defense Department and the Congress 
Nigeria as a nascent state has evolved through a proliferation of political violence in different 
parts of the country but none has been understood as a terrorist group until Boko Haram was 
proscribed by the Nigerian government as a terrorist organisation on June 4, 2013, followed 
by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White House on November 14, 2013 and other 
governments following suit. Hence, the analysis of US policy documents on terrorism and/or 
counter-terrorism in Nigeria becomes central to the understanding of and approach to 
counter terrorism in Nigeria specifically and Africa generally. The US policy documents 
towards Nigeria particularly is considered scanty because despite the rhetoric about Africa, 
no concrete country specific strategy has involved. Even on the level of the continent, it was 
only in 2012 that the first and only ‘‘US Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa’’ was launched 
by the Obama administration. Also, the first ever US-Africa summit was organized by the same 
administration in 2014. Even after the September 2001 event, issues about Africa have largely 
received no significant policy reorientation. In accordance with this line of thought, the 
Bureau of African Affairs was established in 1958 by President D. Eisenhower in order to 
‘‘change what had been a traditionally Eurocentric policy view of Africa’’ (Philip Carter III, 
2008). However, the extent to which this vision has been achieved, remains an issue open to 
debate. As Banjo (2010) argues that this is so primarily because African issues have always 
been a bipartisan one with a seemingly common and fix perception of the continent. The 
documents analysed therefore include general policy, congress testimonies/research and 
security documents where terrorism and/or political violence as relating to Nigeria/Africa is 
mentioned or highlighted. To delineate what comes in or goes out, the focus would be on key 
documents relating to political violence/terrorism in Nigeria during the presidency of Gerald 
Ford (1974-1977) to that of Barack Obama (2009-2017). This timeline is so in order to capture 
at least the 1970s when Nigeria was recovering from its Civil War (1967-1970) and its 
economy became prosperous due to the discovery of oil. This period is also the timeline when 
the U.S attempted to co-opt Nigeria to suppress liberation movements across the continent. 




marginal position in US international relations prior to the 1990s (Akinwande 2014; Deroche 
2006), the Cold War provides a useful context to understanding the development of the 
1990s. It is often argued that US policy towards Africa was largely ‘isolationist’ as only less 
than 2 percent of America’s foreign aid was apportioned for Africa and even most of this 
percentage went to North Africa or the ‘‘white regimes’’ (Deroche 2006:107) where US 
interest in oil is prevalent. On this note Nwaubani (cited in Deroche 2006:107), cautions that 
there is need for thorough examination and appropriate discernment to understand the 
difference between US ‘‘rhetoric’’ and ‘‘reality’’ as the ‘‘the emerging black states in West 
Africa got virtually no concrete support from the United States’’. Also, for instance, according 
to Clapham (1996:194-198) as late as the mid-1990s only an insignificant fraction of US aid 
went to Kenya, in East Africa, with all of this given to non-state actors. In commenting on the 
US relations after the Cold War, during a presidential debate, President Bush (1989-1993) 
asserted that the US has ‘‘no vital interests in Africa’’ (Oyebade et, al. 2008:22). Thus, while 
the ‘crisis’ of the 1990s, as it is being referred to, which relates to state failure like that of 
Somali and Ivory Coast, signals the beginning of Africa’s centrality to the US foreign policies, 
the context of the Cold War helps to better appreciate this. This was marked by the 1997 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) launched by the Bill Clinton Administration. During 
this era, development became linked to security and state building is proffered as the solution 
to the African ‘problem’. To put it in the words of Susan Rice, the Assistant Secretary of states 
for Africans during President Clinton, quoted in Taylor et.al. (2004:33) 
There was a time not long ago when Africa was the exclusive domain of the 
understaffed bureau at Foggy Bottom…but now, virtually every government 
agency is building the capacity to implement new programmes that support 
our policy of comprehensive engagement with Africa 
This relation, however, takes a significant new turn after the September 2001 event. This 
significant shift in the US-Africa relations as argued by Akinwande (2014) witnessed the 
extension of the US foreign policy beyond the domain of development-security to the 
securitization of environmental, political and economic issues in Africa through the War on 
Terror strategy. To this end, more texts were produced which engage with the discourse of 
terrorism in Africa and Nigeria specifically. Hence, this is reflected in the percentage of the 




that are regarded as official US government’s discourse on terrorism in Nigeria and/or Africa. 
The justification for focusing on the Department of State and the Defense Department, as 
well as selection of each text will be given in greater details in the proceeding sections and 
chapter. To engage with the text(s) in order to discover how linguistic practices work within 
them, the text will be coded to identify key words, terms, phrases and labels contained in 
each text; the main assumptions contained within each of the texts will be identified; how the 
main themes or strands of the discourse are constructed will be shown; and the dominant 
narratives will be contrasted with the less dominant ones to highlight the extent to which 
contingent articulations have become normalized. 
Reasons for Focusing on the State Department, the Defense Department and the Congress 
The US Department of State presents itself for a discursive site considered suited for this study 
majorly because it is the executive branch which has leading and constitutional 
responsibilities of the US foreign policy. The Defense Department on the other hand is useful 
to identify key security documents on Africa. It proves more useful in understanding military 
initiatives like African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (1997) which was changed to Africa 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) (2004) shortly after the implosion 
of Ivory Coast argued (by Akinwande 2014) as the resultant effect of ACRI before the launch 
of AFRICOM in 2007. Also, the state Department and the Pentagon (Department of Defense) 
have traditionally/historically been the agencies with somewhat engagement with the African 
continent. For instance, the post of the Bureau of African Affairs was created in 1958 (during 
the Cold war and decade of African independence) by the State department under the 
Secretary of State to co-ordinate and supervise activities in the continent. Also, during the 
administration of President Clinton, the post of the Under Secretary of State for Democracy 
and Global Affairs was created within the State Department to highlight issues of security, 
democracy and governance, among other things, with more focus on Africa than other 
regions of the world. The intervention of the US in Africa and the transformation of its security 
since the Cold war and particularly during the crisis of the 1990s have severally been justified 
on humanitarian grounds but have largely been more of military interventions which Frazer 




a justification for the focus on the Department of Defence (as a discursive site) as it is the 
executive branch saddled that carried out these operations (in league with the Department 
of State). The Pentagon’s engagement with Africa became more pronounced under the 
Clinton’s administration. Though the US has organised and led operations like the United Task 
Force (UNITAF), which was replaced by the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to Africa, it 
was during the Clinton’s tenure that the first US military initiative to Africa (ACRI) was 
launched under the Department of Defence. The Defence Department also for the first time 
during this tenure budgeted for ‘‘conflict-resolution operations’’ in the continent. In the wake 
of the Global War on Terror and its militarised counter-terrorism approach, the Department 
of Defence became even more relevant in understanding the discourse of terrorism, 
especially with the launch of AFRICOM in 2006. As Banjo (2010), Akinwande (2014) and Olsen 
(2017) have rightly argued that to understand the somewhat ambivalent US-Africa policy, the 
State Department and Department of Defence are two very useful sites. Another site also 
considered useful for this research is the Homeland Security Committee. This is because as a 
standing committee of the House of Representatives on security, it conducts oversight 
functions and investigations and remains vital in the process of threat construction to the 
security of the U.S. Other sites like Committee on Foreign Affairs or Council on Foreign 
Relations could also be considered. For instance, Nigerian presidents like Olusegun Obasanjo 
testified that ‘‘the Council on Foreign Relations has contributed immensely to my formation 
in whatever my view and ideas are’’. However, going by the practicability of data 
management, the research will be limited to these three discursive sites. 
Selection of Texts: The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and the Office of the Presidency 
The discourse of terrorism is emergent in Nigeria, so it is unsurprising not to find many 
primary documents classed public on it. Unlike the U.S archive, where a proportionate 
number could be sourced, though not without its own ambivalence, the Nigerian National 
Assembly only host 3 variants of the same document- The Terrorism Prohibition Act. The first 
one written in 2011 and the second a memorandum on the Act and the third is the Act (as 
amended) in 2013. There is a conspicuous absence of any policy document, recommendations 




relating to Boko Haram hosted by the Office of the Presidency under the National Security 
and Intelligence were selected. All documents are dated from 2011 to 2017 as no documents 
relating to the sect’s activities could be found prior to this time. 
Reasons for Focusing on the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 
Office of the Presidency 
Most of the evolving scholarship on terrorism in Nigeria have either reviewed literature or 
drawn resources from the media as the basis for their argument.  While media narratives 
themselves are potential source of data for research, scholars like Popoola (2003;2012) and 
Połońska-Kimunguyi, and Gillespie (2017) have highlighted how the Nigerian press have 
always been doctored (both locally and internationally) and freedom of reportage elusive 
which is a continuation of colonial heritage. Another argument to this end is the recent 
legislation against hate speech in Nigeria where open-ended definition of ‘hate speech’ is 
categorised as ‘terrorism’ (Sahara Reporters Aug. 26, 2017). It could therefore be argued that 
in nascent states like Nigeria where political violence has been prevalent, it might be 
necessary to look beyond the media as an institution to organs of government themselves to 
understand the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. Apart from a handful of doctoral theses 
which have undertaken critical study about terrorism and the National assembly of Nigeria, 
only Sampson and Onuoha (2011) have considered the National Assembly as vital to 
understanding how the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation came about in Nigeria. 
Sampson and Onuoha (2011)’s article was an engagement with the complexities surrounding 
the enactment of the anti-terrorism legislation (ATL), its failures and revival and the dominant 
influence of the U.S and the U.N in its actualization. However, it fundamentally points to the 
overall importance of the National Assembly of Nigeria in understanding the politics and 
power intricate to the construction of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria and therefore the 
contingent nature of such discourse. Though no identified study has pointed to the relevance 
of the Office of the Presidency in understanding the construction of the discourse of terrorism 
in Nigeria, it is considered very important to this research because at the national, sub-
regional, regional and international levels, the Office of the Presidency remains the central 




the emergent nature of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria, only some scanty texts were 
identified as relevant in this site. In order to accumulate appropriate quantity of relevant 
texts, The Office of the Secretary to the Presidency and that of the National Security Adviser 
of Nigeria could have proved very useful but surprisingly none of these sites have any reports, 
recommendations or policy documents on terrorism in their archives. Also, there is the stark 
absence of any policy and/or official recommendations whether comprehensive or otherwise 
on terrorism in all the sites identified (See Appendix 1 for Table of the selection of texts).   
 Interview 
Researching political violence raises sensitive ethical and practical concerns both to the 
researcher and research participants. The ethical and practical challenges encountered in the 
course of this research impacted strongly on the process as well as the final output of the 
research. This is because the initial focus of this research was to garner data from the 
‘subaltern’, that is, those who have been excluded to the margin of ‘society’  through the 
‘‘itinerant of silencing’’ ( Spivak 2004) in order to give ‘voice’ to them. This focus might make 
methods such as ethnography, participant observation and/or in-depth/semi-structured 
interviews more suited to the research agenda (at the initial phase) and in practice present 
many challenges. One of such, is gaining access to the appropriate community, which in this 
case is in the North-East Nigeria, where Boko Haram is domiciled. Having lived in this 
community for a year, between 2009/2010, I had relied on friendships which I have formed 
to regain access and to obtain reliable data. My friendship network as gatekeepers, as well as 
research participants, consented to the use of snowball sampling through which their 
network of friends could also participate in the research. However, prior to my travelling to 
North-East Nigeria, there were a series of Boko Haram’s attacks in North-East, which led to 
the displacement of many people, including some of my gatekeepers. This development 
changed the focus of the research from understanding ‘subaltern’ narratives about terrorism 
to that of dominant texts like those of policy makers and implementers both in Nigeria and 
the United States. 
Like most research which requires access to policy implementers like the military, gaining 




assistance of a friend, who acted as a gate keeper, nine out of about 30 servicemen who were 
approached consented on the grounds of anonymity and confidentiality. To ensure 
participants consented after being duly informed, the aims of the research, how participants’ 
data will be used as well as the meaning of anonymity and confidentiality were explained 
verbally and in writing to each participant and each of the nine participants signed the form 
to attest to their consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were also guaranteed in writing by 
the researcher. Of the nine participants, eight are from the Nigerian Army while the remaining 
one is a navy officer. They are all in Lagos, a south-western state but have all been involved 
with either Boko Haram or other militant groups in Nigeria. Apart from the difficulty of gaining 
access, other practical issues like weather conditions, flooding and a times appointment 
cancellation by some participants prolonged the data collection from July to early October 
2014. While Lagos is a state located in the western region of Nigeria, it represents a good mix 
of Nigerians as a former capital of Nigeria and its home to the highest number of military 
barracks in the country. 
The interview of military officials as the implementers of the GWOT policy in Nigeria become 
important to this research as it helps to understand how these officials as a 
‘‘community...makes sense of and responds to events deemed terrorism’’ (Stump and Dixit 
2013: 97). These interviews are particularly useful on three grounds: one, the interviews 
provide an immensely rich data in understanding how the implementation of the GWOT 
policy is understood and operationalised by the officials who are saddled with the 
responsibilities of enactment (Fosher 2009). With the many instances of their vivid 
descriptions of their engagement in the ‘war’ against Boko Haram or other violent groups in 
the interview text, as well as their constructions of the group, it represents how texts refer to 
each other to legitimise and fix certain meanings (Doty 1993).  Secondly, the interview text is 
positioned as a construction which helps to unveil how military officials define and categorise 
violence and how this enables certain practices in their management of political violence. The 
interview data is not however collected  in order to affirm or otherwise the ‘truth’ underlying 
the practices of the GWOT, it is aimed at understanding how the implementers of the GWOT 
doctrine use words to  justify the morality and rationality of the ‘terrorism’ construct and the 




as workers with possible grievances against both governments, they represent a source of 
rich data that would contrast the ‘official’ version of the GWOT in Nigeria. For instance, the 
personal opinions of participants on corrupt practices by the Nigerian government officials 
and how some of them think the violence of Boko Haram is caused/motivated by political 
elites both locally and internationally could not have been represented in the government 
texts. Some of them particularly demanded that some of their opinions should not be 
recorded as the nature of their job do not afford them the space to air such views. There was 
the incidence of a participant who discussed with me extensively only to conclude by saying 
‘‘please don’t quote me, don’t use it, I was only expressing a very private opinion’’. 
The physical location where the interviews were recorded did aid the ‘loosening up’ during 
most of the interviews. All of the interviews took place either in the participant’s compound, 
a private space in a restaurant or a worship centre like church/mosque.  Each interview 
encounter was face-to-face and was for an average time of twenty-five to thirty minutes, only 
one interview was about 25 minutes and three of the interviews were above this average. In-
depth semi-structured interview questions like ‘what is your experience with political 
violence’ were posed to the participants in order to allow them engage with the subject of 
the research without being ‘lead’ by the researcher (Fontana and Frey 1998). This might in 
theory lead to discussions which might not generate any useful data to the research. 
However, rather than the discussion leading to such, the participants were more concise and 
apt as some of them granted the interview amidst tight personal and official schedules. 
Interviews were recorded and encrypted (with the knowledge and consent of every 
participant) using my mobile phone and were immediately uploaded to the University’s drive. 
To further ensure every data is safe and secure, they were immediately deleted after being 
uploaded as encrypted files to the University’s drive. 
The transcription and subsequent analysis of the interviews were done about six months 
later. This was to allow the participants some time to think about the interview and if 
necessary change their minds about their data. As part of the written agreement on consent 
forms, each participant was allowed till the end of October 2016 to contact the researcher by 




features in personal details like names, age, gender, religion and states of origin of 
participants were overwritten in line with ethics (see Appendix 1). 
Data Analysis 
Discourses as meaning-making enterprises by the I/we of the ‘speaking’ subject create the 
space for how certain ‘truths’ could be talked about and how certain identities could be 
constituted by employing some discursive practices as strategies which work for the ‘speaking 
subject’ (Croft 2007; Foucault 1972). To critically engage with the representational strategies 
like elements, floating signifiers, nodal points, moments, logics of equivalence and difference, 
recurring words and themes were highlighted using Nvivo. Floating signifiers like violence 
were highlighted to examine how they became embellished and transitioned into nodal 
points like 9/11. By highlighting  the signifier ‘crisis’ in the construction of the ‘threat of the 
terrorist’ as a theme, for instance, it becomes possible to see how certain discourses were 
ebbed out and others were made dominant and fixed through the strategy of articulation. 
The transitioning of the signifier ‘crisis’ works then by the ‘‘delimitation of a field of objects, 
the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms 
for the elaboration of concepts and theories ’’ (Foucault 1977:199) which are otherwise 
known as discursive practices. 
Another discursive practice examined by this thesis is how identities are constituted. 
According to Croft (2007:1): 
Discourses create and reflect identities, and thus they construct those who 
are our allies and those who are our enemies. When not in flux, they settle 
who ’’we‟ are, and who ‘‘they’’ are; what ‘‘we‟ stand for, and what ‘‘they‟ 
mean to us. They construct the space for ’’our‟ legitimate activity; and the 
space for the behaviour we will (and will not) tolerate from ‘‘them‟. 
In constituting identities, practices employed are negation, equivalence and difference and 
articulations to delimit how the self is constructed against the other.  For instance, producing 
the identity of Nigeria as a kind of state which exists to counter terrorism works by recurrent 
use of words like security/insecurity; peace/war/terrorism; hate/love; and violence/crisis. 




of discursivity’’ that is, words that could be employed and practices that would be enabled as 
a result of this. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has engaged with Discourse Theory as the theory and method for this thesis. It 
has made the case for the suitability of Discourse Theory for this research and also examined 
how certain discursive practices like articulations and logics of equivalence and difference 
work as representational practices to delimit and fix ‘‘the field of discursivity’’. Discourses are 
not inherently fixed; they are in a state of continual flux and are often unstable. Hence, it 
takes the ‘‘agent of knowledge’’ to delimit certain discourses and thus make it fixed and stable 
through the employment of certain discursive practices. Importantly, discursive practices are 
not self-evident and value-free tools as they are inherently linked to the ‘speaking’ subject of 
the discourse. Furthermore, the chapter has attempted to shed some light on how these 
discursive practices would be teased out particularly by highlighting words/phrases which are 
recurrent and thus make a particular theme dominant. 
Also, the chapter has explained how data were collected and analysed and the rationale 
behind this. Both primary and secondary data from the Nigeria military as policy 
implementers and U.S and Nigeria policy texts (respectively) were considered appropriate 
and important for the research. Accessing this community of research participants was 
difficult as it is against the ethos of their profession to grant such interviews. To ensure access 
then, snowball sampling was employed through the initial aid of a friend who acted as the 
gatekeeper. Informed consent of every participant was documented and signed on the 
grounds of anonymity and confidentiality guaranteed by the researcher. To delineate what 
comes in and what goes out for the government texts, key words like ‘Africa/Nigeria’, ‘political 
violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘security’, ‘Boko Haram’ were employed in data selection. Both the 
interviews and government texts were analysed in the empirical chapters using concepts such 
as Otherness and discursive practices such as logics of equivalence and difference and 
difference. Words and themes were highlighted to examine how these discursive practices 







Chapter 3: Understanding Boko Haram 
‘‘What is most worrying at present is, at least in my view, a clearly stated 
intent by Boko Haram and by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate 
and synchronize their efforts. I’m not so sure they’re able to do that just yet, 
but it’s clear to me they have the desire and intent to do that’’. (U.S. Army 
General, Carter F. Ham, Commander of AFRICOM, August 17, 2011) 
 
Introduction 
According to the Global Terrorism Database, the first attack of Boko Haram was launched on 
the 27th July 2009 with an unknown number of fatalities. This is however in contrast to media 
submission that the group’s first violence was in 2003 (CNN, October 19th, 2018). The 
inconsistency in the emergence of the group and the history of their violence shows how the 
shift of the GWOT into Nigeria helps to construct dominant narratives and fix meaning which 
enables certain productive practices while silencing others. This is because prior to the event 
of September 2001, the activities of the group have been considered local and thus a 
reflection of the volatile political terrain of Nigeria. This is thus within the moral boundary of 
the political violence inherent to the state and hence do not need to be understood any more 
differently than others. Through the service of power therefore, certain discourses and 
practices become dominant and visible while others are not. While the ‘irrationality’, ‘hate’ 
and ‘evil’ of Boko Haram becomes dominant after the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria, the 
oppressive and exclusionary practices of both the Nigerian political elites and the U.S GWOT 
become invisible and thus silenced. According to Doty (1993: 298) ‘‘the possibility of practices 
presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background 
meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place’’. In the case of 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, the shift from ‘‘Islamic fundamentalist’’ which serve the interests of 




what could or could not be done provides the space for the range of actions available for 
social actors. 
The 2009 Boko Haram uprising and subsequent lethality had a lot to do with the effects of 
specific actions and/or inactions of political elites both locally and internationally. It is known 
that the activities of the group became more violent and lethal during President Goodluck 
Jonathan’s heavily militarized counter-terrorism approach (The Guardian, June 5th, 2014). 
According to President Goodluck Jonathan on January 8, 2012: 
…During the civil war, we knew, and we could even predict where the enemy 
was coming from. You can even know the route they are coming from, you 
can even know what calibre of weapon they will use and so on….Some 
continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won’t even know the 
person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house 
(Premium Times 2012) 
This kind of mysterious enemy of the state has already constructs for us the possibilities of 
the courses of actions to be taken against the group. And in this case due to the narratives of 
the GWOT, it is the employment of the military to win the war against an enemy ‘without a 
face’. These practices evidently draw from the background understanding of how the identity 
of the group as ‘Islamic fundamentalist’ serves the narrative of the GWOT. It however silences 
the narrative of politicking that explains the violence of groups of this nature in Nigeria. This 
is captured in the words of former President Olusegun Obasanjo: 
I went out in 2011 to Maiduguri. I took great risk to find out what is really 
happening. Boko Haram, do they have grievances, if they have grievances, 
what are their grievances and I brought all that to Jonathan. Jonathan didn’t 
believe that Boko Haram was a serious issue. He thought that it was a device 
by the North to prevent him from continuing as president of Nigeria which 
was rather unfortunate (Daily Post September 11, 2017) 
This background understanding of groups being used to influence the electoral process in 
Nigeria reveals an important aspect of power to fix and shift meanings and produce varied 
subjectivities as deemed fit. It is this productive use of discursive power that helps to 
understand why under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the group could be useful for 




of power that highlights how policy discourse and official narratives on terrorism helps to shift 
subject positions and construct identities as total closure. 
This chapter provides a background to the proscription of Boko Haram as the first terrorist 
organisation in Nigeria. It focuses on the construction of the Boko Haram group both in 
academic literature, media, policy documents and official narratives both locally and 
internationally. The chapter aims to provide context to the group’s violence by highlighting 
what is known/unknown about the groups’ name, origin, structure, objectives, splinter 
groups, operational dynamics and tactics, religious identity and its international dimension. 
Providing context for the emergence and operations of the group will help to understand later 
analyses in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 and shows how the ‘fixity’ of the terrorists’ label serve a 
neo-colonial divide of a global order versus disorder. This will open up the space for a critical 
rethink of how the movement is being constructed and how this can offer a possibility of 
change. There are three sub-headings in this chapter: The first is emergence, structure and 
narratives of Boko Haram. This section examines the origin of the group and the nature of 
their activities prior to the time they became knowable through the discourse of terrorism. 
Three men have so far led the group as we know it (apart from the splinter groups) and the 
group have to a large extent evolve according to the leadership dynamics. An important node 
in the violence of the group is the role of the state as represented by its political elites during 
the group’s fallout with them. The second sub-heading:  Boko Haram and the Political 
Landscape in Nigeria highlights the role of political elites in constructing and manipulating 
identities for their interests. It highlights this background to give a context to why Boko 
Haram’s 2009 uprising was not taken seriously because such practices are possible within 
Nigeria’s political landscape. The third and final sub-heading before the conclusion examines 
the logic of Boko Haram’s proscription. Not so much is known about the U.S-Nigeria meetings 
which made the later to concede to the proscription of Boko Haram but there seems to be 
some real hesitancy on the part of Nigeria in labelling the group as a terrorist organisation 
which signals co-option. This sub-heading has a subsection: Assessment by Juxtaposition and 
Pre-emption. The subsection examines how the Homeland Security Report (2011) helps to 




juxtaposing the group with other groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda and their ‘‘capacity’’ 






The Emergence, Structure and Narratives of Boko Haram 
 
Muhammed Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founding leader during his arrest  
Source: BBC (2014) 
The meaning of the group’s name, their structure/strategy, source of funding and religious 
beliefs are all contested (Samuel 2013; Iro and Oarhe 2012). As it were, nothing substantial is 
known about the numerical strength of Boko Haram and other demographic profile of its 
members.  The group’s name has changed repeatedly to reflect the present agenda and/or 
leadership of the group. The group’s name was changed from Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah 
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad meaning Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and the Jihad to 
its present official name which is Islamic State in West Africa or Islamic State's West Africa 
Province (ISWA or ISWAP) to reflect their expression of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Levant in March, 2015 (Global Security, 2015). The word ‘Boko Haram’ is not a 
nomenclature by which the group itself self-identify but was appended to the group by 




interpreted to mean ‘‘hate or dislike for book or western education or western civilization’’ 
or ‘‘book or western education/civilization is forbidden’’ (Agbigboa 2011; Abimbola 2012). 
The general theorem in (international) media is that the movement started in 2002 (BBC 
2016; Aljazeera 2015). However, in official and academic discourse the actual date of the 
group’s emergence remains a source of dispute. This dispute is due to the metrics used to 
determine the possible date of the group’s birth. These range from the possible date of birth 
of Muhammed Yusuf and when his militant activism began to the date of his death (Onuoha 
2010; Forest 2012). According to official narratives, however, Boko Haram’s activities pre-
dated Muhammed Yusuf’s leadership and started as a small religious study group sometimes 
in the mid-1990’s (U.S Homeland Security, 2011; Nigeria Security Defence 2012). Adesoji 
(2010) has particularly contended that unlike official documents and narratives which stated 
the group’s emergence as the mid-1990s, he argued that Boko Haram’s strategy, operations 
and goals modelled an earlier sect of the 1970s/1980s known as the Maitaisine and therefore 
it is a splinter group of the latter.  While there seems to be a unanimous agreement by 
scholars that both the evolution and narratives of the group is linked to the history of political 
violence and ‘reality’ of the Nigerian state and also that certain striking similarities between 
Boko Haram and Maitaisine could be highlighted, there is no established connection of Boko 
Haram to the Maitaisine group. The study group usually referred to as the Muslim Youth 
Organisation, also known as Shabab, was said to be teaching and promoting a (Wahhabi) 
puritans and/or separatist version of Islam which the residents of Damboa, Maiduguri, Borno 
state were initially against (Olojo 2013; Onyebuchi and Chigozie 2013). Their doctrine was 
marked by grievances against the corrupting influence of western education as evidenced by 
the corrupt and immoral practices of elites in the country. Under the leadership of the first 
leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Lawan, the group was completely non-violent. Though not 
so much is known about him or the group, what is known is that the group only engages in 
preaching, crusades and criticism of governmental failings (Onuoha 2013). Abubakar Lawan’s 
influence was more visible within the University of Maiduguri where, as a faculty 
representative, he oversaw the study group. However, while no direct correlation was 
established, many students under his leadership were reported to have dropped out of the 




Lawan during this period. Lawan was believed to have been secretly killed by the state’s 
security agencies (Omotola 2013; Cook 2011). 
After the unexplained and suspicious death of Lawan, Mohammed Yusuf, who is believed to 
be given birth to on 29th January 1970 (again varying dates are given), emerged as a 
charismatic leader who fine-tuned the group’s objectives and made a direct link between the 
absence of Islamic principles as a way of life and the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, 
criminal activities and corrupt practices by political elites. Prior to meeting with his 
predecessor in Nigeria, Yusuf was a (graduate level) scholar of theology from the University 
of Medina at Saudi Arabia and was later significantly influenced by the teachings of Ibn 
Taymiyyah and the Egyptian exiled scholar Shukri Mustafa. With a large following from the 
Kanuri ethnic group in Borno state, some scholars argued that the group’s religious beliefs 
dates back to pre-colonial days (Campbell 2013; Danjibo 2009). However, some other scholars 
have submitted that the Salafist version of Islam practised by Boko Haram members are 
‘imported’ from the Middle East. Thereby, Yusuf’s beliefs are considered not compatible with 
the socio-cultural cum religious landscape of northern Nigeria (Samuel 2013; Murtada 2013). 
By attending to the issues of poverty through giving of food and other basic provisions to the 
extremely poor like the Almajiris, however, his doctrine began to attract a wide following 
(Abimbola 2011; Elkaim 2012). Many scholars seem to agree that the group’s dogma taps into 
the longstanding, deep-rooted political, religious and ethnic challenges the country has been 
facing (Solomon 2015; Elden 2014; Herbst 2004) According to Abimbola (2011) and Onuoha 
(2010), his call for an Islamic theocratic state made him particularly attractive to northern 
political elites who consider him to be a useful tool in winning the hearts and the minds of 
the people for electoral purposes. This new phase led to the pact entered into by Mohammed 
Yusuf and Ali Modu Sheriff, a politician and gubernatorial candidate in Borno state. The pact 
was believed to include the payment of monthly salaries to Yusuf’s key followers, the 
conversation of Borno state to an Islamic theocratic state, among other things. After the 
victory of Ali Modu Sheriff at the polls of 2003, he established the Islamic Affairs commission 
and employed Mohammed Yusuf as well as his followers. However, both parties fell out of 
pact due to several undisclosed reasons, leading to Yusuf’s resignation and his subsequent 




became known as the Nigerian Taliban4 or the Yusuffiya sect. It was unclear whether or not 
violence was employed by the group or the extent to which violence was employed by the 
Boko Haram group during the early 2000s. The group was however involved in flagrant 
disregard for the authority of the state and staging crusades with focus on discrediting both 
national and international governments. In most of his narratives, he skilfully links the 
grievances and feelings of injustice associated with their immediate environment with 
international issues focusing mainly on Israel (Jews), the U.S (westerners) and Nigerian 
political elites and Christians. As he asserts in one of his sermons after some revenge killings 
of some Muslims in Onitsha by an unnamed armed group: 
Once [the infidels] have power, once they have control, they show no mercy, 
they show no forgiveness. In Onitsha, they killed everyone. In Maiduguri, 
there have been skirmishes. They burned down houses, but it was nothing 
compared to what happened in Onitsha. That’s why we can’t put down our 
arms …Can you even think of Muslims being in Guantánamo? In Iraq, people 
have been humiliated in their homes, in their own country. They built their 
country, and they were forced to go on their hands and knees. They were 
stripped and then raped by dogs. Can you imagine? To strip a woman and 
have her raped by a dog? Can you remain silent before such humiliations? 
Remain silent, and on Judgment Day, Allah will hold you accountable. (Cited 
in Apard 2015:46, YouTube videos Mohammed Yusuf sermon, 2006) 
 
Mohammed Yusuf during his sermon 
                                                     
4 This was believed as a strategy of gaining recognition beyond the Nigerian border, thereby tapping into the 




Source: You tube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nYGyYEA1Y8) 
As a result of this, several clashes between the group and the Nigerian police were recorded 
between January and July 2009. The group’s members were imprisoned, maimed, brutalized 
and killed both by the Nigerian police and Army and by 30th July 2009, the group’s leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf alongside his father in-law, Baba Mohammed were extra judicially killed in 
front of the Police Headquarters in Maiduguri. 
Further to the killing of Mohammed Yusuf after his fall-out with Ali Modu Sheriff, the then 
state governor of Borno state, the state witnessed an upsurge in violence, popularly referred 
to as the Boko Haram 2009 uprising. This uprising was forcefully suppressed by Nigerian 
soldiers and police through it’s ‘‘Operation Flush’’ initiative leading to the death of some 
thousands of people after which a seeming peace returned to the region. The group however 
resurfaced again in 2010 with more determination to fight having been trained by other 
groups suspected to be either Al-Qaeda or Al-Shabaab in places as diverse as Niger, Sudan, 
Egypt and some other unknown caves and mountains (Oarhe 2012; Elden 2014). Scholars like 
Agbigboa (2010) and Adesoji (2015) have argued that the violence of the group might partly 
be due to Boko Haram’s revenge of the death of Yusuf and partly the aggressive and 
temperamental nature of its new leader, Abubakar Shekau. Agbigboa (2010; 2013) has also 
pushed this further by asserting that Shekau’s aggressive stance was a result of the death of 
Yusuf as there was no evidence of any violence carried out by him prior to Yusuf’s death. 
However, the group became increasingly violent and less discriminately in the targets of their 
attacks from public symbols like the police station to communal market settings where 
everyday people do business to bus stations, to other Muslim sects who do not support their 
course, people were killed almost on daily basis especially during the heavily militarized 
President Goodluck Jonathan era. According to Qaqa, Boko Haram’s supposed spokesperson: 
Allah has said that we revenge on anyone that attacks us in the measure as 
we were attacked. So as far as we are concerned, persons like Ali Sheriff, 
Senator Ndume and Pindar are not in any way different from President 
Goodluck Jonathan, whom we are targeting to eliminate… (Cited in All Africa 




Prior to their proscription by the United States, Abubakar Shekau became more vocal about 
the operations of the group by employing social media to broadcast his messages. He 
reconstructed the goals of the group to mean anything or anyone that is ‘western’ as being 
an enemy of Islam. In his words: 
Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and 
everyone knows there are some things that Allah has forbidden in the Quran 
that cannot be counted as western education (Cited from Boko Haram 
YouTube Videos, Shekau 2012). 
The Quran teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun western 
education, and we must shun the constitution (Cited from Boko Haram 
YouTube Videos, Shekau 2013). 
 
Boko Haram’s Leader: Abubakar Shekau, alongside his fighters 
Source: BBC 2014 
The meaning of ‘western’ in this sense remain contested. As Agbiboa (2012) and Abimbola 
(2014) have pointed out the hypocrisy of the group in fighting western education and 
oppressive systems generally. They contended that the use of western technology for their 
fight and the propagation of their messages at least highlights this hypocrisy. In line with this 




Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world 
out of hand. The group’s use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs,   
YouTube,   chemical   explosives,   automatic weapons, and cars shows it is 
more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits 
them 
Another factor which highlights the group’s hypocrisy in fighting oppressive systems which 
they have equated with being ‘western’ is criminal activities like robberies, kidnapping and 
the likes which the group have continually engaged in. In the height of the group’s violence 
under Shekau’s leadership, the meaning of ‘western’ and being an ‘enemy’ became so broad 
that even his own fighters like Mujtahid Abu Hanifa, Hadhiq Kaka al-Hajj, Mustafa al-
Chadiwho and Malim Omar, who thought he was being too extreme by killing other Muslims 
were killed in 2014 (BBC 2016). The emergence of Abubakar Shekau, the present leader of the 
group, (It is not clear whether Shekau is dead or still alive as there has been claims and counter 
claims of his death both by the Nigerian military and the Boko Haram group), thus lead to 
their proscription as a ‘terrorist’ group because of their scale of violence. Under the present 
leadership, the group carried out the first suicide bomb in Nigeria in July 2011 and has since 
been involved with a high level of destruction of public properties as well as killings, maiming, 
kidnapping and displacement of thousands of people both in Nigeria and beyond. Overall. 
There seems to be a continual increase of Boko Haram’s violence with the death of each 
leader. 
Scholars are also not unanimous on the sect’s ‘‘religious methodology’’ and structure. With 
respect to their dogma, Furnish (2012), Copeland (2013), Ibrahim (2012) and others have 
unequivocally described the sect as Salafist, while Sageman (2004) and Wictorowicz (2001) 
among others suggested that there are ‘‘strands of Salafists’’. Murtada (2013), a Nigerian 
Islamic scholar, has however contended the view that Boko Haram is Salafist. It is thus not 
very certain what informs the group’s religious dogma, if any. In Murtada’s argument, the 
discourse and practices of Boko Haram, especially under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau 
stands in stark opposition to the tenets of the sacred texts and the principles of war as 
enshrined in the Salafist dogma. The differences in the interpretation of who a non-believer 
really is and whether women and children should be part of the war whether as soldiers or 




includes Muslims who have become westernized. This background explains why the dynamics 
of the group changed leading to the breakaway of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the biological son 
of Mohammed Yusuf, to form a splinter group which pledged allegiance to ISIL in his videos. 
It is this breakaway of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and subsequent pact with ISIL that made 
Abubakar Shekau form another pact with ISIL. ISIL has acknowledged both factions at some 
points but seems to give more credence to Abu Musab al-Barnawi in the newspaper al-Naba 
lately (BBC 2018). Though scholars like Onuoha (2010) and Iro and Qarhe (2012) have argued 
that the rhetoric might not mean an actual pact as it is part of the strategies of violent groups 
of this nature to distract the public as well as enjoy cheap publicity, the exchange of 
correspondence between the parties involved found in their hideouts gave some credence to 
this pact (BBC, 2017). Also, it remains uncertain how many splinter groups have broken away 
from Boko Haram as some of its members like Abu Qaqa II has renounced the group and its 
practices publicly (though he was later killed) (Oftedal 2013). This is important partly because 
different people have identified as the group’s spokesperson at different times leading to 
arguments about the credibility of the information. Though the group has reported links with 
Al-Qaeda, there is insufficient evidence to establish this. According to The Jihad and Terrorism 
Monitor (2010), Al-Qaeda has acknowledged twice the provision of some forms of trainings 
and support for their ‘‘Nigerian brothers’’. On the part of Boko Haram, BBC (2009, August 14) 
reported that a supposed spokesperson of Boko Haram, Thani Umar, made a public statement 
that ‘‘the movement had joined up with al-Qaida and thus intends to launch a series of 
bombings starting in August in both Northern and Southern Nigeria so as to make Nigeria 
ungovernable’’. This was not long after the movement’s leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed 
extra-judicially by the Nigerian police. Some have however argued that whether or not Boko 
Haram’s affiliation with ISIS and Al-Qaeda are mere rhetoric focusing on it might 
decontextualize the understanding of the group (Campbell 2013). It is however not clear if 
the supposed affiliations became necessary after their proscription as a terrorist group. As 
Oarhe (2012) has argued that the attempt to link Nigeria’s local struggles to a wider one might 
inadvertently lead to an anti-U.S global allegiance. 




The Boko Haram movement has often been argued as a reflection of the political violence 
that evolved in Nigeria shortly after its independence (Adesoji 2010; Benjamin 2009). 
However, unlike other forms of political violence akin to the (southern) Nigerian landscape, 
which highlights grievances relating to equal political representation and/or economic 
deprivation, Boko Haram’s violence has often been associated with their demand for an 
independent Islamic caliphate which models the early visions of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio prior 
to the advent of colonialism in Nigeria (Obadare 1999; Falola 1998). It is this utopian vision of 
an Islamic theocratic political arrangement that both endeared the group to the political 
elites, especially during the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, and also set them at parallel with 
the Nigerian government as it is today. Many scholars and journalistic accounts seem to agree 
with the group’s narratives that the Nigerian state as characterized by a culture of impunity, 
untamed corruption, coercion, poverty and gross abuse of human rights among others. 
Scholars seem to agree that Nigeria has failed in these indices of governance (Yusuf 2013; 
Agbiboa 2014; Campbell 2012; Animashaun and Saka 2013). Agbiboa (2014) and others 
therefore see a correlation between the culture of impunity by political elites and the 
persistent political violence in the country. Some others contend that Nigeria's history of 
colonization and Arab invasion is the probable reason for the cultivation of a culture of 
aggression and violence as a means of resisting undue dominance of the invaders. According 
to Ayinde (2010), violence and of course terrorism in Africa can be better explained through 
the lenses of Arabs and Europeans’ invasion into Africa. He divided this into three phases: 
Afro-Oriental phase (Arab invasion and enslavement); Afro-Occidental phase (European 
invasion and enslavement) and the Afro-global phase (where Africans has to survive through 
terror tactics). Ayinde’s reductionist account however does not account for so-called 
‘‘primordial wars’’ prior to the advent of the colonialists as well as the role of political elites 
in the continued incidence of political violence in Nigeria. Expressing his frustration and 
inability to find lasting peace, the former President Goodluck Jonathan during his presidency 
affirmed: 
some of them [sponsors of Boko Haram] are in the executive arm of 
government, some of them are in the parliamentary, legislative arm of 





In spite of this outright implication of officials of his government as being either members of 
Boko Haram or sponsors of the group’s violence, there was neither identification nor arrest 
of these persons. Also, commenting on the role of the state as represented by its elites, 
former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in a public lecture in Ibadan, on Corruption and the 
African Child (2017) asserts: 
One of the reasons that members of the extremist group – Boko Haram, 
gave for their insurrection is that they became disillusioned when they saw 
how corrupt Western educated leaders were. According to them, if those 
who occupied government offices by virtue of their Western education 
would corruptly enrich themselves and deprive others of the basic things of 
life, then that education is ‘haram’ which means forbidden…We may not 
agree with their position, but the disappointment and disillusionment of 
citizens over the inadequacy or poor performance of their leaders is real. 
Furthermore, like the Maitaisine uprising in Nigeria which was linked to political elites, the 
Boko Haram group is often represented as a major node in the politicization of religion in 
Nigeria by its political elites (Adesoji 2011; Alao 2013; Hill 2010). The group’s religious identity 
became constructed and mobilized by political elites like Ahmed Yerima, a former governor 
of Zamfara state and ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo who both promised and endorsed an 
Islamic theocratic state in the Northern region of Nigeria in exchange for electoral votes 
(Ayelabola 2013; Perous de Montclos 2014). Boko Haram’s narratives as well as its violence 
therefore received legitimacy among the northerners under the leadership of Mohammed 
Yususf as a result of their religious identity as constructed by the political elites (Guardian 
2014; Cook 2011). As a result, Mohammed Yusuf became prominent during the Sharia 
implementation programme in the 12 northern states of the federation during this period.  
According to Professor Akinwande Oluwole Soyinka, an astute political activist, in his 
interview with Sahara Reporters where he highlighted the instrumental use of religion by 
Nigerian political elites for personal interests by referencing the promise of the enforcement 
of Sharia Law by Sani Ahmed Yerima, during his gubernatorial political campaign: 
…when he was asked why he decided to turn Zamfara state into a theocratic 
state in a secular dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was 
the only weapon he had to snatch power. He said that the PDP was so strong 
that he needed something which would appeal to raw emotions to mobilize 




This assertion is further corroborated by Alhaji Balaraba Musa, the former governor of Kaduna 
state in response to the use of Islamic religion as a political tool by political elites: 
In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class had no foothold 
or any solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the 
country. In view of this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would 
offer the only alternative for the protection of their class interest. But even 
this was not an easy card to play…it was clear that to seek to defend it 
[Islam] would enhance their position. So, they held on to the issue of 
sharia…as their only weapon for mobilisation in the north (Musa; Cited in 
Sampson 2014:335). 
While the polemics of the likes of Professor Oluwole Soyinka remain valid to the extent that 
the use of the Islamic religion as an instrument for the manipulation and mobilization of the 
electorates to a large extent reflects the history of political violence in the northern part of 
Nigeria, it remains that difference and antagonism should be envisioned as part of the 
democratic imaginary in Nigeria. Unlike Samuel Huntington’s submission that religion is a vital 
instrument in the inherent nature of state politics, religion is not monolithic and often is a 
product of discursive constructions that highlights difference, antagonism and dissent in the 
democratic experiment. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the acceptance of difference, 
antagonism and dissent should be part of the radical democratic imaginary, rather than the 
building of consensus. In this sense, instead of highlighting religion as evidenced by 
institutionalizing Sharia Law in Zamfara state for instance as the primary cause of political 
violence, the focus should be about unveiling silence and making oppressive power relations 
visible. In other words, just like groups like the Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) and the 
Bakkasi Boys in the South-western and South-eastern parts of the country respectively, Boko 
Haram as a group exists to give voice to the prevalence of oppressive practices enabled by 





Boko Haram’s Proscription 
 
Boko Haram displaying their weapons and their readiness for war after news of proscription 
 




Source: BBC 2013 
The proscription of Boko Haram as the first terrorist organisation in Nigeria on June 4, 2013 
by the Nigerian government, followed by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White 
House on November 14, 2013 became justified locally due to their use of violence and 
internationally due to the possibility of the group attacking the West (Department of State 
2013; Terrorist Proscription Order 2013). Prior to the proscription of the group in Nigeria, 
northern community leaders through several meetings with the federal government of 
Nigeria, have consistently warned against heavy involvement of the military in combating the 
group and the many human rights abuses recorded against the Nigerian Army (Benedict 
2012).  Also, they gave their voice against labelling the group as a terrorist organisation when 
the pressure from the U.S was getting intense. This is because such measures would be 
counter-productive and that the heightened military involvement that would follow such 
proscription would only offer the group more sympathy from some northern Muslims (Aregbe 
2012). They advocated instead for an Amnesty Programme similar to that offered to the Niger 
Delta militants (Oarhe 2012). After one of the bilateral sessions between Nigeria and the U.S 
on Security and the economy, an official reported: 
In making a case against the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group, 
the Federal Government took into consideration the fact that it will look like 
a sanction which will hurt innocent Nigerians. Some people think that the 
designation will only hurt Boko Haram members without knowing that all of 
us will bear the brunt…. And once the US does that, the EU countries will 
follow. The consequence of the designation is that this country will return to 
the club of pariah nations. This will surely in turn hurt our economy. So, the 
government pleaded with the US Secretary of State and other top officials 
against designation (Badejo 2012) 
Reflecting on this, Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge of the African 
region, also, objected to the designation of the group on the grounds that Nigeria is 
‘‘adamantly opposed to the designation’’, citing that it might have unintended consequences 
on the country and its people and that the designation might work for Boko Haram rather 
than against them (CBS News, July 20th 2016). In spite of this, Oarhe (2014) and Oche (2014), 
argue that it remains unclear however, if Boko Haram’s designation was initially instigated by 




just save face that the violence reflects something more global than a local uprising. This 
reasoning was based on the rhetoric of the war on terror which former president Goodluck 
Jonathan was using to describe the group prior to its designation. The designation, however, 
eventually took place because of Daniel Benjamin, the head of the counter-terrorism Bureau, 
who ‘‘was leaning toward the designation’’ (CBS News, July 20th, 2016). Since according to the 
U.S, foreign governments are appraised based on: 
a) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is 
cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, 
convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the 
act; and 
b) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is 
cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States 
citizens in the foreign country; 
Nigeria was considered not to be doing enough in fighting groups such as Boko Haram who 
are ‘‘threat’’ to the ‘‘interests’’ of the United States in Nigeria. In same breath, the U.S 
acknowledged the several human rights abuses of the Nigerian army in their fight against the 
group and conclude that such practices would deter the direct involvement of U.S soldiers in 
the war but offered technical support to the Nigerian government in the prosecution of the 
war. It nonetheless significantly cut back on aids to the region suffering from the import of 
Boko Haram and the soldiers’ activities in exchange for regions that are more inclined towards 
‘democracy’ and the ‘rule of law’ (Dagne 2011). 
Assessment by Juxtaposition and Pre-emption 
To successfully, designate a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the U.S. apart from 
such group’s violent activities, the group must have been assessed to have the ‘‘intent’’ of 
attacking the U.S and the ‘‘capacity’’ to do such (Department of State, 2013). In the case of 
Boko Haram, the fact that the uprising was mainly about local issues which was acknowledged 
in the report makes its ‘intent’ of attacking the U.S difficult to prove. Although, Boko Haram’s 
rhetoric has been replete of its discontent against western civilization and subjects, there was 
however no ascertained intent beyond these emotive words. The report also explicitly rules 
out the possibility of the group’s capacity to launch an attack against the U.S citing the fact 




attacks (Homeland Security, 2011). The Homeland Security however reached conclusions and 
made recommendations contrary to the premises cited in their report citing that the group’s 
violence is ‘‘believed’’ to be against ‘‘the interests of America and the West’’ because Al-
Shabaab, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) all 
began with rhetoric of hate against the West the same way as Boko Haram. According to the 
Homeland Security (2011:15): 
AFRICOM Commander General Ham warned that while he doubts the ability 
of Boko Haram, AQIM, and al-Shabaab to carry out attacks against the 
United States directly at the moment, he does not doubt their intent to do 
so. General Ham has warned about the potential for a transnational 
terrorist network to develop in Africa if the rising threat potential of these 
three groups is left unchecked. 
The report devoted most of its content to analysing these other groups highlighting that the 
similarities are compelling enough to draw the conclusion of Boko Haram’s intent. Having 
established the intent of Boko Haram based on its comparison to other disparate groups, they 
also prove its capacity to attack the U.S thus: 
The use of a suicide VBIED on the Abuja police barracks in June 2011 marked 
the first time on record a suicide attack was carried out in Nigeria. The bomb 
used was large enough to destroy 40 other vehicles in the parking lot, and it 
demonstrated the sect’s ability to launch attacks outside of its traditional 
area of operations in the north, proving that they were now capable of 
targeting the capital (Homeland Security; 2011: 11) 
This is further corroborated by David Cook, a political scientist testifying before the House: 
While the attack on the police General Headquarters can be seen as a 
continuation of Boko Haram’s fixation upon the Nigerian police and army, 
the United Nations attack is much more in line with other [global terrorist] 
organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the suicide attack in Baghdad 
against the United Nations in August 2003, which was one of the opening 
blows of the Iraqi insurgency (Cook, 2011: 5) 
The report thus proved intentionality based on the intent of other groups with motivation of 
hate against western civilization and through the targeting of western symbols like the U.N 
building, capacity was proved based on the ability to attack Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. 




President George W. Bush that ‘‘we will make no distinction between the terrorists who 
committed these acts and those who harbour them’’ (National commission on Terrorist 
attacks 2004: 326) seems to have enabled the practice of this proscription. The logic was 
simply built on pre-emption. It was not enough that the ‘Iraqi insurgency’ itself as referenced 
by David Cook was a pre-emptive war based on the idea of a global enemy and a globalist 
reach and power (Ahmad 2001), the result of such practices which is still being criticized today 
could still be drawn upon to start yet another war in thousands of miles away. The logic of 
juxtaposition and pre-emption could show how the linkage of a global war on terrorism 
became justified in Nigeria and as such enabled normalization of militarism in this region and 
the rest of the country. This is because prior to the proscription of Boko Haram there was the 
space to discuss the political solutions available in engaging the group and other violent 
groups in the country. However, after their labelling as terrorist, the practices of counter-
terrorism become the space within which discussions and engagement could take place. The 
point here is not that militarism has not been a practice in Nigeria prior to the war on terror. 
At least not until 1999 when the country returned to a democratically-elected government, 
military coups and regimes have defined the most part of the country’s democratic 
experiment since independence. However, the return to democracy has meant that most 
soldiers have returned to their barracks (BBC, August 10, 2000). And the employment of their 
service by political elites to suppress local uprisings have often been subjected to open and 
harsh criticisms of the likes of Professor Oluwole Soyinka and Barrister Femi Falana 
(Vanguard, September 2, 2018; BBC Hard talk, May 10, 2014). The fixing of the label of 
terrorism has however justified and naturalise the return of the military and their untold 
human rights abuses (BBC May 24, 2018). By producing a discourse that works for the mission 
of the GWOT in Nigeria, therefore, Abubakar Shekau became designated as a terrorist on the 
U.S designated persons’ list after this report. In 2013. Two years after this, a bounty of $ 7 
million was offered for anyone who helps to provide details that can lead to his arrest. The 
same week of this offer by the U.S, the Nigerian government proscribed the group locally and 





This chapter has examined the understanding of Boko Haram as well as their violence as 
represented in extant literature and the media. By examining how the group emerged as well 
as their narratives, the first section of the chapter helps to shed some light on the extent to 
which Boko Haram’s background, operations as well as the meaning of their name is known. 
Evidently, many of these important details relating to the history and evolving nomenclature 
of the group remain unknown or open to some serious debate. The second and third sections 
of the chapter have highlighted how the operation of Boko Haram has been enabled by the 
same political elites who now labels them as terrorists. The political landscape in Nigeria is 
such that make use of violence especially for the purposes of elections and Boko Haram is 
only a reflection of these practice. This is why their proscription as terrorists both locally and 
internationally does little or nothing to help forestall the spate of violence groups such as 
Boko Haram engage in. Further, by employing the logic of juxtaposition and pre-emption in 
the proscription of the group the need for a universal enemy of the U.S rather than the 
group’s specificity is highlighted. 
The fixing of discourses exists, therefore, to categorise, organise and label. The GWOT 
remains at the heart of Boko Haram’s proscription and was made possible through the 
strategies of silence, juxtaposition and pre-emption which in turn enables practices of 
oppression. The point is does demonizing the group help to understand the history of the 
violence and possible options of engagement?  The fact that Boko Haram is one of many is a 
tell-tale sign which demands that policy-makers tread cautiously. Hence, the naming of Boko 
Haram as the first terrorist group in Nigeria (both locally and internationally), has implications 
which range from what approach is considered appropriate to untold human rights abuses, 
possible higher tendencies for radicalization and heightened fear between the Christian and 
Muslim communities in Nigeria (Agbiboa and Benjamin 2013). Radicalization and gross human 
rights abuses are already on the increase in the country (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012; BBC June 
2, 2017). The construction of the terrorists as irrational beings who are evil and who destroy 
the good because of hate led to the proscription and works to bring about a new way of 
thinking about political violence in Nigeria. It goes without saying that the label helps to think 
about what is normal or abnormal, justified or unjustified political violence in Nigeria. The 




considered unacceptable by those who are responsible for it. It therefore highlights how 
these dominant narratives seem to take as a given the use of the label terrorism, its 
underlying assumptions and what power (structures) and politics (both in Nigeria and 











Chapter 4: Literature Review: The Cold 
War, Decolonization and Political Violence 
in Africa 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to engage with relevant literatures within which the discourse of 
terrorism in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular has emerged. The Chapter argues that 
political violence like that of Boko Haram is not new in Nigeria and that rather than actual 
terrorists or terrorism,  it the event of September 2001 that helps to evolve ‘terrorism’ and 
thus fix its meaning in Nigeria and beyond. The discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is positioned 
as a given and often linked to the state failure template. The rationale behind this review is 
that an attempt at deconstructing the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists necessitates the 
engagement with the histories of the violence. While the predominant argument of the thesis 
is about the shift in policy narratives to construct certain violence and their perpetrators as 
threats to the ‘interest’ of the U.S, it becomes important to provide context to the 
understanding of such violence and identities. The emergence of the terrorism discourse in 
Nigeria, has often been highlighted as inherently connected to the ‘failure’ of the state and 
the institution of governance. This dominant narrative itself, as will be shown in chapter 5 of 
this thesis, is a product of discursive move. The import of the Cold War while acknowledged 
in discussions about political violence in Africa prior to September 2001, has often been 
silenced in the narrative of African state ‘failure’. Thus, scholarship has been less focused on 
understanding how the dynamics of the Cold War and decolonization both significantly 
influenced divergent movements in the country. 
This chapter as a review of relevant literatures will argue that the histories of violence within 
which the discourse of terrorism has emerged has been blurred to accommodate the ‘shift’ 
of the GWOT. It does this by dividing the chapter into four subheadings: The first subheading 
being Decolonization, Cold War and Political violence in Africa; the second, State Failure and 
Terrorism in Africa; the third, Political Violence in Nigeria Pre-September 2001 and the fourth, 




political violence in Africa were understood during the Cold War and the decolonization of 
Africa. The sharp ‘turn’ in literature from the import of the Cold War and decolonization to 
state-centric scholarship especially during the 1990s points to the silencing of complicities. 
The second subheading thus builds on the first by engaging with the literatures on state failure 
and terrorism in Africa. It argues that the concept of state failure itself is connected to the 
Cold War when the U.S was seeking to ‘modernize’ states so that these states are pro-U.S 
rather than pro-communist. The third subheading of the chapter, Political violence in Nigeria, 
narrows the discussion from Africa to Nigeria in order to show how this dominant argument 
is teased out in understanding political violence in Nigeria. Interestingly, while for 
understandable reason, Britain, Nigeria’s colonizer was often highlighted, the U.S through its 
cold war activities and subsequent state building initiatives is conspicuously absent from 
literatures on Nigeria’s political violence. By highlighting state failure therefore in post 
September 2001, the literatures in the fourth subheading positions the emergence of the 
discourse of terrorism as seemingly natural. 
Decolonization, Cold War and Political Violence in Africa 
The 1950 and 60s represent the decades of independence for most African states (Okoh 
1990). It is also during this period that the Cold War took place. The Cold War represents the 
period when many states in Africa were considered of strategic importance to the USA and 
its allies on the one hand and/or the Soviet Union on the other, as they were co-opted to fight 
the war by proxy by either of the warring factions (Gifford and Louis 1982, 1988; Elkins 2005). 
The twin events: the struggle for decolonisation and the Cold War witnessed a litany of violent 
groups noticeable in the continent during and after the end of the Cold War (Marrouchi 2010; 
Piot 2010). Prior to the end of the Cold War a new ’turn’ within the literature referred to more 
state-centric discourse. However, the understanding of [political] violence (along with 
concepts like ‘conflicts’ and ‘war’ often used interchangeably), in Africa has been represented 
in dissenting voices among scholars with various degrees of emphasis. However, two 
dominant schools of thought (though with some similarities) could be identified: the first 
relating to the inherent incapacity of African states for self-governance and the second mainly 




Linklater (1982), Jackson (1993) and Herbst (1990; 2004; 2006) contend for the lack of 
capacity of the average state in Africa for governance. Defining work here is considered to be 
that of Jackson (1993). According to Jackson (1993), the history of state making presents how 
the logic of war usually determines how the belligerent party claims ownership of the new 
territory and how conquered territories have to assert their freedom through their prowess 
at war. Jackson went as far as arguing that were it not for the ‘‘new rule’ of sovereignty’’ 
African states should not have been granted independence as they are not fit for self-
assertion and self-governance. To this group of scholars then, colonization, decolonization 
and the Cold War cannot explain the unmaking of Africa with respect to incidences of political 
violence and/or terrorism; instead African states are best referred to as '’quasi-states’’ as they 
are bereft of the 'marks and merits of empirical statehood'. 'Empirical statehood' here refers 
to the inherent incapability of African states for self-governance.  Colonization and/or 
decolonization notwithstanding, the modern history of state creation and development 
comes with political violence justified by the idea of progress and states’ functionaries must 
deliver on the ‘merits of statehood’ in order to compete favourably in the global landscape. 
One of the arguments that these critiques fail to engage with, however, is whether Africa 
really attain independence in the true sense of the word. While the argument for the agency 
of states’ functionaries often linked with their incapacity for self-governance is central to this 
school of thought, the extent and nature of sovereignty granted to these states remain open 
to debate. According to Grovogui (2002) and Hill (2005), the ‘‘Westphalia common sense’’ 
within which the normative lack and supposed deviancy of states in Africa have evolved did 
not only position African states as an Other from their European counterparts but it’s also 
ahistorical given the structures of meaning, assumptions, myths and other associations that 
have come to define the ‘reality’ of states in International Relations today. For Grovogui 
(2002: 315-316), drawing from the case of Belgium, Switzerland and Congo, while the first 
two states are often understood as a sign of ‘‘resilience’’ of European quasi states, the other 
is constructed as a sign of incapacity of Africa for self-governance. These constructions as 
regimes of sovereignty not only enables and justifies the ‘failures’ of states in Africa but also 
‘‘assisted’’ the ‘‘failings’’ through ‘‘modulations of power, interest and identity that continue 




Jackson (1993) and others does flatten the ‘reality’ of oppressive practices and violence 
enabled through the Weberian model of statehood and sovereignty positioned as given and 
objective as this further elicits the power of discourse. 
However, the second major group of scholars identified factors ranging from the role of the 
political elites, ‘poverty’, and ‘scare resources ’,‘ the clash of civilizations’, globalization, to 
‘greed’ among others, as the ‘causes ’of political violence in Africa (Usman 1984; Kaplan 1996; 
Homer-Dixon 1999; Huntington 1997; Stewart 2008; Ballantine and Sherman 2002) The 
dominant argument here being the ‘greed’ theory adherents like Collier (2000); Adesoji 
(2011); Herbst and Mills (2003) and Reno (2000) have continued to underscore the prevalence 
of corrupt practices and the deliberate weakening of the infrastructure of governance and/or 
state institutions as the ‘root cause’ of most if not all the political violence in the continent. 
Reno’s (2000) shadow state theory (as part of the Greed theory) as a concept explicates 
the deliberate acts of strengthening informal networks or structures over formal state 
institutions by the ruler (of ‘weak’ African states) and his allies for economic gains. This is 
made possible through a supposed state sovereignty subverted by a system of 'personal rule’. 
As a result, public goods become 'privatized' and the masses are intentionally impoverished 
and denied basic amenities so as to ensure patronage of the ruler. The creation of this system 
ensures a continuous spiral of corrupt practices both by the ruler and his allies and the people 
in general as the framework allows those in power to engage in the siphoning of public wealth 
for private uses without being checked and as a way of survival the masses have to take to 
informal networks to court the favour of the ruler and establish affinity on private grounds. 
For Frances Stewart (2002; 2008), on the other hand, using her Horizontal Inequality theory, 
has submitted that, ethnic identities determine to a large extent who gets what (resources) 
in pluralist and poor countries like Uganda, Northern Island and Sri Lanka. The theory explains 
the prevalence of political violence as due to striking social and economic differences among 
divergent groups in poor countries as these differences line up with politics as it determines 
who gets what. Due to the prevalence of poverty and several ethnic groupings, competition 
for how resources are allocated became connected to the ethnic identities of state 
functionaries as they are considered as representing their ethnic group and not the wider 




impoverished because of lack of access to state resources and the emergence of political 
violence becomes inevitable in such instance. Though Collier (2000) has disputed the validity 
or usefulness of this theory in understanding the incidence of political violence by arguing 
against the salience of identity, Keen (2012), Ballantine and Sherman (2003) have reiterated 
the usefulness of this theory in understanding why violence happens in Africa. Close to this 
school of thought is Gurr and Harff (1994), Ali and Mathews (1999), Brown (1996; 1998), 
Carment and James (1998); Lake and Rothchild (1998), Snyder and Jervis (1999) seeming 
agreement on how elements of group identity and interaction could be used to facilitate 
political violence. However, even positivist like Weingast (1997), Posner (2004), Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) have submitted that the mere fact that a society is pluralistic does not explain 
the occurrence or otherwise of violence. As Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) argue that ‘a greater 
degree of ethnic or religious identity… by itself ‘cannot be ‘a major or direct cause’ of any 
violence or conflict. While the Stewart’s concept seems to capture most of the factors 
highlighted as the root causes of political violence in Africa, ranging from identity to economic 
issues, it nonetheless seems to hold ethnic identities as pre-discursively fixed rather than 
constructed. In the words of Bhabha (2010:3, 4): 
Terms of cultural engagement whether antagonistic or affiliative are 
produced performatively. The representation of difference must not be 
hastily read as the representation of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in 
the fixed tablets of tradition 
Hence ‘the binary logic through which identities of difference’ are perceived is a product of 
some construction and reconstruction and deliberately reinforced rather than pre-given. 
Interesting in the wake of the GWOT, with the exception of scholars like Jeremy Keenan and 
Noam Chomsky, the seeming divergent voices became conflated under ‘state failure’ and its 
link to ‘terrorism’ in Africa. The state failure discourse premised on reductionism, hence, does 
not only make ‘terrorism’ knowable but also exists to justify and normalize the neo-colonial 
venture of modernisation of African states from the Cold War period. This thesis contends 
that in understanding political violence in contemporary Africa, as exemplified by Boko Haram 
in Nigeria, the articulation of discursive structure as well as the productive practices enabled 
by these constructs are not in themselves natural but became necessary in order to silent 




State Failure and Terrorism in Africa 
The concept of state failure is not an entirely new one as it is often linked to the modernization 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Amin 1974; Bayart 1993). The concern for state failure could 
be traced to the Cold War when nation-building became conflated with state-building 
(Marrouchi 2010; Piot 2010). The concept of state fragility/weakness becomes dominant to 
the understanding of world politics because the end of Cold War signals the collapsing of 
bipolarity and eliminates seeming distance between the United States and the rest of the 
global regions (Amburn 2009; Devetak 2008; Duffield 2005; Schmidt 2013). The thesis on state 
failure/weakness is often constructed in literature as the ‘crisis’ of the 1990s evident by the 
case of Yugoslavia, USSR, Cambodia, Sudan, Liberia and particularly Somalia. While the 
conceptualization itself remains problematic amidst scholars and policy makers, it however 
gained significant importance in U.S Foreign policy as signalled by its inclusion as a matter of 
concern in the U.S National Security Strategy of 1998 and the policy focus on ‘weak states’’ in 
the 2002 National Security Strategy. The concept, however, became the core of policy 
narratives, after the September 2001 event (Amburn 2006; NSS 1998). Though scholars and 
policy analysts like Jeffrey D. Sachs and Rita Abrahamsen have highlighted how the strategic 
interests of the United States since the second World War have been based on global 
inequality and the implicit use of the concept have shaped the U.S foreign policy towards 
these states, it remains that it is the (re)conceptualization of these events as ‘crisis’  that 
occasioned the ‘shift’ in foreign policy and therefore enables practices such as militarism 
and/or counterterrorism which has often defined the U.S foreign policy towards Africa. 
According to Nabers (2009) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896), how certain events are 
interpreted by agents often serve as the ‘‘tipping points’’ which signals a crisis in foreign policy 
and therefore justified the ‘shift’ in narratives and the new direction/drive of foreign policy. 
According to Rotberg (2002), today’s globalization makes the phenomenon of failed states of 
graver consequence to the US and the democratic world at large than before. This trend 
has continued to be a source of deep concern because weak or failed states have been 
identified as a source of threat to the stability and development of the democratic world.  As 




Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much 
more relevant and worry than ever before. In less interconnected eras, state 
weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications 
for peace and security. Now these states pose dangers not only to 
themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe. 
In the wake of the War on Terror, the proposition that fragile states are the main threats to 
global security then becomes a dominant argument. With the first appearance of The Failed 
States Index in 2005, the template is invariably linked to the September 2001 event and has 
made a successful journey from the ‘periphery’ to the very ‘centre of global politics’ since 
September 2001. Following September 2001, state failure ‘was held responsible for just about 
every threat to international peace and security that existed: civil war, mass migration, ethnic 
conflict, environmental degradation, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism’ 
(Gourevitch, 2004; 255). However, prior to September 2001, ‘The State Failure Task Force’ 
research project funded by the CIA was initiated in 1994 as an effort to understand the 
emerging trend of state failure due to the ‘crisis’ of the early 1990s but synergized efforts 
were conspicuously absent until the unfortunate event of September 2001. It is in this light 
that academics like Walt (2002) argue that in spite of the huge challenges failed states pose 
to ‘’neighbouring countries’’ which range from ‘’large-scale migration’’ to ’’economic chaos’’ 
and ‘’mass violence’’, the perception of this problem has largely been humanitarian and its 
corresponding response of non-commitment by the US to seriously tackle it. He argues that 
the phenomenon should rather be viewed as a ‘’major national security problem’’ and should 
be tackled accordingly. Citing the inherent danger in the extensive conflicts that are 
commonplace in failed states, for instance, how terrorists’ organisations like al-Qaeda are the 
offspring of unresolved prolonged conflicts. He finally submits that ‘’helping to settle 
protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general; it can also make the 
United States safer’’. 
While state failure as a matter of policy is not just about Africa, Africa has come to occupy the 
centre of the state failure scholarship not just because they are states ‘that will not disappear, 
but simply cannot develop’ (Herbst 1990:138) but also because of its (particularly the Horn of 
Africa) supposedly shared similarities with countries like Afghanistan which makes it ‘a moral 




with  globalization with the resulting effects being endemic poverty and disease, massive 
crime including drug-related ones, privatization of violence, breakdown of law and order 
leading to a supposed ‘global dislocation’ (Kaldor 2001:70; Newman 2007). Thus, African 
‘quasi’ states according to Jackson (1987: 526-528) could be best described as: 
... more a personal- or primordial-favouring political arrangement than a 
public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide political 
goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain 
of privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it... Many 
governments are incapable of enforcing their writ throughout their territory. 
In more than a few countries... some regions have escaped from national 
control... [and the states] are fairly loose patchworks of plural allegiances 
and identities somewhat reminiscent of medieval Europe. 
Moreover, with the exceptions of critical scholarship like Milliken and Krause (2002) and Hill 
(2007), mainstream scholarship on state failure often consider the validity or otherwise of the 
label without its historical contingency as a production which became necessary for certain 
ends. The critical literature notwithstanding there seems to be an obvious gap in literature 
that draws the state failure-terrorism thesis to a productive end, that is, the state failure-
terrorism nexus underscores age-long neo-colonial enterprise. The question is, how does a 
state so ‘authoritarian’ so as to be repressive, is also so lacking in ‘authority’ for effective 
governance? The answer here seems to lie in the silencing of possible alternatives, the violent 
history of state-making, and the dogmatic assumption that the question of (Weberian) 
statehood as appropriate for post-colonial countries cannot be interrogated (Engel and 
Mehler 2005; Lund 2006; Benjaminsen and Lund 2002; von Benda-Beckmann 2001; Young, 
1988; Hyden 1999; Tilly 1985) To put it in Kapferer (2005:286 )’s words:’’ the once broadly 
accepted Weberian definition of state as that authority with the legitimate monopoly of 
violence over defined territory seems to be undergoing challenge in many global regions’’. 
Critics have often responded to this proposition as either ignoring historical timeline, issues 
of context and/or dynamics in modern state formation which makes the comparison an 
imbalance proposition considering that African states are relatively new in the stage of state 
formation especially in the international context (Milliken and Krause 2002; Aidan 2007; 




instance, call for its utter abandonment, whereby emphasizing its othering character and the 
inherent pathological representation. Central to this argument is how ‘failure’ should be 
understood. Beyond the process of conceptualization and its attendant problems, it’s the 
even more serious problem of lack of any serious scholarship on the processes of state failure. 
According to Milliken and Krause (2003:12): ‘one might expect that the case of state collapse 
would be a prominent object of study for those working on state failure, and/or that 
scholarship on state failure would deploy a coherent set of concepts and distinctions with 
which to study the processes of state failure. But ... this is not the case.’ Not only has 
conceptual vagueness and ambiguities proliferated, the normative solution which is state-
building does not put history and context into adequate consideration.  Hence, two hitherto 
separate disciplines (i.e. security and development) have to be linked in order to argue the 
point for state building as the ‘cure’ for state failure/fragile and terrorism in Africa. Albeit the 
conceptual jumble (on state failure) which has continued to abound and its attendant policy 
implications call for a critical introspection into the normative understanding of what makes 
a state. 
However, its linkage to terrorism in Africa is a recent development which could be considered 
as evolving since the emergence of the World Bank ‘good governance’ concept and the state 
failure ‘crisis’ of the 1990s. Hence, after the September 2001 attack therefore these two 
hitherto contested concepts became fixed and naturalised. Evolving literatures on the nexus 
of state failure and terrorism are often considered in three dominant perspectives. Scholars 
in the first school of thought argues that African state weakness/fragility are ‘safe havens’ or 
‘sanctuaries’ for terrorists. In other words, the (deliberate) weakening of such states’ 
institutional structures provides an easy hide-out for terrorists and transnational criminals 
(Andre le Sage 2005; Arseneault and Bacon 2015; Afoaku 2017). Citing reasons why (African) 
failed states lead to terrorism, Andre le Sage (2005) opines that African states present 
themselves as sanctuaries to terrorists due to their physical, legal and financial ‘’safe havens’’. 
Africa many ‘’ungoverned spaces’’ call for worry as these physical spaces are so because the 
respective state governments are either lacking in willingness or capacity to exercise due 
control over the territories and as such terrorists use them for recruitment and operation 




respective legal frameworks and the sluggishness in the commitment of relevant national 
governments and stakeholders to accede to the outcome of the UN Security Resolution 2001 
and introduce punitive measures into the framework. African’s ‘ungoverned spaces’ 
therefore do not only serve as ‘launching pads’ for terrorists but also such states seem to 
provide some sorts of assistance to terrorists and transnational criminals. Obviously, scholars 
in this school of thought have refused to engage with arguments about what actually 
constitute a state failure and what is terrorism and how these contested concepts become 
fixed and dominant. This might reveal why the process of conceptualization itself is 
considered problematic as early works like Helman and Ratner’s ‘Failed States’ (1993) and 
Zartman’s ‘Collapsed States’ (1995) which were obviously addressed to 1990s ‘crisis’ not only 
differ in their labels and definitions but also in their applications. While Helman and Ratner 
sees ‘Failed States’ as states that are ‘Utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
international community’, Zartman sees it as where ‘the basic functions of the state are no 
longer performed’ (1993, pp 2-3). Also, from Rotberg’s to the annual Failed State Index (FSI)’s 
definitions and indices of failed state, disparate conditions and categories continue to evolve. 
For instance, Rotberg’s open blanket definition of a failing state being ‘’any state in anarchy’’ 
poses the danger of an ever-widening category as it is unclear what is ‘anarchy’ and how 
different social and institutional conditions could be so conflated. In 2003, Colombia, Iraq, 
North Korea, Indonesia and Cote d’Ivoire were considered by Rotberg as failing states. These 
states not only represented disparate and parallel social and institutional conditions but also 
the very nature of armed conflicts they experience are obviously different, and so might 
demand different policy response. To mention Colombia and Iraq as examples, drug related 
violence could be said to be the bane of the Colombia government’s challenge while sectarian 
violence that of Iraq. Both states are at extreme when it comes to indicators of fragility, 
weakness or failure. While Iraq has continued to show signs of weakness across board like its 
economic, political, security and social welfare, Colombia has only shown signs of weakness 
in particular areas of the state in relation to security. 
Furthermore, critics like Newman (2007), Call (2008), Aidan (2007) Campana and Ducoi 
(20011) and Brooks (2011) have highlighted how it is the so-called strong states, like Saudi 




According to this group of scholars, often terror networks rely on technological architecture, 
finances and weapons that poor and weak states do not possess. Newman (2007) for instance 
argue that conflating state weakness/failure together with terrorism does not only raises 
serious methodological concerns, it also leads to false conclusions owing to a number of false 
premises. While agreeing to the fact that terrorists’ organisations could benefit from failed 
states like Somalia, he contended that the history of terrorism reveals that such organisations 
has thrived in diverse social and political landscape. According to Call (2008) the ‘cookie-
cutter prescription’ of building state institutions particularly the ‘core’ five institutions, which 
are highlighted as military, police, civil service, the system of justice and leadership (FSI 2008), 
clearly reflect a ‘concern for order and stability’ and exist to serve the self-serving interest of 
the West without putting into consideration the complex and diverge realities of states. Due 
to this bias and self-serving agenda, there seems to be a foreclosure of certain ‘truth’ which 
do not line-up with western interest. The concern for order and the focus on state building 
has therefore led to oppressive practices in struggling African states especially through the 
military. While some scholars in this school of thought concluded by advocating for 
alternative modes of conceptualization and/or policy response in engaging with the problem 
of terrorism/political violence in Africa, either of the concepts or both of them are often held 
as fixed categories which are self-evident outside of discourse. 
Political Violence in Nigeria Pre-September 2001 
The logic of the Nigerian violence has hitherto been somewhat polarised into two distinct 
categories: colonial heritage and/or Nigeria as a weak state. Colonial heritage here refers to 
cultural, economic cum political domination not just by Nigeria’s colonizer, Britain, but by a 
critical mass of foreign (western) countries with economic and political interests in Nigeria. 
As far back as the 60’s to early 2000’s scholars like Nkrumah (1965), Leys (1974) and Uche 
2008  clearly locate the fragile unity and violent reality of the state since its independence on 
1st October, 1960, to its colonial heritage asserting that post colonialism is a myth rather than 
a reality in Nigeria as the state remains subservient to its colonizers which gives rise to a neo-




who serves the interest of Britain and others in a bid to advance their careers in the nascent 
state. According to Williams (1998: 289): 
Independence had brought not the solace and succour it had promised but 
deepening misery and misfortune. Internal colonialism had merely replaced 
external colonialism. Africans, to use the words of local commentators, had 
only exchanged monkeys for baboons. What made the situation particularly 
galling was that in most cases, yesterday's celebrated freedom fighter had 
become today's remarkable tyrant. 
This argument was advanced further by scholars who posit that political violence in Nigeria is 
premised on the ‘divide and rule’ policy of Britain which ensures a reification of religious and 
ethnic identities in order to perpetuate dominance. Religious and ethnic identities thus 
became politicised and this became noticeable immediately after Nigeria’s independence in 
the civil war saga. For Falola (1998), Jibrin (1989); Hunwick (1992), and Isichei (1987), 
sectarian violence which is premised on religious identities claimed thousands of lives 
because ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘political Islam’ was on the rise either for ‘puritanists’ 
purposes like the Maitaisine uprising (1980-1985) or for competitive purposes as the Muslim 
elites from 1930 began striving to keep pace with their Christian counterpart who has had a 
growing influence since 1842.  Unsurprisingly, the proliferation of non-state violent groups in 
the 1960s to 1990s was largely due to agitations around control of resources (Falola and 
Heaton 2008), the Nigerian civil war, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
in Nigeria (MEND), the Suez war in Egypt, and the Algerian war (which lasted for seven years), 
among others, remain quintessential examples of political violence motivated by the colonial 
powers’ exploitation of oil in colonial states. It is worth mentioning that beyond the torture, 
killings and assassinations of nationalist militant groups and leaders, civilian settlements were 
invaded by the colonial armies (with properties and millions of lives destroyed) as deemed fit 
by the imperial powers (Louis and Owen 1956; Cradock 2002; Horn 2006). For instance, Pegg 
(1999) examines how violence has defined the environment where multinational oil 
companies like the Royal Dutch Company and others have operated and groups like 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) emerged to resist the domination 
and environmental degradation. This led to the unlawful killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader 




continued to experience is largely due to agitations against foreign domination and control of 
the Nigerian petroleum. 
As an astute historian, Toyin Falola through a revisionist template contended that violence in 
Nigeria is not a ‘new phenomena’ as earlier (colonial) literature, which highlights 
conflicts/instability with the solution of narratives of ‘accommodation’, would want us to 
believe, but based on religious identity politics. Extant literature on political violence in 
Nigeria from 1960s seems to be represented along the lines of control for the nation’s 
resources (both nationally and internationally) but expressed primarily through ethno-
religious identity, as identity is considered critical to determining allocation of resources 
(Nnoli 1988; Diamond 1988; Adebanwi 2004; Kalejaiye and Aliyu 2013). Not surprisingly, the 
1970’s and 80’s which was Nigeria’s second republic (also anchored on military rule) 
witnessed the rise of extreme religious groups like the Maitaisine, the Yan Izala, Dawa Group, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and many others in the northern part of the country (Adesoji 2010). 
While other militant groups like the MEND and OPC sprung up in the southern part. To 
highlight the Maitaisine uprising in the North, for instance, Adesoji (2010) and Tilde (2012) 
argue that the Boko Haram’s ontology could be located in that of the Maitaisine. The 
Maitaisine uprising, as it is referred to, was a violent uprising that was said to be responsible 
for the deaths of an un-estimated number of Nigerians and almost like the civil war, in terms 
of duration, it lasted from 1980 to 1985 with pockets of violent uprising in Kano (1980), 
Kaduna and Bulumkutu (1982), Yola (1984) and Bauchi (1985) regions. The leader of the 
movement advanced criticisms of corruption, inequalities and the likes against the Nigerian 
government, which he posits as capitalist and westernized (Forest 2012). Agbigboa (2010) and 
others while acknowledging some similarities ranging from religious identity, narratives and 
geographical locations, have however debunked any explicit link of the Boko Haram group to 
the Maitaisine’s. This is because groups with similar narratives and identity are a common 
feature of the Nigerian political landscape. 
To this end, there are ample study on how identities are constructed and mobilized along 
ethno-religious fault lines in Nigeria (Brown 2003; Younis, Mcllenan and Yates 1999; Ikelegbe 




Kaduna state, for instance, Nigeria is regarded as the ‘most deeply divided state in Africa’ due 
to complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly 
intractable conflicts and instability’. He portends that in Northern Nigeria, religion is the 
mainstay of identity as it defines how individuals perceive of themselves, others and the 
world. Boundaries are thus created in social interaction as religion determines whether an 
individual is part of a social group or not. Furthermore, they assert that religion ‘‘acts both as 
a strong identity and bond to a social group and as a tool to legitimize power’’. The argument 
of Blanco-Mancilla like many others, however, seems to underwrite itself by first 
acknowledging divergent ethno-religious identities in the country and at the same time using 
one state (Kaduna) to represent the entire country. Also, the fact that both Christianity and 
Islam practised in the state are not monolithic is not recognised. 
Prior to the 1990s, the literature was focused on understanding ‘conflicts’, ‘uprisings’, 
‘revolts’, ‘civil war’, ‘crisis’, ‘instability’ and/or ‘clashes’. However, the late 1990s heralded a 
new development in literature and discussions about endemic corruption of the political 
elites or the apparent lack of capacity of the Nigerian state, as other African states, in matters 
of administration and governance began to evolve (Ikelegbe 1999; 2001; Abutudu 1995; 
Olukoshi 1996; Herbst 2004). To push this even further, some scholars in this school have 
argued that the entity called Nigeria is only a myth of the Whiteman, arguing that the 
continued fragile polity of the country is as a result of the union of disparate peoples and 
cultures who have no common heritage or history. Citing the already established different 
kingdoms of the Hausa-Fulani, Oyo and others, prior to the advent of Britain in the 19th and 
20th centuries Kyari (1994) contends that Nigeria is a forceful fusion of disparate peoples and 
cultures and could never be regarded as an entity.  For scholars like Jerven (2009) and Decker 
(2008: 605) in this school of thought, the neo-colonial system in Nigeria ensures Nigeria 
remains within its orbit as an economic and political satellite by institutionalizing composite 
laws that are meant to safeguard the self-interest of Britain, USA, France, Japan, Italy, 
Germany and Holland in Nigeria. According to Decker (2008: 605), the British neo-colonial 
system in Nigeria ’ensures Nigeria remains within its orbit as an economic and political 
satellite’ by institutionalizing certain laws that are meant to safeguard the self-interest of 




Nigeria has continued to experience has its root in the foreign control of the petroleum 
reserves. Prior to the independence of Nigeria, the British Petroleum and the Royal Dutch 
Shell has monopoly of the oil industry and control the production, distribution and marketing 
of the product (Uche 2008). After independence, though ownership was transferred to 
Nigeria, not so much changed as only multinational oil companies from countries like Britain, 
the USA, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Holland were granted exploration rights. 
Moreover, tax laws that are composite in nature like the Income Tax Act (No 22 of 1961) were 
put in place to grant fiscal concessions and tax reliefs to these companies (Attah 2013). These 
forms of control were not limited to the petroleum industry but are observable features of all 
key sectors of the economy (Jerven 2009). 
Political Violence in Nigeria Post-September 2001 
In recent scholarship, Nigeria, like most other African states, has been described variously by 
scholars and policy documents/makers as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and/or ‘failing’ and disparate 
political violence (like Boko Haram, Ansaru and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)) rooted in 
the history of the state became understood as ‘terrorism’ (Agbiboa 2009; 2011; Solomon 
2015). For scholars like Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011), Benjamin, Ayo, Ufo and Hakeem (2012) 
and Afoaku (2017), terrorism in Nigeria is intrinsically connected to the failed states template. 
For Ayo, Ufo and Hakeem (2012) and others who obviously have given less consideration to 
the questions: what is terrorism? Who defines it? Why is Nigeria discussing terrorism now? 
And what implications, if any, does the terrorism discourse have on the peoples of 
Nigeria?  are rather swift to highlight either the extreme poverty being experienced by the 
Northern part of Nigeria, lack of basic human rights, corrupt political elite, or the pluralism of 
the Nigerian society as the cause(s) of the Boko Haram uprising and almost in the same breath 
offer a rather naïve and simplistic solution to the complex problem. More often than not these 
group of scholars hypothesize that the acute prevalence of violent groups in the Nigerian state 
is the result of factors like untamed corruption, poverty, gross abuse of human rights and 
coercion. Some others have located the violent reality of the state either within the template 
of the ‘greed’ of its political elites and/or the overtly dependence of the country on primary 
commodity like oil thereby giving rise to arguments on ‘oil wars’ or ‘resource curse’ 




like Adebayo et. al (2012) and Onapajo and Uzodike (2012) contend that the prevalence of 
corruption of the political elites (since the independence of the country) which is in sharp 
contrast to the spirit of democracy explains why ‘religion’ and ‘ethnic’ cleavages have become 
so politicised in such a way that violent groups like Boko Haram were organised for political 
ends like the winning of elections. According to Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:31) ‘‘Nigeria 
typifies a good example of a failing or weak state that is fast gravitating towards a failed or 
collapsed state like Somalia and others’’. They contend that David Rapport’s ‘four waves’ of 
terrorism proves useful in understanding the emergence of the group. Like many other 
scholars of this school of thought, the question of why the discourse of failed/fragile states 
and terrorism is now considered useful in understanding the reality of the Nigerian state 
considering that political violence has been recurrent since the country’s independence is 
never asked? Moreover, the idea of Islamic revivalism as proposed by David Rapoport has not 
put into proper perspective the fact that Islam like many other major religions of the world is 
not monolithic and so subject to varied interpretations. The overriding concern here has been 
to identify the root causes of Boko Haram and other groups’ violence rather than an attempt 
at understanding the construction that enabled such practices as ‘corruption’, ‘weakness’ 
and/or ‘terrorism’. 
These strands of literature which obviously evolve after the re-emergence of the ‘good 
governance’ concept of the 1990’s and became dominant after the September 11, 2001 event 
reveal the prevalence of politics in the articulation of discursive structure. Interestingly, no 
known publication has argued against the use of the label ‘terrorism’ in understanding the 
violence of Boko Haram (and others). As a discursive construct by deconstructing the 
discursive structure positioned as objective, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in knowledge. As 
this thesis argues, this is as a result of hegemonic intervention which explicates the coupling 
together of two hitherto conceptually contested and analytically invalid terms: ‘state failure’ 
and ‘terrorism’. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged literatures relevant to the understanding of political violence in 




emergence of the discourse of terrorism in post-September 2001. The Chapter is divided into 
two broad sections with two subheadings under each section. The first section focused on 
understanding dominant arguments on political violence in Africa both before and after the 
emergence of the discourse of terrorism. This effort is undertaken because the dominant logic 
of political violence in Nigeria as represented in literature often reflect some wider 
happenings in Africa. The section could therefore serve as a background to understanding the 
literature on political violence in Nigeria. The second section therefore reviewed literature on 
political violence in Nigeria both before and after September 2001. Prior to the event of 
September 2001, the understanding of political violence in Africa has often warranted a state-
centric lens which was either about the import of colonial heritage which is somewhat close 
to Mamdani’s argument of ‘decentralized nepotism’ or the failure/weakness of the state in 
matters of governance. Reviewing dominant arguments about political violence in 
Africa/Nigeria this way therefore helps to capture not only the history of certain violence but 
also how understanding about such violence changed after the September 2001 event. 
In this light, the chapter has highlighted the dominant themes in literature on understanding 
political violence in Africa from the Cold War to the present as inherently linked to the 
functioning or otherwise of states in the continent. The chapter argues that political violence 
is not a new phenomenon in the continent as well as Nigeria. However, the representation of 
the violence has often been linked to the ‘weakness’ or ‘failure’ of states from the Cold War 
to the present. While this is not intended to function as a denial of the role state agents play 
in the prevalence of violence as is the case in Nigeria, the labelling of terrorists in post-
September 2001 works to blur the history of violence by silencing the role of structures 
through which such violence is produced. The state failure thesis for instance while 
accounting for the role of local state agents silenced the complicities of the Cold War. 
Moreover, the emergence of the terrorism discourse in Nigeria particularly points to the need 














Chapter 5: Constructing the Terrorist 
Threat: From the Cold War to the Present 
‘‘Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat 
to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible 
to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will 
work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build 
capacity in developing states to increase their progress’’ (National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, 2006) 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to show how the U.S foreign policy, as a discursive site, enables the 
constructions of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. Rather than being a momentous event 
which rewrites the understanding of political violence in Nigeria, the event of 9/11 only 
represents a continuity of earlier constructions of Africa, especially from the 1970s. By 
initiating discursive moves around distant events such that the meaning of ‘crisis’ did not only 
remain elusive but also posits Africa as a site of permanent disorder and anarchy. The 
construction of the terrorist threat after September 2001 represents a continuity of earlier 
constructions of ‘instability’ from the 1970s, the period of the Cold War. These sorts of 
constructions are not products of self-evident objective realities themselves rather they are 
often signalled by the subjective interpretation of distant events as ‘crisis’ which warrants a 
‘shift’ or change in policy strategies and engagements. The (re)conceptualization of material 
events as open referents to mean a crisis by agents helps to weaken hitherto dominant 
discourses and reify other discourses thereby constituting such as ‘focusing events’ (Birkland 
2004: 335). By arguing that interpretation of events as crises are not necessarily a product of 
the material reality of such events but rather that of discursive construction by agents, 
Widmaier (2007: 779-780), highlighted instances of these in U.S foreign policy as transitioning 
from an ‘exceptionalist isolationism’ prior to the World war II to an ‘’internationalist’’ stance 




War on Terror as exemplified by the case of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo and by September 
2001 it became more of an internationalist stance. The interaction of the United States with 
West Africa and particularly Nigeria is suggested in literature to be dated as far back as the 
pre-Columbian era (Ate 1987). However, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the colonization 
of Liberia, a West African nation (in 1822), represent the defining history of the U.S relations 
with the sub-continent. In the words of Oyebade and Falola (2008:18) ‘The shipment of 
several million Africans, mostly from West Africa, across the Atlantic to the New World 
represented the largest forced migration in human history…’ Most scholars conclude that not 
long after the abolition of slave trade, US interest in West Africa became particularly 
isolationist except for their continual dominance of Liberia, their ex-colony (Flint 1976). Apart 
from the slave trade, the US has a long history of intervention in North Africa (the region that 
now play host to most of the terrorists’ organizations in Africa). This could be dated from the 
19th century, 1st and 2nd Barbary Wars to the World Wars. The 2nd World War particularly 
and the Cold War signals the US military intervention in Africa when wars were fought by 
proxies with the U.S either maintaining a ‘paradoxical policy of espousing self-determination 
and decolonization while supporting the European colonial powers’ during the 2nd world war 
or funding violent groups against the government or vice versa during the Cold War 
(Akinwande 2014: 110; Ewoh 2008). 
The representation of Nigeria in mainstream literature is that, unlike most other African 
states, Nigeria won its independence on 1st October 1960, without apparent political 
violence. While this might prove true to the extent that ‘the dynamics of independence’ in 
Nigeria did not warrant any major political violence, it remains however that there were 
evidences of pockets of riots/resistances (throughout the country) relating to the Cold War 
and the structure being put in place during decolonisation (Events in Lagos 1976; FRUS 1950; 
Adebajo 2010; Falola 1999). The discourses of ‘danger’ (Campbell 1999:171) like AIDS, and 
terrorism which have come to signal ‘general sign of anarchy ’became transitioned to state-
centric‘ crises of the 1990s after the Cold War ended. Hence, the shift of the GWOT into Africa 
has often been represented in mainstream literature as not only necessary but also justified 
for pragmatic reasons like the ‘security’ of the U.S.  As the end of the Cold War also signals 




Cold War bi-polar relations with the rest of the world (Devetak 2008). The construction of 
‘crisis’ of terrorism in Africa was enabled by the state failure policy strategy. The construction 
works to normalize and naturalize the counter terrorism focus of state agents both locally and 
internationally. The justification for Africa’s integration into the GWOT therefore explains 
how the ‘I/We’ versus ‘them/theirs’ of the terrorism discourse became represented in Nigeria 
particularly and Africa generally. As Jourde (2006:183) asserts that: 
How a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand 
how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies 
have been excluded. In sum, the way one sees, interprets and imagines the 
‘other’ delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with 
the ‘other’. 
The aim of this chapter is to show how U.S foreign policy towards Africa became constructed 
to signal, ‘anarchy’, ‘danger’, and ‘threat’ as continuities from the Cold War, especially the 
1970s to the present. The change in discourse after September 2001 is however signalled 
from the ‘crisis’ in Africa being a marginal issue as the continent and its issues were only 
discussed alongside other issues prior to 9/11, the ‘crisis’ of September 2001 in Africa became 
transitioned to a discursive moment. Thus, this representation changed how the continent is 
being talked about but not what is being said. This will serve as a context for understanding 
the construction of the counter terrorist state in Chapter 7 and how the Othering process of 
the terrorists i.e. Boko Haram in the wake of the 9/11 signals a continuity of earlier discourse 
(in Chapter 8). 
The main argument of the chapter is that though scholars have often highlighted the end of 
the Cold War as being the end of bi-polarity, the inherent nature of the discourse of terrorism 
in the wake of 9/11 signals a continuation of the binary division of the world into order versus 
disorder with the U.S positioned as the ‘center’.  In order to effectively bring home the 
argument of this chapter, the chapter will be divided into be divided into three subheadings: 
one is Articulating Crisis of Africa: From the 1970s to the 1980s. This section aims to show 
how the period of the Cold War particularly, from the 1970s to the 1980s, the articulation of 
‘crisis’ through the signification of ‘instability’ and ‘development’ became woven around the 




silencing the role of the United States. The second subheading: Articulating Crisis of State 
Failure: from the 1990s to the early 2000s examined the continuities and changes of U.S policy 
towards Africa during this period. It shows that rather being a material ‘reality’, the dominant 
theme of ‘instability’ which helps to justify the concern of the United States’ national security 
was transitioned from earlier years. The third subheading: Articulating Crisis of Terrorism: 
Post September 2001 examines how the ‘crisis’ of terrorism become construction and what 
this means. It highlights how rather than the focus on the Horn of Africa in articulating the 
‘crisis’ of state failure, the articulation of the ‘crisis’ of terrorism helps to integrate the whole 






Articulating Crisis of Africa: From the 1970s to 1980s 
The main thrust of the U.S administrations from the 1950s to the 1970s was the need to 
ensure a pro-U.S or Western-oriented Africa. This was conceived differently by different 
administrations; from Eisenhower (1950s) to Carter (1970s), for instance, the discourse was 
about Africa as a periphery region with varying levels of significance to U.S interests in policy 
terms. One of the early practices enabled by this discourse was the creation of the Bureau of 
African Affairs within the State Department in 1958 as recommended by the Nixon 
Administration. Prior to the Eisenhower presidency, the heightened concern over the 
‘‘psychological warfare’’ of the Soviet occasioned Truman’s authorization of ‘peacetime 
covert action operations’ through the new National Security Council and necessitated the 
development of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy in 1962: 
A military interest in assuring that strategic areas and the manpower and 
natural resources of developing nations do not fall under communist 
control; that these nations remain able to maintain effectively their internal 
security and to preserve independence from communist control. 
The context of the Cold War and the decolonization of Africa therefore serve as background 
to the normative understanding of Africa by state agents prior to the 1970s. The relevance or 
otherwise of Africa, and of course, Nigeria, in policy terms are in line with the U.S 
internationalist stance during the Cold War and the adoption of policy of containment during 
the Cold War (Gourevitch 1986; Ikenberry 2001). Thus, the linkage of the military to political 
and economic issues in Africa became warranted since the continent began struggling for its 
independence from colonialism. However, in the 1970s, especially from the Presidency of 
Gerald Ford (1974-1977) to that of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), the construction of Africa 
generally and Nigeria in particular, as a site of danger was signalled through the interpretation 
of certain domestic events as crises through policy instruments. Unlike conventional wisdom, 
in the materialist school of thought which opines that states interests, and of course, their 
foreign policy is exogenously given (Krasner 1978; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 
1981), it is the interpretation of such events by certain agents that help to fix the meaning of 




Africa is concerned; the latter is always considered to be at the margin of the former’s foreign 
policy and as such issues about the continent are bipartisan and opened to less debate and 
rigorous considerations (Schraeder 1995; Olsen 2017). In the words of Skinner (1986: 43), 
“America’s military and strategic interests in Africa would scarcely have merited a paragraph 
in anything other than an ambitious naval officer's dream book”. Often the                                                                                                                                 
reduction in budgetary allocation to the continent was highlighted as the referent which 
signals the diminished interest of the U.S in Africa (Schroeder 1994; Taylor 2004). The relative 
decline of America’s military and economic might during/after the Cold War, however, could 
explain why funds earlier budgeted for pro-West countries and non-state actors witnessed 
some significant cutback. It is rather this decline in American strength that help to construct 
and justify the importance of revolutions in African states to the U.S security especially from 
the 1970s (Rothchild 1983; Clough 1992). The marginality of Africa then could be argued as 
based on a fixated stereotyping drawn from earlier colonial discourses. Considering the Cold 
War context and America’s policy of containment, it remains that countries like Nigeria that 
have adopted a seemingly neutral disposition and policy towards both power blocs have to 
be kept under some other forms of ‘tutelage’.  This was stated explicitly as the reasons for 
aids and other economic relations (FRUS 1960). Of importance here is that the application of 
the idea of trusteeship analogous to that of the League of Nations where nations are under 
‘tutelage’ and ‘modernized’ became incompatible with the British principle of self-
governance and underscores the reason why the United States, amidst other international 
actors such as Denmark, Syria, Uruguay and Thailand as the members of the committee of 
the International Court of Justice, a principal judicial organ of the United Nations, championed 
the deliberate fusion of the principles of self-government and good governance5 which had 
hitherto been at parallel (Thornton 1999)6. Particularly in the 1970s and 80s, this justified the 
                                                     
5 Note that this concept has a long colonial history (Hewitt 2009) 
 
6 For instance, in the decades prior to independence, the meaning of ‘good governance’, which initially signals 
the superiority of Britain ruling class over others especially the colonies and justifies their economic interests 
and policies, was later transitioned to mean ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’ through a radical social and 
economic change of the colonies. This change meant a complete fusion of the seemingly parallel concepts of 
good governance and that of self-governance. This historic feat originated from and was achieved through the 




U.S support for colonial legacy in the Southern Question i.e. the ‘crisis’ of Angola, Namibia, 
and South Africa itself, and the preservation of its economic interests in the Horn of Africa as 
well as West Africa.  The construction of crisis premised on ‘conflicts’ and ‘instability’ of the 
‘third world’ necessitated a policy response through which modernization of these countries 
become the panacea for ensuring peace: 
The Continent still faces grave problems. The imbalances of economies and 
institutions once under full external control are only too evident today. 
Arbitrary boundaries drawn in European chancelleries left many African 
countries vulnerable to tribal strife; and no-where is the task of nation-
building more taxing. Not least, Africans face the formidable task of 
strengthening their sense of identity and preserving traditional culture as 
their societies make the transition to modernity. We have learned that 
there are no panaceas for African development…. (Peace Strategy for the 
1970’s) 
Africa is the latest, the last, and will be, perhaps, the worst area of 
instability and conflict resulting from the end of the European colonial 
empires, a process which began immediately after World War II and which 
has seen the withdrawal of the British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and 
Portuguese from the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece and Cyprus), the 
Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, and South East Asia. These 
withdrawals involved conflicts between the colonial power and indigenous 
nationalist groups, between contending indigenous groups, and between 
outside powers and forces attempting to fill the vacuum (FRUS 1977-
1980). 
As a discursive move, the articulation of the crisis of development is initiated through 
the enduring colonial discourse which positions Africa as site of lingering problems. 
The problems of instability and strife in the continent became implicitly articulated in 
terms of the lack of capacity of Africans for self-governance as the vacuum left by 
former colonialists’ remains. This background helps to link together the case for 
nation-building and the Southern Question while effectively silencing the role of the 
Cold War. The interpretation by state agents of the Southern Question as crisis of the 
third world in the 1970s and 1980s was at the heart of U.S policy strategies that seek 
to avoid the unpopularity of its involvement in Vietnam while ensuring a pro-colonial 
stance in Africa.  It thus follows that by highlighting development, re-engineering the 




signification of under/development as linked to tribal strife, conflicts and instability 
thus represents a departure from earlier administration and highlights a discursive 
move through which the narrative of the ‘danger’ posed by Africa to the U.S became 
understood and justified. It however goes without saying that development is held 
as an ideal typical construct through the binary division of the ‘periphery’ and the 
‘centre’ (Amin 1974; Bayart 1993). The resultant effect of this is giving an ‘‘analytical 
value and universal status’’ to concepts such as ‘‘development’’, ‘‘modern’’, 
‘‘industrial’’ and ‘‘capitalist’’ (Mamdani 1996:9). Rather than as differential values, it 
constructs the U.S as a rigid ‘center’ through which the concept could be measured. 
Through this dichotomizing system, the necessity of ‘intervention’ became fixed as 
‘humanitarian’ efforts at state/nation7 building. This distinction seems to presume as 
a universal category the theory of state autonomy through deliberate 
exclusions.  However, as Chandler (2006) has already contended that state building 
is a highly political process. This means that even if taken as truly distinct categories, 
state building involves relations of subordination which constructs the ‘the West’ as 
the subject and seeks to transform other states accordingly. It is thus interesting that 
through a stereotypical fixation of Africa, the Southern Question is articulated not in 
terms of U.S-Cuban rivalry in Angola or the control of majority of resources by the 
minority white settlers in South Africa but in terms of development. The production 
of (under)development as argued by Abrahamsen (2000:14) is both ‘culturally and 
historically contingent’ and highlights the discursive formation of subjects and 
objects and how the knowledge produced enabled certain practices which help to 
‘manage’ the continent as a unified whole. 
Again, not only is the meaning of development elusive but its construction as a crisis by policy 
makers creates the space for the narrative of state/nation-building.  The crisis of 
                                                     
7 Of note here is that this is linked to the modernisation theories of 1950’s and 1960’s where the two principal 
agents of the Cold War, the US and USSR, employ nation-building as a strategy to broaden their influence and 
therefore curtail that of their enemy (Dinnen 2006; Hippler 2004; Hewitt 2009). Since nation-building at this 
time falls within the domain of development, to achieve this feat, nation-building was not only equated with 




underdevelopment as articulated then hinges on the vacuum that the withdrawal of former 
colonizers brought about and as a result the U.S has one of three options: 
The end of the European presence creates vacuums which can be filled in 
one or more of three ways: (a) by indigenous nationalist forces (as in India 
under Nehru or Egypt under Nasser); (b) by U.S. influence (Greece in 1947, 
Iran in 1954); (c) by Soviet influence or communist forces (Indochina; 
Indonesia in the 1960s) (FRUS 1977-1980). 
One apparent presupposition drawn from the eighteenth century Scramble for Africa is the 
construction of Africa’s ‘openness’ to colonial exploitation (Pratt 1992). In the 1970s and 80s 
this presupposition however works by co-opting African leaders like ‘‘Muhammed and his co-
plotter and now deputy, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo’’ who ‘‘are the most militant of 
Nigerian military leaders on the Southern African question’’ to ensure that a ‘‘Pan African 
jihad for liberation’’ did not evolve (Documents on Africa, 1975). Paradoxically, the 1970s 
represents the decade of Nigeria’s economic prosperity, the U.S increasing need of Nigeria’s 
oil as well as the Nigeria’s support for MPLA and other indigenous liberation movements in 
Africa. The non-alignment policy adopted by Nigeria to either of the power bloc of the Cold 
War signals a threatening other to the hegemony of the U.S. This was considered ‘dangerous’, 
‘retrogressive’ and ‘destructive’ in view of their space as ‘open’ to Soviet expansion (McKay 
1956). The inclusion of Nigeria in the Southern Question therefore helps to ensure that west 
Africa which has been hitherto left out of the ‘crisis’ (except for Liberia in the late 1980s) 
became part of the discourse.  On the whole, by the 1980s articulating the crisis of 
development in the continent as fundamentally linked to the Southern Question necessitated 
the use of state institutions and/or agents to suppress liberation movements: 
Nigeria’s inclusion in the Southern African equation is the only way that 
some discipline can be brought to bear on the liberation movements. 
Nigeria provides the “cash” for much of the armed struggle (Soviets supply 
guns) and also has extended loans to Mozambique and Angola…Nigeria is 
increasingly disturbed about the liberation leaders traveling around the 
world “playing president” and neglecting their people’s needs. Nigeria is 
interested in the leadership being assumed by Africans not Cubans, Soviets 
or Chinese. They want closer U.S. ties and a joint economic commission 





Co-opting ‘friendly’ African leaders for the purposes of containing the spread of communism 
thus meant that local initiatives and struggles were supported or resisted depending on the 
reading of their activities as either open to the ‘manoeuvre’ of the U.S or that of the 
Communist Bloc. An interesting perspective to this East-West divide is that by the 1980’s, the 
U.S and its allies shifted the meaning of terrorism to be political violence organized by or in 
support of the Communist; thus counterterrorism became constructed as ‘war’. The 
implication of this involves the suspension of the legal process and even the human rights of 
those so named. (Stampnitzky 2013; Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Jackson2005). This shift in 
the meaning of political violence was reflected more in the Horn of Africa, where terrorism 
was not just applied to nationalist struggles but was also used by opposing factions in the 
region to refer to each other (Huband 2001). 
Moreover, in the 1980’s, the Reagan administration reconsidered the policy strategy of earlier 
administrations towards the ‘‘Third World’’. Thus, the narratives were changed from the 
insignificance of periphery regions to the global dominance of the U.S (except as viable 
sources of natural resources) to places of serious source of insecurity due to their revolutions.  
The Reagan administration shifted the focus to winning the confidence of their friends and 
allies by its involvement in the ‘‘Third World’’ as ‘‘the short war fallacy’’ narrative (Annual 
Report 1983:16) has gradually been changed to that of a conventional long war. The policy 
was therefore focused on the growth of American military and economic strength as the so-
called periphery countries became central to American’s foreign policy. Hence, it became all 
the more important to ensure revolutions and nationalist movements in Africa are 
resisted/contained so that these countries do not become hijacked by America’s enemies 
(Oye 1983). In West Africa, the implementation of this policy strategy was made possible 
through Liberia for obvious historical reasons. The U.S partnered with Samuel Doe, a military 
autocrat in Liberia who supported U.S anti-Libyan policies and intervention in Angola and 
helped to smuggle arms to the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). 
The support by the U.S for South African military intervention in Angola through UNITA for 
instance led to the friction in the Nigeria-U.S bilateral relations as Nigeria through its policies 
and leadership in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) influenced most African countries 




involvement of the U.S and South Africa in Angola.  According to Adebajo (2004:35), ‘In an era 
of Cold War, America’s strategic interests in Liberia appeared more important to Washington 
than niceties about human rights and democracy. The Reagan administration sank over $500 
million into Liberia in the 1980s’.  By the end of the 1980s therefore the narratives of 
underdevelopment as fundamentally linked to ‘instability’ and ‘conflicts’ in Africa became 
replaced with the ‘crisis’ of state failure of the 1990s. 
Articulating Crisis of State Failure: from the 1990s to early 2000s 
The late 1980s and 1990s heralded the ‘crisis’ of state failure and the struggle for adequate 
conceptualization.  According to Wyler (2008:5): 
Failed states have appeared as a matter of concern in U.S National Security 
Strategy documents since 1998, though the term had long been the topic of 
significant academic debate and implicitly informed U.S national security 
policy since at least the end of World War II 
The concern for state failure therefore following the Cold War highlights how through the 
discursive construction of crisis several U.S peace keeping initiatives and/or agencies in Africa 
like President’s Clinton’s 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) and the Conference 
on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (the Kampala Document) 
(CSSDCA) in the 1990s championed by Nigeria’s former president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, 
constructs the need for state-building through focus on police, military and a productive 
workforce. An important sign that became dominant in the 1990s then was the need for 
‘stability’ in African states which became a function of the Department of Defense and the 
U.S stabilization efforts became also partly funded by the Department of Defense. As a result 
of this, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, for instance, ensures that funds 
of $100 million were made available through Congress for ‘reconstruction, security, or 
stabilization assistance to a foreign country’ (CRS, August 28, 2008).   A theme which signals 
continuity in the foreign policy of the U.S towards Africa then from the 1970s to the present 
is ‘instability’ and ‘conflicts’. As Lawson (2007) argues that while the concern of the U.S has 
been about security, it is less about the security of Africa and more about the security of the 
U.S itself. ‘Instability’ was however articulated based on two developments: One, the 




The second, which is also closely linked to the first was the articulation of the rising trend of 
‘international terrorism’ in the continent as signalled by the killing of 18 U.S soldiers in 1993 
in Mogadishu, Somalia during peace-keeping operations and the bombing of U.S embassies 
in Dares Salam and Nairobi both in 1998 which recorded about 200 deaths. By the end of the 
state failure ‘crisis’ of the 1990s, the killing of the soldiers signalled a change in the policy 
directive of the U.S as the U.S withdrew its troop through a policy of disengagement and 
reconsidered its criteria for financial support to the continent. This is owing to the sharp 
criticisms which has followed their involvement in the continent. One strong point often 
highlighted as the reason for the sharp withdrawal of the U.S’ support to the continent was 
its failure in Somalia (Woodward 2013). The heavy criticisms that has followed the operations 
of the U.S in Somalia after the latter’s implosion in the 1990s meant that even during the 
massive genocide in Rwanda, the U.S has remained largely uninvolved (Frazer 2017). In 
Nigeria, the effect of this shift in meaning was later reflected by the labelling of the activities 
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) as terrorists by the Clinton 
Administration without an actual proscription (Department of State, 2000). The struggles of 
the group against soil and water degradation by multinational oil companies especially the 
Royal Dutch company which has caused untold sufferings of the Ogoni People whose major 
source of livelihood is the water was therefore clamped down by the federal government of 
Nigeria in favour of the interests of the foreign investors (Ekeh 1990; Falola 1999). 
Articulating the ‘crisis’ of state failure in Africa from these two stand points as warranting 
conditions through the dominant sign ‘instability’ works by a continuity of the narratives of 
development. According to Christie (2012:55), though with reference to Afghanistan, ‘this 
logic requires the coordination of the range of international actors, with the result that 
military operations, diplomatic activity, and development programs are now approached as 
an integrated whole’.  This means that articulating development in this sense, especially in 
the 1990s, produces an envisioning of development based on militarism. Hence, while 
development as a sign during the 1970s and 1980s was connected to instability and the 
Southern Question, the narratives of development in the 1990s was explicitly connected to 




Persistent conflict and continuing political instability in some African 
countries remain chronic obstacles to Africa’s development and to U.S. 
interests there, including unhampered access to oil and other vital natural 
resources (National Security Strategy 1998). 
While economic interest of the U.S was also at the heart of the Southern Question of the 
1970s, as evidenced by the fact that Nigeria was ‘‘the largest exporter of oil to the US,’’ and 
‘‘has considerable leverage over’’ the U.S in 1973 (Department of State, 1975), the ‘security’ 
of the U.S was not constructed as threatened until the 1990s. Hence the ‘crisis’ of the 1970s 
and 1980s was about the continent’s openness to the manipulations of world powers while 
that of the 1990s was about its capacity to directly threaten the U.S. One could argue that 
President’s Bush’s vision of a New World Order where the rule of law, peace and justice 
triumphs over ‘chaos’ and ‘the law of the jungle’ (Bush 1990) would mean a utopian vision of 
peace especially in regions like Africa where political violence has been prevalent as he 
asserts: 
Institution-building, economic development, and regional peace are the 
goals of our policy in Africa. The global trends of democracy must come to 
Africa too… Africa is a major contributor to the world supply of raw 
materials and minerals and a region of enormous human potential (National 
Security strategy 1990). 
As a result, in spite of the U.S initial hesitancy in its involvement in places like Somalia for 
instance, it became the highest donor of financial and human resources to the country 
through Africa Union Peace-keeping Operations (AMISOM) (Patman 2008). The explicit 
linkage of development through state-building in Africa to the U.S security was to identify  
‘‘lower-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking [which] are 
menacing the United States, its citizenry, and its interests in new ways’’ (National Security 
strategy 1991) and ‘‘support friends and allies to improve their self-defence capabilities in 
order to deter and defend against regional aggressors, and continue to maintain and improve 
our crisis response capabilities’’ (National Security Strategy 1993). 
Thus the interpretation of state failure as ‘crisis’ which warrants a policy reorientation was 
not a natural self-evident truth as occasioned by the material events of political violence in 




of the United States. According to Baker-Beall (2014), though in the context of the European 
Council, such linkage functions not only to collapse the ‘local’ and ‘global’ but also to identify 
‘new’ trends of terrorism. Like the European Council’s construction of the ‘‘fight against 
terrorism’’ as argued by Baker-Beall (2009; 2014), the articulation of ‘crisis’ of the state failure 
demands the construction of an ‘ever more lethal environment’ which ‘exists in Africa as local 
civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones’’. Hence ‘’forming coalitions of 
the willing and cooperative security arrangements’’ becomes ‘’key to confronting these 
emerging transnational threats’ (National Security Strategy 2002). As the Horn of Africa 
where these threats to the U.S have been are predominantly Muslim countries, the threat of 
‘Islamic fundamentalism’ becomes constructed as ‘the single most worrisome trend for policy 
makers’ (Clough 1992: 2) especially during the Clinton Administration. As a result of this 
concern, US officials fears were expressed during interviews in January, 1992, that countries 
like Sudan ‘might become a base for exporting Islamic revolution across Africa’ (Copson 
1995).This explains why a ‘retaliatory attack’ was carried out by the Clinton Administration 
against a pharmaceutical company in Khartoum, Sudan which the administration believed to 
be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda. These moves therefore define for the U.S and 
Africa a new era of the crisis of terrorism in the continent. 
Articulating Crisis of Terrorism: Post September 2001 
The attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 was articulated in the National 
Security Strategy (2002) as a threat by ‘failing’ states on the United States as against 
‘conquering’ states which has hitherto threatened the U.S. The reframing of the attacks as 
‘war’ rather criminal acts fuelled by rage and vengeance and focus on state failure rather than 
individuals who perpetuated the acts helps interpret ongoing local issues in Africa as 
‘terrorism’ as thus a ‘crisis’ in policy terms.  As has been argued by various scholars, the event 
of September 2001 could have been framed and understood differently other than ‘war’ 
(Jackson 2005; Van Veeren 2011). The shift in policy narratives to construct the event as crisis 
helps to articulate a space where it becomes possible to continue the discourse of ‘instability’ 
‘threat’ and ‘danger’ beyond the state to other areas. This is signified by the establishment of 




that the ‘“the greatest security stability challenge” to EUCOM was posted by Africa and that 
“a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support 
of U.S. policy and engagement’’ (Ploch,2014:5).  The establishment of Africom as a policy 
initiative of President George W. Bush on February 6th 2007 signalled the nexus between state 
failure, democracy, health, economy and terrorism in Africa and the continuation of the 
discourse of threat and danger after the Cold War. 
While the ‘crisis’ of state failure in the 1990s was more focused on the Horn of Africa, the 
establishment of Africom with its base in ten8 African countries, including Nigeria, shifted the 
focus to the rest of Africa and help to fix as a moment the coupling together of ‘instability’ 
and the lack of governance and/or democracy. As President Barack Obama asserts in March 
2013: 
…because extremists thrive in chaos. They thrive in failed states. They thrive 
in power vacuums. They don’t have much to offer when it comes to actually 
building things, but they’re very good about exploiting situations that are 
no longer functioning. They fill that gap. 
Also this logic was reiterated in the 9/11 Commission Report: 
The United States faces a sudden crisis and summons a tremendous exertion 
of national energy…Terrorists organisations have fled to some of the least 
governed, most lawless places in the world. 
‘‘Ungoverned spaces’’ are identified by the State Department (2006) as ‘‘acute risk’’ to the 
‘national security of the U.S’ and defined as ‘’physical or non-physical area(s) where there is 
an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control’’. This means that apart from 
both possible land mass where government effective control might be lacking, other ‘non-
physical’ areas like the lack of effective democracies as signalled by institutional strength 
could become ‘grounds’ where terrorists ‘breed’. To do this effectively, while there was no 
significant change in the policy formulation and orientation from Presidents Clinton to 
Obama, the discourse of development which had been modified before now to accommodate 
the discipline of democracy in Africa (Abrahamsen 2000; 2004) become fixed such that in the 
                                                     





wake of the GWOT, to not only make development synonymous with militarization and/or 
counterterrorism for ordering purposes but also to natural and normalize it. The seeming 
appeal to universal democratic values, entrenched in policy documents, in the GWOT in Africa 
would only serve to captivate but as Rist (2014:1) has asserted that the discourse of 
development exists ‘to charm, to please, to fascinate, to set dreaming, but also to abuse, to 
turn away from the truth, to deceive’’. Moreover, in the wake of the GWOT, not only are the 
polemics of development bereft of principles and/or social values congruent to the individual 
context of countries in Africa (Chomsky 2006; Call 2008), according to Boggs (2003:3), the 
pretext has contributed to the ‘‘unparalleled military domination over the world’s 
landmasses, sea lanes, and air spaces, with great aspirations toward colonization of outer 
space’’. Whether or not the militarization of democracy in Nigeria and Africa generally exists, 
through the counterterrorism mission of Africom to serve ‘‘America’s Imperial Grand 
Strategy’’ or not as alluded by Noam Chomsky, it remains that the articulation by the United 
States of ‘‘…principles of democracy and human rights, [to expand] economic opportunity, 
[and to] support those who seek peace where war and deprivation have plagued 
communities’’ (U.S STSSA 2012:3)) exemplifies a seeming need for evolving ‘African solutions 
to African problems’ through several security assistance and peace-keeping operations to 
ensure order. 
Thus while the linking of economic issues to a weak state represents some continuities from 
the Cold War especially the 1990s, the discourse changed through the broadening of agendas 
under initiatives like AFRICOM and the Global Peace Initiatives to include health and other 
aspects of democracy. This discursive move to incorporate the whole of Africa highlights the 
new significance in U.S foreign policy that Africa has now gained. Rather than ‘sporadic’ and 
‘reactionary’ policy strategies that has hitherto characterized U.S-Africa policy, Africa thus 
becomes a ‘‘high priority’’ because the U.S ‘‘security depends upon partnering with Africans 
to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of 
effective democracies’’ (National Security Strategy 2006). This shift from a supposed 
marginality often expressed by U.S officials and agencies like the Department of Defense 
articulates a new era which legitimates militaristic ventures as ‘war’ by state agents on their 




their own people’s aspirations for freedom at home”. It is established in literature that a 
seeming ‘postcolonial anxiety’ (Krishna 1999) makes military a symmetry of the state 
(Luckham 1994) and more often than not, military gained some legitimacy through the ability 
to repress resistance movements in postcolonial states (Chenoy 2002). The identification and 
elimination of terrorists/terrorism therefore become a defining priority both for the U.S and 
states like Nigeria that have friends and allies of the U.S. According to Ploch (2014:18), ‘‘under 
this overarching strategy, U.S. programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law 
enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the 
flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies’’. From the Trans 
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to the (Combined) Joint Task Force, both the 
military and civilian architectures were funded and trained to effectively fight the ‘plague’ of 
terrorism in Africa. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the discursive construction of ‘crisis’ in Africa through the U.S 
policy documents. It has attempted to show how rather than the material reality of Africa as 
a site of ‘danger’, ‘threat’ or ‘anarchy’ to the U.S ‘security’, it is the subjective interpretation 
of issues by state agents which serve as warranting conditions for such ‘crisis’ constructions. 
Articulating the terrorist threat after September 2001, therefore, works by drawing from 
earlier discursive constructs of Africa especially from the 1970s. The possibility of such 
constructions is premised on an enduring ‘colonial mind set’ which posits Africa as a site 
‘open’ to colonial exploitation and manipulation. The terrorist threat then did not just 
‘emerge’ and thus demand a ‘new’ way of understanding political violence, it is a product of 
some continuities and changes through which Africa shifted from supposed marginality to 
being a matter of ‘’high priority’’. Prior to September 2001, U.S policy towards Africa has often 
involved the concern for ‘instability’ and the lack of development as a sign through which 
state building become justified. It is this background that help to legitimate the ‘crisis’ of 
terrorism in Africa and its subsequent whole-of-government. As a continuity, the 
stereotypical construction of Africa as a site of ‘danger’ and ‘instability’ were not just 
reinforced through this comprehensive approach, the explicit linkage of empty signifiers like 




moment. The 1970s and 80s for instance articulate ‘instability’ and lack of ‘development’ 
through the Southern Question and therefore silence the narratives of the Cold War. It is this 
construction of ‘crisis’ of Africa that shifted to the state failure ‘crisis’ of the 1990s and early 
2000s.  Rather, than the states-centric constructions as shown in the 1990s and early 2000s, 










Chapter 6: Constructing the U.S Self 
‘‘In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and 
desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—
preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating terror. 
American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same 
direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in 
liberty, peace, and growing prosperity’’. (President George W. Bush, 2002 
National Security Strategy) 
 
Introduction 
The chapter examines how colonized/colonizer dyad (understood here as colonial tropes) has 
become the nodal points through which the U.S Self is constructed. It argues that through the 
productive use of power, the U.S justifies and naturalises its colonial subject position through 
the move from oil issues in the south-south of Nigeria to poverty and health-related issues in 
the north. To self-assert as the center of this discourse, therefore, it becomes necessary to 
construct varying kinds of subject positions both for itself and Nigeria as discursive power 
deems fit. This means that constructing the U.S Self as the ‘center’ is not by itself an easy 
venture given Nigeria’s agency and therefore requires that the U.S draws from background 
understanding of Nigeria and Britain, the Official colonizer of Nigeria, as far back as the 
1950s/60s. On August 11 and 12, 1954, the Joint Resolution 183 was passed unanimously by 
the House and Senate concerning Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana), “to encourage efforts 
toward independence and self-government truly expressive of the desires of the peoples and 
as they show their capacity to establish and protect free institutions” and the Resolution was 
signed on August 27 by President Eisenhower. The deliberate conflating here of the principle 
of self-government and that of good governance- ‘free institutions’ for the first time in history, 
brought about the re-constructed idea of trusteeship (to ensure subordination) under the 




the 1st of October 1954 and subsequent election the following year, the Joint Resolution is to 
be read by the Speaker of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives and the Chief 
Secretary of the Nigerian Government was to move for adoption. This move is particularly 
important because it will project the U.S in a favourable discursive light before Nigerians as 
evidenced in the Lagos Daily Success of September 2, 19549 (The Secretary of State to Vice 
President Nixon, October 6, 1954). The Joint Resolution involves among other things that 
Africa is of strategic importance to the U.S because of resources like aluminium and oil; the 
continent’s strength population-wise and its openness or otherwise to communist USSR and 
China. It became necessary to ensure that Nigeria is pro-America in both its political and social 
organisation. This explains why Nigerian students were sponsored to the U.S to ‘‘observe its 
society’’ and the U.S grievance at the lower British ranks, in Lagos Nigeria, who were ‘dragging 
their feet’ at ensuring this (The Vice Consul at Lagos (Ross) to the Department of State Lagos, 
June 18, 1952). The productive practice enabled by this meant that the prior arrangement of 
‘‘trusteeship’’ through the universal application of ‘good governance’ by Britain which later 
fed directly to the United Nations Trusteeship Council and the Decolonization exercise (James 
1994) would be officially ended on the 1st October 1960, Nigeria’s Independence Day. Besides, 
with Nigeria’s non-alignment policy during the Cold War, the country’s relationship with the 
U.S have continued to be surrounded by ‘mistrust’ because of the obvious disparity between 
the anti-colonial rhetoric of the U.S. and their actual actions in other African countries like, 
the South West Africa (now Namibia), the Congo and Angola (as it relates to the Cuban 
troops). For instance, during what is often referred to as the Congo crisis of the 1960s10, 
Nigeria was completely against and condemned the stance of the U.S which supported and 
funded the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and the (colonial) Belgian troops against national 
liberation movements. 
                                                     
9 Prior to this time (i.e. 1951-1952), anti-American publications in the West African Pilot by Editor K.C. Okoro 
hinged on American’s air operations in Tangier has been particularly pressured through its publisher Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, because of the Cold War and the latter’s interest in becoming Nigeria’s Governor-General in 
1960 and later President in 1963. 
10 Note that this crisis signalled a considerable change to U.S-Nigeria relations as the proxy wars of the Cold 
War fought in Congo meant that in order to prevent Soviet’s influence, the U.S. support for a pro-Western 
government which involves the plans to unseat and assassinate Lumumba if possible, made Nigeria to 




Also, during the grand plan for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the inauguration 
of its new charter in 1963, Nigeria championed a doctrine of neutrality in the interest of Africa 
(Anglin 1964; Claude 1964). Considering the Cold War context and America’s policy of 
containment, it remains that countries like Nigeria that have adopted a seemingly neutral 
disposition and policy towards both power blocs have to be kept under some other forms of 
‘tutelage’.  This was stated explicitly as the reasons for aids and other economic relations. Of 
importance here is that the application of the idea of trusteeship analogous to that of the 
League of Nations where nations are under ‘tutelage’ and ‘modernized’ became incompatible 
with the British principle of self-governance and underscores the reason why the United 
States, amidst other international actors such as Denmark, Syria, Uruguay and Thailand as the 
members of the committee of the International Court of Justice, a principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations, championed the deliberate fusion of the principles of self-government 
and good governance which had hitherto been at parallel (Thornton 1999).  
To this end, while the official colonization era was ended in Nigeria on 1st October 1960, 
America’s maintenance of ‘a firm position alongside the UK in most international questions’ 
meant that the ‘colonizing structure’ of ‘trusteeship’ continued through the ‘western bond’ 
shared between the United States and Britain. As the Vice Consul at Lagos, Nigeria asserted: 
 The Chief Secretary to the government, Mr A.E.T. Benson, believed that it 
was to the benefit of Nigeria to be completely pro-United States even if they 
developed a strong feeling against the UK in the future. It is his feeling that, 
in many cases, British institutions are not necessarily the ones which will 
contribute the things Nigeria needs in the way of training and outlook will 
contribute the things Nigeria needs in the way of training and outlook and 
that steps should be taken to facilitate orientation of the people here toward 
the US. As long as he was in a policy-making position, he said, such steps 
would be encouraged. Benson also said that if the Nigerians developed a 
serious anti-US attitude he would consider British administration here a 
complete failure and would “wash his hands” off the Nigerians and the 
Colonial Service…. On this ground he justified and insisted upon “tutelage” 
by the British for several years to come (Department of State, May 21, 1952). 
It is often argued that with the discourse of terrorism comes the discursive re-construction of 
the world into the dichotomies of ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘civilized’’ states which trumps terror on the 




on the other hand (Gunning 2007; Gregory 2004). For Nigeria and the rest of Africa, the binary 
division of colonized versus colonizer has been the overwhelming submission of most critical 
African scholars (Okoh 1996; Ayinde 2010). While most scholars have often highlighted the 
literal colonizer of Nigeria, Britain, little has been said about how this colonial trope has not 
only constructed the U.S self but has also shaped the dynamics of the two countries bilateral 
relations since Nigeria’s independence to post-September 2001. The Obama administration 
has often been pointed out as changing the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ of the Bush era and 
not necessarily the practices enabled by the ‘war on terror’ (McCrisken 2011; Smith 2010). 
This disparity between rhetoric and practice is not a new development as far as the U.S 
engagement with Nigeria, and Africa, is concerned. The disparity between the U.S anti-
colonial rhetoric and its actual practices during decolonization is highlighted, for instance, by 
the U.S support for the Belgian troop in Congo. What this disparity points to was the 
construction that Nigeria lacks the capacity for self-governance and it functions as the 
dominant signifier for constructing Nigeria’s identity as an Other. Furthermore, the disparity 
reveals why the discourse of U.S expansionism in Nigeria became veiled as a necessity through 
signifiers like poverty and disease. While the road to expansionism in Nigeria has not been a 
simple weave, the discursive construct itself within which the necessity for expansionism 
takes place highlights a denial of agency to Nigeria. Bhabha (1984) refers to ‘colonial mimicry’ 
through which an ‘‘other’’ which was a subject of difference that reflects the self but not 
exactly the same and this other become a total closure i.e. permanent. It is through this 
construct of ‘‘other’’ that practices like expansionism thus became doable. The necessity of 
expansionism calls for naturalizing the leadership authority of the U.S so as to justify the 
construction of a hesitant imperialist. Through the use of strategies like equivalence and 
articulation, the unity of chains of signification provided the justification for the inevitability 
of ‘assisting’ Nigeria. By drawing from earlier colonial constructions together with its complex 
myths and assumptions, representational strategies were employed to construct the U.S as a 
kind of subject that is at the centre of Nigeria’s democracy. However, because of the need to 
expand to other West African states by using Nigeria as a political tool, it became necessary 
to shift subject positions through the exercise of discursive power.  These subject position 




colonial state’ or a ‘neo-colonial’ one (Eze 1999). However, by constructing an oppositional 
discourse, the ‘reality’ of Nigeria’s lack as well as its leadership position was both constructed 
almost in the same breath. The power that inheres in these representational practices, hence, 
shift subject positions around to enable the colonial tropes find avenues of expression as the 
U.S deems fit. 
Background: The Uneasy Road of Expansionism:  From Oil to Poverty and Health Issues 
A great wealth of literature has argued that the war on terror(ism) was about U.S. 
expansionism, which represents the continuation of the Cold War and highlights a colonial 
trope that bears resemblance to earlier colonial practises (Van Veeren 2009; 2011; Schmidt 
2013). With the exception of scholars like Kenneth Omeje who argues that the war on 
terror(ism) exists to accentuate the ‘postcolonial crisis’  in Africa, most scholars like Daniel 
Agbiboa, Solomon Hussein and Hakeem Onapajo with focus on Nigeria who have engaged 
with this strand of argument have often highlighted how the oil ‘‘resource curse’’ in Nigeria 
has engendered massive corrupt practises by Nigerian government functionaries and how the 
incidences of political violence is corruption ‘fighting back’. What these scholars left unsorted 
however is that corruption is a polyvalent concept with different shades of meaning not only 
as it depends on what is measured but also as regards who the actors are within the context 
where it is practised (Underkuffler 2005; Jain 2001). For example, in the words of former 
Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) on the distinction between gifts and 
bribes, he said: 
An integral aspect of [the African] culture could be taken as the basis for 
rationalising otherwise despicable behaviour…In the African concept of 
appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. 
The value is in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes 
an embarrassment and it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted 
and destroyed this aspect of our culture (cited in Pope 2000: 8). 
Though this might be critiqued as a simplistic cultural relativistic argument, this assertion 
seems to confirm the stance of Sardan (1999: 34) that, ‘the real borderline between what is 
corruption and what is not fluctuates, and depends on the context and on the position of the 
actors involved’. As evidenced by the official documents and interview data garnered for this 




in Nigeria could not be argued away. However, there remains two latent points which were 
not accounted for by these scholars: one, the complex mix of local and international dynamics 
which range from how the practises of the U.S.in relating with the ‘strong men’ of Africa 
especially as it relates to their ethnic, religious and political affiliations were used to further 
personal interests. Secondly, in the Nigerian case, while the use or misuse of the revenues 
accrued from oil was understandably a predominant factor in the cause of violence and 
demonstrations in the south-south, this surely cannot explain the incidence of political 
violence in the northern parts of Nigeria and the rest of the south.  It is in this regards that 
the expansionist drive of the U.S  through the  war on terror(ism) and its ‘shift’ into Africa 
needs to be understood for what it is rather than economic and governance failures in the 
country. 
The United States’ relationship with Nigeria is the most strategic 
relationship on the continent, and its stabilization is essential in meeting U.S. 
Strategic Objectives. In addition to being America’s fifth largest supplier of 
oil, Nigeria also produces most of the hydrocarbon in West Africa which 
attracts American investment. The quality of crude oil from Nigeria is easily 
adapted to U.S. refineries, lessening U.S. dependence on the Middle Eastern 
supply. Boko Haram could potentially disrupt U.S. access to this new source 
of oil and cause billions of dollars in damage to the U.S. economy (W.E 
Robertson, U.S Army, and 2012:4). 
A hallmark of the British colonial era was the need for African resources and the need to 
civilize the African people. In spite of the material end of colonialism, scholars like Noam 
Chomsky, Rita Abrahamsen, Mark Duffield and others has highlighted how the imperial drive 
of the U.S in Africa represents a continuity of the mission of ex-colonizers. However, while 
the colonial tropes of the U.S remain a reality as far as discursive constructions and its 
enabling practises are concerned, it has not always been an easy road in Nigeria. The US-
Nigeria relationship could be captured as passive-aggressive: this is reflected not only in the 
friction between interpolating the U.S as the subject of the post-colonial era in Nigeria but 
also the need to ‘‘responsibilize’’ Nigeria for other African countries. The latter is done in 
order to use the country as a supposed tool in the U.S expansionist drive. For instance, prior 
to and during the Nigerian military era (1966-1979),the U.S was praised for their policy of 




to either the Nigerian government or the Biafra secessionists. The U.S, however, oscillated in 
their supposed ‘friendship’ with Nigeria depending on whether the military head of state is 
from the northern or southern part of Nigeria and whether or not the head of state considers 
U.S’s interests as integral to Nigeria : 
The salient question for Nigeria is whether the federal structure can survive 
in the face of the many internal strains and tensions. The facts of geography 
and population assure that under the constitution, the federal government 
will continue to be dominated by the party representing the tradition-bound 
Moslems of the North, who are generally contemptuous of the South and 
unsympathetic to its problems. The southern regions, which are deeply 
divided along tribal, regional, and party lines, resent northern domination. 
Some southern leaders cooperate with the North in federal affairs realizing 
that only thus can they and their interest reap the benefits of participation 
in government (Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968 Volume 
XXIV, Africa). 
The leader of the coup against General Yakubu Gowon is an erratic, vainglorious, impetuous, 
corrupt, vindictive, intelligent, articulate, daring Hausa. Muhammed also inherits - and has 
contributed to - a tradition of corrupt civilian and military officials, urban problems second 
only to those of Calcutta, drift and ineptitude in development, insoluble but containable 
ethnic problems, and a national temperament which combines pride, aggressiveness, 
arrogance and patriotism into a brand of xenophobia best labelled ‘Nigerianism’. Almost six 
years after the civil war, Muhammed is probably ushering in a period of coups. As a corrupt 
Hausa, he automatically attracts Ibo and Yoruba enmity, which he knows and has attempted 
to reduce by early appointments. As a Northerner and a Muslim, he will be expected to 
consolidate once and for all the leadership role which his fifty million brothers are certain is 
theirs. Muhammed will agree, of course, but will seem to the Hausas to vacillate as he sings 
"One Nigeria.” (Foreign Relations of the United States, Documents on Africa 1973-1976) 
The above excerpts represent how the relations of the U.S with the ‘African strong men’ more 
often than not shapes how its foreign policy is driven in Nigeria. While the second excerpt is 
particularly representative is because of all the Nigerian head of states-only General Yakubu 
Gowon (August 1966-July 1975) and General Olusegun Obasanjo (February 1976-October 




respectively. Suffice it to mention that the southern part of Nigeria is the oil-rich and most 
economically viable part of Nigeria. Hence, the relations of the U.S, like their colonial 
counterpart, Britain, has predominantly been with political elites (civilian and military alike) 
who are either from southern parts of Nigeria or had some strong ties with elites from this 
region. By profiling General Muritala Muhammed along with his ‘Northern’ and ‘Muslim’ 
‘brothers’, the U.S was not only exploring ethno-religious fault lines to their advantage but 
was also signalling a continuity of earlier discourses which interpolates the colonialist as the 
subject of the discourse. Being a supposed hinterland and a prize of political and strategic 
contest, Nigeria particularly and Africa in general should be transitioned in such a manner 
that suits the modern template of the U.S and should effectively function for the U.S. The 
concept of ‘Nigerianism’ or ‘one Nigeria’ represents a discursive struggle where instead of 
being the object to be acted upon by the subject, the U.S, Nigeria seeks to be the subject. 
Thereby challenging or even negating the hegemony of the U.S. It was rather interesting that 
General Olusegun Obasanjo who took over after the political assassination of General 
Muritala Muhammed went into a pact with the U.S for an effective transitioning from a 
British-style parliamentary system of government to a U.S-style presidential system of 
government (while it is beyond the purview of this thesis, the debate on the 
inappropriateness of the presidential system to the Nigerian character and the need for 
restructuring Nigeria as way to end the incessant political violence is still ongoing). The 
conflict in the passive-aggressive relations between the U.S and Nigeria was signalled by 
Muhammed’s choice of privileging ‘Nigeria’, as nodal point and subject of his policy rather 
than ‘democracy’, the U.S oil-centred economic developmental template or even the U.S-
prescribed presidential system of government.   Prior to the administration of Muhammed, 
the First Republic (1963-1966), which was a parliamentary system of government was 
considered of ‘security concerns’ to the U.S because of the Cold War and the need for 
continued access to Nigerian oil after independence (Foreign Relations, 1958-1960 Volume 
XIV). ‘Security’ here seems to signal economic security of the U.S which the decentralised 
system of government in Nigeria could not guarantee in the long run as U.S need for Africa’s 
resources was to ‘increase’ in the near future and the regions in Nigeria would likely demand 




U.S therefore proposes an oil-centred economic development plan alongside a presidential 
system of government where power would become centralized. However, in sharp contrast 
to the U.S visions for Nigeria, Muhammed seems to give voice to the visions and hopes of 
Nigeria prior to independence.  Hence, the self-assertive stance of Nigeria signalled through 
the construction of ‘Nigerianism’, which means the decision of Nigeria to formulate and drive 
foreign policy architecture that is focused primarily on Nigeria and Africa. This represents a 
discursive friction. 
The new struggle for Nigeria’s autonomy and unity would mean that the continued access to 
Nigerian oil both during and after the Cold War on terms that privilege the U.K, US and others 
would no longer be the norm. This new development which the U.S was not favourably 
disposed to was considered a defining factor in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and also 
the uprising of violent groups like the Maitaisine (Falola 1992). Having successfully taken 
control of the south and its oil, the use of contrast here between Gowon and Muhammed 
highlights the challenge faced by the U.S. in its bid for expanding to the northern part of 
Nigeria (through its elites) which is about constructions of ethno-religious identity. Both in 
prior documents and those shortly after, the concerns raised about defiant or despotic 
Nigerian leaders have often been linked to their ethnicity/religion and corruption. The 1990s 
onward, however, signals a shift in understanding and focuses on state-centric discursive 
constructions.  The linkage of Muhammed’s ethno-religious identity to corruption which was 
empirically inaccurate as Muhammed was about the most accountable military head of state 
Nigeria has had (Eze 1990; Akindele 1992). This could only be understood in the light of his 
defiance against the U.S intervention in Nigeria and the U.S undemocratic role in Angola. Also, 
Muhammed’s ‘nationalistic impulses’ to revive the economy of Nigeria from the ruins of the 
civil war led to his banning of most importations into Nigeria (mostly from the U.S) and this 
obviously pitched him and ‘his brothers’ against the U.S. 
Shortly after the assassination of Muhammed on 13th February 1976, it became all the more 
important to the U.S to ensure ‘stability’ and ‘strengthen economic ties’ with Nigeria. This led 
to the signing of technical agreements and the official visit of President Carter to Nigeria from 




October the same year. During this time on the international scene, petroleum products 
which has been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and as well as in some other African 
states, witnessed a dramatic increase in price due to the 1970s recession and sharp increase 
in oil prices globally (Perron 1988). Hence in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976, Volume E–6 (Documents of Africa, 1976), concerns were expressed thus: 
The future development of Nigeria petroleum policies is expected to be 
shaped by more nationalistic impulses. In this mood of vigorous nationalism 
and well-heeled self-confidence, Nigeria may 
be expected to scorn self-serving offers of specific AID projects or financial 
incentives. Responsible FMG officials have come increasingly to the 
conviction that financial assistance is too inflexible to be of significant help 
to a country which expects $8 billion in governmental oil revenues for the 
coming year. Even though per capita income in Nigeria remains at about 
$100, American foreign aid must be recognized as having only a modest 
impact in a country blessed by this petroleum windfall. 
It was unsurprising then, when instead of a further reduction in the AIDS policy to Nigeria as 
a result of the ‘petroleum windfall’, it was increased on the basis of poverty as reflected by 
the citing of Nigeria’s per capital income. As a result, many sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Nigeria, went into mounting trade deficits that adversely affected the polity 
(Adebajo 2011). According to Schmidt (2013), and Dia (1994), the incidence of economic 
mismanagement and corruption in African states during this period contributed greatly to the 
decline of state institutions. With the logic of the cold war, the rulers of these nascent states 
took advantage of the external support/pressure to take sides to loot resources and suppress 
internal insurrections, some of which are due to boundary and resource-related disputes as a 
result of decolonization. The resultant effect, as is argued, are countries with very high 
poverty rates, severe decline in per capita real gross national product and a rise in warlord 
politicking. Furthermore, the result of external factors which accentuate the decline of state 
institutions meant the subordinate position of Africa in the global political economy together 
with the cold war politics. In order for struggling African states to survive the economic 
plummet, they resorted to borrowing from the IMF and World Bank with stringent conditions 
meant to promote free trade that is global capitalism. The so-called ‘unintended 
consequence’ to use Reno (1998)’s words, of these reforms such as reduced government 




in jobs, among other things, as imposed by the World Bank. For Nigeria, this move was initially 
blocked in order to make the country ‘assume an international position’ in congruence with 
its finance position, however the move was resisted by the U.S: 
Despite Nigeria's hostile position on Angola, the country remains very 
important both to our overall policy in Africa and to our relationship with 
the developing world; we must not go out of our way to cause additional 
problems. We should oppose Treasury's attempt to "cut off" Nigeria from 
the World Bank, but at the same time encourage the country to assume an 
international financial position more appropriate to its increased wealth. 
(Documents on Africa, 1976). 
The uprising of political violence both in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria as a result 
of poverty led to the enlisting of the partnership of Nigeria to fight militants in the Niger Delta 
who the U.S has just labelled as ‘terrorists’ while poverty, disease (especially HIV) and mother-
child mortality also became linked to the absence of ‘democracy’ and presence of 
international terrorism. 
In addition, radical youth gangs in Nigeria abducted and held for ransom 
more than three dozen foreign oil workers. The gangs held most of the 
hostages for a few days before releasing them unharmed. Terrorists 
targeted US interests in 169 attacks in 1999, an increase of 52 percent from 
1998. The increase was concentrated in four countries: Colombia, Greece, 
Nigeria, and Yemen. In Nigeria and Yemen, US citizens were among the 
foreign nationals abducted….Ethnic violence flared in Nigeria during the 
year as bloody feuds broke out among various indigenous groups battling 
for access to and control of limited local resources. Poverty-stricken 
Nigerians across the nation, particularly in the oil-producing southern 
regions, demanded a larger share of the nation’s oil wealth (Patterns of 
Global Terrorism 1999, U.S Department of State 2000). 
With the nodal point of liberal democracy that enables the discursive constructions of the 
need for ‘economic growth/prosperity’ through a ‘healthy’ workforce, in Africa generally and 
Nigeria particularly, the U.S colonial tropes moved from its focus on oil in the southern part 
of Nigeria to poverty and health issues in the northern part of Nigeria. It is during this era that 
HIV became constructed as a matter of ‘international terrorism’ and ‘a threat to international 
peace and order (Elbe 2003).  According to Caldas-Coulthard (2003: 272) on discourses of the 
media, politicians often enlist the use of ‘we’, ‘the West’ and ‘free democracies’ to construct 




haven of terrorists based on open-ended elements like poverty. Hence, almost in a haste the 
discourse of (international) terrorism made a sudden shift from the southern region of Nigeria 
to the northern part during the Clinton presidency. General Sanni Abacha, who has been 
considered as one of the most despotic and corrupt Nigerian leaders, was at this time 
sanctioned by the U.S for his non-compliance to international norms but it also was 
interesting that the U.S economic relationship with Nigeria also got to its peak during this 
time (Akinwande 2014). The punchline here is that the drive for expansionism together with 
the need to factor in the interests of the elites enable the construction of ‘terrorism’ through 
which the structure which produced the struggles of the Niger Delta as well as the poverty 
and disease in the northern Nigeria were silenced. 
To do this effectively, after the event of September 2001, from President Bush to Obama, not 
only did Africa’s democracy continues to be ‘stabilized’, trade, education, civil society, health, 
energy and indeed economy including agriculture and land rights become articulated as 
fundamentally demanding order. For instance, HIV/AIDS which was a new pandemic in Africa 
but became understood through ‘‘colonial tropes’’ of race (Flint and Hewitt 2015) was already 
described as a ‘a threat to international peace and security in Africa’ (Elbe 2003) during the 
regime of President Clinton became linked to the promotion of democratic institutions under 
the guise of global development programmes like the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCM), and the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR). According to Lymann 
(2009) instead of a global orientation of these programmes as earlier posited, it became 
synonymous with Africa. The focus on Africa through these programmes is poised as altruistic 
intervention for struggling African states to move out of poverty and disease which makes 
them less stable and able to compete internationally and thus open to the exploitation of 
‘terrorists’.  The explicit linkage of democracy and economic issues to the understanding of 
political violence became well highlighted especially after the September 2001 event. Also, 
unlike the paltry American aid that went to isolated African states, aids and trade budget 
became significantly improved more or less as a bait for compliance on bilateral terms of 
policy and institutional reforms which remain a serious source of worry to many (Dagne 2010; 




Greenfield (2006)’s testimonial to the Congress, child health, education, infectious diseases 
and hunger all become connected to democracy: 
It is strongly in the interest of the United States government and other 
Western governments to help the young democracies of West Africa prosper 
economically. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was created 
with just that purpose in mind, on a global scale, and roughly half of the 
compacts signed thus far have been with West African democracies, 
including some of the largest ones ….is a necessary prerequisite for 
economic development, for a healthy and educated workforce is necessary 
for long-term economic prosperity and for the growth of democratic 
institution. 
Indeed, it is argued for understandable reasons that increase in aids to combat things like 
HIV/AIDS or even infant mortality rate should be applauded (Dagne 2010). However, the 17 
indicators as preconditions for these aids meant a drastic policy and institutional change that 
most struggling African countries might be unable to meet. McInne’s et, al. (2008) also 
contended that constructing the pandemic as a security threat (internationally) shows how 
the groundwork for integrating Africa into the GWOT was being laid and Flint and Hewitt 
(2015) show why such ‘colonial tropes’ justifies the need for ‘saving’ Africa from itself. 
Moreover, positing the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a security threat and proffering the building of 
state institutions based on militarized visions of order is another thing altogether. To 
articulate and justify the integration of Nigeria into the GWOT, it is unsurprising that things 
like HIV/AIDS, infant mortality rate and even poverty became located within the security 
imaginary of the U.S. because the Northern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram originated from 
play host to the highest indicators of poverty and disease in Nigeria (World Bank 2012) and 
constructing these issues as security threat only serves to accentuate the discourse of ‘new’ 
history that  demands corresponding measures. To this end, the discourse of failed states and 
terrorism might seem tenable. A follow-up argument might then be that the fact that the 
North hosts the poorest explains why Boko Haram is there in the first instance whether they 
are labelled terrorist or not. This argument could be refuted on three grounds: one, the 
motivations or causes of political violence have been established as complex and dynamic 
(Adesoji 2011). This shows why there are several violent groups in the Northern Nigeria 




The fact that the not-so-poor regions of Nigeria also houses several violent groups might serve 
to negate poverty as the primary causal factor. So, the argument for variables or causal factors 
remain fragile. Secondly and interestingly, from some narratives of violent groups like Boko 
Haram, it is the political system of Liberal democratic imaginary which the U.S. is trying to 
stabilize that the violent groups are agitating against (Jordan 2015). As Hugh (2004), political 
systems like Liberal democracy bring about certain ideals, norms and values that define the 
identities of members of that system; it constructs boundaries and limits and practices that 
are acceptable or otherwise. More importantly, political systems also entrench ideologies and 
interests which might be at parallel with other systems. Examples of this abound, the Cold 
War is one and some narratives of al Qaeda and even Boko Haram reveal this. Thirdly, while 
empirical evidences point to the prevalence of poverty and disease in the Northern part of 
Nigeria when compared with other regions (World Bank 2012), the development points to a 
history of ‘decentralised despotism’ that entrenched ethnicity and privilege based on the 
colonial divide of settlers and natives which political elites have continued to perpetuate 
(Mamdani 1990) and the politics of aids by the U.S. and other European countries that 
accentuate corruption either by turning the blind eye on the deliberate misuse of aids or 
(in)directly enabling/participating in corrupt and questionable practices often for economic 
reasons (Doty 1996). Most importantly is the fact that suffering regions like the North-East 
cannot meet eligibility criteria for aids because of the proliferation of political violence and 
more especially the proscription of Boko Haram. This inadvertently serves as an underwriting 
of the arguments advanced for constructing security and threat out of people’s suffering. 
Constructing the U.S as the Subject of Democracy 
The defence of ‘democracy’ and the ‘free world’ often on the grounds of ‘progress’ are 
premises upon which the Cold War were fought (by proxy) in Nigeria and elsewhere. This 
universalist and totalizing discourse that not only demands that other possible conceptions 
of democracy and development are excluded and silenced but also through a naturalised 
binary of the world where the U.S is positioned against its Other becomes the norm (Jackson 
2005: 62). In Nigeria, this representation demands that the central image of the U.S. as the 
subject of democracy and progress becomes the defining feature by which its relations with 




argued that (American) democracy remains the most important lens, if not the only one, 
through which its foreign relations could be read and understood. The practices enabled by 
this discourse not only positioned the U.S as the subject but also ensures the continual 
manipulations of its border especially its linkage of ‘democracy’ to economic 
prosperity/development and ‘civic action’.  ‘Democracy’ and ‘Progress’ who’s meaning are 
hinged on ‘economic prosperity’ and ‘military defense’ in order to factor in the interests of 
the ‘free world’ and ultimately that of the U.S became constructed. Democracy then could 
mean any actions undertaken by the U.S to secure its economic and military interests. 
Despite the recent blasts against U.S. policy on Angola by the FMG, the basic 
relationship is still sound and we would not want to imperil it without 
compelling reason. The World Bank feels strongly that it should develop a 
close working relationship with Nigeria, and we support this view. Nigeria is 
the natural leader of the black African constituency, an important bloc in the 
Bank. It is in our interests to assist the Nigerians in constructing a policy 
framework for development which is generally Western-oriented with a 
large role for market forces, and the World Bank can play a major role in 
this process. (Documents on Africa, 1973–1976) 
Nigeria's successful transformation is key to anchoring the climate 
of peace and rapid development that our citizens hope to see throughout 
Africa, and, thus, central to meeting all our economic, security, and political 
objectives in the region (subcommittee on Africa 1999) 
The construction of the U.S as the subject of Nigeria’s democracy was drawn from the tropes 
of colonialism through which the binary divide of colonizer/colonized serves the fruitful use 
of constructing an Other for the self. As Said (1993) has argued that not enough critical 
engagement has been done to challenge the discourses which privileges the West and 
through which practises of entitlement are enabled. Here, political and economic access to 
Nigeria as the nodal point to significations of entitlement and the denial of agency to Nigeria 
by the U.S. Through this, the power of U.S (colonial) discourse elicits the capacity of the U.S 
agency over Nigeria’s in making Nigeria function for the U.S both politically and economically. 
In the 1960s, the thrust of the U.S foreign policy towards Nigeria was to ensure the 
‘‘friendship’’ of Nigerian leaders so as not to be perceived as a ‘‘nasty imperialist’’ like Britain 
but to interpolate itself as the kind of subject that both owns and controls Nigeria’s polity and 




The 1970’s onward was significant for both Nigeria and the U.S for two reasons: one, it was 
the period of Nigerian oil boom (‘‘petroleum windfall’’) which made the country became a 
member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971. The oil boom 
also signalled the dearth of Nigeria’s agro-economy (majorly from the northern part of 
Nigeria) as well as the rise of significant political violence and corrupt practises in Nigeria 
(Falola 1994).  Secondly, it was also the period of the U.S drive towards ‘democratization’, 
‘security’ and political order (Okolo 2011) and therefore a probable reason for transitioning 
Nigeria from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. It was to this end that 
the U.S assisted African states in ensuring regional development, stability and economic 
integration through the formation of regional organisations like Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Akinwande (2014: 233) has argued that ECOWAS was 
used by the U.S as a ‘security complex’ to ensure regional stability, peace and democracy in 
line with socio-political processes ongoing in Washington.  Central to the developments of 
the 1960s to post-September 2001 was the practice of linking the open signifiers ‘assisting’ or 
‘helping’ Nigeria/Africa to ‘our interests’ or ‘western interests’.  By coupling these two 
elements together, it became easy to say more by saying less. While the literal meaning of 
the word ‘help’ or ‘assist’ points to making something easier for someone, which in this case 
should be Nigeria/Africa, it is interesting to see that the supposed assistance was to further 
the interest of the U.S or ‘the west’. Hence, it is not just laudable to promote democracy and 
economic prosperity, it is also important to construct the U.S as the subject of the discourse 
of democracy. For instance, the direct import of U.S’ actions of inadvertently aiding 
corruption through its support for Nigeria’s borrowing from the IMF and World Bank while 
also increasing its aids grants to Nigeria as a way to buy back Nigeria’s support of the U.S after 
Nigeria’s disapproval of U.S role in the Angolan crisis, was that Nigeria has to pay mounting 
interests at the expense of basic human needs. This is better captured in the words of 
President Clinton during his visit to Nigeria: 
We face, of course, another obstacle to Nigeria's economic development, 
the burden of debt that past governments left on your shoulders. The United 
States has taken the lead in rescheduling Nigeria's debt within the Paris 
Club, and I believe we should do more. Nigeria shouldn't have to choose 




in education and health. We are prepared to support a substantial reduction 
of Nigeria's debts on a multilateral basis, as long as your economic and 
financial reforms continue to make progress and you ensure that the 
benefits of debt reduction go to the people. 
Critics like Rodney (2018) have often highlighted how through the World Bank, and other 
transnational bodies, the flow of capital was facilitated from Africa to the U.S and the rest of 
Europe. This is why the rhetoric of President Clinton and others, which appears laudable at 
an uncritical level, was actually to further the impoverishment of ‘the people’. In the first 
instance, this discursive construction takes for granted that both countries are supposed to 
be sovereign and thus interact at a level that reflects their independence at the very least. 
The rhetoric of President Clinton for instance at an uncritical level appears laudable.  On 
further examination, it however, reveals two important factors in the colonized/colonizer 
dyad of the timeline under review. One is that Nigeria, like in colonial times remains, Nigeria 
remains an extension of the ‘hesitant’ colonizer and secondly that the core commitments 
and/or construct of ‘progress’, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and the likes which are dominant 
signifiers associated with the colonizer’s values remains the exclusive domain of the colonizer. 
As it were, the definition as well as the commitments of Progress remains western-oriented 
and generally elusive. The idea of U.S assistance to Nigeria here did not only silence the 
history of how poverty was produced but also simultaneously construct the U.S as a kind of 
subject with an altruistic democracy. Both at the regional and state levels, the drive for 
democratization, security and political order in the 1970s which was also further evidenced 
by the revival of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(the Kampala Document) (CSSDCA) in the 1990s, signified a necessity for ensuring Nigeria as 
well as Africa remain within the binary divide of the colonizer versus the colonized. 
The material end of colonialism in Nigeria by Britain during the Cold War meant that American 
democratic imaginary and more importantly, expansionism might experience a setback if the 
U.S.S.R gets a firm footing in the newly independent state. The idea of a universal political 
order which could be said to underscore the Cold War and woven around the ‘openness’ of 
Nigeria means entrenching the values of ‘democracy’ which the U.S. represents. As Obi (2010: 




developing the West African region”. This reveals why, a 5-year developmental plan tied 
majorly to democracy and economic development with a proposed $225 million by a 5-man 
delegation was formulated in June 1960, shortly before Nigeria’s independence in October. 
And also why R.H Hunt, the U.S. consul general, visited Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the premier of the 
eastern region of Nigeria, in April 1957 to highlight the dangers of communism and also warn 
against possible ‘contamination’ of Nigeria by the Eastern bloc. The visit was later to the then 
Premier of the western region of Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, in October 1957 to discuss 
the merits of democracy and the need for the containment of communism in western 
Nigerian (U.S Foreign Relations 1960). Prior to this visit, the then minister of finance, Festus 
Okotie-Eboh has answered back at the U.S during a national broadcast that Nigeria is willing 
and ready to accept aid from any of the western powers who is willing to help.  This raised so 
much concern for the U.S that several high level meetings with Nigerian officials were held in 
order to ensure the elites did not fall to the U.S.S.R. Hence, by engaging with Nigeria on the 
need for a liberal democratic imaginary (positioned against communism), politics of aids as 
an inducement for Nigeria to actively join in the war against communism and as well as 
strengthen economic ties immediately followed suit (Darwin 1991; Killingray and Rathbone 
eds. 1986). In the words of Hattori, (2001: 634) aids then is ‘a policy tool […] to influence the 
political judgments of recipient countries’. However, as the subject of the discourse, the U.S 
positioned itself in Nigeria as helping struggling African states and entrenching democratic 
values through aids inducements in order  to have ‘free and democratic institutions’ for 
stability and reduction of (extreme) poverty while actively participating in economically, 
socially and politically salient processes. Since the representation of the U.S as the arbiter of 
democracy was the nodal point around which deliberations were fixed, it becomes necessary 
for the U.S to be represented around its size as a ‘a big nation’, its strength as ‘strong’, its 
humanness as ‘peace-loving and peaceful’, its resources as ‘prosperous’, its values as 
‘freedom loving’ its essence as ‘civilized’ and above all through the assertion of self, the other 
stand in stark opposition to the ‘absences’ of Nigeria and their need of the U.S altruistic 
venture. This discursive representation helps to construct a kind of international identity that 





Constructing the Hesitant Colonialist 
The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits 
of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of 
democracy, development, free markets and trade to every corner of the 
world (The White House 2002b) 
We must use every tool at our disposal to meet this grave global threat, 
including strengthened non-proliferation regimes and export controls, and 
moving ahead with missile defense to deny any benefit to those who would 
try and acquire weapons of mass destruction (Rice, 2002) 
Now, let me say, as we do our part to support your economic growth and 
economic growth throughout Africa, we must also work together and build 
on African efforts to end the conflicts that are bleeding hope from too many 
places. If there's one thing I would want the American people to learn from 
my trip here it is the true, extraordinary extent of Nigeria's leadership for 
peace in West Africa and around the world...Last year President Obasanjo 
came to Washington and reminded us that peace is indivisible. I have 
worked to build a new relationship between America and Africa because our 
futures are indivisible. It matters to us whether you become an engine of 
growth and opportunity or a place of unrelieved despair. It matters 
whether we push back the forces of crime, corruption, and disease together 
or leave them to divide and conquer us. It matters whether we reach out 
with Africans to build peace or leave millions of God's children to suffer 
alone (Clinton visits Nigeria, July 21, 2015). 
Nigeria has been freed by the higher prices of the transformed petroleum 
market from the absolute necessity to exploit to the maximum its growing 
oil resources (Documents of Africa, 1976). 
The ‘reality’ of ‘‘emerging’’ African nations presents to the U.S complex webs of challenge 
ranging from the lack of free institutions, economic development, racial inequality and hatred 
to the concerns for political order (FRUS 1973-1976). Every discourse is a partial fixation or 
partially closed through which a totality is impossible.  The construction of ‘reality’ is the 
same: it is a possible construction amidst other possible alternatives.  It is a partial closure 
that creates certain subject positions and identities as well as fixes meanings. The subject 
positions and identity constructs of the colonizer/colonized upon which the identities of the 
U.S and Nigeria have become partially fixed was accomplished through the representational 
practices of articulation and equivalence. The U.S and Nigeria relations have followed the 




is for obvious reasons as ‘stability in the small nations is necessary to us. Turmoil in small 
nations forces the large nations into opposition (Memorandum of Conference with President 
Eisenhower, October 8, 1960). The text here was the first official meeting between the first 
Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa and President Eisenhower, just 7 days after 
Nigeria’s independence at Washington. The equivalential identities of the two countries in 
the discursive construction was subverted by the specificity of each open element through 
something that they both considered common to them. One is prominent, stable and safe 
while the other is emerging, unstable and dangerous. One has mastered self-governance 
while the other is dependent and unable to be left to themselves. One is modern and the 
arbiter of democracy while the other is traditional and authoritarian. The positivity and 
specificity of each equivalential identity pairs are thus subverted through each one’s 
identification with colonialism. While the common something could be argued as the Cold 
War especially in the light of America’s anti-colonial stance. The choice of elements, among 
other possible elements, which are chain of equivalences articulated through other texts 
reveal something beyond America’s Cold War. The U.S Foreign Policy (1958–1960:47) further 
highlight these chains of equivalences through the fear that ‘African nationalism’ could 
become ‘a massive anti-European movement’ which heightens the concerns for the 
‘immature and unsophisticated’ Africans who are ‘subject to many pressures-Communist, 
Pan-African, Islamic- all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were western 
minded to keep their followers on the right path’. In constructing the identity of the U.S as 
the hesitant imperialist of the African continent and particularly Nigeria, complex webs of 
association, assumptions and rhetoric are drawn upon to enable certain production of world 
representation and as well create the space for the subject position that the ‘other’ is to 
assume. The U.S-Nigeria relationship was anchored on colonialism as the dominant signifier 
and equivalential identity of these chains of significations. This construct evidently plays some 
vital roles in the evolving relationships of both countries. The shared commitments of both 
countries to (open-ended) visions of economic prosperity premised on ‘free institutions’ 
positioned the U.S as the ‘exemplar’ or ‘arbiter of democracy’ and therefore constructs the 
space for Nigeria’s ‘emergent’ identity construct. Indeed, the U.S democratic identity 




modified to suit certain interests depending on contexts. (Cox et. al. 2013; Doty 1996; Omeje 
2008). For instance, scholars like Cox (1995) and Quinn (2010) have highlighted the fact that 
the U.S unpopular intervention in Iraq during President Bush era was woven around 
democracy and the idea of freedom (from tyranny). In Nigeria, the western-centric 
epistemology which informs the dominant discourse of the colonial era as well as the anti-
colonialism rhetoric of the U.S bring about the need for the U.S to justify its identification with 
Nigeria’s colonizer. In other words, it is because Nigeria is emerging, unstable and dangerous, 
among other things that necessitated the corresponding chains of equivalence which resulted 
in the unity through which America’s identity as the hesitant imperialist is created.  Thus 
articulation of Nigeria’s identity through the unity of significations across texts point to 
sudden ‘facts’ about how 50% of narcotics are ferried through Nigeria to the U.S; how some 
Nigerians are ‘very poor people’; how ‘instability’ there could ‘threaten the peace of the U.S.’; 
how ‘primitive tribes’ and ‘emerging nations’ need transitioning to ‘modernity’; and how 
diseases like HIV is of ‘international concern’. While the unity of significations through which 
the U.S identity became constructed point to ‘Nigerian oil’ being of ‘strategic economic 
interest’ to the U.S; and Nigerian ‘leadership in West Africa’ of strategic political interest to 
the U.S and how the U.S is positioned to ‘assist struggling African states’. 
The representation of self as prominent, stable and safe, among other things simultaneously 
demand the construction of the other. It reveals the fact that without one the other cannot 
exist. The U.S became an imperialist, albeit hesitantly, because of Nigeria’s identity construct. 
As seen in President Clinton’s words while the U.S identity is woven around its altruism, 
exemplar character, strength and prosperity that of Nigeria is constructed around conflict, 
poverty, crimes and a bleak future. The unity of these significations mean that the 
undemocratic practices of the U.S like its linkage to the  assassination of the then Nigerian 
Head of State, Muritala  Muhammed as well as its heavy involvement in the assassination of 
the acclaimed winner of Nigeria’s June 12, 1993 election, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola 
(Events in Lagos, 1976; 1993), not to mention the funding of repressive governments and 
structures and programmes like the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that ensure the 
further movement of capital away from the poor to the rich that were either silenced or 




and therefore loses their differences or positives. By subverting these specificities through 
the identification of either pair with the underlying common element of colonialism, it 
becomes possible to cancel out the significations of each identity so that one could replace 
the other. 
Articulating the Impasse: Nigeria’s Leadership and America’s Colonial Trope 
The second most powerful country in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria. Nigeria 
has the people (in numbers and education), oil, a tradition of reasonably 
effective political authority, and a lingering British residue, which could 
make it the Brazil of Africa in the coming decade. The factors that favour the 
Soviets in Africa are generally weaker in Nigeria than elsewhere in the 
continent.  It should become a principal target of U.S. effort to develop 
support in Africa (FRUS 1977-1981) 
A democratic Nigeria is key to a stable and prosperous West Africa, an 
invigorated Africa, and to U.S. national and economic security.  Nigeria is 
our second largest trading partner in all of Africa (Jeter, 1999) 
The U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission is our flagship agreement for 
bilateral cooperation on the entire African continent…Nigeria has also 
played an important role on global issues through its seat on the UN Security 
Council and has been a leader in helping to improve stability in West 
Africa…Economic development is key; Nigeria is one of the fastest-growing 
economies in the world, with the largest population in Africa and strong 
trading relationships (Clinton, 2011) 
On political, economic, military and other pragmatic fronts, Nigeria has often been considered 
as playing the dominant role of the leader in West Africa and probably the rest of the 
continent (Obi 2010; Ikelegbe 2006). This was also foregrounded explicitly as one of the 
United States’ driving force for building ‘friendship’ with Nigeria on a level deeper than pre-
independence era (U.S Foreign Policy 1960). However, ‘the responsibility for world 
leadership’ (NSC 1950: 390) that the U.S has self-assigned to itself makes it a particular kind 
of subject that heavily relies on colonial trope in Nigeria and the rest of Africa. Evidently, the 
colonized/colonizer identity binary which represents the nodes upon which the U.S-Nigeria 
relationships was based directly feeds the assumptions, myths rhetoric and contradictions 
through which the U.S became constructed as this kind of subject. As has been demonstrated 
above, the unity of significations related to the identity of the colonizer in Nigeria demand a 




different challenge to the U.S as unlike Algeria, Rhodesia, Kenya, South Africa and others in 
East, North and Southern Africa, it has no resident European communities and remains 
economically viable. The apparent presence of settled European communities and the need 
for aids as a political tool was considered of justifiable ground for an alliance with existing 
European powers ‘to achieve similar aims’ (Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960; 
Department of States Central Files 751S.oo/1961). Hence, the absence of these two critical 
factors mean that Nigeria might challenge instead of passively submit to the necessity of U.S 
leadership in Africa. To articulate the impasse of Nigeria’s leadership and the U.S colonial 
trope, therefore, an oppositional discourse of Nigeria’s absences as against its leadership role 
in West Africa becomes partially fixed with the supposition of the necessity of U.S leadership 
role in West Africa and Africa generally. Thus, the articulation reveals the struggle in discourse 
because while the construction of othering was necessary to maintain Nigeria’s 
subordination, the construction of its leadership also became necessary to use Nigeria as a 
tool for the furtherance of U.S interest in Africa. This struggle in representation reveals the 
topsy-turvy that has accompanied US-Nigeria relations since the Cold War to the GWOT era. 
One of the most fundamental presupposition that gives support to the oppositional discourse 
of Nigeria’s absences as well as its leadership role in Africa was the premise that Africa’s need 
for socio-political order as well as economic development comes naturally. 
The new leaders see this more aggressive foreign policy as a logical 
international counterpart to their ambitious attempt on the domestic front 
to remedy the management inadequacies of the regime they toppled 
(Documents on Africa, 1973). 
The Nigerian Government now increasingly sees the US as indifferent or as 
an impediment to the achievement of objectives which Nigeria considers 
legitimate. These include economic growth and African political and 
economic independence. Nigerian foreign policy therefore gives high priority 
to strengthening ties with fellow-Africans and cooperating with other third-
world countries, and lower priority to relations with the US and other 
developed countries Nigeria wants little from the US and seeks to keep 
relations with us at a distance. (Documents on Africa, 1976) 
These representational texts highlight the discursive struggle to couple the seemingly natural 
leadership of the U.S with that of Nigeria in Africa generally and West Africa in particular. It 




However, as a representational practice, it sets up the U.S as a kind of subject with a natural 
authority and power to expand into Africa and to make use of Nigeria for that purpose. What 
this reveal is that the U.S drive for expansionism in Nigeria and Africa is natural. Nigeria was 
thus constructed as a kind of subject who should accept this position without challenge. The 
construction of Nigeria’s leadership was therefore dependent on the power of the U.S to 
define and at the same time to self-assert. To set it in a larger context, these representational 
strategies assume a natural mode because of the idea of trusteeship the U.S earlier 
highlighted as a concern which might make their disposition to ‘assist’ Africans 
misunderstood. Hence, one of the most important elements in articulating this impasse is the 
struggle to fix as a total closure the presupposition that America’s need of Nigeria’s resources 
and leadership is legitimate. As a result, the need to use Nigeria as a political tool to influence 
West Africa’s policy and make it U.S-oriented or western-oriented forms the larger discursive 
framework within which other discourse should take place. Hence, the possibility 
that  ‘Nigerian foreign policy therefore gives high priority to strengthening ties with fellow-
Africans and cooperating with other third-world countries, and lower priority to relations with 
the U.S’ became a site for discursive struggle. It is this site of struggle that Bhabha (1983:31) 
asserts as ‘‘a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power’’. The shifting of 
these subject positions from being an ‘emerging’, ‘poor’ and ‘dangerous’ nation to being ‘a 
leader’ of Africa are all partial constructs to enable the practice of imperial power depending 
on present interests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the construction of the U.S Self is premised on some colonial 
tropes and based on the colonizer/colonized binary divide. In the words of David Apter, a 
political scientist, in his testimony, as an authority, before the Senate subcommittee on Africa, 
"Nigeria is much more of a western country than we [Americans] tend to think it is" (Briefing 
on Africa, 1960:104). The colonizer/colonized binary was therefore the nodal point around 
which much of the identity construction of the U.S was centred around, and this was based 
on the significations of ‘democracy’ and/or the ‘free world’.  This is so for obvious reasons as 
concerns relating to ‘free institutions’ and ‘the free world’ was the bane of colonisation and 




specificities were linked to democracy because it makes possible a particular kind of identity 
which conjures the images of ‘strength’, ‘wealth’ and ‘order’ which both equates that of 
Britain in terms of colonialism. While being the ‘friend’ of Britain was of prime importance 
apparently because of the ‘western bond’ they both share, it was more important to construct 
Nigeria in the same breath, both as a West African leader and a country in need of leadership, 
in order to justify the necessity for America’s subject position of taking up the job of the 
‘‘nasty imperialist’’. For instance, in spite of the Joint Resolution of 1954 and Dr Nnamdi 
Azikiwe’s pro-American assertion, Nigeria’s non-alignment policy to either of the power bloc 
of the Cold War signals a threatening other to the hegemony of the U.S. This threat was 
demonstrated by the subsequent hedging of the U.S in the devolution exercise as Nigeria was 
considered ‘dangerous’, ‘retrogressive’ and ‘destructive’ in view of their space as ‘open’ to 
Soviet expansion (Mckay 1956).  However, the agency of Nigeria, as with most African 
countries, could only be exercised within the bounds made possible by the United Nations, 
which is considered an agency for International Development. Through representational 
practices like articulations and equivalence, these identity constructs became possible. It 
therefore became necessary to produce an oppositional discourse which both assert Nigeria’s 
leadership position in Africa and in the same breath deny this so that Nigeria should not be 
made aware of its importance to America, partly because America’s supply of energy from 
the Arab world became crippled during the Cold War. America’s colonial tropes based on this 
kind of subject position and identity construct .This stems from the U.S. assumption of a neo-
colonial stance as the arbiter of democracy and increasing interest in Nigerian oil, the 
‘mistrust’ of Nigeria about the genuineness of U.S in Nigeria and Africa generally. With the US 
perception of Nigeria’s awareness of its own strength and leadership position in Africa and 
assertive stance usually demonstrated through protests (especially in Lagos) rather than 
‘public polemics’ (U.S Foreign Relations 1973), the subject positions continue to be moved 










Chapter 7: Constructing Nigeria as a 
Counter Terrorist State 
‘‘U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help 
partners and allies build their own security capacity…. Although security 
assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that such 
assistance can play in providing security in today’s environment. Threats to 
our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state 
weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will 
increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous grey area that is neither 
fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to 
respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend 
security to areas we cannot reach alone’’ (The Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report, February 2010:73.) 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 has attempted to demonstrate how the construction of the U.S Self functions to fix 
the U.S as the center and how the discourse continually struggles to integrate Nigeria and fix 
its positioning as the user of the discourse deems fit. To do this effectively varying subject 
positions has to be constructed for U.S and Nigeria fixed around the colonized/colonized 
binary divisions as nodal points. To further add to this, this chapter aims to show how the 
Nigerian state has become constructed as a certain kind of state- a state that exists essentially 
to counter terrorist. In this light, the representation is not about the state as a ‘possible user 
of terrorism’ nor is it about state terrorism. Constructing Nigeria as a counter terrorist, 
therefore, enables the re-engineering and refocusing of the entire state architecture on 
terrorism in order to ensure that the ‘menace’ of terrorism and terrorists are effectively 




and as such the absence of Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ becomes equated to peace in Nigeria. 
Among other things, producing such constructions, work to legitimise and normalize counter 
terrorism such as militarism. 
On 9th February 2016, the Director of the Nigerian Army Public Relations, Sani Usman, issued 
a public statement ordering that certain public markets in Borno and Yobe have become 
hideouts for  ‘the adversaries’ of the state as the traders are ‘‘sabotaging the successes of the 
military’’ and so they should be shut down because these markets “have clandestinely been 
aiding the terrorists (Boko Haram) with logistics and other supplies through smuggling and 
other forms of illicit trading, thus sustaining them while the merchants of death make money 
out of it” (Nigeria Security Tracker, 2016). By producing certain spaces as spaces of terror, 
among other things, poor people whose lively hood depend on trading are further pushed to 
the margins. These sorts of practices of representation of social actors and actions as 
discursive practices have come to define for us not just the identities of the Northerners (who 
are predominantly Muslim), as accomplices of evil but also that of the Nigerian State, as the 
peaceful state that counters terrorism. This is particularly interesting because the shift of the 
GWOT into Nigeria was premised on the U.S policy directives which focuses on ‘strengthening’ 
failed/weak states which have become breeding grounds for terrorists. 
As Blakely (2007) has shown through her analyses of the history of democracies in the global 
North that the use of military and/or financial support to oppressive governments, like that 
of Indonesia against East Timor as supported by Britain, U.S. and Australia, has a long history. 
She contended through this and many more examples that state complicity in fostering 
violent activities should be given more attention in Critical Terrorism Studies. While the 
argument here is not about the state use of terrorism, this chapter draws from works of these 
sorts in the Critical Terrorism studies to argue that the September 2001 event, with the 
attendant GWOT brought about the articulation of a discourse that constructs Nigeria as a 
counter terrorist state through which the normalization of (political) violence is justified. To 
do this effectively, while there was no significant change in the policy formulation and 
orientation from Presidents Clinton to Obama, however the war against terrorism 




life became envisioned through the identity of Nigeria as a counter terrorist. The seeming 
appeal to universal democratic values, entrenched in policy documents, in the GWOT in Africa 
would only serve to captivate but as Sardar and Davies 2002:56 asserted that ‘the questions 
to which we all need answers since 11 September fall off the agenda in the face of the 
description ‘evil’. Evil simply demands opposition rather than analysis or understanding’’. 
Moreover, in the wake of the GWOT, not only are the polemics of counter terrorism bereft of 
principles and/or social values congruent to the individual context of countries in Africa 
(Chomsky 2006; Call 2008), according to Boggs (2003:3), the pretext has contributed to the 
‘‘unparalleled military domination over the world’s landmasses, sea lanes, and air spaces, 
with great aspirations toward colonization of outer space’’. 
The chapter is divided into two major parts with five subsections in order to fully capture the 
how the counter terrorist state is constructed, and the practises enabled by such 
constructions in Nigeria. While the first part is focused on the construction of the state as a 
counter terrorist, the second part works by applying this construction to the Boko Haram 
group. Hence the identity of the counter terrorist’s state functions by ensuring groups like 
Boko Haram is constructed in certain ways which work for the counter terrorist state. The first 
part starts with the subsection: Constructing the state as the target of terrorists aims to show 
how the inherent nature of this discursive construction is to categorise what oppressive 
practices and/or political violence should or should not be fixed as ‘terrorism’. Hence, the 
silencing of the history of such violence and its positioning as inherently against the survival 
of the corporate entity called, Nigeria. The second subheading: Constructing the peaceful 
state that counters terrorism argues that terrorism/terrorists are represented by this 
productive practice as the antithesis of peace in ‘society’. Hence, their elimination would 
ensure the return to a peaceful society. The second part of the chapter starts with the third 
subheading constructing Boko Haram’s violence as crisis. This section shows how Boko 
Haram’s violence is constructed as a crisis and as such demands a solution from the norm. 
The point here is that the construction of a crisis situation enables the justification of 
extraordinary measures which works nicely for the counter terrorist’s state. The fourth 
section : constructing Boko Haram’s violence as war aims to show how ‘crisis’ and ‘war’ are 




secured against its enemies. The last subheading: Constructing Peace as the absence of 
terrorism highlights the practice enabled by the discursive construction of the counter 
terrorist’s state. Boko Haram is thus the only group whose violence represents the lack of 







The State as Counter terrorist State 
Constructing the State as the Target of Terrorists 
It must also enhance its liaison relationship with Nigerian security services 
and help build their capacity to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram to 
Nigerian and U.S. interests…[and] may be pursuing interests it shares with 
AQIM (Boko Haram Emerging Threats to the U.S Homeland, 2011). 
Terrorism is just an act of violence against the government. They feel 
through that they will get what they want. Just an act of violence, killing 
innocent people. That is it and they have very strong networks. They link up 
with other international terrorist organisations. Anywhere they spring up 
like in Mali, they still have their financing from the international terrorism 
group. They use this to destroy lives (Interviewee 1) 
They don't really have any grievance and there is none. They are just hiding 
under the canopy of religion and want to take over the government in 
Nigeria. That has been their aim. They have not come out publicly or 
privately to make known their grievances (Interviewee 4). 
In the words of George (1991:1), ‘‘the term ‘terrorism’ has been virtually appropriated by 
mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West’’ and through these 
sorts of constructions, state-centric bias in describing violent activities and formulating 
[repressive] policies are the norm. As has been argued in previous chapters, one of the 
primary functions of the discourse of terrorism is to decontextualize acts of violence thereby 
making it ahistorical. In constructing the identity of the counterterrorist state such discourse 
function by fixing the state as the primary target of the terrorists. The construction here was 
not fixed for instance around the history of the violence and the possible grievances Boko 
Haram might be putting forth. The terrorists’ violence thereby evolves from nowhere and 
with no apparent reason and only exist to target the state and destabilize its architecture. The 
‘threat’ and ‘danger’ posed by the terrorists to the interests of Nigeria and the U.S through 
which their proscription became justified, is positioned as a self-evident truth for the 
necessity of ‘‘tools and security collaboration’’ for effective counterterrorism measures. On 
the contrary, rather than Boko Haram being the threat to the effectiveness of the state or to 
democracy in Nigeria, the militaristic posture of the Nigerian state especially from the state-
building policy strategy of the 1990s is the threat to the political stability of Nigeria. For 




rights abuses including assassinations of journalists, women leaders and political activists 
which led to the official sanctioning of Nigeria from the international scene. However, in spite 
of the U.S rhetoric against Abacha’s oppressive and corrupt regime, their economic ties with 
Nigeria witnessed an increment during this period. This contributed to Abacha’s insistence on 
the continuation of his regime rather than a return to democracy by arguing that Nigeria’s 
resources make it indispensable to the survival of countries like the U.S (Oye 2000). Shortly, 
after the death of Abacha and the return to democracy in 1999, rather than a holistic and 
integrated approach in policy terms, the discourse of instability through the African Crisis 
Response Initiative became dominant.  The signification of instability through the policy 
strategy of strengthening vulnerable states in the 1990s became transitioned into a moment 
after 9/11. The signification of instability as a moment therefore help to give legitimacy both 
nationally and internationally to the oppression of the state through the forceful repression 
of dissident groups like Boko Haram. The justification of ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to 
countering the terrorists’ threat after 9/11 is therefore premised on not just the 
weakness/fragility of the state but how the presence of non-state actors who seek to give 
voice to injustice and oppression by the state represents instability. According to Puneet 
Talwar, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on June 4, 2015: 
We have made substantial progress addressing instability in Africa over the 
last decade. Our African partners are increasingly taking charge of their own 
security. We welcome these efforts to provide African solutions to African 
security challenges However, significant 
and complex security challenges remain. Conflict persists in the Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and 
South Sudan. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram threaten the regional and 
international order. 
As has been highlighted in this thesis, the discourse of ‘instability’ about Nigeria and other 
African countries emerged during the Cold War when local issues were understood by the U.S 
as possible grounds for co-opting African countries into the East-West divide. While the usage 
of the language has changed overtime, the ‘solutions’ often proffered has been ‘partnership’ 
of foreign and local military to address the issues. Prior to and after the GWOT in Africa, the 




partner to the U.S by the Clinton presidency in addressing security and fighting international 
terrorism.  As a result of this partnership, the discourse of instability witnessed some revival 
during the Obasanjo presidency (1999-2007) as signified by the establishment of the 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa through the 
Kampala Document provided a comprehensive security and Development framework 
towards the provision of much-needed peace and economic prosperity in Africa.  The new 
relevance gained by the discourse of instability was also signified by the priority given to it by 
Nigeria’s foreign policy (which was why Niger Delta militants became labelled as ‘terrorists’ 
in the late 1990s) during the Obasanjo presidency as well. According to scholars like 
Adoghamhe (2006), Deng and Zartman (1999) and Akinwande (2014: 147), this partnership 
could be understood as an official acknowledgement of ‘the link between security and 
stability on the one hand, and development and cooperation in Africa’ on the other hand. This 
background is triangulated by Abrahamsen (2018) on how the new form of global militarism 
in Africa is linked to development/democracy and political order especially the discourse of 
war. By being constructed as targeting the interests of the Nigerian and U.S governments and 
seeking to ‘‘take over the government’’, Boko Haram thus represents the cause of instability 
to the socio-political landscape not just in Nigeria but to a global political order. As a result of 
this, the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria, as highlighted by the Boko Haram proscription, help 
to construct and normalize the identity of the state as the counterterrorism state. 
The second narrative of the discourse of terrorism through which the state is represented as 
the target of terrorists is the extent of strength and lethality of such groups which in turn 
demand a ‘strong’ and ‘resilient’ state to counter such groups: 
Terrorism is an act of destroying or planning attack on a group of people 
who have actually done nothing so as to achieve a particular goal. It is not 
like a war setting, they just come together to plan attack. This day we see 
them tie bomb to themselves and they just explode anytime and any day. 
They do that in public places (Interviewee 5) 
As President Obama has said, effectively addressing evolving terrorism 




the political will and the ability to disrupt and degrade terrorist networks 
(Thomas-Greenfield, May 10, 2015). 
From the Global Terrorism Database to the Council on Foreign Relations, Boko Haram is 
represented as one of the deadliest terror groups across the globe owing to the number of 
fatalities recorded since the group became known. Constructing the strength of Boko Haram 
is often directly linked to their facelessness and invincibility as a result of guerrilla strategy 
and links to other terror networks in Africa.  Boko Haram like most terrorist groups is 
constructed as being so strong, sophisticated and ruthless that the former president of 
Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan asserted that due to the strength and sophistication of the 
group, even his own life is not safe (Oarhe 2012). As regards the group’s fatalities, both Boko 
Haram and the Nigerian Army have often traded blames on who is responsible for the deaths 
of victims on certain attacks (BBC 2012, January 26th). Also on statistical terms the number of 
fatalities according to perpetrators (whether it was state actors i.e. the Nigerian army or Boko 
Haram) remains unclear. An example of this is highlighted below: 
 
Source: Nigeria Security Tracker, May 2011-April 2019 
Prior to and even after the emergence of Shekau, the present leader of Boko Haram known 
for his violent and aggressive stance against the state, both the Nigerian police and army have 




International, 1999; Ogunoye 2001). Hence, representing the state as the target of terrorists 
based on lethality of groups helps to fix the assumption that the terrorists’ use of violence is 
needless, devious and ruthless (Bush, November 2001) while that of the state is necessary 
and virtuous based on the legitimate use of violence by the Weberian state. One could argue 
that the oppressive practices of states like Nigeria thus justifies their labelling as weak states 
which are ‘‘axis of evil’’ according to President Bush. Obviously, the repressive practices of 
Nigerian cannot explain ‘weakness’ in terms of authority as the U.S policy instruments would 
want us believe. It should rather point to its strength as signalled by its military and economic 
strength and leadership position in Africa. The concern of the U.S in Africa especially as 
highlighted by the GWOT is premised on the fear of African governments sponsoring terrorist 
groups against the U.S. Hence for states such as Nigeria to resist being labelled as part of the 
‘’axis of evil’’ against the U.S, what is necessary is becoming a ‘friend’ of the U.S not in terms 
of respecting the human rights of the Nigerian people but partnering with the U.S to counter 





Constructing the Peaceful State that Counters Terrorism 
Another strong justification for constructing and normalizing the counter terrorist state is that 
terrorism is a bad kind of political violence which a peaceful state like Nigeria should counter. 
As one of the primary functions of the state is to protect human lives and properties and 
defend its territorial integrity against any form of aggression, it behoves any well-meaning 
state to carry out such functions to fulfil the reasons for its existence. The statement by 
President Bush on September 11th, 2001 that 
Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with 
us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that 
continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime 
function as a discursive move through which being part of an ‘us’ group constructed by the 
U.S as its friends and allies against enemies who are ‘axis of evil’ meant that the ‘differential 
value ‘ of the U.S as a peace-loving state is fixed in equivalential terms with terrorism. As a 
result, the move helps to fix the identity of the U.S and its friends in terms of an antiterrorists 
state as this signals a strong commitment to peace, freedom and democracy. This sort of 
representation was premised on an earlier analysis that the incidence of September 11 could 
have been averted if threats from weak/failed states had been treated with less complacency 
(Woodward 2002; Suskind 2006).  By drawing from the virtues of freedom and peace, it 
becomes all the more important to ensure that ‘terrorism’ which is the predominant threat 
to peace is eliminated at all cost. Hence in the National Security Strategy (2002 p.15), the 
need for pre-emptive strikes became warranted and justified. As the document stated that ‘‘ 
the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves…to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries’’ the U.S would not hesitate to ‘‘ act pre-emptively’’. The identity of the 
counterterrorist state which is a state that is able to know the terrorists’ intention, capacity 
and allies necessitated the need for Pentagon, the State Department and the Bureau of 
African Affairs, the three most important organs on the U.S policy towards Africa, to conclude 
on the need to re-evaluate the need for U.S military in Africa.  This is because since the case 




regards direct U.S military involvement in Africa became enacted (Patman 2008). However, 
in the wake of 9/11 this changed through the signification of 9/11 as crisis in policy terms and 
this enables the need the physical presence of U.S military in Africa in order to train African 
military so they could become ‘professionals’ at managing and controlling conflicts and 
instability (Olsen 2017). 
A nation of Nigeria's size and importance, however, needs a credible and 
professional military force that respects civilian control and fulfils its 
constitutional role of protecting the nation. It is therefore vital for the U.S. 
government to engage with Nigeria's military as part of an overall effort to 
consolidate democracy, rebuild institutions, and encourage investment and 
economic growth in Nigeria (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs January, 
2001) 
 
The government [of Nigeria] has lent strong diplomatic support to U.S. 
Government counter-terrorism efforts in the aftermath of the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Government of Nigeria, in its official 
statements, has both condemned the terrorist attacks and supported 
military action against the Taliban and Al Qaida. Nigeria also has played a 
leading role in forging an anti-terrorism consensus among states in Sub-
Saharan Africa U.S (Bilateral Relations Factsheet, Nigeria February 2008) 
The war against terrorism therefore requires the fixing of Nigeria not just as a major concern 
of the U.S foreign policy but constructs it as a kind of state: a counter terrorist state. Through 
this, the Obama government adopted a whole-of government approach which focuses on 
peace, stability and security in sub-Saharan Africa as ‘‘one of the United States’ highest 
priorities’’ by the State Department (Blanchard 2015). Through the appeal to the rule of raw 
and the virtues of justice, liberty and freedom therefore, the whole-of-government approach 
by the Obama Presidency works well to fix the narrative of the peaceful state as the counter 
terrorist state. This is further evidenced in the following excerpts: 
While military efforts remain critical, the success of counterterrorism 
efforts in Africa increasingly depends upon capable and responsible civilian 
partners -- police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, religious and 
community leaders -- who can help address terrorism through a sustainable 
framework that advances rule of law and respect for human rights. In that 




enforcement, judicial, and other criminal justice sector institutions (Thomas-
Greenfield 2015). 
Of course, the western country they are liberal people because if Nigeria 
falls, they will want to support Nigeria (Interviewee 4) 
As a partner to the U.S through initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP), Nigeria military was trained not just on countering terrorism in the country but also 
on its prevention. The whole-of -government approach during the Obama administration thus 
embodies the executive, legislature, police, judiciary, army, health professionals, community 
and religious leaders and civil society so as to address the ‘‘root causes’’ of terrorism. This 
approach become inevitable after the factual details of the millions who have become 
displaced, killed and/or maimed by terrorists’ groups like Boko Haram. The ‘facts’ about the 
evils of terrorism and that of the terrorist is so self-evident that they speak for themselves. 
Such ‘facts’ are ‘‘so ‘real’ that it requires no frame, so ‘true’ that no interpretation is 
necessary, so ‘concrete’ that no meaning need be inferred’’ (Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 5). 
The ‘facts’ about the evils of terrorism for instance highlights how through (suicide) bombing 
scores were killed at Abuja and how the U.N building was destroyed; it however, did not 
discuss how thousands of supposed ‘terrorists’ have been so dehumanised and killed extra 
judicially with the bodies of some dragged across the cities so as to be completely 
dismembered (BBC 2012, Nov 1st; Amnesty International, 2013). The corollary to the hostility 
of terrorism is a peaceful state which is that that is strong and capable to counter and 
degrade Boko Haram terror networks. Terrorism was frequently referred to as ‘‘plague’’ and 
‘‘crises’’ which requires all the efforts that any responsible and responsive government could 
garner. As a result of this, in 2015 the Obama Administration provided $71 million through 
the Department of States, $40 million through the Global Security Contingency Fund program 
and $45 million in Presidential Drawdown for its counter-Boko Haram strategy (Thomas-
Greenfield 2016). This heavy funding to ensure terrorism is effectively countered is so 
instructive because for instance in spite of Nigeria’s economic prowess, about 53.5% of its 
population live in extreme poverty in 2009 (World Bank, 2018), yet such a whole-of-





A considerable amount of constructing the peaceful state which counters the hostility of 
terrorism positions the military as the solution to the problem of terrorism. Interesting policy 
documents and official narratives often involve partial acknowledgment of the ‘complex’ and 
‘diverse’ ‘realities’ and ‘challenges’ facing Africa and an explicit assertion that military 
solutions are inadequate. However, a sharp disparity could be drawn between such and the 
solutions provided.  In 2004, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA) program became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) through which 
both military and humanitarian needs of Africa would be addressed (Stimson Centre 2005). 
In furtherance to this, in 2007, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) became established 
to be the epicentre of most U.S operations in Africa. Hence, issues as diverse as health and 
the oil of African states are to be addressed through AFRICOM with the main aim of 
countering terrorism. In response of this, Theresa Whelan, at a testimony to the congressional 
subcommittee in 2008, asserted that AFRICOM’s establishment is mainly to confront ‘‘violent 
extremism’’ and not “…solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage 
China”. The fixing of the meaning of terrorism and labelling of groups as such works to provide 
a justifiable ground for the increased militaristic ventures through various initiatives like 
Africa Peacekeeping and Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the ‘Flintlock’’ Exercise. 
On the question of the extent of agency exercised by Nigeria, as argued in earlier chapters, 
the discourse of terrorism is a discourse of advantage to both countries as it works by silencing 
the roles of the structures which produced it. Hence, constructing the identity of the counter 
terrorist state is somewhat an easy task for the U.S. to do in Nigeria. This is partly because 
Nigeria, like most African countries had been under military regimes for longer periods than 
they are under democratic setting.  In Nigeria, for instance, the military toppled the new 
democratic state in 1966 after the country’s independence in 1960 and ruled till 1999, 
excluding the four-year period between 1979 and 1983 (Bappah 2016).  It goes without saying 
that Nigerians experienced the height of oppression during these times as even the press was 
gagged, and emerging liberation movements violently contained (Chisom, 1999). The U.S. 
emphasis on containment through political order during the Cold War which brought about 
the accusation of the U.S. complicities in the assassinations of General Murtala Muhammed, 




election, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola due to their anti-U.S. stance (Falola 1998), the 
Nigerian political elites have become somewhat docile in their compliance to the U.S. (Sowale 
2013; Events in Lagos, 1976; 1993). 
` 
The Transitioning of Boko Haram’s Violence as 
Terrorism 
Constructing Boko Haram’s Violence as Crisis 
This is in line with the ‘instability’ and ‘crisis’ envisaged in the ‘foreseeable future’ of 
‘developing countries’ that were being ‘granted independence long before they are able to 
govern themselves’. The policy document which was a defining document as it aggregates 
both military and economic strategy of the U.S in managing the democracies and/or 
development of ‘emerging African nations’ in line with ‘civic action’ elicits the history of 
controlling Africa’s economy through a deliberate global militarism. With several high level 
meetings on what the ‘instability’ in African countries portend for the U.S., Nigeria became of 
‘security concern’ which necessitated the construction of the U.S as the subject to be secured. 
The representation of the U.S as being responsible for securing the interests of the ‘free 
world’ as well that of the U.S. in ‘developing countries’ enables the explicit linkage of 
democracy to the military. 
Prior to the launch of AFRICOM in 2007, as a response to the crisis of the 1990s, Africa Crisis 
Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor ACOTA were the initiatives of the Department of 
Defense between 1996 and 2004. While criticisms and counter-criticisms of imperialistic 
agenda abound as regards the successes and failures of the involvement of the U.S. in 
countries like Somalia, Ivory Coast or even their evasiveness in the Rwandan crisis (Frazer 
1997), it remains that the tradition of resorting to reactive foreign policy with telling 
consequences on the African continent reveals, among other things, how Africa is being 
imagined by the U.S. This tradition could rightly show why in spite of the severe criticisms that 
followed ACOTA for the implosion of Ivory Coast for instance, immediately after the 




Operations Initiative with immerse presence in Africa. Also the hasty manner by which state 
failure and terrorism become reified to the ‘center of global politics’ and through which this 
thesis has shown that Boko Haram became proscribed further buttress this argument. 
According to a Congressional Research Service statement, ‘the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always 
intended to remain on Africa’. The reasons for substituting ‘Global’ for ‘Africa’ was not stated 
explicitly but the tradition of knowing and acting upon Africa through a ‘sovereign’ discourse 
could help in understanding the reasons for the focus. 
The productive practice of the discourse of the GWOT enabled several peace-keeping 
operations and ‘partnerships’ for ordering and stability reasons. An instance of this is further 
highlighted in another of Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s, the assistant secretary bureau of African 
affairs, testimonial: 
Through our bilateral and regional relationships as well as through our 
engagement in the UN Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the 
capabilities of our African partners to prevent and respond to crises. 
..Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP), a 
Presidential initiative announced at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders’ 
Summit, we will continue to develop a full-spectrum of crisis management 
capabilities and strengthen the capacity of West African states and the 
African Union to not only improve their response mechanisms once a crisis 
develops, but to also proactively identify and prevent crises in a more pro-
active manner. (June 4, 2015) 
I believe during president Obasanjo, he was advised that time that the crisis 
would soon break up and from his own experience, he warned the one that 
took power from him, that he should take the matter of security so 
seriously….We started having internal crisis even until now we are having 
internal crisis. So the time this Boko Haram started manifesting was in 
2004… We are talking of Boko Haram. We have been having internal crisis 
with different names and factions but the one of Boko Haram should be 
2004 (Interviewee 1). 
No matter how you are looking at that, any country that you find violence, 
the crisis does not calm down at once, even since that 2006, there is still 
crisis in Liberia but not as it was. Today everywhere will be calm and 
tomorrow they will come out again. In which troop had to be sent to calm 




... And all these coupled up has led to Islamic crisis in Nigeria. Before now, 
we hardly have crisis in this nature. Therefore, with the help of those Islamic 
countries, that are now sponsoring these things, we have these crises. 
Looking at the number of people that are been killed within a short period, 
you will know that we have lost a lot of Nigerians to this crisis (Interview 3) 
The government don’t really care because the government is for those in 
government. The average Nigerian feels very little impact of the government 
and prays the issue of crisis be brought under control as soon as possible 
and can go on with their daily living. (Interview 4) 
In 2011 the crisis subsided in Jos and  to my understanding, I believe is the 
same group that was fighting in Jos that moved down to Maiduguri to  now 
form a kind of base in Maiduguri..….. the crisis started from church as the 
Muslims started blocking Christians that were going to churches then the 
Christians were fighting back (Interviewee 7) 
From the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in the 1997 during the presidency of Clinton 
to African Contingency Operations (ACOTA) in 2002, the discourse of ‘crisis’ has become a 
necessary construction to justify the intervention of both foreign and local military men in 
issues organic to democracy and every lives of Africans. In the entire interview text, the 
element ‘crisis’ was used about 42 times by 7 out of the 9 soldiers who were interviewed. In 
using this, the violence of Boko Haram was not only constructed as ‘crisis’ but it was also used 
in equivalential terms to ‘terrorism’ and to that of the Niger Deltas, the Maitaisine’s and other 
violent groups in Nigeria. The interchangeable use of ‘crisis’ and ‘terrorism’ in the entire text 
was unsurprising as situations of political violence have often been described as ‘crisis’ in the 
military lexicon. The use of ‘terrorism’ only represents a shift that is silenced in order to 
naturalize its meaning. However, with the exception of one, all the soldiers consider the crisis 
situation in Nigeria as asymptomatic of issues of marginalization and corruption. An important 
highlight of this discursive construction is the salience of the complex interplay of social, 
economic, political and cultural processes in Nigeria. Understanding Boko Haram’s violence 
as ‘crisis’ in this sense meant that as an antagonism, it signals the friction between 
‘westernization’ and/or ‘modernization’  as against the ‘traditional’ socio-political character 
of Nigerians prior to and after independence. The project of transitioning Nigeria to be 
‘modern’ or ‘western-oriented’ as has been highlighted in this thesis involves an economic 




became the subject of the discourse. Through this the people of Nigeria become acted upon 
in such a manner that they are silenced. One of the dominant narratives of Boko Haram, as 
well as others like the Avengers, is the theme of corruption, westernization and economic 
deprivation. For instance, Abu Qaqa, Boko Haram’s spokesman asserted that: 
…Absolutely nothing will stop us against waging war on the Nigerian State 
and its establishments ….The sect will not hesitate to eliminate anyone that 
chooses to prefer the western culture over sharia (Cited in All Africa 
November 25th, Qaqa 2011). 
As Seyeifa (2013) has argued, these grievances acted as ‘catalyst’ for ‘vulnerable’ and ‘poor’ 
people to engage in political violence.  In the word of Danjibo (2013) about Boko Haram’s 
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, he was ‘feeding people freely, giving people money to get married, 
was paying people’s rent…that attracted a lot of young people who lacked some economic 
strengths to join that group’. Hence, rather than constructing the people of Nigeria as the 
victims of the practises enabled by the discourse of terrorism, (the interests of) the U.S 
became constructed as the defining feature of Nigeria’s democratic experiment. The U.S then 
became the victim who suffers economic loss (partly because of exploration of mineral 
resources) and therefore the one who suffers should be understood. An interesting 
perspective to this, however, was that none of the soldier (except interviewee 6 who made 
an explicit linkage of the sale of weapons for war to the importation of/exchange for oil) 
highlighted the role of the U.S in the ‘crisis’. This interesting feature, among other things, 
points to how the role of structures that produce meta-narratives and violent ‘reality’ like that 
of Boko Haram is silenced. Silence then highlights the power to produce what we know and 
the politics of fixing meaning to serve a certain end. To this end, the uprising of violent groups 
like Boko Haram represents the signification of a challenged hegemony. The ‘crisis’ did not 
only show that something is not working but it gives ‘voice’ to what has been silenced: the 
possibilities of alternative ways. As an addendum, this was why rather than engaging with and 
understanding the sufferings and grievances of the Ogoni people in Niger Delta, the 
presidency of Clinton ‘adopted’ the Nigerian government in partnership, hence they were 
considered as ‘terrorists’ owing to the ‘economic loss’ suffered by the U.S. Thereby, silencing 




Secondly, from the Nigerian civil war to the emergence of ‘terrorism’ in the 1990s and 
particularly after September 2001, the presence of ‘crisis’ relates to the clear cut identity 
markers : North versus South or Muslims versus Christians respectively. By assigning rigid 
categories to these identity constructions, the one is positioned against the other in Nigeria 
through the modern/traditional dyad. The ‘society’ envisioned is the one which is not only 
accessible and thus open to the U.S but also that which remains a ‘hinterland’. The use of the 
language of identity to describe, engage with as well as understand political violence here is 
not natural nor is it new. It is a deliberate design that ‘essentializes’ and re-enforces the ‘us’ 
against ‘them’. This is because unlike previous violent groups in Nigeria, the evoking of these 
identity constructs, in the emergence of the discourse of terrorism, relate to the identification 
of an enemy rather an attempt at understanding. Hence, it is the coupling together of ‘crisis’ 
and the ‘them’ identity construct that equates ‘terrorism’. It was interesting to note the 
discursive struggle and obvious contradictions by the interviewees to construct a crisis 
situation on the one hand and the identification of the enemy of the state on the other hand. 
From the perspective of these military officers, Boko Haram’s categorization as an enemy of 
the state represents ‘terrorism’ and in the same light, their narratives as highlighting common 
grievances  of corruption, deprivation and marginalization represents ‘crisis’. The 
contradictions then became necessary to justify the militarization of democracy in Nigeria. 
Otherwise, without the identification of an enemy of the state, how else would the 
involvement of the Nigerian army be justified? 
Constructing Boko Haram’s violence as War 
Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the 
distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to 
answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against 
us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when 
stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. 
It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing (President Bush, 
Washington, D.C. 2001) 
I have been to Liberia twice. I was told before I enter the force that then 
during the war, if not for that Nigeria soldiers, the war wouldn't have been 
successfully won, I believe if we follow the same approach with Boko Haram, 
the war against terrorism can be won like we did in Liberia. We just need to 




you find violence, the crisis does not calm down at once, even since that 
2006, there is still crisis in Liberia but not as it was (Interviewee 3) 
... But what I know is that only he cannot do it. You cannot say as a president 
you will go out and win a war alone. (Interviewee 2) 
This Boko Haram terrorist uses unconventional method to fight like mines. 
The Geneva Convention forbids the use of mines in warfare. In warfare 
situation, the provision on the convention allows you to kill your enemies 
and not like say amputate your enemy and leave him half human. There is 
also an allowance to take your enemy alive if he surrenders. This is basically 
the method the Boko Haram guys are using. The unconventional method. 
They make it in a way that it looks like a trap. The mines strategy has been 
their major style of operation and this has resulted in major casualty 
(interviewee 4). 
Sometimes, the war itself looks like a propaganda. How this group started. 
Boko Haram has been on for a long time for instance, what is the meaning 
of Boko Haram (Interviewee 6) 
It became a war between boko Haram and Christians. They burnt churches 
300 to 400 churches in Borno state, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Damaturu and 
Adamawa. When the Boko haram group escalated further, they said their 
fellow Muslim are not supporting them but supporting the government of 
Nigeria. Then it became a fight after the Nigerian nation and no longer 
religious (Interviewee 8) 
The discursive shift and interchangeability from ‘crisis’ to ‘terrorism’ almost in the same 
breath serves as the basis for the construction of Boko Haram’s violence as ‘war’. However, 
unlike the Just War theory, and its theological base, within which Jackson (2005) has argued 
that the ‘war on terrorism’ is positioned, the ‘war on terrorism’ in Nigeria is aptly positioned 
within a justifiable premise of the nation’s ‘security’. The obvious need for ‘security’ of human 
lives and their properties; for state apparatus and its personnel’s, among other things serves 
as justifiable grounds to defend the people and the state’s sovereignty against external 
aggression. The meaning as well as the genuineness of Boko Haram’s violence as ‘war’ seems 
to come naturally. It is because the violence is ‘terrorism’; it is an escalated ‘crisis’ and 
therefore it is beyond what is ‘normal’ in Nigeria. Hence, neither does ‘war’ needs defining 
nor the need to explain or justify why a country goes to war against its own citizens. The 
seeming naturalness silenced the need to explain why soldiers in their quantum now resume 




is at ‘war’; only that the war is against itself.  The war on terrorism has variously been defined 
as a war against something vague, a broad idea and a concept (Collins and Glover 2002; Van 
Veeren 2011). It is simply an endless war and a venture so infinite and undoable. In a similar 
vein, however with some twists, the war against Boko Haram’s terrorism is not just vague, 
infinite and broad, it is a war that defines for Nigerians the line between ‘good’ violence and 
‘bad’ violence. The history of political violence in Nigeria usually understood as ‘crisis’ 
presents a practical challenge to the Meta narrative of the terrorism construct: how is the 
terrorists’ violence different from others? The implicit response to this as given by some of 
the interviewees is that Boko Haram make use of ‘unconventional’ tactics or they have killed 
more Nigerians than other violent groups. Both responses are not just empirically incorrect 
but also do not shed light on why some ‘terror’ is considered moral and legitimate. 
Unconventional tactics for instance have been employed by non-state actors like the 
Maitaisine’s and the Avengers (Abimbola 2010; Agbiboa 2013), and this approach has been 
well documented as the major means available to non-state actors in their fight against an 
organised state army (Lacquer 1977; Crenshaw 1995). Again, the Fulani Herdsmen have killed 
more people according to several sources including the Global Terrorism Database (2017). 
Moreover, if the quantity of deaths is the yardstick to measure ‘terrorism’ how many lives 
should then be taken before it is considered not ‘normal’?  By giving the ‘crisis’ an 
equivalential identity of terrorism, the violence becomes ‘bad’ for the country and its peoples. 
Hence, its elimination was not just justified but also the violence of the state as represented 
by the military become ‘good’. Hence, Boko Haram’s violence as ‘war’ is a representation of 
a ‘bad’ violence because it is targeted against the collective identity of the nation. The 
discourse of terrorism, among other things, therefore articulates a new history where political 
violence whether by the state or non-state actors are ‘good’ and therefore ‘normal’ until they 
become boxed into moral judgement of ‘terrorism’. 
Constructing Peace as Absence of Boko Haram’s Terrorism 
Terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with… Now we don't have plan 
because we are living with fear of the terrorist. This is very bad for a 
country…terrorism is causing havoc in a particular place that have peace. 
Making the place unstable, making the place unbearable for people living in 
a peaceful place. Terrorism has caused pain in our society…. I can round up 




That is what peace will really mean because the terrorist activity is a real 
threat to life in the country. The movement does not really have a friend 
except you are there’s. Probably their sponsors. …I hope with time; the 
threat will be completely eliminated. Nigeria will know peace again 
(Interviewee 4) 
..... For me, peace is actually a state where the society is working as it is 
supposed to be. It is absence of terrorism. Where people can go about their 
normal day to day business. Daily activities without disturbance, without 
fears, and threat to their lives and properties (Interviewee 5) 
Terrorism is an abnormal act why I say it is abnormal is that, it doesn’t 
maintain orderliness but breed destruction and disorganises people and 
takes life and at the end nothing is achieved (Interviewee 7) 
During the military, things were done in a normal way and you don’t go out 
to agitate anyhow even during Obasanjo democratic regime, it started small 
and wasn’t the way it is now (Interviewee 8). 
The discourse of terrorism in Nigeria assumes its naturalness through the appeal that a ‘bad’ 
violence gives: the need for peace or normalcy. However just like the definition of ‘terrorism’ 
remains elusive and evasive so also that of ‘peace’. The only way to define peace would then 
be the absence of terrorism. Otherwise, how else do we know ‘peace’ until when the ‘war’ is 
won? After all the olive branch of dialogue and negotiation has been turned down by the 
‘terrorists’ and there is ‘fear everywhere’. And for Nigerians to resume their ‘normal business’ 
the ‘terrorist threat’ of necessity should be eliminated. What ‘peace’ as the ‘absence of 
terrorism’ seems to point to is that the prevalence of political violence both in the southern 
and northern parts of Nigeria remains asymmetry with the normal state of things. However, 
the kind of violence that challenges neo-colonial drive as represented by the ‘interests’ of the 
U.S and that of Nigeria’s political elite is the violence that needs elimination especially 
militarily. ‘Peace’ then in this respect does not necessarily mean ‘peace’ to Nigerians but 
peace to the subject of the terrorism discourse. It is the elimination of antagonism as 
represented by Boko Haram’s violence in order to evolve a Liberal democratic imaginary 
devoid of agitations against the state. At the very basic, the realist thought associate peace 
with the democratic process and this idea of peace relates to the absence of war, especially 
among nation-states (Kochler 1995). This explains why after the discursive re-construction of 




militarily but also it immediately excludes the group from Nigeria’s body polity. They became 
‘alien’ to the nation’s democratic imagination and therefore a separate entity. However, the 
subversiveness of the so-called ‘western-oriented’ democratic experiment is not just 
exclusionary in political participation but inadvertently encourages an autocracy or 
totalitarianism. This is why the definition of ‘peace’ in the narrowest sense of defending the 
state is upheld in the war against Boko Haram’s violence. 
Moreover, constructing the absence of terrorism as peace also highlights a deliberate 
discursive construction through which Nigeria’s numerous governance and economic issues 
became substituted for Boko Haram. Apparently, by using the emotive response that comes 
along with acts of violence, the history of this ‘terrorism’ is safely hidden and the need for its 
elimination become a binding force. Hence, for the first time in Nigeria’s history, peace 
became fixed as unity against a group whose violence has been defined as the centre of all of 
the issues facing Nigeria. Hence, the discourse is constructed to say that if only ‘terrorism’ 
could be eliminated, then all of Nigeria’s challenges would be solved and everything would 
come to ‘normal’. 
Furthermore, while ‘peace’ in the ‘war on terrorism’ is evoked alongside the idea of ‘justice’, 
and understandably so because it has to be justified through the Just War theory. 
Constructing peace as the absence of terrorism in Nigeria comes alongside the justification 
for the militarization of the democracy process. The rhetoric of the need for Nigerians to 
‘trust’ the military so that peace could be restored was often repeated using different words 
and discursive frames. It is frequently claimed both implicitly and explicitly that the idea of 
democracy without the active participation of the military, especially during the Jonathan 
administration led to the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. This is substantiated below: 
I think then, the political violence was not rampant like from 1999 
downward. Although, there were silent killings, you know it was military 
then. No civilian will protest because the military was just using power. 
During the military regime, there was nothing like human rights as we have 
today (Interview 3). 
I think terrorism is as old as Nigeria but it has become pronounced with our 
democratic settings. Probably because our democratic leaders do not have 




It is obvious that the so-called weakness of democracy to ‘fight’ political violence led to the 
‘reality’ of ‘terrorism’. Hence, the very survival of democracy depends on the brute force of 
the military. Without doubt, during the repressive military era there was little to no political 
violence. This is because human right activists like Ken Saro Wiwa and Dele Giwa were extra 
judicially executed. As has been pointed out in this thesis earlier, in spite of the sanctioning 
of these governments by the international community, Nigeria’s trade with the U.S reached 
its epoch during the most repressive government of General Sani Abacha. Constructing peace 
as the absence of ‘terrorism’ exists to justify and normalise the militarization of democracy. 
As Abrahamsen (2018) has pointed out that this is so because the militarization now upholds 
the ‘bare life’ in Africa.  For Spivak (2012), how western knowledge has ‘commodified’ and 
‘museumized’ the problem of terrorism reinforces the representation of the destruction of 
the world trade center as the destruction of world peace as well as the double bind of politico-
military aggression makes terror an object beyond border instead of considering it as an 
affect. She submits that the representation of terror is based on some disconnect the 






This chapter has examined how the construction of the counter-terrorist state positions it as 
a kind of state that inherently counters terrorists. The productive practice enables by this 
discourse among other things help to read ‘terrorism’ through the lens of violence which a 
state disapproves of. The construction of the state as the target of terrorist therefore silences 
the violence of the state by reading it as something legitimate while making the violence of 
the terrorists visible. It reinforces the narrative that a state is peaceful only when terrorists 
are eliminated. Through this discursive construct, the terrorists become the ‘menace’ and 
‘threat’ to the peaceful co-existence of people. This means that the counter terrorist identity 
among other things function only to ensure that no ‘terrorists’ thrive within its domain. By 
constructing Boko Haram’s violence as ‘crisis’ and ‘war’, the histories of violence is not only 
silenced but a shift in the understanding of political violence within the socio-political 
landscape of Nigeria is produced. The discursive move thus helps to initiate a military solution 
to a complex political problem. Boko Haram as a terrorist organization thus represents the 
challenge to the peaceful co-existence of Nigerians. 
The discourse of terrorism as a political discourse thus constructs spaces for subjects and/or 
objects that are knowable and could be acted upon.  As a political discourse, it seems to mesh 
well with the essentialist use of language about African fragile/failed states and the realist 
logic of the conception of ‘state’ and ‘security’ to the exclusion of possible complicities and 
other alternatives. This is because in much of International Relations and policy debates, it is 
not uncommon to start the discussion of Africa including the failed state-terrorism nexus 
(Elden 2009) on a metaphor of ‘sickness’, through a positivist ‘hard science’ of governmental 
‘lack’ or ‘failings’; the discourse of terrorism premised on state fragility in Africa, therefore 
draws heavily from the metaphor of ‘sickness’ or ‘lack’ to justify its essence. In order to fix 
and subvert the identity of the ‘terrorist’ such that the discourse becomes partly closed 
through the logic of equivalence, a discursive construction of ‘failing’ states drawn from 
colonial myth of ‘‘primitiveness’’, ‘‘barbaric splendours’’ or ‘‘beastly savages’’ (Leclerc 1972) 
became necessary. Whether deliberately or not, the speakers of the discourse have engaged 




essence of this discursive categorization therefore is to ensure an enduring silencing of the 
structures that produce ‘terrorism’ as well as the terrorists. 
Producing the identity of the Nigerian state as essentially a counter terrorist, therefore helps 
to define how a state should function and thereby ensure that the (entire) 
resources/institutions of such state exist for that end. As has variously been highlighted in this 
thesis, Boko Haram is only one of many violent groups in Nigeria and political violence is 
increasingly becoming the option that Nigerian politicians employ to gain access to elective 
positions, it then follows that producing Nigeria as a counter terrorism works to further 
entrench and normalise as well as legitimise oppressive practices among other things. This 
argument follows that of Call (1996) which submits that the focus on order as represented by 
the police, army and others in a state might work for rather than against oppressive practices 
in certain states where government agents use state institutions for selfish ends.  Moreover, 
if the state exists essentially to counter terrorism, all other possible challenges simply become 
‘boxed’ into the ‘normal’ category and therefore needs no pragmatic political solutions. The 
construction inherently positions how we can talk about the state, what could be said and the 









Chapter 8: The Terrorist Other 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined how the identity of the counter terrorist state is 
constructed to produce Nigeria as a certain kind of state which exists essentially to counter 
terrorism. Through the discursive shift of an implicit binary division of the state as the anti-
terrorist and a subsection of its citizens as the terrorists, a whole of government approach 
became necessitated and justified to counter the country’s most important problem, which 
is ‘terrorism’.  As a continuation of this argument, this chapter will examine how the identity 
of the terrorists become fixed as an Other. As articulations made possible through the 
representative practice of equivalence and difference, the representation of identities of 
‘terrorists’ become positives based on the foundational essence of the counter terrorist state 
and/or the ‘difference’ of the terrorists. This thesis understands that discourse plays a central 
role in the range of possibilities made available to its users and political identities are 
constructions constituted in and by discourse. Bhabha (1983) clarifies that Otherness is not a 
rigid construct as it is inherently unstable and contingent and could only be understood within 
certain historical and discursive conditions. 
In producing the discourse of terrorism in Africa and particularly Nigeria, one of the 
ambiguities is the struggle to highlight root causes of the terrorist violence by reifying 
systemic failure (which is argued as the continuation of prior colonial discourse) while also 
(dis)locating the ‘terrorist’ in a realm/space that is transcendental. The ambiguities of the 
construction posit among others a tension between dualisms and an embrace of ‘‘the 
universe of differences’’. The ambiguity remains a contradiction in the logic of representing 
‘terrorists’ in Nigeria and Africa in general. In this light, Hughes (2004:7) argues that identity 
and interests are intrinsically linked. This means that the I/We as the subject of the discourse 
of terrorism constructs an Other through a representation of Self. The self here includes 
perceived values and principles whether they are self-serving or not. This understanding 
challenges positivist’s thought that ‘terrorism’ and of course, ‘terrorists’ remain something 
‘out there’, identifiable and knowable outside of the discourse that produce it so. This 




presents to the logic of fixation made possible through the articulatory practice. As will be 
analysed in proceeding sections, in order to delineate a differential position for the violence 
of Boko Haram and its many others in Africa, the open elements have to be infused with myths 
and assumptions subsumed within a larger colonial discourse. By condemning the political 
violence of Boko Haram through the terrorism label, therefore, the label works to define other 
political violence not in the category of terrorism as either ‘good’ or ‘normal’ or simply fit for 
purpose. To put it in the words of Dexter (2012: 123): 
This allows for the possibility that our violence is different. By condemning 
some violence, the category of terrorism also serves to legitimise violence 
by suggesting that an alternative violence is possible, violence that only 
targets the guilty, that only produces what is intended, that does not 
communicate a message (of fear) and that serves a progressive purpose. 
This chapter analyses the discourse of terrorism as Othering in a thematic manner and three 
themes were identified and discussed: The Terrorist as Threat; Terrorism as a Negation; and 
the Terrorist as an Outsider. To do this effectively, a section was dedicated as a background 
to the close reading of legal definitions of terrorism both by the U.S and the Nigerian 
governments. Engaging with the legal definitions of terrorism becomes important in order to 
understand how the discourse of terrorism is fixed as an Other which is a continuation. As a 
result, the three themes analysed are only separated analytically but are to be considered as 
overlapping with the GWOT as an overarching discourse within which the discourse of 
terrorism as Othering is produced. The first theme, ‘The Terrorist as Threat’, is possibly the 
most highlighted feature of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria and elsewhere. This 
subsection is an attempt at deconstructing the construction of the terrorists as ‘threat’ by the 
U.S. through the ‘failings’ of Africa and by both governments through the construction of anti-
terrorism. As it were that Boko Haram is a threat is taken almost as a given in literatures and 
the texts under analysis. However, more than anything else, the construction of threat is 
discursive and represents the productive practice of the power of discourse through the logics 
of equivalence and difference. The second theme, ‘Terrorism as a Negation’ is another 
deconstructive attempt at the discourse of terrorism in producing the terrorist as an Other. 
The discursive construction of the identity of the terrorist as a negation requires the 




meaningful connection to the ‘threat’ of Boko Haram. One of the paramount condition for 
the presence of antagonism is the construction of identity based on the logics of equivalence 
and difference. However, to effectively construct a discourse of the Other in this sense, 
antagonism has to be collectivized and constructed as ‘enemies’. The third theme, ‘The 
Terrorists as Outsiders’ examines the insider/outsider dichotomies inherent in the discourse 
of terrorism as based not only on the ambiguous construction of antagonism but also on the 
account of ‘difference’ and ‘new’ kind of political violence in Nigeria. 
Background: Legal Definitions 
In the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011(SB.335) by the Senate Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
judge in Chambers may on an application made by the Attorney General, National Security 
Adviser or Inspector General of Police on the approval of the President declare any entity to 
become a proscribed terrorist organization and the notice would be published in official 
gazette. The definitions of a terrorist and terrorism are as follows: 
A person who knowingly— (a) does, attempts or threatens to do an act 
preparatory to or in furtherance of an act of terrorism; (b) commits to do 
anything that is reasonably necessary to promote an act of terrorism; or (c) 
assists or facilitates the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism, 
commits an offence under this Act. 
The discursive construction of identity is inherently connected to the discourse of terrorism. 
Terrorists then are not just those who engage in a kind of political violence considered 
illegitimate (Butler 2010); terrorism itself becomes the violence of those that are disapproved 
of (Whitaker 2001; Jackson 2005; Zulaika and Douglass 1996). According to Weldes et al 
(1999:11), ‘‘Thus, there is always a politics of identity and difference through which difference 
can, but not be transformed into otherness’’. This means, due to the partial nature of a 
discursive construct, it is possible to fix the identity of the terrorists as a closure, a ‘fixity’; a 
permanent and total state (of disorder). However, that something is possible does not mean 
it should be done. It is interesting that the only two publicly available documents on terrorism 
produced by the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria defined the identity of the terrorist 
before engaging in the rigour of defining terrorism. Whether this is intentional or not, it thus 




important than defining the ‘act of terrorism’ itself. The first and the most fundamental 
challenge here is how to delineate the boundary between which political violence counts as 
terrorism and which ones did not. The identity of Boko Haram from background knowledge 
either in terms of their ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (Agbiboa 2012) or in terms of their 
grievances against the state as represented by their political elites (Adebayo 2010; Seyeifa 
2014) or a combination of both bring about the possibility of knowing who a terrorist is. More 
importantly, the practices of the GWOT (with its ubiquitous enemy) in Nigeria necessitated 
the production of the Terrorism Prevention Act (2011; 2013) in the first place and make the 
‘terrorist’ knowable and the production of their identity a possibility. Apparently before the 
production of these documents, there have been high level meetings by the U.S and Nigerian 
government officials on the difference of Boko Haram and their violence in Nigeria. The 
transitioning of the difference of Boko Haram and their violence here as terrorists and 
terrorism respectively therefore precludes that of the practices of the U.S in its 
counterterrorism practices in places like Iraq for instance; so does it preclude the oppressive 
practices of the Nigerian state agents. The identity of the terrorist thus transcends its value 
as a difference but to that of Otherness (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Weldes et al 1999). After 
the identification of the ‘terrorist’, the document thus proceeded to define ‘terrorism’: 
(2) In this section, "act of terrorism" means an act which is deliberately done 
with malice, aforethought and which: (a) may seriously harm or damage a 
country or an international organization; 
The construction of the terrorists’ identity in (1) above was connected to intentionality 
through the adverb ‘knowingly’ and this is also fixed as a node in the definition of terrorism 
itself. The premise of intentionality and causing ‘serious harm or damage’ evidently draw 
from or rather based on criminal law. Without going into the possible long legal debates about 
serious harm or damage that could be caused by indifference or negligence (West’s 
Encyclopaedia of American Law, 2010), establishing intentionality, would then mean that, 
among other things, the supposed terrorists are presumed to be rational actors. It follows 
that if rationality cannot be proven, as in the case of madness for instance, intention to 
commit such a crime cannot be established (Foucault and Simon 2017). However, if we agree 




have a right to be heard or tried in a law court. The point here is that while the definition of 
terrorism as a kind of political violence follows a legal template, the language of the GWOT 
which enables the discursive construct takes their engagement beyond the purview of the 
law and therefore give legitimacy to a system of oppression. So, instead of the law court being 
the resort as in every criminal case, the rhetoric of ‘war’ then justifies the use of the military 
by the state to defend its territory. 
Building on this, the intended action is constructed as against ‘a country or an international 
organisation’. Terrorism in this sense is an intended injurious act against a corporate entity. 
It is interesting that usually what scholars like Primoratz (2013) tries to distinguish as terrorism 
is the targeting of ‘innocent’ individuals that is those who are non-combatants but terrorism 
here is posited as harmful acts against the state. The subject of ‘international organizations’ 
here as being targets is also interesting given the Nigerian environment. Sprout and Sprout 
(1965)’s argument about ‘environmental possibilism’ being the range of practices and actions 
available to social actors, based on the constraints within their environment helps to make 
sense of how international organisations not the local ones become part of this definition. In 
this light, non-state actors in Nigeria have often accused the Nigerian government of 
compromise with international organisations especially the oil firms and aids-donating 
organisations, for personal economic gains (Ekeh, 2008). So, it is reasonable to these non-
state actors to fight the government of Nigeria by fighting/attacking the sources of their 
economic power. A quintessential example of this is Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) in Nigeria. So ‘international organisations’ as a referent sign in the definition 
of terrorism exists not just to protect the economic interests of political elites but also to enlist 
as one of the ‘friends’ of the U.S in the GWOT. This is further emphasized: 
(b) is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to— 
(I) unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or 
abstain from performing any act; (ii) seriously intimidate a population; (iii) 
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organization; 
or (iv) otherwise influence such government or international organization 




Highlighting intent of the violence as the fundamental principle guiding the categorisation of 
terrorism from non-terroristic violence follows the definition of terrorism as a communicative 
tool (Stohl 2008). If this line of reasoning is followed through, it then means that other non-
state actors as well as state agents could make use of terror as a tool for certain ends. 
However, the intent of ‘compelling’, ‘intimidating’, ‘destroying’ and even ‘influencing’ 
government as characteristic nature of the terrorists puts them in contrast to the state and 
other violent groups who are implied as using violence tactically or even legitimately (Hosmer 
and Crane 2006; Agbese 1986). In constructing the discourse of force and terror as linked to 
the identity of the terrorists, a moral distinction is being made between the violence 
perpetuated by state agents or even non-state violent actors. This is so because what seems 
to give legitimacy to an actor’s violence is the state’s ability to prove the actor’s intent. It 
therefore leaves the space open for when such intent cannot be proven. This means despite 
the violence of groups like Oodua People’s Congress and their well-known activities at 
compelling and intimidating as well as destroying people’s lives and properties, until the 
intent of their actions are so proven, their violence remains ‘good’ and/or ‘normal’ (Dexter 
2012). This does little to help our understanding of the violence of several groups both in the 
northern and southern parts of Nigeria. It is in this light that the application of this definition 
in the proscription of the Boko Haram group could only make sense through the doctrine of 
the GWOT. The definition continues thus: 
(c) involves or causes, as the case may be— (i)an attack upon a person's life 
which may cause serious bodily harm or death; (ii) kidnapping of a person; 
(iii) destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform 
located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to 
endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (iv)the seizure of an 
aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and diversion or 
the use of such means of transportation for any of the purposes in 
paragraph 
(b)(iv) of this subsection ;  (v) the manufacture, possession, acquisition, 
transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of biological 
and chemical weapons without lawful authority ;(vi) the release of 
dangerous substance or causing of fire, explosions or floods, the effect of 




supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the 
effect of which is to endanger human life ; (d) an act or omission in or outside 
Nigeria which constitutes an office within the scope of a counter terrorism 
protocols and conventions duly ratified by Nigeria. 
The deployment of the rhetoric of fear based on the limitless capacity of the 
terrorists to destroy lives, facilities, hijack airplanes as well as use and/or produce 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons resonates well with the discourse of 
‘super-terrorism’ (Falkenrath 2001) which is drawn upon by the GWOT. While this 
thesis does not in any way undermine the effect of Boko Haram’s violence in Nigeria, 
the construction of the extremely dangerous terrorists who could potentially destroy 
thousands or even millions of lives by an attack could be aptly captured for instance 
by the incidences of the Nigerian Civil War or even the Odi killings. The Odi killings 
of November 4, 1999, similar to but not exactly like the Nigerian Civil War, the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, took sides with multinational oil companies like Shell 
and Agip against the militants in Odi, Bayelsa state who wants to be in control of 
their resources and land. The resulting conflict led to the killing of seven policemen 
by an unnamed armed gang. In retaliation to this, both the state and federal 
governments ordered the executions of both young and old people in the small 
community leading to the killings of several thousands, with an unnamed number of 
girls and women who were raped by the soldiers and their land including buildings 
burnt down with explosives (Human Rights Watch, 2000).  The point here is that, 
drawing from the context of political violence in Nigeria, all the elements weave 
together to construct and evoke an ultimate fear through which the supposed 
terrorist could be identified could aptly described state actors as enabled by their 
foreign counterparts. As examined by Falola (1999) all the major violence through 
which, statistically speaking, thousands or even millions have died in Nigeria were 
motivated by or woven around some considerations for foreign actors in Nigeria. 
Citing elements as diverse as the hijacking of planes to the use of weapon of mass 
destruction both of which have not been employed by non-state actors in Nigeria 
only serve to attribute to non-state actors the scale of violence which state actors 




Another interesting perspective to this kind of definition is that the fear of an 
extremely dangerous terrorists in the GWOT goes together with that of the failed 
states in Africa. For instance, President Bush asserted that ‘‘The United States of 
America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the 
world’s most destructive weapons’’ (January 29, 2002). The presumed alliance of 
dangerous regimes and dangerous terrorists who are simply enemies of the United 
States and would employ the most lethal weapons against the United States is what 
helps to construct the image of the kind of catastrophe imagined in this definition. It 
might then be safe to imagine that for Nigeria to construct the ultimate danger of 
the terrorists and employ the language of the GWOT which construct the ultimate 
fear associated with terrorism, it ought to have at least acknowledge or deny the 
possibility of its own support for such groups. Instead of an explicit 
acknowledgement or denial of the possible collaboration of the state and the non-
state actors against the United States, the document highlighted the commitment of 
Nigeria to provide all necessary information and assistance to ‘‘any foreign state’’ for 
the purposes of ‘‘mutual assistance’’ necessary for ‘‘investigation’’, ‘‘extradition’’, 
‘‘prosecution’’ including the permission to enter and search private properties, 
collect biometric details, and access documents  and the extent to which 
radioactive/biological/nuclear substances  are harmful as such details deemed 
necessary by both governments. Thus by securing the commitment of Nigeria as a 
partner in the GWOT, the inherent drive of the GWOT to identify enemies with 
limitless capacity for danger has been duly transferred from state actors being 
potential enemies to non-state actors in Nigeria. The last section that will be 
examined for the purposes of this thesis further corroborate this: 
(3) An act which disrupts a service but is committed in pursuance of a 
protest. However, demonstration or stoppage of work is not a terrorist act 
within the meaning of this definition provided that the act is not intended to 
result in any harm referred to in subsection (2) (b)(i), (ii) or (iv) of this section. 
Through the template of the GWOT in Nigeria, the only non-violent means available to non-
state actors in Nigeria thus become described as ‘‘acts of terrorism’’. So the activities of 




service but is committed in pursuance of a protest’ and might explain the arrest of its 
Convener, Dr Oby Ezekwesili on the 28th January 2108 (Daily Post 2018). Rather than the 
normative argument about the intention to cause terror to people (which itself is 
problematic), the state agents who produced this document therefore seems to be interested 
in protecting the institution of government which they represent. 
Furthermore, the lack of an agreed upon definition of terrorism both amidst academics and 
states highlights its highly contested nature and the resort to value judgements in delineating 
what is and what is not terrorism (Horgan and Boyle 2008). It also points to the understanding 
among policy makers that ‘terrorism’ is just not another crime which is covered by general 
criminal law, but it represents a different kind of threat with essence based on its motivations 
and intended consequence. It behoves the state to codify their constructed threat into law by 
drawing from the Hobbesian principle of the ultimate need of ensuring the people’s safety. 
This hitherto value-laden judgement become fixed albeit the dissenting and divergent 
arguments as to what constitutes the boundary of the construct is not taken into account. 
From the above definitions, groups as divergent as the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the 
Arewa Consultative Council (APC) and the Ohaneze Ndigbo group or Igbo People’s Congress 
(IPC) which later evolve to the Movement for the Actualisation of the sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB), to name a few, which have constantly sought to coerce or influence the Nigerian 
government through different means to listen to their grievances fall under the open-ended 
definitions. The OPC, for instance, was a nationalist oriented group which was formed to 
protect and defend the rights of the Yoruba people after the killing of Moshood Kashimawo 
Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the June 12, 1993 election. The complicity of state agents in 
Nigeria and from foreign governments like the U.S in the death of Moshood Abiola was 
employed by the group as a justification for the use of violence including kidnapping, riots 
and political assassinations. Both the APC and IPC evolved in response to the motivations as 
well as violence of the OPC and that of the Nigerian government (Akinyele 2001; Olaniyan 
2009). As such conducting an investigation into the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist 
group through discourse theory helps to bring discursive power to the fore. The question of 




knowledge and truth.  As knowledge remains a product of power, both what is known and 
unknown as well as what is said and not said is produced as discursive power deems fit. 
According to the U.S Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d), (‘‘the Act’’), the 
following definitions are adopted since 1983 for legal, analytical and statistics purposes: 
I.The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
II.The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country. 
III.The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or that has 
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 
Under the Federal Criminal Code Title 18 of the United States Code, terrorism is defined in 
Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B), as: 
…activities that involve violent… or life-threatening acts… that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and… 
appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and…(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States… 
The template of the Just War Theory which has come to define the deployment of official 
narratives after September 2001 (Jackson 2005), is not limited to narratives of state agents 
but policy documents as well. This means that the bi-polar divide of the East versus West of 
the Cold War through which political violence believed to be organised by or sponsored by 
the Communist Bloc became constructed as terrorism (Harbeson and Rothchild 2000), 
justified the invocation of the Just War Theory in defining what is/what is not terrorism. Since 
the terrorist groups are international actors/agents which involves countries, it is in the 
National interests of the United States to outlaw their violence and declare war against it. 
Hence, for both states, the definitions of terrorism are woven around the nodal point 
‘National Security’. However, while the identification of an external enemy who is a terrorist 




While some dissimilarities do exist between definitions of both states, there are at least one 
interesting similar perspective to both legal definitions.  One, it shows how the definition of 
terrorism makes meaning in connection with the identity of the perpetrators of violence. As 
a discursive construct, it helps to organise, delineate and categorise the legitimate use of 
violence by focusing on ‘who’ uses violence. In the case of Nigeria, the target was any person 
who commits ‘‘acts of terrorism’’. Technically, this refers to local individuals who commits 
terroristic acts but not whole groups like Boko Haram or even the state. The terrorists are 
individuals who are considered anti-state and/or against international organisations; it is 
about the enemy within. The terrorists are therefore those who are making the architecture 
of governance difficult and frustrating diplomatic relations through the kidnapping of foreign 
persons or the destruction of the U.N building at Abuja. For the U.S, while the definition of 
what constitute terrorism differ from one government agency to the other, it identifies whole 
groups as terrorists. Though this definition predated the September 2001 event, the context 
of the Cold War within which the definition evolved, could explain why ‘terrorist groups’ are 
considered international rather than locals. 
Self/Other Binaries and the Terrorism Discourse: Dichotomous Logic and Identity 
Construction 
Engagement with the production of discourse is critical to the understanding of relations of 
power because every discourse remains a narrative with a partial construction of the self and 
not a necessary relation between a discursive representation and ‘reality’. As Cobb (2004) has 
highlighted that in spite of the actual violence of Al-Qaeda, the group would necessarily 
construct itself as victims of an oppressive system and therefore acting in line with its own 
moral values by resisting a system of oppression. The narrative of the US on the other hand 
is articulated as hinged on the principles of liberty, democracy and justice for human kind. 
These principles therefore form the lens through which the violence of the US should be read 
and understood. The perception and construction of self/other then, is not a function of 
essence as it relates to identity but that of discourse and power (Baker-Beall 2009; Clifford 
2004). The logic of binary thinking inherent in the terrorism discourse, unlike Said’s 
Orientalism which positions the Orient against the West, produces subjects and objects which 




instance, scholars like Shah (2004) and Baev (2007) have demonstrated how Russia used the 
war on international terrorism to explain, justify and legitimise its actions against Chechnya, 




The Terrorist as Threat 
Now we don't have plan because we are living with the fear of the terrorist. 
This is very bad for a country (Interviewee 3) 
So many areas which were under the control of these terrorist have been 
liberated and, I hope with time, the threat will be completely eliminated…. 
Nigeria will know peace again …they will want to support Nigeria by taking 
people in and these people will become a threat later to them (interviewee 
4). 
One of the outstanding themes of the terrorism discourse both by the US and Nigerian texts 
is the representation of the identity of the terrorist as ‘threats’. Simon Dalby (1997) points 
out that more than being a linguistic and epistemological act, the art of highlighting difference 
serves a very political purpose as it positions the subject of the discourse to construct a space 
where others become knowable and acted upon. In constructing the identity of the ‘terrorist’ 
as a threatening other who is ultimately dangerous, the subject of the texts (as represented 
by the US and Nigerian state agencies and functionaries) transitioned the open element 
‘threat’ into a nodal point, and become a state of being, an ontological positioning rather than 
a construction amidst other possible constructions. Since the history of the violence 
represents a ‘painful knowledge’ and demands a ‘deliberate blindness’, the meaning 
constructed from the violence of the other has to be made not only to mean ‘threat’ but also 
to inscribe or mark their being as ‘threats’. 
However, as all values are values of difference, what reveals the instability or openness of the 
constituted identity is the logic of equivalence which creates a chain of significations that 
cancels each other until a ‘common something’ is left. By constituting the identity of the 
terrorists as positives through the logic of difference, there is a presumption of foundational 
essence through which difference is established. If terrorism is an identity construction which 
is a negation in itself, we cannot assert a signification of a ‘terrorist’ as ‘threat’ without 
asserting who a terrorist is not. A chain of equivalences of ‘threat’ according to the texts are: 
‘insecurity’, ‘menace’, ‘danger’, ‘risk’, ‘fear’, ‘destruction’, ‘tyranny’ while that of the anti-
terrorists are: ‘security’, ‘help’, ‘safety’, ‘stability’, ‘confidence’, ‘protection’, and ‘freedom’. 




of the terrorists (in this case Boko Haram) as well as that of the anti-terrorists (the US and 
Nigerian governments) by referring back to each other in a circle of significations which 
cancels out each other; hence the positivity of the signs security and insecurity is subverted  by 
a reference to something common in the differences expressed by help/menace, 
safety/danger, stability/risk, confidence/fear, protection/destruction, freedom/tyranny.  By 
taking the first pair of signification: security and insecurity; both are invoked as constituting 
some positives and considered central to the understanding of terrorism. Hence, to speak 
‘security’ in this sense, is to articulate representations of difference in a way that the sign is 
reified/modified as a new collective identity. The collective identity ‘we’ or ‘us’ is made to 
mean security and security also becomes ‘we’ or ‘us’. The discursive constructions of what 
(in)security means then becomes elusive except when placed within the hegemonic 
constructions of identity through a dichotomous logic. The common something remains the 
differentiation between the terrorist and anti-terrorist. 
The positivity assumed in the chains of significations represents a hegemonic fixation of 
meaning/identity. Security or insecurity could be made to mean several things depending on 
the subject/object of the discourse. In the texts, the identity ‘we’ or ‘us’ refers, in some sense 
to ‘Americanness’, and in another sense, the state as represented by its functionaries. This 
constructed identity modified as a new collective identity is made to mean security where 
security refers to ‘‘unparalleled military strength’’ and ‘‘America’s growing economic 
strength’’. The articulation of brute force as signified by military and that of capitalism as 
meaning security leave us with several problematics on several grounds. To take the 
increasing incidence of gun violence in the US, after the September 2001 event, for instance, 
we could ask if that development means security for Americans. Again, does the idea of killing 
for a cause, whether considered noble or not, automatically makes ‘us’ secured? And 
ultimately if unparalleled military strength means security why did the event of September 
2001 happened? The problematics of making the state the referent object of security is also 
represented in for instance a state like Nigeria where state institutions/apparatus are used to 
repress the people. Also, articulating the ideology of capitalism as meaning security does not 




which is inherent in the discourse of capitalism. To reiterate, the point here is that the 
assumed positivity of these significations are made possible only in their differential position. 
Security could then mean insecurity and become mobile and interchangeable depending on 
context and the enterprise of the speaking subject. The term security could prove useful when 
constructing and mobilizing collective identity based on principles and values like 
‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ but could also be used for the justification of human 
rights abuse and [pervasive] violence as is the case with Guantanamo Bay, the War in 
Afghanistan, or the gross abuse of human rights and wanton killings of Nigerians by Nigerian 
soldiers in the course of fighting Boko Haram. Moreover, the inherent reductionism, 
essentialism and Othering in the discourse of terrorism represents the silencing of the 
complicity of ones naming while demonizing the Other (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). The 
representation of the identity of ‘terrorists’ as ‘threats’ then does not point to an objective 
‘reality’ or ‘something out there’ but are made possible through the partial closure of 
discourse. 
Terrorism as a Negation 
Prior to and after the proscriptions of Boko Haram [as well as Ansaru and IPOB] as a terrorist 
organisation in Nigeria, political violence has been prevalent in the country. However, what 
is new to the country and the continent is the representation and understanding of disparate 
insurgent movements as terrorism. This representation functions as a Negation.  Negation 
here as a process works through interpellation and antagonism; it therefore denies effective 
agency to a constituted group/entity. This is evidenced in the following texts: 
In a Background briefing on designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist 
organisations and as a specially designated global terrorists, Karen DeYoung with The 
Washington Post (2013) asked senior U.S administration officials: 
Question: Hi, thank you. Two things: I wonder if-excuse me- could you tell 
us what – I’m sorry-what the specific links are to AQIM that you are aware 
of. And also, do either of these groups pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or 




In response: senior administration official two: Yes, while we believe that 
Boko Haram remains primarily a Nigerian organization with its principle 
objectives in Nigeria, and that is true also of Ansaru, as I said in my opening 
remarks that it does-both groups have links to AQIM. Our assessment is that 
AQIM has helped provide some training to the groups and has provided 
limited financing. 
Senior administration official one: And as far as it’s-the relationship to 
Americas- to U.S. security, there is a very large American population in 
Nigeria, as you probably are aware, and a lot of U.S. investment-economic 
investment in Nigeria. So threats to Nigeria automatically impact U.S. 
economic and American citizens’ interest. 
As relational identity constructs, the terrorist/anti-terrorist label is an identity mobilized for 
political purpose i.e. based on constructed ‘threats’. Through interpellation, the US become 
‘hailed’ into the subject position of the violence of Boko Haram in such a manner as to make 
the violence ‘speak’ or mean something to them. In other words, given US interest, a 
connection has to be established. As to the why and how? Firstly, because with the shift of 
the GWOT into Africa, Nigeria which is the US most strategic economic partner in the region 
has to be incorporated into the discourse to effectively execute the war. In order to 
successfully hail themselves into the subject position of Boko Haram’s violence, ‘‘warranting 
conditions’’ which ‘‘makes a particular action or belief more ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’, or 
‘appropriate’, given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors’’ (Fay 1975:85 cited in 
Weldes 1999:13) had to be provided.  One of such warranting conditions is the protection of 
US economic investment in Nigeria which is basically in the oil-rich region of the coastal areas. 
This is situated in the south-south of Nigeria, while Boko Haram is domiciled in the Northeast 
of the country. Moreover, the oil-rich Niger Delta where the US (as well as Britain, France and 
Germany’s) economic interest lies already plays host to several militant groups since the 
discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 due to repression, pervasive neglect and untold human 
suffering both by the Nigerian state and multinational corporations like Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation (Pegg 1999; Oyefusi 2008; 2007; Ibeanu and Lockham 2007). This 
warranting condition shows why the scramble for oil has been advanced as the reason behind 
the integration of Africa into the GWOT (Keenan 2010). Whether this is or not the case in 
other African countries, it remains that in Nigeria, going by the warranting condition cited, 




should have been proscribed a long while before now. By providing such a warranting 
condition through a seeming self-evident connection based on ‘facts’, a discursive 
construction of threat is established and made justifiable.  Secondly, we could argue that the 
bombing of the UN building in Abuja, also cited in the texts, is another warranting condition 
which help to make the interpellation of US as the subject a possibility. This might, among 
other things, mean the bombing of the UN building represents to the US metaphorically (as 
an unquestioned analogy) the destruction of the US interest in Nigeria. Obviously, prior to 
this time, the pressure of the US on the Nigerian government to label the Boko Haram group 
as ‘terrorists’ has been intense. While the Nigerian government was hedging on the 
proscription, a heavy-handed military actions were being carried out against the group. So, 
almost like a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, the violence of the group did not only increase but 
western symbols like the UN building became part of their rhetoric and practice. As an 
unquestioned analogy then, the US ‘saw’ themselves in the destruction of the building and 
promptly leverage on that warranting condition for more serious deliberations with the 
Nigerian government, leading to an eventual proscription of the group by both governments. 
The metaphoric connection of the UN building to the US interest thus made the hailing 
process do-able.  In order to appropriate the hailing process successfully, some discursive 
substitution was therefore, employed. Through this the UN building became substituted with 
the World Trade Center and al Qaeda with Boko Haram. As a strategy of articulation, the art 
of substitution helps in the process of meaning fixation so as to bring about a discursive shift. 
To reiterate, the strategy of militant’s occasionally targeting western interests or persons has 
been on, especially in the South-South where oil is the main concern. So, the destruction of 
the UN building by itself remains a social action, until it was made to mean the same thing as 
that of the World Trade Center by Al Qaeda.  The violence as a referent or sign is thus loaded 
with myths so it could be made to mean something to the US. To be clear, showing why and 
how the US became the subject of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria does not in any way 
undermine the actual violence of Boko Haram. Through interpellation then, the 
subject/object of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria becomes produced and the 





[It] defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way 
that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also 
influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct 
of others [emphasis mine]. 
To further deny effective agency to Boko Haram and their primary target, Nigeria, 
antagonism, as a strategy of negation was employed. This becomes necessary in the making 
of a discursive shift that could accommodate the productive practice of constructing Boko 
Haram as a terrorist group. Since ‘society’ itself exists only as a discursive construct, 
antagonism makes obvious the limits of that discursive construct and reveals the impossibility 
of its full realization. In the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 125) ‘it is because a peasant 
cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his 
land’.  Since no pre-discursive identities exist, every identity including social actions and 
relationships are produced through discourse. What this implies is that the present national 
and international identities, are produced through discourse as a ‘society’ which ‘never 
manages to be society’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:127). In this sense, the relationship of the 
US with Nigeria, like other African countries, lend itself to infinite possibilities through 
discourse but would only be limited by ‘something subverting it’ which is within the social. 
This ‘something’ becomes an Other because it prevents the identity of US as a global leader 
from full actualization. This is why the reification of Boko Haram’s religious identity became 
necessary in mainstream literatures on terrorism in Nigeria. For instance, some scholars 
which could be positioned within Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ template argue that the 
group are religious fundamentals which implicitly reflects the nature of the Nigerian society 
and taps into local grievances in order to advance their course (Elden (2014); Agbiboa (2014); 
Solomon (2015) and Abimbola (2011)). In his words, Abimbola (2011:99-100) asserts that 
‘Nigerians are a highly religious people, or so it seems…the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 
indicated growing Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, apparently in the face of the 
government’s seeming unreadiness to tackle the menace’. So for scholars in this school of 
thought, not only does culture explain violence but also culture is a discrete category with a 
seeming pre-discursive identity. This form of essentialism and reductionism evade the 
complexities that scholars like Okafor (2011) and Nnoli (1988) have already highlighted in 




these identities are deliberate but shifting constructions in the service of the political 
elites.   Moreover, the construction of equivalential identities through discourse is the 
necessary condition for the presence of antagonism. 
So, just like discourse, the social never fully constitute itself and its limits not only subverts it 
but limits the realization of its full presence. Antagonisms present to us the limits of the social 
and subverts society from fully actualizing itself. It reveals to us how the violence of Boko 
Haram, which is an objective reality became ‘the presence of the Other’. It marks the end of 
objective relation and reveals the non-being of society. In this sense, the identity of Boko 
Haram, is a referent that seeks to destroy the ambition of society from constituting a full 
presence. So Boko Haram’s terrorism as an antagonism, an Other, is not by itself an objective 
reality, but drawn from a metaphorical representation, or ‘an ‘experience’ so to speak. The 
metaphorical representation or ‘experience’ (which is the GWOT), not in itself a totality, 
produces the Other by de-individuating the agency of the factual agents of violence, it 
becomes constructed as the violence of a collective Other, i.e. Boko Haram. 
The non-being of society, i.e. limits of the productive relations between US and Nigeria, 
especially the GWOT, as a result of antagonism produces the construction of the terrorist 
identity. The non-being of society as represented by the presence of Boko Haram, the Other, 
is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevents its being fixed as full positivity’ (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985:124). This suggests that the ethnic/religious/political identity of Boko 
Haram, their history as well as their violence open up the possibilities for several meanings 
and bring about the impossibility of essence in understanding. Identities are always almost 
over-determined, and it is through a negation, that is, an emptying of the productive 
possibilities of over-determination of identities that a constituted entity is identified with a 
referent. This reveals that to label Boko Haram, as a terrorist group demands a deliberate 
identification with a sign or referent through discourse and a re-articulation of their being, 
which is an Othering and a negation. This Othering is what the discourse of terrorism 
represents. For instance, the Maitaisine violence of the 1980s, as well as the Izalas, which 
many scholars believe Boko Haram originated from was often represented as ‘uprising’, 




Maitaisine uprising, as it is often referred to, was said to be responsible for the deaths of 
thousands and destruction of an un-estimated amount of properties including western 
symbols and almost like the Nigerian Civil War, in terms of duration, it lasted from 1980 to 
1985 with pockets of violent uprising in Kano (1980), Kaduna and Bulumkutu (1982), Yola 
(1984) and Bauchi (1985). The leader of the movement, like that of Boko Haram, also 
advanced criticisms of corruption, inequalities and the likes against the Nigerian government 
which he posits as capitalist and westernized (Forest 2012; Ndidi 2016). So why the actual 
violence of Boko Haram, including the destruction of the UN building are positivities to the 
extent that people were killed and physical properties destroyed, the antagonism is not 
reducible to them. This becomes necessary as far as their incorporation into a metaphorical 
or symbolic order (i.e. US global leadership/the global war on terror) is considered a viable 
project. The structuring of the discourse of terrorism itself makes the reification of a sign or 
referent while silencing or ‘emptying’ other signs a necessity which appeals to ‘experience’ or 
‘metaphor’ in order to arrive at a partial totality. 
As a negation, the discourse of terrorism makes use of the logic of equivalence and difference 
to produce social totalities (identities)since they are not pre-given; they emerge through 
articulatory practices as ‘‘attempts to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of 
differences, to construct a center’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112). In this light, the 
‘‘terrorists’’ are ‘‘enemies’’ of the ‘‘people’’. According to Aho (1994) the enemy/friends 
binaries exist to serve the mobilization of one constituted group against another by evoking 
certain emotions through reconstruction. A reconstruction of their being as an ontological 
presence that makes society incapable of achieving its ambition means a forcible change into 
‘friends’ of the ‘people’. Again, these signs bring about chains of significations like 
poverty/wealthy; evil/good; barbaric/civilization; and hate/love in a polar divide that cancels 
out each other and are drawn upon to arrive at a common something. The dominant signifier 
here seems to be the concept of Liberalism which also reveals the common something as the 
colonized/colonizer differentiation.  The presence of something that subverts or limits the full 
presence of ‘society’ might seem to reveal some positivity in the discursive construct of the 
‘terrorist’ as an ‘enemy’. To assume a positivity to the identity of the ‘enemy’ as a limit to the 




positive- ‘a new difference’ (ibid127). In the texts, two reasons were highlighted as the basis 
for the designation: one, political violence which directly/indirectly targets the US; two, 
connection to already designated groups in [North] Africa. Since [political] violence is 
highlighted as one of the referents through which this identity is constructed, one could argue 
that [political] violence is an objective reality. Even if we accept that violence is a positivity 
and the ‘fact’ that it is politically motivated could be established from the narratives of the 
insurgents themselves, this still does not show why the violence of other politically motivated 
groups, who also target western interests/persons in Nigeria has not become constructed as 
terrorism. The second reason cited might then illuminate the discourse: their connections to 
other Islamist group(s) in Africa, particularly AQIM and Al Shabab. This could be disentangled 
on two notes. One, while it is beyond the purview of this thesis to contend the proscription 
of AQIM and Al Shabab as terrorist organisations, it remains that empirical evidence have 
continued to point to context-specific local conditions within which their violence could be 
understood. Dowd and Raleigh (2013) and Farrall (2011), for instance, have pointed to the 
implosion and fragmentations in Al Qaeda, AQIM and Al Shabab which not only put the 
strength of their franchise at a question but is also manifested through their own verbal 
dissonance of their motivations, agenda, ideology, narratives and their relevance in national 
politicking. Al-Shabaab leadership have also for instance publicly discredited narratives linking 
their localised struggles to a globalized agenda.  This background unveils what Dowd and 
Raleigh refers to as ‘‘the myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the 
Sahel’’ through which Boko Haram’s violence has been linked to that of groups in North Africa. 
Hence, the linking together of Boko Haram to AQIM and Al-Shabaab amounts to a 
reductionism which is not just ahistorical but lacking in substance. Two, it is interesting to 
note that the supposed connection of Boko Haram to these groups were stated explicitly as 
based on secondary, open sourced documents rather than some (rigorous) intelligence 
gathering by the U.S. The result of which clauses like, ‘‘Boko Haram evolving tactics…may be 
the result of ties between AQIM and Al-Shabaab in Somalia’’; [Boko Haram] is focused on local 
issues, although it may be pursuing interests it shares with AQIM’’ (Boko Haram: Emerging 
Threat to the U.S Homeland 2011:12; Statement for the Record on the World Wide Threat 




designation. The resulting decisions of designation is therefore produced based on some 
‘interests’ of the U.S. in the group and therefore mythic rather than factual. 
To accept this proposition of some positivity to the construction of ‘enemies’, will amount to 
dislocating the limit to the full presence of society as something transcendental and external 
to its construction. That Boko Haram, like other groups, is not a homogenous entity is 
evidenced in the nuance in their narratives concerning their ethno-religious identification and 
its diverse hermeneutics; their different stratum of class identifications and the splinter 
groups that have evolved from the movement (Ordu 2017). The fixedness of these identities 
so constructed will among other things mean to evade the possibilities of change and with 
the interruption of the democratic discourse, the constructed identities become a limbo 
where the governments can dislocate and thus explain away ‘oppression’. To reiterate here, 
taking away agency from the individual perpetrators of violence and positing some positivity 
to their construction as ‘terrorists’ who are ‘enemies’ reveals the strategy of negation in 
mobilizing identities against themselves. Moreover, the limit of the social is present within it 
i.e. internal to the very logic that constitute it and the construction of the ‘enemy’ of the 
‘people’ only reflects a hegemonic intervention. 
To further consider this, the discursive construct of the identity of the ‘people’ as ‘friends’ 
against which that of the ‘enemies’ were mobilized presents some challenges. One, to 
construct this identity, again synecdoche had to be employed. This is because what is 
articulated as the ‘people’ reveals how component part of an entity i.e. Nigeria is represented 
as the entire entity. An instance of this logic is represented in the interviews conducted for 
this research: 
 Yeah, before we go to the final question, just curious about why you think 
the army wiping them out will help I mean what does it mean for a country 
to be going to war against its citizens? (Interviewer) 
The purpose of governance is to create an enabling environment for her 
people to do business and exist. Whatever is necessary to bring about that, 
I think it is worth it and it is the responsibility of government to do so. The 
government cannot because of a group has religious bigotry against others 
and allow them to continue to destroy others in the society. Any responsible 




good of the larger populace. I think that is it. If the government has to do 
away with some people in order to achieve the higher goal, I think it is worth 
it (Interview 1). 
The partial closure of this polemic is predicated on two assumptions: firstly, that culture 
and/or race explains violence that cannot be justified by progress (Mamdani 2003: 130); 
Secondly, that the Other is deserving of elimination for the good of progress. Firstly, as a 
negation, by privileging culture (i.e. ethnicity/religion), the discourse draws from European 
constructions of ‘backward tribes’, and as Berry (2006) has submitted that in constructing the 
Self/Other binaries of the discourse of terrorism both parties draw on religion to further their 
course and perpetuate violence. So even if the violence of Boko Haram is taken as a given that 
it is motivated by religion, this is not exclusive to the ‘terrorists’. For Mamdani then this 
deliberate ‘essentializing’ helps us make sense of the violence of the Other. In his words: 
Unable to explain it, we turn our back on history. Two such endeavours are worth noting. The 
first turns to culture, the second to theology. The cultural turn distinguishes modern from 
pre-modern culture and then offers pre-modern culture as an explanation of political 
violence. If revolutionary or counter-revolutionary violence arises from market-based 
identities such as class, then non-revolutionary violence is said to be an outcome of cultural 
difference. On a world scale, it is called a clash of civilizations. Locally – that is, when it does 
not cross the boundary between the West and the rest – it is called communal conflict, as in 
South Asia, or ethnic conflict, as in Africa. 
While Mamdani’s historicism might be criticized on account of a seeming relativist argument, 
it remains useful to the extent that the dichotomized logic premised on an imperialized model 
or logic presents an internal contradiction in a world where the state can no longer be the 
privileged unit of analysis. This contradiction becomes obvious in the words of the same 
interviewee and that of others: 
…A society that is made up of 250 ethnic groups and then we have 36 states 
in the federation. Nigeria is a federation and then the issues of violence 
arises as a result of scarce resources. Each of these 250 ethnic groups tries 
to be in control and so any one that is in the centre will control these 
resources and try to allocate it to his clan from my personal experience. So 




government in Nigeria is not really for the people but for those who are in 
government, that is why everyone want to be there because the resources 
is not only controlled for their clan but for their pocket as well. 
I mean the government of the day, there are some group of people 
sponsoring the people. Using it against other religions and other political 
believe and ideology. When Goodluck was there as a president, he was a 
Christian and they do not want him. So let me say the other opponents were 
using it against him so they could say that, during his tenure in office, there 
was no peace. ..... Yeah, the name Avengers. You know if somebody has not 
wrong you, you won’t be thinking of vengeance but if otherwise, you want 
to avenge. This group was formed so as to fight against the government 
because when Goodluck was there who was from the same region as they 
i.e. the group, Boko-haram was used to trouble his government (Interview 
2). 
The internal contradictions inherent in the narratives of the interviewees of asserting on the 
one hand that the violence is motivated by ‘religious bigotry’ and on the other hand by 
‘resource control’ reveals the hegemonic intervention through which the discourse of 
terrorism has become fixed. If the ‘failings’ of government is also highlighted as the cause of 
‘terrorism’, the reification of culture then exists to manage and produce the Other (Said 1978) 
among other things. It is interesting that culture remains an implicit discourse in the U.S. and 
Nigerian government’s texts but given voice to in an explicit manner in the interviews. This is 
because there is an implicit double dealing in the texts: the violence is articulated as global 
because of the ‘threat’ of Boko Haram to American/Western interests and thus fits well into 
the GWOT while at the same breath in all the texts the violence is constructed as targeted at 
local issues. As pointed out by Mamdani then, culture becomes the touch point when the 
global dimension is added to violence. The boundary of the local/global divide then becomes 
both blurred and highlighted through the discourse of terrorism. Like Said (2003) has argued 
that the production of the culture of the Arabs as backward, anti-democratic and threatening, 
the same can be said of the production of Boko Haram’s violence as terrorism. 
Secondly, the identity of the ‘people’ here is articulated as a homogenous population, 
whereas Nigeria, remains a ‘‘complex web of politically salient identities’’ which makes 
Blanco-Mancilla (2002:4, 26)’s seminal study submit that Nigeria is the ‘‘most deeply divided 




Mancilla should just have mentioned that this division and ‘‘intractable conflicts’’ works 
through the ‘‘binary logic through which identities of difference’’ are produced (Bhabha 
2010:4) and mobilized (Nnoli 1988; Adebanwi 2014). Also, the construction of the ‘people’ 
here as in the other texts points to an exclusionary representation where the group that is 
being negated is articulated as not belonging to the ‘people’ of Nigeria. Hence, a part becomes 
the whole. Laclau (2005:81) sums it up this way: ‘The people’ in that case, is something less 
than the totality of the members of a community: it is a partial component which nevertheless 
aspires to be conceived as the only legitimate totality’’.  The ‘’people’’ becomes part of the 
members of the community produced as ‘friends’ against the collective Other who are 
considered problematic. They are articulated as the legitimate occupiers of a territory for 
whom governance is due.  This discursive construction which directly justifies the negation of 
a part of the Nigerian population as ‘terrorists’ worthy of elimination based on the ‘‘higher 
goal’’ of government reveals the inherent inconsistency in what is often conceptualized as 
governance or security especially when the postcolonial state is in question. The disruption in 
the production of the discourse is however further highlighted in the ambiguities in the 
meaning of the sign ‘people’. Does it refer exclusively to Nigerians who are not terrorists? Or 
does it include Americans/Westerners both in Nigeria and elsewhere? Since the US has been 
interpellated as the subject of the discourse through a metaphoric connection, the ‘people’ 
could be taken as an inverse representation of the US and not that of Nigeria.  Evidently, the 
uneasy history of political violent in Nigeria reveals several nuances in the ethno-religious 
cleavages as well as the international dimension inherent in the narratives of both the 
government and the violent groups so constructed (Adibe 2012). So, a necessary elimination 
of some for the ‘good’ of others cannot be further from a ‘postcolonial anxiety’ (Krishna 1999) 
where nation-building has become synonymous with militarized state centric security 
(Parashar 2018). A clear instance of this remains the Nigerian Civil War where millions of 
Nigerians in the South-East were killed in order to deter secession (Stremlau 1977). Therefore, 
the idea of Progress evoked in the texts continually draws upon the conceptualization of 
racial/ethnic and/or religious superiority as a fundamental justification for the ‘‘extinction of 
barbarous customs’’ (article 2 of the Brussels Act of 1892). It is interesting here that in writing 




violence but rather it is not only the violence of the ‘inferior’ that is articulated as bad for 
progress but also their being. In this sense, the story of Progress has moralized not only the 
violence of Others but also marked their bodies in such a manner that they are only worthy 
of elimination for the ‘higher goal’ of society to be actualized. In essence, depending on whom 
the object of the discourse represents i.e. Boko Haram or other Nigerians, they become 
represented as the ‘‘victims of progress’’ who are meant to ‘‘disappear’’ (Bodley 2008). 
Therefore, it dislocates the violence of the ‘people’ from its history and by so doing justifies 
an oppressive collectivized arrangement that frames the elimination of peoples as a necessary 
good. 
The Terrorists as Outsiders 
It must be a foreign organization. 
The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security 
of U.S. nationals or the national security (national Defense, foreign 
relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. (Department of 
State, 2013) 
Following the negation of ‘terrorists’ is their representation as ‘outsiders’ not only in the 
global schematic of things but also in Nigeria. By constructing a Collectivized Other, the 
representation of two forms of society became possible through politics. As a problem of 
politics, the ‘‘two opposing systems of equivalences’’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:151) of the 
insider/outsider or internal/external dichotomies in the terrorism discourse is articulated 
through the productive practice of representation. Constructing this totality of an 
‘‘ambiguous’’ dichotomy would amount to a kind of ‘populism’ which is ‘a frontier of exclusion 
[that] divides society into two camps’ (Laclau 2005:81 emphasis mine). This is because both 
Boko Haram and the other groups so constructed, have been de-individuated and 
represented as a collective Other, i.e. ‘Outsiders’, so as to construct and mobilize the identity 
of the ‘people’ as ‘Insiders’. This means that as a moment the insider/outsider dichotomies is 
only made possible through a ‘‘fragile and ambiguous’’ (ibid.) articulation of antagonism 
through which society becomes an impossibility. Such Binaries as Othering are not just overly 




are manipulated but reflects the power of discourse to produce ‘reality’. This can be further 
exemplified through the following interview excerpts: 
Terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with. Looking at the number 
of people that are been killed within a short period, you will know that we 
have lost a lot of Nigerians to this crisis (Interviewee 3) 
 
The Boko Haram themselves are they Nigerians? In part they are Nigerians 
in part they are not Nigerians (Interviewee 6) 
 
This argument meshes well with mainstream body of scholarship on Boko Haram like Solomon 
(2015) and Amusan and Ejoke (2017) that Boko Haram’s specificity/difference lies in the 
lethality of the group as compared to other violent groups in Nigeria. However, if this is the 
case how then should we describe the violence of the Nigerian state against the Biafra 
secessionists of the 1960s? Or the present carnage of the Fulani herdsmen (which has 
surpassed that of Boko Haram)? (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The articulation of the 
lethality, ‘havoc’ or ‘fear’ of the Boko Haram violence is made possible by the fixation of 
antagonism in a way that posits it as ‘new’ or ‘different’ from what is ‘normal’ to society. By 
highlighting the pain and fear of people in society as a result of the presence of the terrorist, 
this not only means that other prevalent violence has assumed a ‘normalness’ and thus could 
be understood as ‘peace’ but also that of Boko Haram is beyond the boundary of ‘normal’ or 
‘insider’ violence. The ambiguous delineation of what violence passes as ‘bearable’ or 
‘peaceful’ reveals the difference of the violence of Boko Haram and thus the warranting of 
the ‘outsider’ status. The outsider designation works through the seeming ‘‘givenness’’ of 
‘new’ kind of violence that comes with the discourse of terrorism. Again, the argument that 
‘‘Looking at the number of people that have been killed within a short period, you will know 
that we have lost a lot of Nigerians to this crisis’’ shows that the dichotomize logic of the 
terrorism discourse presupposes that the so-called ‘terrorists’ are neither Nigerians nor did 
the loss of their own lives count. This brings about not only a dehumanization of the victims 
of both sides but also a righteous self and a deliberate construction of one’s pains and 
suffering in the cause of the war as meritorious while that of the Other as due justice (Cronin 




that has produced ‘terrorism’ out of extant political violence which has been prevalent since 
the supposed independence of Nigeria in the 1960s. Hence, Boko Haram’s violence is as 
‘Nigerian’ as its many others. If the difference of Boko Haram is to be taken as given, then the 
many other violence is being ‘banalized’. This argument could be further substantiated in the 
words of Spivak (2012:94) ,‘I am suggesting that if in the imagination we do not make the 
attempt to figure the other as imaginative actant, political (and military) solutions will not 
remove the binary which led to the problem in the first place. Hence cultural instruction in 
the exercise of the imagination’. By this she presents the other not just in the sense of root 
causes of his violence but in terms of Kant’s ‘sublime’. Spivak describes suicide bombing as 
“purposive self-annihilation…the extreme end of auto-eroticism, killing oneself as other, in 
the process killing others” (2012, p. 383). She posits that in attempting to understand, we 
often rationalization and this makes the idea of terrorism simply dismissed through 
categorization. Having critiqued Foucault and Deleuze on two grounds (in can the subaltern 
Speak?): one, the inherent counter-productiveness of reducing power/desire/interest’s 
heterogeneity to a seeming ‘coherent narrative’ and two, the argument for the awareness of 
intellectuals on the ‘discourse of society’s Other’ (ibid. 272). As this thesis follows Bhabha’s 
theory of Otherness, Bhabha suggests that Otherness is the fixation of ambivalence based on 
some strategy of stereotyping in order to veil the ambivalence inherent in a dyad. In this light, 
fixing Boko Haram as an Other works not only by their seeming exclusion from the collective 
identity of ‘Nigerians’ but also by denoting their violence as essentially different from that of 
others. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has made an attempt at showing how the construction of the terrorist as an 
Other has come to be produced through the U.S., and Nigeria texts. It has been argued that 
this construction came about through an implicit binary division of that state as the anti-
terrorist and some citizens as the terrorists. This discursive totality therefore works to make 
the terrorist knowable and to be acted upon. With the Nodal Point of the legal definitions (of 
terrorism/terrorist) by both governments, being National Security, it becomes possible to 
construct security/insecurity to mean what the speaking subject deemed fit. To this end, 




‘foreign’ entities or some anti-government persons/ movement in the U.S. and Nigeria 
respectively. 
The construction of the terrorist as an Other, therefore, is premised on the articulation of the 
full possibility of society where antagonism is located beyond ‘difference’ and becomes 
transcendental. As such the discursive construction of threat is made possible through politics 
as ‘difference’ makes society an impossibility. To construct threat is to construct (in) security 
which has been argued as articulations pliable to the service of power. The productive power 
of discourse among other things would mean that security or insecurity becomes whatever 
the speaking subject defines it as. This means that the prevalence of political violence in 
Nigeria could mean security while the violence of Boko Haram is articulated as insecurity. The 
discursive construction of threat is particularly important as it dislocates Nigeria and/or 
Nigerians from the subject of the discourse and incorporates the U.S as the subject of the 
violence of Boko Haram. The result of such a discourse is the negation of the ‘terrorist’ 
through the articulation of the necessity of Progress to bring about ‘Liberty’, ‘Democracy’ and 
‘Justice’. This invariably means that through negation the terrorists are without help the 
‘victims’ of Progress because they are the ‘embittered few’ who are not only outsiders to 
society but are unwanted for the full actualization of society. 
It has been argued that articulating Boko Haram as a terrorist group is a possibility but not a 
necessity because violence as a social action is a referent that is open to several 
interpretations. The construction is only made possible through the implicit discourse of ‘who’ 
uses violence in the texts under study and not through the discovery of an essence that is 
terroristic. As such while the U.S. points to seeming ‘warranting conditions’ that justified the 
proscriptions, the Nigerian texts has no such warranting conditions but gave an endlessly 
broad definitions of terrorism in order to ‘appear’ as the speaking subject of their own 
territory. The discourse of terrorism functions then as a productive space where oppression 
can be explained away, justified and legitimised.  It is then a discourse of advantage to both 
governments and only serves to normalize other categories of violence not labelled as 









Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis has not been to argue against Boko Haram’s violence as being of ‘real’ 
harm to the people of Nigeria and the region of West Africa. Ironically, it is the harm caused 
by this political violence that should justify the seriousness of engagement with the group. 
This is reflexive of the motivation to undertake the research in the first place.  It is rather the 
aim of this thesis to show that Boko Haram’s violence is a referent sign with many possible 
constructions. It is therefore a major argument of this thesis that the history, (or ‘‘inventory’’ 
to use Said 1979:25’s words), of the violence, should serve as context to understanding and 
engaging with this violence. This thesis has attempted at challenging and/or deconstructing 
the label ‘terrorism’ in Nigeria by examining the understanding of political violence in Nigeria 
prior to and post September 2001 through the discursive constructions of the other and the 
self as well as the practices enabled by this discourse. Though writers like Akinwande (2014) 
has pointed out that processes in the U.S usually influence its foreign policy as well as its 
bilateral relations, in this thesis processes in Washington has largely been ignored in order to 
focus more on constructions of Nigeria and the terrorist by the U.S. In order to avoid 
exclusions, which is also an important node of this thesis, interview texts from nine Nigerian 
military officials were analysed to provide the extent to which representations and practices 
by the U.S are either accepted or challenged. Hence, the ‘voice’ of these servicemen serve as 
that of the state to the extent to which they represent the state by justifying and naturalizing 
the ‘war on terrorism’ and as that of the people of Nigeria because of their identification as 
Nigerians suffering from the import of corruption. To this end, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
affirm that for representational purposes, subject positions are almost always 
overdetermined. Hence, the military officials in their capacity as servicemen could ably 
represent the state and as part of the ‘public servants’, they represent the Nigerian populace. 
Their identification with the people of Nigeria is reflected by eight out of nine of these soldiers 
who highlighted corrupt practices by political elites as being complicit in the ‘crisis’ of Boko 




to engage with the dominant narrative of terrorism and how it enables the ‘war’ they are 
fighting. The main argument of this thesis is therefore that the discourse of terrorism through 
Boko Haram’s violence is rooted in the neo-colonial structure of Nigeria and exists to 
normalize violence in Nigeria. The labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist group therefore exists 
to silence the structure that produce the violence as well as normalize the political violence 
that are not assigned to that category. 
This thesis does this by examining the role of discourse in producing what we know as ‘‘truth’’ 
and ‘‘reality’’ as it relates to the construction of identity and the productive practices enabled 
by this. Both the fixing of meaning and the construction of identity are partial closures which 
are open to other possible constructions. Hence, meanings and identities are not given but 
are the products of representations. According to Laclau (1988:256), ‘’if difference exists only 
in the diachronic succession of the syntagmatic pole, equivalence exists only at the 
paradigmatic pole’’. This means that history of the evolution of a word as a background would 
inform how such words could be used and substituted in the immediate. Hence difference 
eventually equates or means same.  The terrorist identity in Nigeria therefore is an identity 
construct which reflects the history of the neo- colonial discourse in Nigeria and on 
equivalential grounds, it becomes the same as that of the one who is antiterrorist. This by 
itself does not deny the existence of ‘facts’ of violence or corrupt practices as it were but that 
how we understand and construct these ‘facts’ does matter. In theory, this might have 
implications for some infinite discursive constructions based on the same referential sign and 
therefore represent a seemingly impossible task. However, the argument here against an 
absolute and totalizing discourse like terrorism does not present itself to some infinite 
constructions. Rather, it creates the space for a fruitful and critical engagement with political 
violence to the end that it might be understood rather than being explained away by 
demonizing the perpetrators of the violence. Both the governments of Nigeria and the U.S, 
for instance, have little empirical evidence about the group, including details as banal as when 
the group started, comprehensive profile of its leaders and whether they are actually 
Nigerians or Nigeriens or drawn from different countries in Africa. This shows that if details 
that should be commonplace are missing, we cannot ask ‘why’ the group is engaging in such 




‘terrorism’ now. While scholars like Solomon (2015) and Ayinde (2010) has attempted to 
answer this question, with the former situating it within the context of the revival of Islamic 
fundamentalism while the latter considers it through the lens of the ‘invasion’ of both the 
Arabs and the colonialist into Nigeria. However, those in the former group did not account 
for the fact that Islamic fundamentalism has already been foreshadowed by the U.S during 
the decade of independence and this has informed to some degree their engagement with 
Nigeria and other African countries. Islamic fundamentalism itself is also not a given but an 
identity construction that is open to other possible constructions. Even if we accept Islamic 
fundamentalism as an organising category, it still remains that it has neither engage with nor 
answer the question of why Nigeria is talking about ‘terrorism’ now and the implications that 
follow these constructions. Also, the latter group that highlighted foreign invasion in Nigeria, 
especially through violence, has also taken for granted the labelling of Boko Haram as a 
terrorist group. It only seeks to unveil the history of the violence but nonetheless accept the 
construction as ‘terrorism’ as closed and total. It remains that like the U.S Vietnam war and 
even the Cold war, the war against Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ might represent not just an 
endless war but also another utterly unnecessary waste of human lives. 
Through the focus on discourse, this thesis is intended to both challenge and complement 
other approaches to the research on Boko Haram’s violence in Nigeria. As a challenge, one 
major issue at stake is the conception of power as something used [to oppress] others. 
Therefore, agents and structures are assigned a priori identity to the exercise of power. This 
thesis, however, considers power in line with Michel Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe’s 
postulation. According to Foucault (1980b: 93), ‘‘there can be no possible exercise of power 
without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of 
this association’’.  In other words, there would be neither agents nor structure without the 
exercise of power as both agents and structure are effects of power. The productive use of 
power produce both knowledge and truth. Hence, both agents and structures have no 
identity before discourse. What is known can only be known within discourse. Hence, power 
is inhered in meaning-making and thereby the possibility as well as the production of agency 
and structures, respectively, are sites of discursive power. To this end, the question about the 




Nigeria is always negotiated within the structure of discourse produced. For instance, the 
representation of certain regions of the world as ‘Third world’ come along with structures of 
power like subjugation and domination and defines the extent to which agency could be 
exercised within such structures (Goldberg 1993; Doty 1996). The production of the ‘’truth’’ 
of Nigeria being a ‘‘Third world’’ country already defines for it the structure within which it 
could operate and the extent of agency it could exercise within such structure of domination 
and for the Boko Haram group this relates to their limits within the relationships of oppression 
available to them. The focus on discourse and representation in understanding the violence 
of Boko Haram, therefore, helps to unveil the inherent connection between power, structure 
and agency. This thesis, therefore, intends to challenge earlier researches on Boko Haram’s 
‘terrorism’ in Nigeria. Building on this the thesis made a unique contribution to bridge this 
gap in knowledge as no known research has shed light on the construction of terrorism in 
Nigeria following representational focus. As a complement to earlier research, as no 
knowledge exist in isolation, this research intends to add to the understanding of U.S Foreign 
policy on terrorism and/or political violence in Nigeria particularly and Africa in general. It 
seeks to unveil the politics of naming, silence, exclusion, oppression and domination to the 
understanding of political violence in Nigeria. Every violence has a history and it is this history 
that could help us to ‘know’ why certain discursive constructs enabled practices that now 
define our ‘’reality’’. As an attempt at deconstruction, it shows how knowledge and truth of 
Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ is produced and how associated discourses all form a unity to evolve 
this ‘’reality’’. 
This research is situated within the Critical Terrorism Studies. However, the aim of situating 
this research within the Critical Terrorism Studies is not to uncritically bifurcate the research 
into ‘‘critical and orthodox ghettos’’ ‘‘where one divide cannot speak to the other’’ (Smythe 
et. al. 2008:147). As highlighted earlier, the ‘critical’ approach of the thesis is to challenge the 
normative understanding and a seeming essentialized positivist construction through which 
the Boko Haram’s terrorism is positioned as given and fixed. Arguing for an anti-
foundationalism ontology helps among other things to do away with an a priori identity label 
in engaging with the group. It creates the space for both the structures (which produce the 




will lead to an unveiling of the strategy of silence which is inherent in totalizing discourses like 
terrorism. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will do several things: One, the second section will 
engage with the research questions of this thesis: 
Main research Question:  To what extent does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria represent 
a hegemonic political construction? 
Sub Questions: 
I. How does the U.S foreign policy towards Africa, from 
the 1970s, enable the construction of the threat of 
terrorism in Africa/Nigeria? 
II. How does the construction of the U.S self from the 
1970’s enable and justify U.S colonial tropes in 
Nigeria? 
III. How does the construction of Nigeria as a 
counterterrorist state enable and naturalize 
discourses/practices of counterterrorism in Nigeria? 
IV. How does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria enable 
and justify the construction of the terrorist as an 
Other? 
The second section therefore will show how Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory will help 
to answer the main research question of this thesis as it reflects on the central contributions 
of the thesis. This is done by referring back to elements analysed in Chapters Five, Six, Seven 
and Eight. As a result, it will show how the threat of the terrorist become constructed and 
more importantly, how the productive use of power makes possible the colonial tropes within 
which the identities of the U.S, Nigeria and the terrorist are constructed, and practices of 
counterterrorism naturalised. The third section of this chapter will discuss the limitations of 




does not allude to any absolute ‘’truth’’ or any objective scientific endeavour as the 
conclusions is only one of many possible ‘truths’ there are. Since it is the product of the 
researcher’s knowledge of ‘‘reality’’, it therefore opens up other avenues for research that 
could focus on the U.S securitization of West Africa/Nigeria; the relationship between the U.S’ 
‘war on terrorism’ and the E.U’s ‘fight against terrorism’. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting the limitations of the thesis. 
The discussions in this second section will attempt to answer the research questions by 
highlighting Boko Haram’s terrorism as a discursive totality which seeks to fix the meaning of 
‘terrorism’ so as to enable and naturalise the discourse of terrorism as well as 
counterterrorism in Nigeria.  The practices enabled by this discourse as well as the ‘’reality’’ 
of the terrorist do not exist outside of discourse; they are therefore products of discursive 
power. This second section will engage with the discussions of the core arguments of this 
thesis.  It is argued that as a result of these constructions, the discourse assumes a natural 
mode by justifying the constructions through the presupposition of legitimacy that dominant 
narratives give. This is done by analysing how the texts and the practices enabled are 
articulated to form a partial closure that justifies the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists. 
The section will do more in terms of engagement by highlighting the core arguments of this 
thesis which also relates to the other research questions of this thesis. The core arguments 
then will provide answers to the main research question of this thesis from the different 
perspectives the thesis has engaged with. 
Hegemony: Construction of the Threat of Terrorism in Africa/Nigeria 
The construction of threat (from Africa) which is against the ‘security’ of the U.S could be 
better understood within the context of the Cold War. Linguistic elements common to the 
colonial era were drawn upon and deployed to constitute identities, relationships and events 
in such a way as to make distant events mean ‘something’ to the U.S. To do this effectively, 
either new meanings were fixed to understand open elements like ‘development’ through a 
discursive move that signifies ‘crisis’ or some new narratives were constructed to understand 
events like the Southern Question. The continuity in the representation of ‘crisis’ in Africa 




hegemony. As a strategy of articulation, ‘crisis’ in discursive constructions works by initiating 
a discursive move which disrupts earlier articulations in order to entrench new meanings 
through the productive practice of discourse.  Prior to the ‘crisis’ of terrorism in Africa, several 
events in Africa/Nigeria has been represented as ‘crisis’ which threaten the ‘security’ of the 
U.S and the Western world. ‘conflicts’, ‘instability’ and ‘crisis’ of the 1970s and 80s became 
disrupted and transitioned after the end of the Cold War to the state failure discourse of the 
1990s. In the wake of the bombing of the world Trade centre (by Al-Qaida), the event has 
become another nodal point which now defines how disparate political violence in 
Africa/Nigeria should be categorised and understood. After, September 2001, the transition 
in the way political violence of groups like Boko Haram are understood is noteworthy. The 
discourse of terrorism as a fixity creates the space for the play of hegemony especially after 
the attack of September 2001. It positions as closed, fixed and permanent the understanding 
of Boko Haram’s violence by linking it to the failure of the state. While it remains unclear 
whether Boko Haram is an entirely new group or not, few scholars like Adesoji (2010) have 
linked them to the Maitaisine uprising of the 1980s. All the authors seem to agree 
unanimously that groups like Boko Haram have a long history rooted in the socio-political cum 
economic ‘reality’ of Nigeria but their understanding as terrorists after September 2001 
seems to be taken as a given and have assumed a seeming naturalness. Most mainstream 
scholarship currently hold a supposedly fixed and objective understanding of what terrorism 
in Africa and particularly Nigeria is. Specific interpretation of terrorism as its considered 
congruent with that of a dominant world power like the United States is normative. The 
construction and understanding of what terrorism is in Nigeria today do not only blur the 
unfortunate violent history of Nigeria but also the historical context of the discourse of 
terrorism as it relates to its contingency and rupture in meaning over time. Importantly, the 
historical context of the discourse of terrorism elucidates how through hegemony, partial 
fixation of dominant meaning to the exclusion of possible silenced alternatives are not only 
legitimatized but naturalized. Moreover, considering the prevalence of several violent groups 
in Nigeria since its independence, it is unclear what makes Boko Haram’s violence labelled 
’terrorism’. This background highlights how political violence has become normalized and 




To this end, through analogy whereby ‘western’ ‘strong’ and ‘stable’ states are held as the 
norm and ‘accomplished’, the extent of failure or otherwise of their African counterpart could 
be measured. The scholarship examining the interface of state failure with terrorism seems 
to be more concerned with the falsity or otherwise of the state failure-terrorism proposition. 
It goes without saying that ‘terrorism’ as well as state fragility/weakness is often held as a 
sutured totality, identifiable outside of discursive construction. 
Approaching Boko Haram’s terrorism as a discursive construct therefore situates it within the 
Critical Terrorism Studies. This is because unlike the Traditional Terrorism Studies, the role of 
discourse in understanding political violence is very critical. Violence, whether political or not, 
usually evokes emotive response for obvious reasons: people are either harmed, maimed or 
killed and possibly properties are destroyed. The Boko Haram and Ansaru groups became the 
first violent groups to be proscribed internationally as terrorist organisations on November 
13, 2013 after being proscribed nationally a few months before. Ansaru remains unknown 
even in Nigeria, so while this justify the exclusive focus on Boko Haram by this thesis, the 
international community, the Nigerian government, the media and scholars, it leaves many 
questions unanswered as to how the U.S arrived at the proscription of Ansaru in the first 
instance.  While the history and profile of the Boko Haram group has been at best sketchy, 
there is consensus that the group started out non-violent until their pact with the Borno state 
government became broken and their leader was killed. Evidently, the group’s violence 
increased in accordance with the state’s violence against them (Seyeifa 2015). To reiterate, 
this thesis neither downplay the import of Boko Haram’s violence nor attempt to justify it. It 
is rather submitting that the history of Boko Haram’s and other group’s violence in Nigeria 
demand a more honest, holistic and robust approach than the undefined and unhelpful 
mission of ‘war on terrorism’. The military officials’ interview texts analysed in this research 
highlighted that poverty, youth unemployment, poor governance and state-sponsored 
violence are nodes that could help to understand Boko Haram’s violence. Interestingly, and 
ironically, the U.S texts suggested that some or all of these significations and practices come 
together in unity to inform the violence of the group. However, there is silence on the part of 
the U.S and the Nigerian government to admit their roles in the aforementioned practices. 




recasting them as ‘enemy’ of the state who will be defeated by the military. Labelling the 
group as a terrorist organisation is thus a hegemonic construction that is politically convenient 
so as to perpetuate silence and exclusion, among other things, by the structures that 
produced it. Following this, Nagy (2018), junior Assistant Secretary of States for the Bureau of 
African Affairs by assessing the U.S Policy in Africa during previous administrations, asserted 
that: 
If you recall, in Nigeria a number of years ago, Boko Haram was a relatively 
minor organization involved in Islamic education, and it was largely through 
the brutal reaction of the Nigerian government at the time which turned 
Boko Haram into a much more radical organization and actually increased 
Boko Haram’s membership 
While Nagy’s silence on the role of the ‘shift’ of the U.S war on terrorism into Nigeria is quite 
instructive, it nonetheless reveals how the labelling of the group as terrorists helps to silence 
the role of the structures that produce it. This means that the discursive construction of Boko 
Haram, Nigeria and the United States should reveal both their complicities and their fight 
against oppressive practices. However, what Otherness in discourse does is to ‘fix’ certain 
elements while excluding the others in order to arrive at discursive constructs which are self-
serving. Understanding Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ as a discursive construct therefore help to 
unveil representational practices through which their identities became so constructed. The 
representations are thus practices of power which highlight the phenomenon of neo 
colonialism in another form. Discussing the phenomenon of neo colonialism, Said (1993: 26), 
argues that the past is in the present and it remains very doubtful if neo colonialism is a thing 
of the past. As has been highlighted above, power produces discourse and it inheres in the 
fixation of meaning. This is particularly evident in one of the key reports through which 
recommendations were made for Boko Haram to be proscribed: 
Do Not Underestimate Boko Haram’s Intent and Capability to Attack the U.S. 
Homeland.—As this report makes clear, the U.S. Intelligence Community has 
recently underestimated the intent and capability of terrorist groups to 
strike the homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These underestimations had 
near-deadly consequences on Christmas Day 2009 over Detroit and in May 




Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, December 
2011). 
The report therefore draws its strong recommendation based on a juxtaposition of Boko 
Haram with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 
The undergirding supposition was based on the committee’s ‘believe’ that Boko Haram is an 
‘emerging threat’ to the U.S homeland and this should be taken with more seriousness to 
avoid the mistake done with Al Qaeda and others. Several assumptions not only of Boko 
Haram’s capacity to launch an attack against the U.S but also of profiling the group were thus 
evoked based on ‘believe’ ,which is a subjective transcendental experience. While the 
violence of Boko Haram leaves no one in doubt as to their seriousness, the subjective reality 
of the group itself has nothing in common with AQAP and TTP. It is only through the 
intervention of hegemony that such totalizing construct became arrived at. Hegemony 
according to Laclau (1988:101) ‘‘refers not only to the privileged position of a nation-state in 
a group of nation-states, but more generally to construction of a predominant discursive 
formation’’.  It is this form of hegemonic constructions that have defined Nigeria and Africa 
prior to the advent of the war on terrorism. It is also within this constructed truth which 
privileges neo liberal democracy above all other possible alternatives of political systems that 
moments like failed states and underdevelopment could evolve. Neo liberalism itself is 
articulated on an idea of Progress that excludes antagonism i.e. it is a form of articulation that 
denies its limits and therefore its possibility to accommodate change. The majority of political 
violence in Nigeria, without the exception of Boko Haram, highlight the need for a change in 
the democratic imagination and structure of statehood of the country; they contend often 
explicitly for political representations that are not only accountable but that also reflect the 
will of the people. While the use of violence by virtually all of them, though at different scales, 
remains regrettable, Boko Haram like these groups should not just be demonized while the 
structures which produce the ‘reality’ remain silent. 
Following the Critical Terrorism Studies rejectionists arguments therefore, this thesis submits 
that the fixing of the discourse of Boko Haram’s terrorism as a total closure reflects the 
construction of the political space where certain kinds of subjects and/or objects became 




between the power to produce knowledge and truth. By situating the history of Boko Haram 
within its history and subjective realities, it becomes obvious that its labelling only exists to 
the interests of the structures that are labelling. This thesis argues that the discourse of 
terrorism in Nigeria as a hegemonic discourse only represents a moment in the history of U.S-
Nigeria relations. As a construction, it not only fixed the meaning of political violence by 
silencing the role of the structures through which the violence is produced but also would 
further reinforce dominant (western) constructions of Nigeria/Africa and the policy response 
it receives. By situating it within the productive use of the post-structural, the project is 
theoretically and empirically informed through primary data as interviews and secondary data 
of U.S government texts from 1953-2017. 
Representational Practices: Nigeria as a Counterterrorist State 
Representing terrorism as a discursive totality which is given, among other things, enables 
and legitimises certain discourses and practices to the exclusion of others. The discourse of 
counterterrorism which has come to define the understanding of some political violence in 
Nigeria fixes a certain kind of security imaginary which constructs the state as essentially an 
entity that exists to counter terrorism/terrorists. What this sort of construction does is that 
security and insecurity become interchangeable as one becomes another. Through the policy 
strategy of a whole-of -government approach towards countering terrorism,  the meaning of 
security become fixed as engaging and deploying all the apparatus and architecture of 
government to destroy those whose violence are disapproved of. Thus, in a country like 
Nigeria where political violence has been prevalent, it remains unclear how to understand 
other categories of violence not labelled as terrorism and how to respond to such. Moreover, 
constructing a secured country as that which is bereft of terrorism legitimises and normalises 
among other things the militarization of democratic experiment in Nigeria. This is because the 
discourse of terrorism which before now has not been how political violence in Nigeria is 
understood has become the dominant signifier that is at the very center of discursive 
structure and defines for us both the ‘‘play’’ and the limits of understanding political violence 
in Nigeria.  The texts examined attest to the power of representations to form an unconscious 
boundary in defining whose violence gets visible, talked about and how they are talked about. 




instance has largely been normalized as a result of the militarization of democracy through 
the linkage of the military to the economy, health, education and other aspects of 
government. Owing to the ascription of legitimacy and monopoly of violence to the state, 
which this thesis is not by any means contending, the use of violence both by the military and 
non-state actors as aided by both local and foreign governments especially during periods of 
elections, become the norm in intimidating and/or influencing voting patterns across Nigeria 
and Africa (Seyeifa 2015). Thus, the power of representation through the strategy of 
exclusions works well to silent these sorts of political violence; it makes it invisible and 
delineate for us what political violence functions for the system. The ‘reality’ of ‘terrorism’ 
then in Nigeria points to the power of discourse to produce ‘good’ violence and ‘bad’ violence. 
Otherwise, how do we understand and deal with other political violence not categorized as 
terrorism in Nigeria? Through this, the emergence of the discourse of ‘terrorism’ exists to 
delineate between the moral character of the violence: while other violence is ‘good’ for 
Nigeria, the violence categorised as ‘terrorism’ is ‘bad’ and should thus be countered through 
the linkage of all aspects of democracy to the military.   
 Power and Politics: Representation of the U.S Self and the Terrorist Other 
Power inheres discourse through representational practices. Prior to the fixity of the 
discourse of terrorism, the U.S imaginaries of colonial troupes provide the space to construct 
the U.S sense of Self. Articulating this identity plays a critical role in the struggle for a 
discursive ‘center’ through which ‘emerging’ African states and particularly Nigeria could be 
measured. It, therefore, functions as an exemplar through which, for instance, ‘development’ 
could be known. Through the effective deployment of silence therefore instead of the 
narrative of expansionism into both the northern and southern parts of Nigeria, the U.S sense 
of Self therefore provides the space not only for what could be said but also how to say these 
things. The politics of representation according to Michel Foucault come along with the 
possibilities of several silences: silence therefore is present not just in the binary of what is 
said or not said but within the strategies employed to represent what is. The dynamics of 
representations are assumed to construct as well as signify certain subjectivities; through this 
medium, power relations could become distorted; ironically, representation can function as 




representation of absence itself could function as a form of silence; it could also function as 
a means through which the tensions between oppression and resistance could be 
sequestered. In the words of Foucault (1987:27) 
Silence itself- the thing one declines to say or its forbidden to name- the 
discretion that is required between different speakers- is less the absolute 
limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict 
boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with 
them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no binary 
division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we 
must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how 
those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which 
type of discourse is authorized and which form of discretion is required in 
either case. There is not one but many silences and they are an integral part 
of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses. 
Silence as one of the predominant contributions of this thesis functions through 
metanarratives as they became naturalized through dominant structures. The politics of the 
production of identity employ the use of exclusion and inclusions of elements for the fixation 
of meaning. To this end the discourse of terrorism is a metanarrative which produces an 
identity through which the voices of resistance is sequestered from the practices of 
oppression: 
I have been among the peace keeping mission in Somalia, Sierra- Leone, and 
Sudan. I have been able to experience that things just don’t emanate like 
that but because government have not been up and doing in the area of 
their assignment. Like the experience I had in Sudan, if you have ever been 
to Sudan. No communication there except in their state capital, no school, 
no health centre. The people are just living like animals. No road we only 
travel through the desert. We use the PS to get our bearing and that is how 
we move. The people there are suffering…..Also in Somalia the situation is 
similar. Like what we are experiencing in Nigeria now, the issue of this Boko 
Haram, Republic of Biafra, Niger Delta militant, is because there is no 
balancing in the way our government are doing their things. Some tribes are 
feeling aggrieved while some tribes declare they have been cheated in the 
area of assigning appointments, some tribes feel they are always left out 
because they are minority. With all these I feel most of these problems is 
being caused by the government. The particular issue of the Boko Haram, 
there are some people who have settled down for long in a particular 
area...The North east. Because the thing broke out from the North east. 




got to the time when they are doing all this politics, they count them not to 
be their own indigene. Some of the people were aggrieved somehow.….. To 
execute their grievances just for the government or the people around to 
know they are being cheated. So they now group together and spread some 
propaganda among their colleagues around them. So this thing now 
escalated they never know this thing will spread like that (Interviewee 1). 
Having been part of extensive peacekeeping operations across Africa and a very recent retiree 
as he retired some couple of months before the interview, Interviewee One was the only 
participant who contended the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists. He was very deliberate 
about not using ‘the terrorist’ label in understanding Boko Haram. According to him, Boko 
Haram’s violence is a form of resistance against the oppressive system in Nigeria and the 
group is very much like other resistant groups in Nigeria and across Africa. Their resistance 
against the state represents the disillusionment not only of Northern Muslims but also that 
of other citizens of the country. By highlighting the group’s resistance against an oppressive 
system, he makes visible the practices of exclusion that have been silenced in their 
representation as terrorists. The very logic of the war on terrorism in Nigeria was premised 
on the group’s identification as an enemy of the people of Nigeria; thereby making invisible 
the oppressive practices of the government. Ironically, however in his struggle against the 
marking, naming and exclusion of the group and others, he asserts that any violence directed 
against the government of the state could be regarded as ‘terrorism’. The effects of 
representational texts through which ‘terrorism’ was produced then works through another 
strategy of silence: it is the exclusion of moments that helps in the fixation of meaning. The 
identification of the Niger Delta militants by the U.S as terrorists in the 1990s which led to the 
extra judicial execution of their leader, Ken Saro Wiwa served as the moment for fixing the 
meaning of terrorism after September 2001. During the Clinton’s administration when the 
concept of terrorism became introduced in Nigeria, there was no actual definition of the 
concept nor was there any attempt to define it.  What was important was the exclusion of the 
untold sufferings of the people due to the extraction of oil that led to oil spillage which made 
majority of the people homeless and jobless.  It is interesting that during this time not only 
was Nigeria  ‘adopted’ as the ‘official partner’ of the U.S in the fight against ‘international 
terrorism’ , the focus of the state was ‘security’ as poverty also became labelled as terrorism.  




contested, with dissenting voices on the meaning of terrorism, ‘terrorists’ could be identified 
with less rigour.  From the southern to the northern parts of Nigeria, it is those who are 
disenchanted, poor and struggling and want to give ‘voice’ to these struggles due to the 
import of ‘western-oriented’ policy and development frameworks that have become known 
as ‘terrorists’. The strategy of silencing moments like these, therefore, works as a means of 
exclusion in fixing meaning and production of identity. The construction of meaning and 
identity is not value-neutral. It exists for certain end. The strategy of silencing and production 
of meaning and identity is well reflected in the works of most scholars with works on Nigeria. 
Categories, meanings and identities are held as fixed and arguments are made based on this. 
Obi (2010)’s thought on African development and terrorism proves useful here. He contends 
that the linking of African development “to the on-going international fight against terrorism 
will not only amount to distorting its development priorities’’. He further contends that there 
are fundamental differences between ‘‘fight of terrorism in Africa and the civil strife in the 
region which is a symptom of state-building”. This civil strife, according to him, could be 
termed as “local terrorism” or “political terrorism”. He postulates that terrorism in Nigeria as 
well as other African countries is the result of resentments projected at foreign 
interests, foreigners and their involvement in Africa. Hence, their resentment is not against 
Africans and African governments per se. ‘‘It is thus arguable that development, with all the 
associated welfare benefits, even if equitably distributed among a country’s population, will 
not necessarily deter committed terrorists from carrying out their plans’’. In other words, 
disenchantment within Africa’s Muslim communities is not a sufficient factor to dictate the 
direction of the ‘‘region’s development agenda’’ (Obi 2006; 2010: 183). Like most other 
scholars, Obi’s ‘terrorism’, ‘development’ and other associated concepts are self-evident 
truth. The power of discourse to produce an unchallenged truth as a result of the politics of 
exclusions and inclusions point to the play of hegemony. However, the play of hegemony 
works through an effective strategy of silence in the production of discourse.  
Limitation of Study and Recommendations for Further Research 
This thesis has argued for the understanding of terrorism as a discursive construct and has 
contributed to Critical Terrorism Studies by examining how the production of the discourses 




examined how the production of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state enables and justifies the 
discourse of counterterrorism in understanding and responding to some political violence. 
The thesis has focused on discourse analysis by using both primary and secondary data from 
nine Nigerian military officers and U.S and Nigeria’s policy texts. While the thesis has 
focused mainly on policy documents which are produced by the U.S State Department, 
Defense Department and the Congress, other sites that could have been considered but for 
the practicality of data management include the Homeland Security Committee, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Council on Foreign Relations. Policy documents from these other sites 
could potentially have enriched the discussions further or challenge some propositions in 
this thesis or even might yield meaningful data for novel/further research. Also, with the 
extremely scanty Nigerian government texts, a research focus on discursive frames across 
various media in Nigeria might yield some interesting results in the understanding of Boko 
Haram and terrorism generally in Nigeria. 
Finally, as was noted in Chapter 2, the initial focus of the thesis was to understand the 
narratives of the ‘subaltern’ on terrorism in Nigeria. Rather than its present commitment as 
a challenge to hegemonic discursive construction, the thesis would have done more by 
giving ‘voice’ to the ‘voiceless’.  The focus of the thesis itself on the examination of 
metanarratives, as it were, exclude ‘voices’ of the seemingly voiceless which could have 
further enriched our understanding of terrorism in Nigeria. This is particularly an avenue for 
an engaging and enriching research which can build on this thesis because representing the 
voices of the marginalised might help to challenge practices of exclusion inherent in 
discursive totalities like terrorism. This choice might prove useful both on the basis of 
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Appendix 3: Interview Transcriptions 
Interview 1 
Interviewer - I am Modupe Akinleye researcher from the University of Bristol. I am here to 
look at how you understand Boko Haram, and how it is being responded to. May I ask about 
your background? Questions like, your education background, your age and things you would 
want us to know sir? 
…….. I am a Warrant officer as you can see, 
Interviewer…… Continue sir. 
………. Hmmmm, Warrant Officer xxxxx, I am from xxxx State, I am xxx years old and my 
educational background is an O’level certificate. I am a xxxx, soldier by profession, and I just 
retired now. 
Interviewer…. Thank you sir. Can you tell us about any experience you have had with political 
violence? 
….. Thank you I can recount very well is hmmm. I have been among the peace keeping mission 
in Somalia, Sierra- Leone, and Sudan. I have been able to experience that things just don’t 
emanate like that but because government have not been up and doing in the area of their 
assignment. Like the experience I had in Sudan, if you have ever been to Sudan. No 
communication there except in their state capital, no school, no health centre. The people 
are just living like animals. No road we only travel through the desert. We use the PS to get 
our bearing and that is how we move. The people there are suffering. The way we understand 
the war in Sudan is, that there are those who claim to be the owner of the land. We call them, 
hmmm, Janjanwei, we have those blacks who when going to the Mecca and they normally 
trek along the paths and were not  able to make it back home and settle on those paths while 
to nomadic dwellers that is called the Janjanwei claims the people are strangers and they 
don’t want them on their land. They the Janjanwei invade the villages and kill everybody. The 




situation is similar. Only one particular individual that is General Addis Farah Didi was their 
commander in chief when the war broke. He went and hide all their weapons in a place called 
Bakara. The European when they came, they tried to locate where he hid those weapons 
because he has bombs, they couldn’t because he has a strong security network. We have one 
issue, October 3, 1993 where seven America Rangers were killed. The America soldiers went 
in search for more than three days we could not sleep. The war in Sierra-Leone, similar like 
this. The people in power were so greedy and about five faction’s broke-up that they don’t 
want that government, we appease to the different faction and they all said no. in fact there 
should be checks and balance in the way the government operate so that at least all these 
grievances among the citizens wouldn’t be so open. Like what we are experiencing in Nigeria 
now, the issue of this Boko-Haram, Republic of Biafra, Niger Delta militant, is because there 
is no balancing in the way our government are doing their things. Some tribes are feeling 
aggrieved while some tribes declare they have been cheated in the area of assigning 
appointments, some tribes feel they are always left out because they are minority. With all 
these I feel most of these problems is been cause by the government. The particular issue of 
the boko-haram, there some people who have settled down for long in a particular area, 
Interviewer….. Some tribe? 
….. Some tribes, The North East. Because the thing broke out from the North East. Some tribes 
feel their father settled down in a particular place but when it got to the time when they are 
doing all this politics, they count them not to be their own indigene. Some the people were 
aggrieved somehow. 
Interviewer…… Is that they took their land from them? 
……. No. You know the land owners, when they know their territory then, when strangers 
come to stay within their area, they know that the people are not part of their tribe then 
some people feel cheated at least and when it results to political appointment, they are 
supposed to get somethings allocated to them. They feel cheated and now come under the 





….. To execute their grievances just for the government or the people around to know they 
are being cheated. So, they now group together and spread some propaganda among their 
colleagues around them.so this thing now escalated them never know this thing will spread 
like that. They have their first training in Sudan and later in Libya as I was told 
Interviewer so... sorry who are they? 
…… I mean those aggrieved 
Interviewer….. Ok Boko Haram guys? 
…..yeah. They are now coming out in the name of religion to fight back. 
Me….. Hmmmm 
……. I believe during president Obasanjo, he was advised that time to that the crisis would 
soon break up and from his own experience, he warned the one that took power from him, 
that he should take the matter of security so seriously. So, the thing started like a child play 
until it now spread like a wide fire. Because in their operation when they are coming, they 
may be around five and as they are moving anyone they come across their way and refuse to 
join them is killed. 
Interviewer- hmmmm 
……. So that is how they operate. It is not all of them that carry weapon. Some just carry cutlass 
Me… Thank you sir, just to buttress on the point you made now, why do you think Boko Haram 
spread like a wide fire? 





……………. The government of President Jonathan thought it won’t escalate to that extent so 
the area of security was not taken care of as it should. 
Interviewer- But boko haram started before President Jonathan 
….. I know. They were calling themselves different names that time  but before the real name 
Boko Haram, came into being, it was during the time was late president Yar’auda either in 
2004. We started having internal crisis even until now we are having internal crisis. So, the 
time this Boko haram started manifesting was in 2004. 
Interviewer- So sir, you think terrorism started in 2004 in Nigeria? 
…… We are talking of boko haram. We have been having internal crisis with different names 
and fraction but the one of boko haram should be 2004. To the best of my knowledge 
Interviewer- thank you sir. In your opinion because we are particular about terrorism and why 
you think terrorism started in 2004 since we know that Nigeria has been having political 
violence for so long and so. Why do think terrorism started in Nigeria with boko haram? 
……. Boko haram that is the name of their fraction. The issue of internal crisis. The major tribe 
in Nigeria is Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. The other tribe who feel marginalise in the area of 
political appointment, which is the cause of the crisis, the government is supposed to find a 
way to make the amendment by accommodating them into the polity. 
Interviewer-Thank you very much sir…. The next question here says what terrorism means to 
you as security personnel 
……. It is an act of violence against government. Terrorism is just an act of violence against the 
government. They feel through that, they will get what they want. Just an act of violence, 
killing innocent people. That is, it and they have very strong network. They link up with other 
international terrorist organisations. Anywhere they spring up like in Mali, they still have their 




Interviewer- I don’t know if you have any personal experience with boko haram as a security 
officer? 
……. I have not had any experience with them, shortly when I came back from Sudan that was 
when I retired. When the issue of boko haram became intense. They deplored some of my 
unit there and I was not with them. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir…. The other question is what does peace in Nigeria mean to you. 
If we say peace in Nigeria, what does it mean to you? 
……… Peace is when government do the right thing. Let everybody feel the impact of good 
government, I think that is when there will be absolute peace. You get what I am saying? 
Interviewer- Yes sir.  The right thing, you think boko haram is fighting for things they are 
entitle to so if the government do the right thing by giving them what they want, there will 
be peace? 
……. I am not particular about boko haram. Like what is happening in Niger Delta for instance, 
president Obasanjo made a comment during his regime. He said the goose that is laying a 
golden egg, is it taken care of? All our natural resources and source of revenue is from that 
side of the country. The Niger delta, those people are suffering, if you been to that area, you 
find petroleum pipe spilling on their water way, their rivers. They don’t have good water to 
drink. Their crops are dying and people have been crying come to our aid, the government 
refuse to listen to them. look at Igbo as another example, they don’t allow them to become 
president, they don’t allow them to hold some position in the country and they are crying 
where is the one Nigeria, see you people are cheating us like this and where is the one 
Nigeria? And this result in all these grievances. For peace to reign let the government do the 
right thing so that everyone will be please. Like the National conference which they all 
contributed their own view and billions of funds was used for the conference in 2014, till now, 





…… The present government now don’t want to hear anything about that. Without taking a 
look at its recommendation. Our government should look at the area where they can make 
amendment to this. 
Me- Thank you sir… This directly link us to the next question. What do you think of Nigeria as 
a country? 
…… Nigeria is a blessed land. We have enough natural resources but in the hand of very few. 
Look at the price of petroleum has fallen in the international market yet we buy at a high price 
in Nigeria also the price of kerosene now per litre is almost two hundred naira now. The 
average Nigerian in the street, uses kerosene to cook and now it is so expensive, go to the 
hospital, it is so expensive and go the school, school is so expensive now. Nigeria is a country 
where we have bad leaders, they are just mismanaging the funds. Instead for them to invest 
their money in the country, they steal this money and run away to other countries to invest 
it. Like in former president Jonathan, we heard he has refinery in Malaysia. 
Interviewer Hmmmmm 
…… yes. All our crude oil, they are selling it to his refinery. So that is the issue. For peace to 
reign, we should do the right thing. 
Interviewer- In comparison to other places I remember you mentioned Somalia, Sudan, what 
do you think of the level of violence in Nigeria when you compare it with other places. 
Whether in Africa or other places? 
….. Our own is a bit better because what is happening in those country, even in thirty years’ 
time, they cannot recover from the war situation. 
Interviewer- You mean Sudan and Somalia? 
….. All the area I visited, Somalia, Sierra-Leon and Sudan. They are so many problem for the 
government to solve. We don’t pray to be in such situation. If you look at the vegetation ours 
is better. There is nothing we plant that will not geminate. Somalia and Sudan there is nothing 




our own country, we are blessed. Over there all their things are imported. All their things are 
imported. They don’t have any industry there. So many government houses have been burnt. 
Sea port has been vandalised. We don’t pray such for Nigeria. 
Me- We are almost there 
….. Let us go 
Interviewer-laughing…..Just two more questions. Sir what do you think about Nigeria 
government, I know you have been talking about them. What do you think about Nigeria 
government and the way they have been responding to issues? 
…… That is what I have been saying 
Interviewer-hmmmmm 
…… The government is in the hand of very few. What is meant to be spent as our budget in a 
year, you discover that somebody runs away with trillion of naira not billion. We hear report 
from the EFCC that so amount has been given to someone who will just convert it to his own 
personal account. After some time we heard he has spent so out of it 
Interviewer- Those account are not found in Nigeria? 
….. Those account are not found in Nigeria. You know where they hide it 
Interviewer- No 
….. The problem we have in Nigeria, money that is meant to purchase weapons for soldiers 
to go and fight Boko Haram, you now convert it to run campaign for Jonathan. You can see 
the kind of country we are. So that is the problem. That is just the problem. The government, 
they know where the problem is so let them do the right thing. 
Interviewer- The next question is, what is your assessment of how the government is fighting 
boko haram? 




Interviewer- why do you think so? 
…….. Because initially we hear of bombing here and there over the news how they go to 
market places and detonate bombs and casualty are reported in the news but since President 
Buhari enters now and with the new set up of security network they have subdued those 
people. We don’t hear about those bombing again 
Interviewer- But boko haram seems to strike once in a while? 
….. They still strike once in a while, it is true but it is not as before. 
Interviewer- Not as frequent as before 
….. Yeah, not as frequent as before 
Interviewer- So the battle is being won? 
…… Yeah they subdue them seriously. They have. 
Interviewer- This should be about the last question. What do you think is the way forward for 
Nigeria? We have so many movement coming up here and there. Now we have Avengers and 
all of them. What do you think is the way forward? 
……. Why not call all this people to a round table discussion. You don’t use violence to resolve 
violence. This constitutional conference and told you about, why not bring all this people to 
a round table. those aggrieve parties  and find the way forward for all this things to be 
controlled and that is the only way we can be able to rectify it and let all the aggrieve tribes 
have a hand in government. If not the problem will still continue and more fraction may still 
come up again. If we should say Igbo should go, Niger delta should go, there all other aggrieve 
party, they just waiting they too will follow suit 
Interviewer-So the way forward is dialogue? 
……. Yeah dialogue. Let them all come to the round table and discuss the best way to solve 




Interviewer-Thank you very much sir. Thank you for giving me your time 
…….. You are welcome 
Interview 2 
Modupe- Good afternoon ma. I am Modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the University of 
Bristol. I am here to understand Boko-Haram and how it is been responded to, political 
violence generally in Nigeria. If you please want us to know about your background; age, 
gender and educational qualification and nature of job? 
......Is this relevant? 
Interviewer- yes ma. So we can know who we are talking to. 
.......Educational background. HND holder, profession, military personnel, we are not allowed 
to participate in political events whether during election or anything about politics, we are 
not allow as a military personnel. 
Interviewer-political violence in this respect that we are interested in is in things like people 
fighting for a course or for one reason or the other like we have the Niger Delta Avengers in 
Nigeria, Boko-haram. If you have had any experience with them? 
........I don’t think I have had any experience with them at all but I know that they do exist in 
Nigeria. We have those in the North that call themselves Boko-haram and then the Biafra but 
really I don't have any experience with them. 
Interviewer-How about outside the country any? 
........I wouldn't want to discuss that. 
Interviewer-What do you think about Boko-haram? 
.......To me no one can really say, I don't think anyone in Nigeria can give a particular thing 
about themselves. What people use to say is that they are fighting because of religion while 




one religion But I don't believe so but what I know is that this people we don't really know 
what they want and no one can really say what in particular they are all about. We just see 
them in Nigeria and that is it. 
Interviewer-Thank you. .okay 
Interviewer- How long do you think they have in Nigeria? Is it before we got independence or 
after independence? 
.......No not before Nigeria got independence but after Nigeria Independence and not quite 
long let say in 2006 I.e. about 10years or more and it all started in the North. 
Interviewer-ok thank you 
Interviewer-In your opinion, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
......Actually I cannot say the particular time but what I can say is that if you look at the Niger 
Delta crisis, that has been on for a while and after it was calmed down we are now face with 
Boko-haram but the particular time Boko-Haram started or what did you call it, I mean the 
question? Hmmmm terrorism in Nigeria, hmmmm, I don't have a particular time for it. 
Interviewer-Ok, What do you think terrorism mean, if we talk about terrorism what does it 
mean to you? 
.......Terrorism. What it means to me, you know if there is such in a country, people may not 
be able to have free movement hope you get me? 
Interviewer- yeah 
........Because you will be thinking that they will be here or there. People we be afraid of going 
out or doing things that they ought to do because they don't know the time they will strike. 





Interviewer-It is not like a technical definition we are looking for actually just how we know 
that this act of violence is terrorism and this one is not terrorism. 
.......Because you know, when you just see normally in a country something is going out of 
hand a tribe is fighting against the other tribe but when you see the one generated from like 
those Boko Haram people and you are thinking it will end but now spreading to other state 
of the federations. I believe Boko Haram movement is not something of just ehn people 
fighting against themselves within the country but seems to have people backing them up 
from outside the country. I believe it should have die down. 
Interviewer-within and outside the country? 
.......We cannot say, nobody can say. We can have insider and people sponsoring them from 
outside Nigeria. 
Interviewer- You have told us that you do not have any particular experience with Boko-
haram and you do not want to tell us your experience with insurgent movement but we are 
not looking for like I told you, any particular security report but just to draw from your 
experiences with any peace keeping operation and things like that so we can understand how 
Boko-haram can be tackled. That just the essence. 
.......My experience with peacekeeping operations? 
Me-Yes please 
........ Hmmm I have been to Liberia twice. I was told before I enter the force that then during 
the war, if not for that Nigeria soldiers, the war wouldn't have been successfully won. I believe 
we follow the same approach with Boko-Haram, the war against terrorism can be won like 
we did in Liberia. We just need to trust our military. No matter how you are looking at that, 
any country that you find violence, the crisis does not calm down at once, even since that 
2006, there is still crisis in Liberia but not as it was. Today everywhere will be calm and 
tomorrow they will come out again. In which troop had to be sent to calm them down. But I 




Interviewer-Thank you ma. 
Interviewer- So what do you think peace means to us in Nigeria? 
......I believe and I pray that God will be with us to bring total peace in Nigeria. You see when 
we are talking of peace, there will not be no war, no tribalism, people will not be talking about 
I am a Christian, I am a Muslim and all of us will be one and we will believe in what we believe. 
You are a Muslim, you continue serving your god and Christian as well so that two of us and 
all Nigeria will be able to stay together, do everything in common when there is peace, 
everywhere and people from outside when they come to Nigeria they will be able to say in 
that country, there is peace. To me I believe when there is peace, everyone will be happy. Our 
prayers every day is that God should send peace to Nigeria like now, you see in North what 
happen during the Chibok girls that we are talking about even until now that we have not 
seen them. Some people said they saw some of them while some people said they have not 
seen anyone of them. I have not been there to witness things myself but we are hearing from 
the news media but what I know is that if there is peace in Nigeria, we will not be thinking 
about Boko-haram anymore. Hope you understand? 
Interviewer-hmmmm 
.......we will not have Niger delta movement as all these would have been tackled. 
Interviewer- Ok. Thank you ma. 
Interviewer-So in your opinion you think that Terrorism is when political violence is spreading 
like that of Boko-haram. 
........ I don't know if Boko-haram is political violence or not. I don't really know it is only God 
that know but for me I don't know.  If we say because of political problems we have Boko-
haram because some people said if Hausa people reign again, there will be no problem and 
Boko-haram issue will be something of the past. But since the new president has emerged, is 
he not a Hausa man? But we are still having the same issue. So you can see, if people are 




Interviewer- hmmm but some people think he is winning the war against Boko-Haram, that 
Buhari and the present government is winning the war against Boko-haram. 
........ Yes I will believe so by the grace of God that Nigeria will be normal again. That's what 
we think now. We pray that it will so in Jesus name. But what I know is that only he cannot 
do it. You cannot say as a president you will go out and win a war alone. You need to assign 
some people to do it but it is now left for those assign to do that particular work to do it right. 
You know when you are going out with your troops they need the necessary artillery to work, 
like food, cloths etc. If you can provide all the things needed at that particular time, what do 
you think will happen? Even if they are about to win the war and all the logistics needed is 
not available, it can cause so many problems. 
Interviewer-Thank you 
Me- That will just take us to the next round of question but we are almost done as you can 
see. What do you think of Nigeria as a country? 
..........Hmmm Nigeria they say my father land. You know no matter how it is, one Yoruba 
adage says ‘ Ile abo Simi oko’ meaning the home is once resting place after a journey. No 
matter where you are, no matter how your home is, no matter what you are in life, surely you 
must think about your home and one day you will thinking of coming back. You can’t compare 
Nigeria with another country, it is our home and I believe that Nigeria is the best because we 
all can’t migrate to another country. It is not possible, who will take us, nobody.  I know no 
country is like Nigeria, no matter what and I believe that by the grace of God, Nigeria will be 
better. You cannot compare other country with Nigeria. We are okay and God will help us. 
Interviewer-Thank you 
Interviewer-In comparison with other places, what do you think of the level of violence in 
Nigeria? 
........Nigeria situation is still better we can still give God the glory. Nobody is thinking about 




not really okay let say 99% okay which we are praying for. But our own is better compare to 
so many countries over there. When you think of countries like Congo, Somalia and so many 
others we are still okay and I believe that God will help us. When you think about Sudan, it is 
only in the North that we really have this problem and I believe that with God all things are 
possible. 
Interviewer-What is your thought about Nigeria government? 
........ You know, what can I say, any house maybe during the war, let me use Liberia as an 
example, from 2006 till date when I visited Liberia, they have been talking about peace until 
now but you cannot compare Liberia of then and now. If I get your question right 
Interviewer-What do you think of Nigeria government? 
........When things have gone wrong, for you to bring that thing back to normal is really difficult 
because it will go through processes, so Nigeria government presently is okay and I believe if 
there is any lapses from the previous government, for this government to put them in order, 
at least they will go through some processes and I believe that what they are doing and for 
the first year of this new administration I believe they are okay and I believe if they continue 
with what they have been doing for the past one year, Nigeria will be better. 
Interviewer- Ok Thank you 
Interviewer- What is your assessment on how the government is fighting Boko-haram? 
.......You know there is nothing they can do more than what they have been doing because 
when you look out so many soldiers that have lost their lives. In serving their father’s land, 
just to see that peace reigns in Nigeria. The government have been trying, I believe that if 
there is any insider that is backing them up or maybe sponsoring them, the Boko-haram 
before you know it you will not hear anything about Boko-haram again because the 
government they are trying and those people deployed over there they are trying their best. 
Nobody will leave his house and say I am going out and will not come back and you see they 




do anything even in the job they are no more useful. I believe that Nigeria will be better again. 
The government they are trying. 
Interviewer-and what do you think is the way forward for Nigeria now? 
........ The way forward is that first, we should pray to God, if there is anything we have done 
maybe sin against God one way or the other, and we should come together and ask God for 
forgiveness because I know, if God is for us nobody can be against us. So we should pray to 
God for forgiveness after that, we can come together as one and I believe that there is no war 
that cannot be won. Because they say, a stick of broom cannot do anything but if it is a bunch 
of broom, it can clean up whatsoever dirt that is on the floor. So all of us as Nigerian need to 
work together, as a team and nothing will be impossible to us. This will lead to peace that's 
my belief. 
Interviewer- How do we come together since we are made up of different tribes, religious 
and ethnic backgrounds? 
......... I have said earlier for us to work together, we have to remove tribalism, thinking if been 
a Muslim or Christian. Because if you are thinking I am a Christian, Muslim, Yoruba, Hausa or 
Igbo that means things will not go on sweet. It will not go on as planned but if we can all 
remove those things and believe we are one and that we are brothers and sisters as long as 
we are Nigeria and all of us are the same, I believe things will go on fine. 
Interviewer- Thank you very much, I really appreciate you giving me your time. Thank you and 
I don't know if you have any question for me? 
....... No. 
Interview 3 
Interviewer: Good afternoon sir. As I had introduced myself earlier, I am Modupe Akinleye 
PhD student from the University of Bristol and I am taking a research about political violence 
in Nigeria. May I know your background sir? I mean about you, educational background, age, 




..... My name is xxxxx I am from xxxx state. Serving in the Nigeria army for about 14 years now. 
I am xxxx years, a xxxx and HND holder. I think the information is okay. 
Interviewer- Alright sir. Ok if you can just tell us your level 
..... On the job? 
Interviewer- hmmm, so that we know if you are a senior officer 
..... I am a corporal brigade 
Interviewer- Thank you very much sir. Can you let us know your experience, any experience 
you have had with political violence whether in Nigeria or outside Nigeria? 
...... You know, political violence is something that happens within an environment every day 
and you know it has been a custom to us that once those things comes to be we don't care 
about them again, because, we know that those are things that must come and they must go. 
So political violence is what we have live with for years now. I think in Nigeria, in 1999 ever 
since the civilian took over from the military, we have been experiencing the violence. 
Interviewer- Do you have any personal experience along the line say as a security officer? 
..... My first experience was in 2007 when there was crisis in River State Nigeria. I am talking 
about the militant. I went there 2007 I think in October. I spent 3 years there as a captain. We 
experienced a lot of hard times there. We lost some of our colleagues. The experience was 
very painful for one to loss his colleague because of political violence. 
Interviewer- Okay thanks 
Interviewer- What do you think about Boko-Haram? 
..... Boko Haram how will put it, Boko-haram was arranged by the same politicians and there 
was a purpose they trained this group. There is a saying that goes like this: ̀ man proposes and 
God disposes` If your plan and God’s plan is different, it is either your evil prevail of God’s. 




Interviewer- The Boko Haram guys? 
..... Yes, they send them abroad to train them for several years but the Boko-Haram their 
activity was partially in operations in 1999 at the Northeast region and not as it is today. Today 
we experience bomb blast every now and then. People are no longer afraid of their attack 
anymore as after a bomb is detonated, and there is casualty, shortly after this, people go on 
with their daily life. However, the purpose they were trained took another dimension for 
these politicians. I know it was during the period of handing over to civilian government that 
those boys came out. That was 1999. Since then the country has been in such mess. These 
days everywhere you go there is no trust. The activity of Boko-Haram has really cause deep 
pain in the lives of Nigerian. They may feel the effect of their activity either directly or 
indirectly so the effect of their operations is felt daily. Look at now the Niger Delta Avengers, 
they are doing their own now because of the political crisis is been fuelled by those who wish 
to run the government down. Like the other government, Goodluck regime according to 
them, they said because Goodluck was from south-south, the activity of Boko-Haram was 
premeditated to run down Goodluck regime so, the Niger Delta Avengers will love to do the 
same with this present government. I heard a prominent person said I will make this 
government unbearable. Such a person is walking freely today. 
Interviewer- Was that directed to former president Goodluck Jonathan? 
..... Jonathan. Look at the Niger Delta Avengers and other groups coming up. They will be 
thinking that because we were peaceful now the northern region is ruling. They will want to 
make sure they Avenge. When statements are being made, there are many interpretations to 
statements made. You know if a word is being said to different people, they will come out 
with different meaning. So the fight in Nigeria is just tussle of power. The North will say, we 
are the leader of the country, trying to silence other people. I pray that God will end this Boko-
Haram and Niger Delta crisis so we can move on as a nation. 




Interviewer- So do you think that, it is more like politics. They use groups like Boko-Haram 
and Avengers and other groups. This has something to do with politics and politicians? 
....... Yeah, first deal with Nigeria politics. If you check the background of all these people, who 
are the sponsor of these groups, it is the same politicians. 
Interviewer- So they are being sponsored? 
..... They are being sponsored by the same politicians who embezzle money for their own 
selfish interest. Despite I am not a northern, I love what president Buhari is doing, because, 
he is trying to create awareness that at this time you cannot steal from the government. You 
maybe stealing before, now you cannot steal anymore. He is doing a good one by also 
retrieving money stolen in the past. This is very important because if we continue like this, I 
think our generation and generations to come will suffer the consequences. So the country 
will be in total mess. But I love what Buhari is doing now. Because I know it is something that 
will give our children the future they deserve. We have graduate going into the society to be 
employed, you we be thinking of how much you will earn and not the knowledge you will 
impact to your generation. That is one thing that kills us as Nigerians. We don't think about 
what we can impact on the society. We always think of what to receive. Because your father 
or mother or some fraction has sponsored us to school, we want to make money and pay 
them back and likewise make name for ourselves. Unlike in the western world, you think of 
what to offer to the society and not what to gain from it. Having that mind-set make one focus 
on what to contribute to societal building. For example, if you compare our councillors (a 
political position in Nigeria) with a councillor position in the western world, you see a 
difference in their discharge of duty. The Nigeria councillor, some of them owe billions of 
naira in their account. You might disagree with me. How much is their income? So those are 
the issue. Just to govern a particular locality and councillor will be making money out of the 
same people he is governing. What are we saying, because of selfish interest and the rest? 
We have to go back to the drawing board. If I have opportunity to be in government, I would 
love to create impact on the society and not gain from it. If we all can think towards this 




Interviewer- So why do you think they keep sponsoring the groups, violent group like Boko-
Haram, I mean the politicians? 
..... You know, in a society, we have the rich that have power. As a rich person, you will want 
to have boys working for you. Among these boys working for you, you will have the good and 
the bad. In a society when you look at a rich man, if the man belongs to one group that has 
made him wealthy, he may begin to harbour the fear that this money will start to cause envy 
and feeling of threat That he may be attacked and killed. Therefore, such fears will make them 
train up boys. Those boys just like agent will want to look after the interest of their principal. 
They buy them equipment to do their job such as guns, knives etc. That is the way violence 
starts. The fear of the unknown. The poor man that has nothing is thinking of what he will eat 
tomorrow, so he doesn't have any fear. So the rich men want to protect themselves by using 
these boys. The problem with our society is that the society is very poorly organized. When 
you see a boy who has graduated, having nothing to do and walking on the streets and looking 
for what to eat, you can easily recruit them. Give them some money and give them everything 
they need, they become your boys and any errand you send them, they will gladly do it. These 
boys sees the rich men as their saviour. 
Interviewer- just before we move on from that point, you talked about power tussle. You 
know the Niger delta Avengers and the rest of the groups are agitating base on the fact we 
are a pluralize society? Hope you remember that point 
..... I do 
Interviewer- Boko-Haram was been sponsored by northern politicians to destabilise the then 
government because the president was from the south. And now the Niger Delta Avengers 
are also coming up and some many other factions. Do you think that is the actual cause? 
...... I don't think so. You know politics is a dirty game as we always say in the military that 
everyone is a suspect 




..... Yes. Until you are cleared by the law court. So I can say that despite the crisis, they still 
have synergy to work together.  If you look at the crisis in River State, Rotimi Ameachi the 
former governor of the state and his brother, Wike the present governor were from the same 
village but different political parties. They were at loggerheads and this lead to killings and 
the rest. The crisis resulted because the then governor wanted to impose a successor and 
Wike wanted the position who was a serving minister at that time. I do not buy into Rotimi 
Ideology of imposing someone to take over from him. 
Interviewer- hmmm 
..... You understand 
Interviewer- yeah 
...... The present governor who was from the same village as His predecessor were fighting 
seriously which resulted in loss of lives and properties. Now tell me why they are fighting if 
they are from the same village. This politicians, I don't know but I don't blame them. I blame 
the masses that voted them in and they make use of this same masses to propagate their 
selfish agenda. Because if an individual will say what we I gain if I sell my conscience, how 
much I am paid for destabilising the country. You know to build is very difficult but to destroy 
is very easy. If you listen to the news media, River State is a place everyone is afraid to go 
now. 
Interviewer- Are you from Rivers? 
...... No I am from Bayelsa state. 
Interviewer- Okay 
..... It is also happening in Bayelsa state to same way as in River State. It is all about power 
tussle. 
Interviewer-hmmmm 





Interviewer- In your opinion when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
..... Like I said earlier, terrorism began in 1999, although by then it was just hidden. I know 
they kill silently 
Interviewer- They, who are they? 
.....Then they weren't called Boko-haram. They were just silent. Their names were unknown. 
They will say religious crisis. Flagging it with religion. There was terror activity going on then, 
like bombings, loss of life and properties as a result. 
Interviewer- But why did you think it began in 1999, with religious movement in the North. 
Since we know that they have political violence in Nigeria before then. 
..... I think then, the political violence was not rampant like from 1999 downward. Although, 
there were silent killing, you know it was military then. No civilian will protest because the 
military was just using power. During the military regime, there was nothing like human right 
as we have today. But today when you think of human right as a military officer, it mean you 
are bounded by two laws.  The civil and military laws. 
Interviewer-Ok 
..... As a result, even the society is bounded by both laws. If you commit an offence and the 
civil law did not catch up with you, the military will. Furthermore after the military handed 
over power in 1999, to a civilian government, this various groups are springing up across the 
nation. It was Nigerian that were sponsoring the Boko-haram group like ISIS. This religious 
movement did not start from Nigeria as they say, it started from all these Islamic nations and 
one thing with Islamic movement according to Islamic cleric is that whenever you fight for 
Jihad, when you die, you have reward in heaven. You know this philosophy motivates them 
to kill. This ideology is brought into Nigeria. And all these coupled up has led to Islamic crisis 
in Nigeria. Before now, we hardly have crisis in this nature. Therefore with the help of those 




that we don't know the culprits I mean the sponsors. When the America troop came into 
Nigeria, concerning this Boko-haram. They came over, got some information but did not let it 
out to the open because as they said, if they let it out, it will lead to more trouble. 
Interviewer- Can you explain what you think terrorism mean? 
..... Terrorism is causing havoc in a particular place that have peace. Making the place 
unstable, making the place unbearable for people living in a peaceful place. Whenever there 
is bomb blast in a particular place, people will be unable to live in peace as they will be afraid 
to go about their daily business. Whenever people start living with fear, the next thing is 
death. Once you live with fear, you won't have a stable mind to think. Terrorism is something 
that needs to be dealt with. Looking at the number of people that are been killed within a 
short period, you will know that we have lost a lot of Nigerian to this crisis. If you go to the 
barracks now, we have widows. Young woman having one, two kids and she is a widow all 
because of terrorist. Terrorism has caused pain in our society. I can round up by saying that 
terrorism is what disorganises a society. Now we don't have plan because we are living with 
fear of the terrorist. This is very bad for a country. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 
Interviewer- Have you ever had any experience with Boko-haram as a group, probably as 
relating to your duty or peace keeping whatever. Counter terrorism. 
..... Thank God I have not have encounter with Boko-haram. I only had encounter with Niger 
Delta militants which was 2007 to 2010. I was there for three years plus. With that I think I 
can relate about crisis situations. I have colleagues, friends, mates that have come back from 
the Northeast tell us what is happening there. This is too hard to relate because is scary. When 
you look at a soldier trained by the Nigeria army, you should know it cost so much to train 
him or her. In America, if the live of one soldier is lost, the whole country will come to a 
standstill. Because they know the cost of training one soldier and they value it. In our country 
people only want to make money. They care about human lives and that is why the crisis is 




the politicians and they send this soldiers with bare hands to fight Boko-haram. It is something 
that is annoying. We don't know what the country is turning to. This is something we need to 
deal with having serious minded people to handle it. If we continue on how to use human 
lives to make money and not think about our future will lead to a sad end. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 
Interviewer- Considering the situation we have in Nigeria now. I mean that, Nigeria is multi-
ethnic, multi- cultural and multi- religious and all of that, what do you think peace will mean 
to us Nigerians. What will peace mean to us? Will it be a situation where we will never have 
any violence or what? 
..... Peace is what everybody want to see 
Interviewer-hmmmm 
..... Peace is a thing of joy to every individual but you know violence is as a result of selfish 
desire but peace is what everybody is praying for and before we can have peace, we need 
godly men. It is only God that can give peace. If you can know God and know the 
commandment of God and live according to the scriptures, it means we will have a peaceful 
place to live. 
Interviewer- That sound more like religious believe. Are we not doing that already? 
..... If you look at the world now, at least, in religious adherence, we can say we are 1-5 
countries but religion only make us to know what. But if you are a Christian, what is the bible 
telling you? And if you are a Muslim, what is the Koran telling you? What is your ideology? 
What are the people learning from the various religious backgrounds? Are you teaching this 
people on how to create violence? How can you tell me in the Koran if you kill, you will go to 
heaven. Is that not fallacious?  You know, we have to know the truth individually, we need to 
take it upon ourselves, that as a Christian, what are my duties. I call myself Christian and I 
don't know the bible and the basis. For instance, the bible say thou shall not kill and I killed 




says. The bible says love your neighbour as yourself. If the love is there, peace will come. If I 
love my neighbour, I cannot think evil concerning my neighbour. There cannot be envy 
towards my neighbours. So I know that with that law been obeyed, peace will reign. We don't 
need to pray for peace, we need to just act. If you believe, you will have no negative feeling 
about your neighbour. It is only God that can help us. The fight against Boko-haram is not 
ordinary, it is not physical the with the way we are looking at it. Someone told me that, do I 
know that Boko-haram is stated in the scripture? In the book of revelations that ‘difficult 
times we come’ that is what we are into now. Let me deviate a bit.  Look at our world today, 
it is looking like Sodom and Gomorrah with this gay stuff around. What is behind this ideology, 
do you think it is ordinary? It is not ordinary. Therefore Boko-haram is not ordinary. The bible 
has said the time is coming were son will rise against the father and father against son. A 
village will rise against each other and likewise countries against one another. So let's look 
beyond the physical. When you are tackling issues, you need to look beyond the physical. How 
can someone kill his fellow and be happy about it? 
Interviewer Sir you understand that not all Nigerians are Christians, some are Muslims and 
others traditionalist. I know you are a Christian from the way you are talking and you are 
responding from your own religious belief. 
..... Perspective 
Interviewer- Yeah, what will peace mean to us with our different religious beliefs and ethnic 
identity and so on? 
..... We need to identify the core of your Faith. Like bible say people perish for lack of 
knowledge. We allow people to read and tell us what is not supposed to be. We have to learn 
and find our ourselves. We have to think deeply if what we are learning is good for me. How 
does this affect my relationship with the society where I live and others around me? Does it 
contradict the norms of the society I live? Because if your belief contradict the value system 
and norms of the society which you live in, you will be punished. I also said earlier on this 




place that will also result in my death? It shows they are not operating with their natural mind 
and something is driving them beyond physical. Because everyone is afraid to die. 
Interviewer- Sorry to interrupt you 
Interviewer- you mentioned earlier that, the group is been sponsored for political reason and 
things like that, how will you think of Nigeria as a country? What do you think of Nigeria as a 
country from our past, to present and the future? What does the hold for us from all that is 
happening? 
..... You know in Nigeria, we are dynamic, we have so many culture and so many things that 
is happening but I think because of our population, the North want to say we are the head. 
They say we are born to rule, the south-south we say the same thing. But if we can understand 
each other, we have thirty-six state of the federation excluding Abuja I.e. thirty-seven and we 
have one of the largest population in Africa. If we can come together and understand 
ourselves 
Interviewer- Some people are saying that Nigeria should divide 
...... Hmmm, the Biafra agitation has been since the 1960’s Biafra is supposed to be 
independent on their own but you know creating another country from Nigeria cannot solve 
the problem. I said earlier, if we deal with ourselves. Now if the Biafra separate from Nigeria, 
How many state will make up Biafra country? And this will not evade crisis from coming. Any 
problem unsolved is unsolved. If the separation happens, the Igbo group will say we 
singlehandedly fought for this independence and we will be the one ruling and the south—
south group will disagree. And another crisis again will erupt. The crisis we face now cannot 
be solved by separation.  It just like having a problem with your husband in the house and you 
do not deem it fit to settle it, the problem will continue to degenerate and will be waiting for 
both of you to address it. We have to know that, as a country, we have to be one. Forget 
about tribal differences. If we can come together and say, this is our country, and let think of 
the way forward as a people, Nigeria will be great again. When there is power tussle, so many 




now, boko-haram, Niger Delta militants, the Avengers, Biafra and so on if it dies down today, 
another fraction will rise up. To tell you the truth, people are working against the peace of 
this country and it is not ordinary but the work of the devil. That is why I said this crisis we are 
facing will not come to an end of a sudden because there are individuals fuelling it. I don’t 
know what someone can achieve by putting the other to grieve. 
Interviewer- Thank you very much 
Interviewer- In comparison to other places, what do you think about the level of violence in 
Nigeria? 
..... I can still say in comparison to other country, we are still okay. Like if you go to other 
countries of the world like Iraq, you can sleep. Nigeria is still better than Iraq, Afghanistan and 
the likes. We know that we can still close our eyes in so part of the country and sleep 
notwithstanding, crisis is not good we need peace. We need absolute peace to make sure that 
at least foreigners can come into our country and improve our resources. We need peace. 
Nigeria is still okay compare to other countries of the world to be realistic, Nigeria is a good 
country. We live together as one no matter your skin colour and belief. 
Interviewer- Thank you so much sir. What is your assessment of Nigeria government and your 
opinion about them? 
..... Nigeria government! You know it is individual that make up government. They are trying 
to recover funds stolen by public servants and public office holder. I think that is a good job. 
Government is elected in by the masses and when this present government came in, they 
promised they are going to give jobs to those young people, the graduates and they have to 
keep up with their promise. The government is trying but what i ask people is what are you 
doing for the government? You are waiting for the government to pay you. We have come to 
that aspect of life. You don’t need to receive but you have to give out also. Most of our 
problems is let’s wait on government. Though the government is doing their best and we still 




the poor to garner more wealth and poor goes on getting poor. The government is doing its 
best. 
Interviewer- And the fight against Boko-haram? 
..... The fight against Boko-haram has reduced somehow, the government gave ultimatum 
that the fight should end in previous two month before now. But this is not achieved. However 
things are not as it used to be. At least people are now moving about their normal businesses.  
Those that left their villages are coming back to start life again. Then if you listen to radio 
service station’s news, you hear of bomb blast and number of casualty recorded but now this 
has reduced. So this is a plus to the president. 
Interviewer- What do you think should be the way forward for Nigeria? 
..... We should start thinking as Nigerians 
Interviewer- How do we do that? 
..... There are so many ways we can do these. By using the media to unite the nation 
Interviewer- Are you saying on the part of the government? 
..... It should be top down. It is the government that will initiate that and try to bring everyone 
under one umbrella. Do you know why? 
Interviewer- No 
..... An average American will fight for America, why because they know who they ar. See let 
me tell you this will shock you. America bans their flag in other country of the world 
Interviewer- Hmmm 
..... Yes, I cannot trample on America flag. An average American can never do that but Nigeria 
we are not patriotic enough as other countries like America. Maybe because we do not have 





..... As a citizen you pay less tax and if you don’t have, the government will give to you and 
make you comfortable. Unlike in Nigeria. I heard in the US, a man was trying to commit suicide 
by jumping down a storey building and was asked why he wanted to commit suicide, he said 
he needed $100,000 maybe to clear off a debt and the police in the country brought the 
money to him. In Nigeria we can do that. We need to give people their right and make them 
know their right and I hope you know the cause? Poverty. As a father of five children and I 
don't have money to train them, those children, might end up been a robbers and thief to 
survive and this is what is causing the crisis. So therefore , we have a lot of bad people in the 
society and people are using their money to employ these kids who cannot taken care of by 
their parents and the government is not coming in to savage the situation. There is need for 
everyone to put his or her effort, the government including to educate these young mind so 
as to get them off the streets and make society a better place. Government should also 
provide the basic amenities, people in the society will be reasonable and there won’t be 
violence anymore. We need to go back to the drawing board. 
Interviewer- you know issue of various ethnic group living together like the three major ethnic 
group in the country, the Igbos, Hausas and Yorubas. We can trace it back to the civil war. I 
do not know if you know anything about the civil war? 
........hmmmmm Ojukwu 
Interviewer- Yeah and some of the Northern Generals. Don’t you think it is grievances that is 
still the issue in Nigeria? 
...... It is power tussle. I told you earlier on any problem that is not solved even if it is half 
solve, it is not solved at all. Everyone have something in mind. Ojukwu was there as an Igbo 
man and people did not want him. It is just power tussle and everyone just want to be there 
for self-interest. It is just selfish ambition. We have to go back to the drawing board. I think it 




Interviewer- Thank you very much. I do appreciate your time. I think that will take us to the 
end of the interview. 
 
Interview 4 
Interviewer- Thank you so much sir for your time. Like I have explained earlier, my name is 
modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the university of Bristol and would like to know about 
your understanding on political violence in Nigeria, particularly Boko-haram movement and 
how it is been responded to in Nigeria. Can I know your background? 
..... Ok hmmmm. I am warrant officer xxxxx. A soldier of the Nigeria army, xxxxx years of age, 
xxxxx and in have a first degree in French and xxxxx. I have been in the Nigeria army for 32 
years. So the issues of political violence in Nigeria is a very complex one because Nigeria is a 
plural society. A society that is made up of 250 ethnic groups and then we have 36 states in 
the federation. Nigeria is a federation and then the issues of violence arises as a result of 
scarce resources. Each of these 250 ethnic groups tries to be in control and so any one that is 
in the centre will control these resources and try to allocate it to his clan from my personal 
experience. So this is one of the things that give birth to political violence. Basically the 
violence as we have known usually used to be from the Northern part of the country because, 
the Northern part of the country is predominantly Islam and then the south are 
predominantly Christians and we know from experience that Islam is usually associated with 
violence and I do not owe anyone apology for that. In addition, to that they also like to be in 
control and that is the cardinal principle of Islam. They just want to be the one leading and 
they don't like to be led by others. So what also give birth to political violence as at present in 
Nigeria is because we are going through turbulent times. The Boko-Haram movement initially 
was an Islamic movement. The man that brought the movement in Borno state Nigeria, 
though I can recall his names. He was an Islamic teacher and he brought this movement which 
was a bit different from existing Islamic teachings. It is a radical type of Islamic movement 
which is quite different from what the Nigerian Muslims are used to. So it is a kind of idea that 




Northern part of the country is backward educationally, if anyone comes up with the idea that 
western education is really against their religion, the youth in that part of the country will buy 
the idea. That is how Boko-Haram started. Initially the fight was between them and the police 
force but over time, the Boko-Haram movement has now transformed to something else. 
Today, it is no longer a religious movement because, their aim as we have seen in the Nigeria 
situation is not just to Islamitize the entire Northern part of the country but also take over 
control of the nation. They took over some local government in Borno state Nigeria and in 
those local government, they raised their flags which means it is not just a religious movement 
but political with a purpose to set up their own form of government which is against the laws 
of Nigeria. So that is the background of the Boko-Haram movement in Nigeria. 
Interviewer- In your opinion when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
..... Well I will not say it is quite a while but like I said before, this violence i.e. at the root of 
the violence is this desire to control the limited resources of the country. That is the bottom 
line of any political movement. This desire to control the resources of the country which is 
situated at southern part of the country. So but in the late 80’s, there was the movement of 
the Maitaisine which was also from the North as it is in the North that this type of movement 
comes from. The government of Nigeria which usually comprises of the Muslim north, as the 
movement usually start as a religious movement, they usually, that is the government 
overlook it till it goes out of hand. So that has been the trend but at the moment, in think 
Maitaisine It happened the same as it did today and after a long while, the military were able 
to nip it in the board. I cannot pinpoint the exact time but I think Maitaisine in the late 80’s 
was the first violence that the country actually encountered. In terms of religion and political 
violence. I will say the late 80’s with all modesty because as a country, we have not witness 
so much of this violence. Nigeria could be noted for other things but violence, is a recent 
development in our nationhood. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 
Interviewer- With regards to saying that violence is a recent thing, what about the issue of 




..... Okay, well the civil war hmmmm. Why I said violence is a recent development, the civil 
war like we in the military and the world all over know it to be. The war is, although certain 
incidence led to the war but the civil war was a combination of a political like I said at the 
centre of the crisis is the desire to control the resources and then what actually happened in 
the case of the civil war was the first military coup that Nigeria had which was carried out by 
late Maj. Kaduna Nzeogwu. The man at the centre of the coup in fairness to him was a patriot. 
That is my own personal opinion and I stand to be corrected. Because what motivated the 
coup was because of the level of corruption on the part of the post independent government 
and the military officer was a comrade. He saw the way the political leaders were living which 
was at variance with the living standards of the masses. So he saw the need to topple the 
government and introduce a workable system that will enable the masses to live at standard. 
A regime that will be people oriented in nature but unfortunately, the idea could not 
materialise because some of those who planned the coup together with him, betrayed him. 
The first coup resulted in the first prime minister of the nation late. Tafawa Balewa was killed 
and the sultan of Sokoto. The two key leader from the North. So this resulted in the civil war. 
The officers in the North saw it as a blow as the initial plan was they should execute all political 
leaders in all regions of the nation. Ojukwu was tasked for this assignment and fulfilled his 
own part but those in the east and west did not follow suit as planned. This is available in the 
public domain as several books have been written on the civil war. So the officers in the North 
felt betrayed that this was a calculated attempt to destroy their own political leaders while 
those of the east, west were not touched so, they had to come up with a counter coup. What 
happened then, the leader of the Nigeria army then Maj. Gen Aguyi Ironsi who took over the 
Nzeogwu coup led to disarray in the political arena. He late. Maj Gen Aguyi Ironsi took over 
government then but unfortunately, he could not manage the situation because he did not 
as a military tradition, try the coup plotters. So the officers did not get tried. So they the 
Northern officers saw it as an attempt by the Igbos because Ojukwu was from Igbo like Aguyi 
Ironsi, to seize power and destroy their political leaders. Therefore, the Northern officer’s 
stage a counter coup and Ironsi was disgracefully killed so, the civil war erupted but violence 
is not as it is now. In the military, we look at war as a full flesh war and not a violence that 




was Gen. Gowon who was the leader at that time. He gave no Victor nor vanquish verdict for 
the war. So Nigeria got back to normal life and since then, Nigeria has not had these issue of 
violence as it is today. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 
Interviewer- I can see you are trying to distinguish between the concept of war and violence 
..... Yeah violence 
Interviewer- That would have brought us to the next question. What does terrorism mean? 
In your own opinion 
..... Well terrorism in military concept, we see the act of terrorism as an attempt by a group 
of people imposes themselves on people in a community through intimidation and violence. 
Who forces people to accept their ideology, beliefs and concept? So that is terrorism and at 
the centre of it, is the use of intimidation and violence. Terrorism is what build-up to all full 
flesh war because, if it is not well managed, it can lead to a full flesh war. Terrorism basically 
involves a group having an idea and wanting to impose that idea. In An ideal situation, you 
are expected to sell the idea and allow people make a choice on what they want. But in the 
case of terrorism, they do not want people to make a choice but will want to force people to 
accept it through violence means. By using intimidation, like we see in our country, people 
killing people even those who are not involved normally. The masses are always at the 
receiving end. The political leaders are well secured and their places of abode is well guarded 
but it is the masses they target so as to give the impression that the government is in effective 
and the government is weak and so, that people are open to any kind of attack. So by doing 
that, they want the people to lose confidence in that government and forced to accept their 
ideology. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 





..... hmmmm, well as a soldier, the issue of Boko-haram in Nigeria, the Nigeria army have 
really bear much of the brunt because, so many of my colleagues who participated in the war 
at one time or the other and of course the thing is still on-going and nobody know when is 
turn will come next and unfortunately or fortunately I was out of the country from 2012 to 
2015. So, I was out of the country for three years probably that is why I am not drafted in 
earlier. I have heard from eye witness, from colleagues and those we live in the same block 
who went. In fact there was one of my colleagues, we did course together in the army that 
was drafted to the battlefield. While I was outside the country we use to chat through the net 
and suddenly, I didn't hear from him anymore. I try to call his number but it didn't go through. 
Only for me to see a post by his son on social media that he was killed by the Boko-Haram 
terrorist and I called my other colleagues to confirm this. Sadly I was told this is true. There 
are other cases too and other colleagues we were victims as well. So the Nigeria army has 
actually bear so much of the brunt because Nigeria army is at the centre of the fight against 
Boko-Haram. The other arms of the military service are just supporting, like the air force. The 
Nigeria army is on ground to fight. The air force come to give support service in air surveillance 
and bombings on the air but the Nigeria army are always on ground. This Boko-Haram 
terrorist uses unconventional method to fight like mines. The Geneva Convention forbids the 
use of mines in warfare. In warfare situation, the provision on the convention allows you to 
kill your enemies and not like say amputate your enemy and leave him half human. There is 
also an allowance to take your enemy alive if he surrenders. This is basically the method the 
Boko-Haram guys are using. The unconventional method. They make it in a way that it looks 
like a trap. The mines strategy has been their major style of operation and this has resulted 
in major casualty. 
Interviewer- If we can just build on that. As an officer, do you have an understanding of what 
this group are agitating for or fighting for?  Are they aggrieved over anything? 
Interviewee: ..... Unfortunately, the so called Boko-Haram have not come out even the 
government, the past and present tried to make some effort to negotiate to ask for their 
grievances like I said, the truth is that this terrorist aim is to take over government. They are 




say Boko-Haram, it means western education is a sin. That is their doctrine, that western 
education is a sin. Now, what we have expected them to do is to discourage people from 
accepting western education but of course, come to think of it, the idea of planting bombs, 
the idea of manufacturing bomb, the idea of planting mines are all traceable to western 
education because the Islamic education is not based on science. So when we come to look 
at it, it is all hypocrisy on their part. They are just trying to deceive some sections that western 
education is a sin and yet they pose messages on internet, if western education is a sin how 
come you have access to internet. Islamic education has never introduced something like that 
to the world. The scientific discovery and whatever components the world is enjoying today, 
is attributed to western education. They don't really have any grievance and there is none. 
They are just hiding under the canopy of religion and want to take over the government in 
Nigeria. That has been their aim. They have not come out publicly or privately to make known 
their grievances. But unlike the Niger Delta Avengers, their grievances is on the control of 
resources but everyone knows that the North is the Savannah area in country with no much 
resources. They don't have any grievance. They just want to take over the government of 
Nigeria and to be able to control the resource. That is the hidden motive. 
Interviewer- Thank you sir 
Interviewer what would you say that peace would mean to us 
..... Peace will mean a lot. Peace will mean that the average Nigeria will be able to move to 
other part of the region to do business without fear, hindrance and doing his normal business. 
That is what peace will really mean because the terrorist activity is a real threat to life in the 
country. At the beginning of their activity, they were sparing Muslims but today, they don't 
spare anyone, whether you are a Muslim or non-Muslim, everyone is a source of their target 
except if you are their member. The movement does not really have a friend except you are 
there’s. Probably their sponsors. Peace will bring a feeling of togetherness and been accepted. 
It is our hope that this will materialize and that God will intervene so that the average Nigerian 
go back to their normal life. 




Interviewer- Can you tell us of your thought on Nigeria as a country. You mentioned earlier 
on that Nigeria is a plural society and all of that. What do you think of Nigeria as a country? 
..... Well, Nigeria is a country, I will say first and foremost as a Christian, my thought for Nigeria 
is rooted directly on my Faith. I believe God has brought Nigeria together. Though it is often 
said that God did not create Nigeria but that Nigeria was created by a lord Luggard. Overtime, 
I think that Nigeria have come to accept that we have no other country than this. Nigerian 
and all over the world knows that Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world and 
when Nigeria squeezes, Africa catches a flu. Nigeria is a country that God has destined for 
greatness. Except for the act of terrorism we are witnessing. Even with the political turmoil. 
This are all stages countries go through. Nigeria that is my own opinion, I see that if this threat 
caused by the act of terrorism is not curtail, our unity as a nation is under threat. As so many 
other movement or groups are beginning to come up. Like the Biafra who are agitating for 
separation and also the south-south states that is those that have this crude oil are also 
agitating on their own for separation. My opinion, from the trend and the way things are 
going, I will say that if God does not help us and if our leaders do not manage the situation 
very well, Nigeria may break-up in the near future. The political leaders have to emphasize 
the need of togetherness and drop their ethnic alignment. That has been the position and the 
result of these agitation today. The south-south are agitating against the way the resources 
of the country is been shared and most of the present administration seats in government 
are people from the president’s region and religion. If this trend continue, there is a limit to 
human endurance. With the development, this country may likely break-up as we have seen 
in other countries. Because other countries never experienced what we are experiencing 
today and they broke up. I remember when we were in operation in former Yugoslavia that 
is peace keeping mission, those people were telling us that we came to keep peace in their 
country and that very soon they we come to keep peace in ours. I pray the situation we not 
degenerate to that level. 
Interviewer-- What do you think about the level of political violence in Nigeria in comparison 




..... Let me say that, what I know about other countries of the world basically is from the social 
and mass media but when we are talking about violence in Nigeria, I think I have a first-hand 
knowledge. So I cannot say much about what is happening in other countries. However, in 
the case of Nigeria, the situation is still manageable because ours have not degenerated to 
that level and the reason is simply, the average Nigerian does not like violence. The average 
Nigerian are interested in earning their living and be okay. The average Nigerian does not 
believe in violence because violence causes dislocation. Violence causes disorganization and 
as a result plans cannot be made and result in sudden death and all that. The average Nigerian 
want to live in peace and earn their living. These reasons is what makes the situation 
manageable unlike in other countries like Libya were the government was sort of a socialist 
regime were people get everything almost freely and government was taking care of them, 
which makes them to be easily bought over but the average Nigerian will have to fend for 
themselves. The government don’t really care because the government is for those in 
government. The average Nigerian feels very little impact of the government and prays the 
issue of crisis be brought under control as soon as possible and can go on with their daily 
living. 
Interviewer-- Thank you sir 
Interviewer-- You mentioned that the government of Nigeria is for those in government, and 
that will lead us to the next question. What is your thought about the Nigerian government? 
..... Well my thought is personal and I stand to be corrected. My thought concerning Nigeria 
government, not just Nigeria government only but the government in Africa is that they 
should change the trends, I attribute this to the British that handed over government in 
Nigeria because Nigeria got independence on a platter of gold. The British just left the scene 
and Nigeria set in though, during the colonial era, the British were the lord so the Nigeria 
political elites who stepped into their shoes, like I said the British were the lords and the 
average Nigerian were regarded as nobody even in the Nigeria army, during the colonial era, 
the British were the officers, then Nigerian were the other ranks. So, when the British step 
out because, Nigeria did not fight for independence, the political elite stepped in and they 




looked down on. That is why you see the violence and whatever movement. It is as a result 
of control of resources because, it is he who control resources that can dish out to anybody. 
The government in Nigeria is not a government that cares for the people. They pay lip service 
to democracy especially during political campaign. Even the present regime in Nigeria who 
promised change, they assume power and went back on their words. They are now turning 
back to say, they never promise somethings on their manifesto. The government in Nigeria is 
not really for the people but for those who are in government, that is why everyone want to 
be there because the resources is not only controlled for their clan but for their pocket as 
well. That why we are bearing a lot about corruption. Those past government, borrowed so 
much money and embezzle them. The government took $2million loan from the World Bank 
which they said was to prosecute the Boko-haram war. Unfortunately this money was shared 
as we know today by the political job here. The money was not use to procure weapons for 
the Boko-haram fight. So that is the Nigeria government. The Nigeria government is all about 
sharing. The political elite share the limited resources among themselves. The average Nigeria 
is left at the ebb of these leaders 
Interviewer-Thank you sir 
Interviewer-- hmmmm at the moment, the fight against Boko-haram is still on going, we can 
see some commitment from the present government as well. What do your assessment of 
the fight against Boko-haram? 
..... Well the fight is still on going, and the present government with all due respect have tried. 
Because for now most of the area, which the terrorist took over has been liberated and 
normal lives has been restored in quite a number of area but not in the entire North-east. 
Otherwise, the issue of the IDP will not be in existence. We still have IDP everywhere, even in 
Lagos you can see them 
Interviewer- What do you mean by IDP sir? 
.... It mean Internally Displaced People. Those people who are in the theatre of the war and 




has not been brought under total control but to a large extend, so many areas which were 
under the control of these terrorist have been liberated and, I hope with time, the threat will 
be completely eliminated. Nigeria will know peace again. 
Interviewer-- Thank you sir 
Interviewer-- What do you think is the way forward for Nigeria? We are aware that apart from 
Boko-haram, there are so many other movement and groups that is springing up as a pattern 
..... Like I have said before. The way forward is for the government of Nigeria to realise that 
whoever is in the government should realise that Nigeria belong to everyone and all part of 
the country. They should run an all-inclusive government the North, South, East and west are 
the component of Nigeria and so that, every part of the country must be active participant in 
government. In addition to that, the government must realise too that government exist for 
the welfare of the people. The government of Nigeria is detached from the people. I don't 
owe anyone apology on that that. The government of Nigeria is detached from the people. 
The government takes decision which are at variance from the people. You see a government 
making laws that are anti masses. For instance, a man retrenched from his job and try to find 
a source of income for himself and family, buys a motorcycle for transport business and 
government will wake up and banned motorcycle operation in his state. The government is 
supposed to understand the plight of the masses. So one who is just retrenched from work 
and find a source of livelihood and you ban the business he is doing, how he keeps body and 
soul together. So the government should realise that they exist to care for the welfare of the 
masses and not for those who are in government alone 
Interviewer-- Thank you sir 
Interviewer- Any last word you would want to say as a summary? 
..... I will like to say that Boko-haram in Nigeria is challenges because their method of 
operations is a novel one because in the past, we had such similar things and the government 
rose to the occasion were able to nip it in the board but for these movement of Boko-haram, 




east should support Nigeria as Boko-haram pledges allegiance to ISIS. Like they did in Iran 
where the whole world stood against such movement with sanctions. If we can fight against 
the external support I mean the world because it is this external support that is making them 
more difficult to deal with. Because of the support the world need to raise and come to 
Nigeria aid because, by and large, the truth must be told, if Nigeria as a country in Africa falls, 
Africa has fallen. If Nigeria falls, there is a problem. The whole world will feel it. Because 
Nigeria will move to everywhere. I think that is why the world need to come to our help. If 
not the Islamic radicals will take over the whole country. Of course the western country they 
are liberal people because if Nigeria falls, they will want to support Nigeria by taking people 
in and these people will become a threat latter to them. The world should deal with the source 
because Boko-haram pays allegiance to ISIS. ISIS gives support to Boko Haram like materials, 
weapons and so on. This is an area I think the world need to come to the aid of Nigeria. 
Especially the West. Because the long term effect of the disintegration of Nigeria will have an 
impact not just on African but on the world at large. 
Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir, so grateful for your time. That is the end of the interview 
Interview 5 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much sir for availing me the opportunity to have this interview 
with you. As I mentioned earlier, my name is modupe Akinleye a student of the University of 
Bristol and I am completing my PhD on political violence with emphasis on Boko-haram 
movement is been understood and responded to in Nigeria. Please sir, can we know your 
background? 
..... I am xxxx xxxxx, a military officer of the Nigeria army, precisely from the xxxxx 
Interviewer-- Your educational background? 
..... I am a HND holder 
Interviewer-- And your rank in the Nigeria army 




Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Have you had any experience with political violence in 
Nigeria? 
..... Of course, of recent over past few years there have been political violence around which 
mostly caused by terrorist. As a soldier, we are trying to see how we can ensure peace and 
try to ensure that the environment is safe to live 
Interviewer-- Thank you sir, any personal experience like the ones you experienced personally 
..... The one I experienced personally was the one that happened in Kaduna state Nigeria, 
close to the army barrack 
Interviewer- When was that? 
..... Last year, they almost entered the military barrack but we were able to push them out. 
Interviewer-- Which group was that? 
..... It was Boko-haram 
Interviewer-- The same Boko-haram? 
..... Yes 
Interviewer-- What do you think about the group itself? 
..... I think the group is politically motivated not only that they are motivated by some religious 
group. I mean not only political motivation given to them but religious motivation. They feel 
that power should be theirs and the whole country should come under one religion. I think 
that is their motivation. 
..... Why do you think this is motivated by religious group? 
Interviewer-- If you follow the events, the attack first started by attacking churches and 




Interviewer-- But we do know that, from unfolding events, they kill both Christians and 
Muslims. And there are official records that says that more Muslims are dying from the attack 
than Christians because from the region where they are attacking, there are more Muslims 
than Christians. 
..... If you say so, our perspective of saying that is more religious incline. For instance, if a 
Boko-haram kills a military personnel and runs into a group of Muslim sitting, instead of them 
identifying him, they will tell you nobody enter the house. So what do you think of that? 
Protecting their own. By my understanding of what is happening, it is political but there is a 
religious element in it. That is my take. 
Interviewer-- hmmmm. Thank you very much. In your opinion, when did you think terrorism 
began in Nigeria? 
..... I think terrorism is as old as Nigeria but it has become pronounced with our democratic 
settings. Probably because our democratic leaders do not have the power to fight it. 
Interviewer-- You said it is as old as Nigeria, what do you mean by that? 
..... Yeah, it is as old as Nigeria. There was a time of the Maitaisine group. The group was 
clamped down but they evolve over the years and what we are having today is what is called 
Boko-haram. The same group. So it is as old as Nigeria. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you give us your opinion on terrorism, what it means 
to you? 
..... To me terrorism is an act of destroying or planning attack on a group of people who have 
actually done nothing so as to achieve a particular goal. It is not like a war settings, they just 
come together to plan attack. This day we see them tie bomb to themselves and they just 
explode anytime and any day. They do that in public places. 
Interviewer--Thank you very much. Just to press on that a bit. You think terrorism is all about 
planning attack on a group in order to achieve certain goals. Other political violence we have 




..... That's true. Political violence in Nigeria has not been as destructive as what we have now. 
Though we have been having political issue and I think the most challenging is this issue of 
Boko-haram that has really claim a lot of lives. I tell you every day, recently in Abuja, we heard 
of a Christian who was murdered while she was preaching the gospel. All of these have 
become pronounce within this political era. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Do you by any mean have experience with the Boko-
haram group? Probably on duty or any peace keeping mission? 
..... I have not had direct contact with them. However in term of providing security. Maybe 
when there is a security alert that there is an attack going on, we are deployed to make sure 
it does not spread to other places. 
Interviewer-- You went to the North to do that? 
.... I think I mentioned Kaduna earlier on 
Interviewer-- Okay you were on duty there? 
..... Yeah 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you just tell us what peace means to us? 
..... For me, peace is actually a state where the society is working as it is supposed to be. It is 
absent of terrorism. Where people can go about their normal day to day business. Daily 
activities without disturbance, without fears, and threat to their lives and properties. 
Interviewer-- Do you think they can be a society that is absent of violence? 
..... Honestly, there is no society that is absent of violence. There will always be one or two 
issues. The government can be focus with their will power to ensure an average peace. So 
people can do business and go on with their daily lives. 
Interviewer-- Thank you. We are talking about political violence and Boko-haram in the first 




some factions are already agitating that they want to secede and all of that. With what we 
got on ground, what do you think about Nigeria as a country? 
..... I think Nigeria would have been a better place. If the nation is devoid of ethnicity, religion. 
They will see themselves as one. Like you said, the region are trying to go away and be on 
their own. Simply because, they do not have a sense of belonging to the country and so for 
them been on their own is a dream and they are walking towards that to see that the dream 
is actualized. 
Interviewer-- What you are trying to say is that we are better off together 
..... Can I say we are better off together. When issues like our strength is in our diversity. Is 
that true? Are we really making the necessary progress? How do the average Nigeria feel if 
he is not from the North east? How is he treated? Do we really see ourselves as one? These 
are questions I must ask 
Interviewer-- Do we see ourselves as one? 
..... I don't think we do. To be honest i do not think we do 
Interviewer-- Why do you think so? 
..... Maybe the problem was from inception 
Interviewer-- What do you mean by inception 
..... I mean inception. When the amalgamation the thing came about. I think it was not 
properly done in the sense that, they did not consider a lot of factors. This idea was not put 
in place as it should have been. Maybe our colonel masters felt this will be to their advantage. 
If the right indexes was put in place maybe we should have been better off apart. 
Interviewer-- Would you support secession? 
.....  I support it for now? 




..... Wouldn’t want to say yes or no but I would want to see a country where everybody is 
seen as one. I had a bad experience when I joined the army. We were on a particular 
assignment and it was going to bring some financial reward. I heard someone saying the 
person responsible for giving this financial rewards after the assignment, discriminating us in 
the line of regional affinity and religion. I wouldn't want to use the actual language the person 
used. This are the issues we face daily. 
Interviewer-- When was that? 
..... As early as 2001 
Interviewer-- Okay 
..... I just came into the system. You can only imagine how I would feel then. If we can see 
ourselves as one, if you are a Nigerian, you should not be discriminated against in the country 
no matter your beliefs and regional affinity. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. What do you think about the level of political violence in 
Nigeria in comparison to other countries of the world? 
..... I think we are better off compare to other part of the world. I think we are better. The 
violence in Nigeria is synonymous with some part of Nigeria and not the whole country. So 
we are still better off. 
Interviewer-- Like which country in comparison. 
..... You said other part of the world and I am looking at it holistically 
Interviewer-- Yeah, just like highlight some countries 
..... Ok. Let me look at it with countries like Iran, Afghanistan. If you compare our system to 
that, I think we are better. 




..... America is seen as the world power. This mean they have a lot of responsible off their 
shoulders and it also mean that a lot of people has a lot of expectation from them. I am sure 
that, relatively they are better off than us because of technology. 
Interviewer-- There are so many variables 
..... Of course they are so many variables. If you look at the trend of violence there, they 
always come up with those who are the culprits in time because of technology. If we can 
increase our technological arsenals in term of security, maybe in the nearest future, we could 
start to compete with them. 
Interviewer-- Thank you. You’re thought about the Nigeria government? 
..... For me, I think we are headway. Before now we were ruled by military but now 
democracy. And it is getting better in the sense that, we now have people who could criticize 
the government constructively and put them under pressure to perform. There is freedom of 
speech with democracy. Though we have some setback but in the nearest future, I think we 
will have a good system in place 
Interviewer-- So, you think that Nigeria is doing fairly well? 
..... Yes they are doing fairly well. 
Interviewer-- Not just the present government? 
..... Yes they are doing fairly well 
Interviewer-- Thank you. What is your assessment of the fight against Boko-haram? 
..... Like I said initially, the fight against Boko-haram is both political and religious.  And in such 
situation, it will only take a government with a strong will power irrespective of your religious 
inclinations to calm the situation. Presently I can assure you the Nigeria government is on top 
of the situation. 




...., yeah, the fight have been progressive and the result is getting obvious and we hope in the 
near future, it will be a thing of the past. 
Interviewer-- And, don’t you think it will be a thing like the Maitaisine’s. Like they seem to 
have been wiped out but they never really go? 
..... That is where religious issues come in. The Maitaisine was a religious ideology and even 
the one that is currently going on. It is my personal opinion. The government is going to do 
well to make sure this people are wiped out I think for now. From revelation, we think there 
is a collaboration between this group and foreign groups and if the government can put the 
necessary machinery in place, we can defeat this group I.e. Boko-haram for now but then, 
there must be a lasting solution. We must go back to the drawing board. Taught religious 
leaders. They need to be licensed properly. Nobody should just pick up the bible or the Koran 
as preachers. They must be made to go through the necessary accreditations, so that people 
that should speak, should be those who are well trained. Not those who we just take their 
time to read the bible or Koran and psyche the people base on their personal interest or 
ideology. 
Interviewer-- Yeah, before we go to the final question, just curious about why you think the 
army wiping them out will help because what does it mean for a country to be going to war 
against her citizens? 
..... The purpose of governance is to create an enabling environment for her people to do 
business and exist. Whatever is necessary to bring about that, I think it is worth it and it is the 
responsibility of government to do so. The government cannot because of a group has 
religious bigotry against others and allow them to continue to destroy others in the society. 
Any responsible government we have to seek for the higher goal. The higher goal is to the 
good of the larger populace. I think that is it. If the government has to do away with some 
people in order to achieve the higher goal, I think it is worth it. 
Interviewer-- Do you think this will not lead to growth of more splinter groups? Like what we 




activities of the militant but they seem to be multiplying. Don’t you think that is what we will 
continue to experience? 
..... The simple reason is that, the basics are not been handled 
Interviewer-- What are the basics? 
.....The basics for instance, we have a situation were the past government came up with the 
amnesty program for those who choose to lay down their arms, I mean the militant group. 
You will agree with me that it became political because the whole group was not captured. 
The government should make sure there is an orientation. What I meant by orientation, if you 
been to that part of the country before, you discover that they are been neglected. The 
government should allocate resources towards that end to give more support. They must 
empower them in terms of skill acquisition and help them start-up businesses of their own. 
The last time I went there, it was not a good experience. The education system over there is 
poor. I think there is a lot of things the government can do to ensure that those who accept 
the amnesty offer are properly integrated back into the society by providing skilled jobs and 
empower them. 
Interviewer-- What do you see as the way forward for a Nigeria? 
..... As regard to? 
Interviewer-- As regards to political issues, religious issues and all of that 
..... Whatever I say is my personal opinion. I think the government should allow every zone to 
manage her natural resources and give some percentages to the centre. I think it will help to 
reduce this violence. 
Interviewer-- More like confederacy, is that what you mean? 
..... Yeah, so that the centre will not be too powerful. They should do it in a way state should 
be allowed to manage its resources. Then federal government will not have the whole power 




..... Thank you. So you think the whole issue that is spreading religious violence, is not all about 
religion but also resource control? 
..... Yeah. Looking at the issue of the south of Nigeria, you see agitation there is all about the 
way the government have used their resources to develop other part of the region why they 
are suffering. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Mr. Festus 
...... You are welcome. 
Interview 6 
Interviewer-Thank you so much sir for availing me the opportunity to interview you. My 
names are Modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the University of Bristol and I am carrying 
out a research on political violence especially the boko-haram movement and how it is been 
responded to so far. Can we meet you by giving us your names, education qualification, 
occupation religion stand and so on? 
…. I am xxxxx a staff of the Nigeria Army. We have been hearing of the Boko haram, the battle 
with them has been on and it is only God that has given us power to overcome them thus far 
because it has not been as it used to. Peradventure you still hear they bomb so places, I will 
like to make you understand that an enemy cannot just be able to have power in a country 
without an intruder. I don’t know whether you understand. Hmmm so times, the war itself 
looks like a propaganda. How this group stated. Boko haram has been on for a long time for 
instance, what is the meaning of boko haram. It say book is a sin that is book has become a 
taboo. If you look at it that way, it is not the Islamic way as the Muslims will tell that, if you 
write Arabic way, it is book also likewise Christians therefore they 
Of Boko Haram…no one can say education is a sin... we are trying to condemn them but we 
find it difficult…… the former NSA to Jonathan he made a comment that majority of them are 
found in the PDP…automatically the government remove him from the post….and he later 




Boko Haram are holding a brandy when the new president came, he furnish the Army with 
sophisticated weapons….. 
……. this problem of Boko Haram has been long, before 2012 but it has not been like that…, if 
you want me to tell you more. Before this Boko Haram of a thing in the time of Babangida 
they wanted to form a national guide. These northerners you see they know what they are 
doing, they wanted to form a national guide and they build some place which were not 
completed, just like, you know say when we are talking of the Sambisa you know like 
underground when the Boko Haram are was not meant for them before Babangida wanted 
to make that place a national guide 
What does a national guide mean? 
Babangida wanted to make that place to supersede military, army. 
Most of the areas designed for the national guide are left vacant so the Boko Haram are 
underground in the Sambisa forest...until we have to use extra mine destruction you know 
there are bombs that you are able to destroy the ground 
The Boko Haram themselves are they Nigerians? in part they are Nigerians in part they are 
not Nigerians the Boko haram themselves are very smelly, if you see them now immediately 
you see them now they are very easy to identify, they have a very big odour they don’t bath 
they have long finger nails they don’t eat much, you understand me and if you kill them now 
they have little blood. Their blood is not much. I think you understand what I mean now. So 
if boko haram is within us here now we will know him, we know them. If you have any other 
thing you can ask me 
Interviewer-When do you think terrorism started in Nigeria 
…I will first of all tell you that like the Boko Haram of a thing is a sabotage because if I mean 
ask of the Boko Haram of a thing that what are they demanding for? For me and you to 




ungodly, they are antichrist, they are the people that the bible have already prophecy against 
that nation will rise against nations 
When I was in Sudan 2009 it started but was contained….. 
The government also will carry money and give to the communities in the Nigeria Delta na 
done man will eat it……there’s problem within ourselves when a child is hungry is hungry what 
do you think he will do….take for instance this country Libya, you see Libya was doing well by 
their Muammar Gaddafi because he ruled for 42 years I’m giving you instances now for how 
many years that Gaddafi ruled, all these things, the peace.. this American of a thing, you know 
there are some countries now that doesn’t have oil at all they have their own power in 
weapon and I’m selling oil I will like you to come and make trouble so that I will sell my arms 
its very common in the world. Another point I have to let you know you see USSR their power 
see this country see... America…USSR... that on they are very good in manufacturing strong 
weapons and they don’t have oil...where do you think they will make up for their economy if 
they did not make crash landed other countries to fight with one another so that they will be 
able to say okay you take this gun and give me your oil 
Interviewer-So there seems to be some external... 
Yes 
Take for instance Libya was doing well …until other countries came and set up a rebel, only 
God knew how they set up a rebel in that country… even here in Nigeria... it is a 
propaganda...until today Libya is not having peace 
Interviewer don’t you think boko haram might have some grievances 
Interview 7 
Interviewer- Thank you for availing me the opportunity to conduct this interview.  I am 
Modupe Akinleye I am completing my PhD studies on political violence and how it is being 




……. I am corporal xxxxx. I am from xxxxx State Nigeria, I am xxxx years old of age xxxxx. That 
is all for now 
Interviewer-- Your educational background? 
….. My Educational background, I am an HND holder. That is all for now 
Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir. Do you have any experience with political violence 
before now? 
….. First and foremost my encounter is that of the militant in Warri that is in 2003 then I later 
join the army and posted down to that place where we encountered the militant and the issue 
was resolved in 2009. Before the Boko-haram came up. The Boko Haram group stated earlier 
in 2003 and the whole thing was in a cool way later on in 2009, religious fight came up 
between the Christian and Muslim then after the fight in 2009, in that same year in December, 
the Muslim group now came up with the issue of Boko Haram. In 2011 the crisis subsided in 
Jos and  to my understanding, I believe is the same group that was fighting in Jos that moved 
down to Maiduguri to  now form a kind of base in Maiduguri. This has really took lives of 
Nigerian in their base in Maiduguri. 
Interviewer-_ Thank you sir Hmmmmm when we talking about Jos, where you there in Jos or 
do you have anybody there as a civilian or a military person? 
….. Ok I was there in Jos as a military person 
Interviewer-- Ok what were you doing there? 
….. I was posted there that same 2009 on the 5th of January that very day I was posted to Jos, 
the crisis stated from church as the Muslim stated blocking Christian that were going to 
church then the Christian were fighting back. I think that is how the thing stated there. They 
state chasing me as a soldier because I was driving on my vehicle on my military uniform 
Interviewer-- Who were chasing you? 




Interviewer-- Do you know the particular group? 
….. I don’t know the particular group. I just saw people chasing me so that I will not get 
through any access road. I was able to run away from them before I encounter soldiers on the 
way. They protected me and led me to the barracks. 
Interviewer- ok 
….. I never knew Jos before, that was the first day I entered Jos. 
Interviewer- You got into the middle of the crisis 
….. Yeah. I was asked to sign in and secure the barracks 
Interviewer-- thank you sir. From your experience and as a military officer what do you think 
of the Boko-haram movement or group, what do you think they are fighting for? 
…… my experience from this Boko Haram group is that it stated with religious fight which 
gravitated to what it is today. They are not body of individuals who are touts I think they are 
supported by prominent Nigerians because first, we caught some of them with sophisticated 
weapons which we cannot find in Nigeria but we see them handling this weapons. How did 
this weapons get into Nigeria? I believe Nigeria is a secured country but most of our military 
men out there are been intimidated by the so called rich men and high personality in Nigeria. 
So if you are in a check point, you are asked not to check a particular vehicle and if you check 
it, your commanding officer may lock you up or mess you up or jailed or they dismiss you from 
the job. We in the Military are trained to obey every order whether good or bad as the 
subordinate, you are trained to obey your superior. If you’re superior ask you to allow the 
vehicle to move, you cannot disobey that order. So that is how these weapons come into 
Nigeria. With what it is now, I believe Boko Haram is supported by senior personality in the 
country. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much for that incite and to you understanding why do you think 




……. I think maybe they are fighting for political positions like what is going on in the cabinet, 
the labour congress, different party fighting the other, I think that because they want to 
jeopardise their opponent government. Such things can cause the other party to be against 
the other one. What I am seeing in Nigeria is a fight between two individual that the common 
man cannot go in between them 
Interviewer-- thank you very much, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
….. When terrorism began in Nigeria... hmmm, not in 2000. The only one I really experienced 
is in 2003 
Interviewer-- When it began? 
….. I have not really gone into history to know when terrorism began in Nigeria the only 
knowledge I have is the experience of 2003 
Interviewer- Do you think it might have begun before then? 
….. Yes I believe it might have begun before then. I think Nigeria has been a tough country in 
terms of power tussle. When this issue of power comes in, the opponent will be planning 
strategy on how to bring down your own power and I think that may lead to terrorism 
Interviewer-What do you think terrorism mean? 
….. Terrorism is an abnormal act why I say it tis abnormal is that, it doesn’t maintain 
orderliness but breed destruction and disorganises people and takes life and at the end 
nothing is achieved. 
Interviewer-- So it mean mass destruction, is that what you are saying? 
….. Terrorism can lead to mass destruction 
Interviewer-- it can lead to it but how do we identify a terror act or say this is terrorism? 
….. Terrorism does not want to see anything good because when you are into terrorism, you 




has not gotten what he or she want he becomes selfish. Terrorism is selfishness. That is how 
me I look at terrorism. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. You have given us your experience with boko-haram and 
others. What do you think peace will mean in Nigeria? 
…… One thing about Nigeria is, if we want to bring peace in Nigeria, it has to start from various 
religious head. They have to dish out the truth and let the people know the truth from the 
scripture because the scripture is supposed to be God’s business but now it is becoming an 
individual business. Somebody will just come and start turning the scripture upside down. 
Like this issue of Boko-haram, I think the meaning of that word Boko-haram if translated to 
English means western education is prohibited then if you prohibit western education and a 
preacher tells is followers that western education is prohibited and kill everyone with western 
ideology, what do you expect and the followers believe in their head and whatsoever he tells 
them is what they will obey. Just like in the military, when your superior gives you order, you 
follow. If I will advise, I will advise the government to focus on every leader in every religious 
organisation 
Interviewer-- In Nigeria 
….. In Nigeria. Then, the village heads should be told to caution their people. On the part of 
the government, the various parties should support each other’s in governance and let their 
followers know they are not fighting and wrestling power with each other in a violent way. 
They should contest for positions in a peaceful way. That will make Nigeria a peaceful place. 
Interviewer-- Thank you so much on your thought on that. And what will you say about 
Nigeria as a country seeing we have different regions and ethnicity? 
….. Nigeria is a great country and would have been a very peaceful country if there was no 
terror acts. Nigeria are friendly and we are very hospitable people no matter where you are 




Interviewer-_ Thank you. Some people have been calling for national conference and some 
people have been agitating for division like the Biafra. They started agitating, they want to 
secede from Nigeria as early as 1960 shortly after Nigeria independence and up till now they 
are still fighting for it and some other sections are beginning to ask for that and some are 
saying Nigeria should divide while others are saying in the near future that will happen. What 
do you think about that? 
….. You know Nigeria is a big country, the issue of dividing Nigeria is political. It is a political 
issue. It has nothing to do with the common Nigeria. It is those politicians are the one 
empowering the common Nigerian to go into this issues of dividing Nigeria. They have their 
own aim of why they want to divide Nigeria but Nigerian do not want to be divided. 
Interviewer-- Nigerians 
….. Nigerians 
Interviewer-- If I may ask, How you will identify yourself, is it as a common Nigeria or…. 
……. Yeah, I am a common Nigeria. The reason why I say I am a common Nigeria is that I am 
not in the political field and I hold no position that is highly recognise and I don’t have anyone 
I am contending with because if you have someone you are contending with, it means you 
will be in position probably aiming a higher position and you don’t want others to get to that 
position hence you start contention. I am not of that stuff. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much. In comparison with other countries of the world, what 
we you say about the level of violence in Nigeria when you compare it? 
….. For real I will say many other countries are worse than Nigeria in the issue of terrorism. 
Nigeria terrorism lately and they are still behind us. 
Interviewer-- Like which country are you looking at? 
…… Like countries like Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan and many others 




…… Yeah it is still minimal 
Interviewer-- compare to other places and you’re thought on the Nigeria government? 
….. I think I have spoken a bit about the Nigeria government. What I see about the Nigeria 
government is that will need to reshape our government especially our top leaders. We still 
need to reshape that aspect because it was from them that eminent from. There is this saying, 
if the head is corrupt, all the whole body will be corrupt. If our leaders play a good role on 
that seat, we the followers will concur to that standard. Our leaders really need to change 
their lifestyle and look into their attitude. 
Interviewer-- Do you think the Nigeria government is doing well with the fight against Boko-
haram? 
….. They are trying, the present government I think they are trying. That of president Buhari I 
think they are trying 
Interviewer-- Why do you think they are trying? 
….. Why I think so is that a year plus that he has been on sit, the issue of bombing and killing 
in Maiduguri has really subsided. I believe he is trying 
Interviewer-- Through the help of the military is it? 
….. Yeah Through the help of the military 
Interviewer-- What do you see as the lasting solution for Nigeria. What do you see as the 
solution for Nigeria in this crisis situation? I mean the way forward. 
….. By the grace of God, Nigeria, we are aiming there. The present president is putting on 
effort to fight against corruption and I believe if corruption is taken away, then terrorism will 
die. We will be able to handle terrorism and crush it in Nigeria. That’s my take. 
Interviewer-- So corruption is the direct cause of terrorism in Nigeria? 




Interviewer-- is there any final word or thought? 
….. I will suggest the main parties that is political parties should resolve their differences and 
run their political parties in a peaceful way and Nigeria will be a better place for everybody if 
they don’t, the issue of terrorism, we may find it very tough because if their no agreement 
between the main two political parties, there is tendency that the opposition party will 
encourage terrorism to destroy the party in power. It is always good to be in peace to achieve 
our goal. 
Interviewer-- Thank you so very much for taking your time 




Interviewer-- I am Modupe Akinleye from the University of Bristol and I am doing research 
on political violence and Boko Haram movement and how it is being responded to. Can we 
get some background information about you like your name, education background, religion, 
occupation and things like that? 
….. I am xxxx an ex-military officer from the Nigeria navy. I served the navy and left the navy 
as a DVC 
Interviewer-- When was that? 
…..xxxxx this is almost 22 years. And I have been residing in Lagos. Lagos is like our mother 
station, because every vessel come through Lagos. Since then I have been in Lagos and I know 
Lagos very well 
Interviewer--You are from what part of the country? 




Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you talk about your educational background? 
….. I finished my secondary school in xxxx state and that was when I joined the navy. When I 
joined the navy, I did my basic navy training and after the training I graduated and served the 
navy for 14 years and went for other training like underground weaponry training and at the 
moment I am doing have a training certificate on security and I am working as a security 
officer. The certificate on security is undertaken by those who are about the leave the arm 
forces though not compulsory. The training was done in NAFRC 
Interviewer-- What is the full meaning of NAFRC sir? 
….. Nigeria Arm forces Resettlement Centre that is NAFRC. You are free to read any course 
there as there are Engineering courses, Mechanical Courses and so on. I studied security 
management and got employed by continental shipyard. I worked there for 8years and 5 
months. I was a security officer and trained security personnel there on security and 
criminology and after some time during the Obasanjo regime, a policy was enacted that ex-
military men should no longer work because they are earning pension from the state. I 
voluntary resigned from that place and since then, I have not be fully engaged in employment 
but I only work part time. 
Interviewer-- As a consultant? 
….. No, not as a consultant. At times, when NPA (Nigeria Port Authority) buys some boat, from 
Holland and brings it to the yard, they engage my service to be in charge of the boat and take 
care of it. Like the other year 2013, for three or four month and last year from February 2nd 
to August 7th I took care of their boat. But since then I have not have such engagement by 
them. 
Interviewer-- Thank you sir. What do you know about the boko-haram movement or think 
about them? 





……. I are born and brought up from the north. When you say Boko in Hausa language, mean 
western civilization and haram mean forbidden in the Arabic language. 
Interviewer- The meaning of the name but what do you think about the group, their 
grievances or what they wanted? 
…..  When they started initially, some of them believed it is written in the Quran that anyone 
who did not practice the Islamic faith can be killed under violence and nothing is wrong and 
nothing should be done to prosecute the murderer and in their kingdom whether that of 
Mohammed, the person will go to paradise and there will be a reward for the victim of the 
Jihad war that fought for the course of their religion. This I believe is as a result of illiteracy 
especially in the northern part of Nigeria. But in the south, it is not so among the Muslim. 
They are more literate and believe they shouldn’t make their religion a problem to others. 
The Boko haram movement like I said earlier on, they are against western education and 
believe everyone should study Arabic language and that is the only acceptable language and 
form of study in Nigeria. 
Interviewer-- Sir why do you think that they want everyone to shun western civilization 
considering that even they using western technology to fight. Why do they want that? 
….. During colonization of Nigeria by the western nation, they gave Nigeria western education 
but when the jihadist of Usman Dan Fodio came into Nigeria they force the people to deny 
their faith as Islam came with force and Christianity was their choice. The Boko haram when 
they came up, came with that ideology because I was born in North and stay awhile in Katsina 
where president Buhari came from. They claim that everyone in the country is supposed to 
be a Muslim and our people who were Christian already were assumed to be kafari 
Interviewer-- What is the meaning of Kafari? 
….. Kafari is seen as an unbeliever. My father was a teacher. He said when they started that 
was the Jihadist before boko haram, they were fighting against the Christians. They burnt 
many of our churches because I use to listen to the news media daily and kill a lot of people. 




Quran and said if a Muslim kills a Christian is like a person killed a hen before their Allah and 
that there is no sin there. After sometime the boko-haram group came up and started with 
Christian in 2011. It became a war between boko haram and Christians. They burnt churches 
300 to 400 churches in Borno state, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Damaturu and Adamawa. When 
the Boko haram group escalated further, they said their fellow Muslim are not supporting 
them but supporting the government of Nigeria. Then it became a fight after the Nigeria 
nation and no longer religious. An eyewitness account from the troop that went to restore 
order in that region said when they capture anyone, they ask whether they are Muslim or not, 
I am speaking as a military officer that is if the Boko haram capture you, they ask if you are 
Muslim or a Christian and if you say you are a Muslim, they will ask why did you join the 
military to fight against them and not join them in the course. They say they are fighting for 
Allah and that they are a mission. And as we are been taught in the bible, nobody can fight 
for God and that God is the creator of all things. But hey once they capture any Christian or 
Muslim in the Army fighting for the state, they will tie their hands backward and their feet 
and ask them to kneel and they begin to shout Allah Bakkar. And cut off his or her head. They 
say this ones are kafari. There was a friend of ours who had a friend in Damaturu, who is a 
Muslim said their citation of Allah Bakkar is taken from the Quran and is as if a hen is killed 
according to their Quran. We spoke with that Muslim friend and ask you that is been lenient 
because he went to the university but didn’t graduate. That why will you talk that way with 
your educational exposure. He said it is written in the Quran. You know the Quran is a book 
is written in Arab language and they never make it into other translation unlike the bible. They 
the Muslim only listen to the interpretation of the Quran by their Imam who is their spiritual 
leader and due to their level of illiteracy, they what he says without raising question. 
Interviewer-- When do you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
….. It began in Nigeria long time ago. We have the Niger Delta Militant and it was during the 
time of Obasanjo. They were agitating that they were draining their crude oil which made 
their land non -productive and then they form the militant group sponsored by some rich 
Nigerians from that place who bought weapon for them. Their strategy was that they hide in 




tanker and sell them to ships who sell this oil abroad. No one could stand them hence today 
in the oil creek, today you will see arm forces units their fully arm. The creek is just like a 
house inside the sea. It is like an up stair. They drain this oil from pipeline or other sources I 
don’t know and put them into the ship. That is where they sell to foreign buyer. After the 
militant come the NASO. It is the Igbo people they want to secede from Nigeria and declare 
themselves a Biafra Republic. Even on the 29th this year, they blocked Asaba Bridge to Onitsha 
and said that is where Biafra Stated from 
Interviewer-- I think you are talking about the civil war? 
….. The civil war was an argument between the East and the North and that was not a 
terrorism stuff like that 
Interviewer-- So when Major Ojukwu wanted Biafra, he wanted secession because of control 
….. Ojukwu said he was the most educated military officer at that time and why should Gen. 
Gowon be the head of state and that he went to university while Gen. Gowon went to military 
academy like NDA (Nigeria Defence Academy) When Britain was leaving Nigeria they handed 
over a lot of things to the Northern and that time I was a very small boy that was around 1966 
when we were talking of Arava. The Nigeria military agreed to kill all the top politicians for 
the four region at that time. According to the arrangement, they killed the top politicians from 
the North and the southern military officer did not kill top politician from the south like 
Awolowo, Azikwe but the Northern officer I think killed their top politician like the sultan of 
Sokoto was killed on a Friday as they don’t carry charm on a Friday and other important 
politician like Tafawa Balewa and in 1967 the Northern Military officer saw that they were 
tricked to killing their people and they stated killing the Igbo from the North. 
Interviewer-- So sir. Why do you think terrorism really began during Obasanjo regime and not 
before then? 




Interviewer-- Sir. I just need a bit of clarity, is that Obasanjo regime as a military man or as a 
civilian president? 
….. Yeah as a democratic person 
Interviewer-- In 1999? 
….. Yeah in 1999. During that time, the militant from the Niger Delta said they have not being 
taking care of them and their land is not productive and as they dredge crude oil their land 
can no longer yield agricultural produce. Though government have been giving their leaders 
money but this money ends up in their pocket and not been use for the community hence the 
youth started agitating and resolved to fight the government to my understanding 
Interviewer-- Why, do you think the political violence happening that time is not terrorism 
until the democratic regime with president Obasanjo. What is the Difference? 
….. During the military era 
Interviewer-- yes sir the military and the civilian government 
……. During the military, things were done in a normal way and you don’t go out to agitate 
anyhow even during Obasanjo democratic regime, it started small and wasn’t the way it is 
now. There was a fight in Benue state where the Tiv people had problem with Jukon people 
in Taraba State, and it was found out that the ex-service chief during Obasanjo rein as military 
head of state gave them i.e. people of his tribe weapon to fight the Tiv people. Most of the 
crisis today, are been supported by serving and ex- military personnel. 
Interviewer- Why are they supporting or sponsoring the violence? 
….. They are supporting it because they like to cause problem. They say if two elephant fight, 
it is the grass that will suffer. 




…… they want Nigeria to split into the various region. They do not believe in the Nigeria 
project. 
Interviewer-- So they want Nigeria to go back to what it was before the amalgamation? 
….. 1914 was the amalgamation period 
Interviewer- yeah 
…… I read history in school. They want Nigeria to separate. They say there was written 
agreement that when Nigeria is not happy together after a determined period of time, they 
should all go their separate ways or we should go back to the regional government as it was 
those days that is into four region and during the civil war, the Igbo and the Yoruba said the 
North were dominating them and they want to separate from the North but when the Igbo 
now started to process of the separation, the Yoruba did not support them again and they 
withdrew from them though there was a sabotage by one Adekunle in the Nigeria military 
during the civil war. He goes to get the Nigeria troop into the hands of the fighting Biafra we 
then in return gave him monetary reward 
Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir.  You mentioned you studied security management 
earlier on. Do you think there a particular definition you will want to adopt about terrorism 
or what does terrorism mean to you? 
….. Terrorism is an act where people terrorise innocent people and kill them for no reason. It 
started from the Arab nations and so say they are the sponsors of this terror act in the whole 
world because all those that have been caught in the terror act are always identified as Islamic 
militant. It started right from the bible. 
Interviewer-- How do you mean? 
….. The root of this religious started when Abraham in the bible could not bear a son with his 
wife and took to himself Hagar his wife maiden and raised a son through her. That is when it 
started. Isaac and Ishmael. The separating of Ismael and Isaac was with a fight between both 




Arabs. Isaac is the father of the Israelite and the fight is still ongoing till today and it will be till 
the end of the world. 
Interviewer-- Is it why they distinguish between militant and Islamic militant in Nigeria? 
….. The militant says their land has been wasted as they have been dredging crude oil in their 
land which make it difficult for them to use their land and that is why they are fighting for 
their right, saying their leader gets money from the government and they embezzle it without 
it getting to the masses. There militancy started among them but in the area religion, we have 
not heard of Christian militant only Islamic militancy and the boko-haram is the worse militant 
in the whole world because they killed 1.6 million people that is the one they counted even 
the one of Iraq did not kill people like that of the Nigeria Boko-haram. Why we are blaming 
our Nigeria government is that they have never pinpoint those sponsoring them. Because 
they are been sponsored by rich people. You will hear that have war tank. You wonder we 
gave them and where did they get it from. How did they get their weapon? They got machine 
guns when the Nigeria military are using AK47 and with that sophisticated weapon, it is 
difficult to combat them. Also President Jonathan was very slack. He gave money to the 
military to get weapons to combat this insurgency but he didn’t supervise the use of the 
money. And the money was embezzled and use for other purpose. There was no check and 
balance in his govt. However the government have not come up to tell us who is sponsoring 
them. Some rumoured it was the former governor of Borno state but he wasn’t tried nor 
convicted nor tried. He was even made the chairman of the opposition party at some point. 
Interviewer- Have you by any means have any experience with political violence and boko 
haram as a group? 
…… I use to listen to news daily but I left the military 24 years now but while I was in the 
military the issue at that time was this Bakassi people which is in Cameroun. It was about land 
dispute because there was an oil creek in that region. It was a fight between the Nigeria army 
and the Cameroun army. Though later Obasanjo handed over to Cameroun but this present 
administration says they will go to the world court to review the judgement that gave over 




Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir. What do you say that peace will mean to you? 
….. Peace. When we unite and come together and there is employment for the youth and 
there is all round development, there will be peace in Nigeria. Nigeria will not want to 
experience another civil war 
Interviewer- Thank you sir. We are almost done. Just you’re thought of Nigeria as a country? 
…… What I think about Nigeria is if we can have employment and a moving economy. The 
people of Nigeria are really going through hard times. If you go the North you will see. In 
Nigeria, we have different class of citizenry. We first class citizens, second class citizens and 
third class citizen. 
Interviewer-- so what class do you belong to? 
….. Me? From the third-class citizen, which is the poorest of the poor. Unlike in the developed 
world where at certain age you are given certain privileges and job to start building your life. 
All of our Nigeria politician are liars including president Buhari himself. He promised that 
when he get into power, he will give our graduates #5000 every month but when he became 
the leader of the nation, but he went to another country after he became president, he said 
that he doesn’t know the number of graduate in the country. Can you imagine that? Just last 
week they say they are going to recruit graduate into teaching line and they said they needed 
18,000 teachers but after a while they said they have not gotten the quota they needed. After 
that they will keep quiet about it as if they weren’t the one that made such promise. People 
suffering in Nigeria and they cannot avoid to get food now. 
Interviewer-- do you think that all of this situation is what contributed to political violence in 
Nigeria? 
….. It contribute to it. When everyone gets what he want, who will go and fight? 
Interviewer-- and considering the point you made about politicians and rich men sponsoring 




….. When I said, I don’t want it to break into four region 
Interviewer-- yeah. 
…… But this are the people pushing it underground so that one day Nigeria will break. 
Interviewer-- You just said the way the Nigeria government is treating his citizens contributed 
to the uprising of groups in the country 
…….. Yeah 
Interviewer-- and they are also part of those who are sponsoring the crisis 
….. Yeah, because they have never held anyone responsible for the terror of this groups even 
to those who are obvious to us? Babangida the former head of state said he was among those 
sponsoring the group and the government have never challenge he till today. It is only when 
they are dead like the case of late Gen. Sani Abacha. When I was in the military, Gen. 
Babangida embezzled all the crude oil money bought from Nigeria during the cold war. They 
said he owns swatch Watch Company or a major shareholder there and a refinery outside the 
country. But he is alive and no one even queried him or accuse him but Late Gen. Abacha is 
been talked about every time. Obasanjo spoiled Nigeria. He sold National shipping line, 
Nigeria airway was sold by him and as he is alive, no one dear challenge him. 
Interviewer-- This should be the last question. How then do you think that Nigeria can actually 
move forward in term of the upsurge of political violence as at the moment they are still 
fighting Boko Haram and the Niger delta militant. Considering that as you said the 
government are implicated, how can we move forward considering all this problems? 
….. When there is job for the youth, and the economy of this country is moving and all party 
satisfied. With what we get from the sale of crude oil, only in that, we are ranked sixth richest 
country in the world on the other hand, Nigeria citizens are the poorest in the world. Even 
Liberia during their civil war, they are still enjoying more than Nigerian. Over there in Liberia, 
they distribute food to her citizen every month so that they could have what to eat. There is 




go home with fat salary for example a senator take home pay in Nigeria at the end of the 
month is #30 million including sitting allowance. Nigeria is supposed to be like America. When 
we were born in those day, Naira is higher than dollars but now, as at yesterday, a dollar to a 
naira is #434. Because of corruption. Our people are highly corrupt 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much sir for avail me your time 
….. You are welcome 
Interview 9 
Interviewer-- Thank you so much. As I mentioned earlier, my name is Modupe Akinleye, I am 
a student of the University of Bristol. I am completing my PhD on Boko Haram movement and 
how it is been responded to. Ma, can you tell us about your background. Everything you think 
we can know about you? 
..... I am a military officer. I am also a student of Nigeria army school of nursing and 
administration. I just completed my HND. I am xxxx. 
Interviewer-- What about your rank or level in the army. 
..... I am a corporal 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much 
Interviewer-- Do you have any experience with political violence? 
..... Not really 
Interviewer-- Maybe personal experience or an eyewitness testimony of somebody you 
know. Base on the job? 
..... Well some experience I had, based on my job is not direct contact with such but some 
colleagues of mine who have been to places of war, related some of their experience to us 
and with that I think I can make a little input. Some of our colleagues that were deployed to 




They get trapped as they are trying to escape. All these experience was related to me. I also 
heard from an eyewitness, who was among those at the theatre of the war. These are my 
experience on the fight against Boko-haram 
Interviewer-- Alright, thank you very much 
Interviewer-- What do you think about the Boko Haram movement? 
..... They are group of people, agitating for their own self-interest. They are agitating for their 
own personal interest and not the interest of the public. The movement is so organized that 
it is not easy to defeat them. It is something they planned for years even before they started 
carrying out their actions: The kind of terror they unleash on people, how they move from 
one state to the other and how to recruit others to join them. The government of the day has 
not be able to overcome them for now. 
Interviewer- Thank you 
Interviewer- You don't think that they might be some reason why they are agitating or 
fighting? 
..... I just believe that 
Interviewer-- In your own opinion, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria? 
..... It started for long but what I can specifically say is that, it began in 2010 during the former 
regime. The reason why i can say this is because, we started hearing of their activity that time. 
Interviewer-- Ok 
Interviewer-- What do you think terrorism mean? 
..... Terrorism means a deliberate act of a group of people, agitating for a specific thing and 
causing violence as a result. This violence is targeted at innocent ones. When we talk of 
terrorism, it does only relate to the killing of people but its act also involve, kidnapping and 




Interviewer-- Ok do you think terrorism is different from other form of violence we 
experience in Nigeria? 
..... Yes of course. Because Nigeria have had incidences of violence in the past. For instance, 
in 1993, I can say much about the violence that erupted after the annulment of the June 12, 
election that year. That is political violence. They destroyed properties and some people died 
in the process. Even I was part of it myself as I nearly escape death. Wasn't a military officer 
then as I was still young then? The tear gas fired into our neighbourhood almost choked me 
to death. All these is also part of violence but terrorism is different from violence.  Violence is 
more focus. Its agitation is more focus but terrorism is targeted at everyone and anyone can 
be affected. It can be at any place. When we are the wrong place, at the wrong time, one can 
be affected. So that is what I understand by terrorism and how it is different from violence or 
political violence. Violence may not lead to death but terrorism may cause a lot of death. A 
lot of property is destroyed through terrorism. 
Interviewer-- Thank you very much ma 
Interviewer-- What about your experience with boko-haram, have you ever had any? 
...., well I have not come in personal contact with them 
Interviewer-- Base on your work or any peace keeping operation? 
..... But in 2011, I was supposed to go on a mission to Sudan but unfortunately, I got admission 
into the school. Before then, I was about rounding off my HND. So I have not been to any 
operations but internal and external. I have not had personal contact with Boko-haram. 
Interviewer-- Thank you 
Interviewer-- What will peace mean to Nigeria? 
..... Peace at this crucial time will mean so much to us. Peace means when there is no war. A 
time where security of lives and properties are no longer an issue. So, in our country today, 




of Maiduguri and so on. If you must go out, you go out with care. According to someone's 
account, they tell their neighbours, as I am going out, if you do not see me again, know that I 
am gone. In such area, I don't think there is anything we call peace. 
Interviewer- So peace in Nigeria, is it a possibility? 
..... Yeah it is possible, we have experienced peace before and I believe we can still have it 
back 
Interviewer- Thank you very much 
Interviewer-- What do you think about Nigeria as a country? 
..... Nigeria as a country in my opinion, I believe that good days are ahead. I am an optimist. I 
believe good things and days are coming and this whole issue of terrorism and violence will 
be wiped out. 
Interviewer-And the level of violence in Nigeria compare to others, what can you say? 
..... When we talk about other Africa countries, Nigeria is a peaceful country. If not for this 
period that we are experiencing this things, there are some other countries in Africa, Nigeria 
is a peaceful country. If not for this period that we are experiencing this things, there are some 
other countries in Africa that have experienced more violence and terror act in Africa. 
Example is like the case of Angola where there was civil war between the two main tribes of 
the region. The war lasted for a while but ended in 1994. Nigeria crisis has not gotten to that 
level. In Sudan, they have been fighting this war and yet Nigeria military and other contingents 
are still going there to try to bring peace to that nation. To God be praised at least, no 
foreigner is in this country to maintain peace. So also Liberia. In the case of Nigeria, we have 
not gotten to that extent. So, I believe we are going to come of the Boko-haram movement 
soonest. I remember the Maitatsine movement. Though I cannot give account of their activity 
then but I heard from those that were part of the crisis then and I also read about them, and 
today they are no more. 




..... Of course I believe they are still there and they are working hand in hand. Let me say, it is 
only a change of nomenclature because they are agitating for the same thing. Religious fight. 
They may not have direct alliance but it is still part of the foundation they the Maitaisine 
Interviewer--Thank you 
Interviewer-- The fight against Boko-haram, how would you assess it? 
..... Well, the fight against Boko-haram, I will say that the fight has a political undertone in it. 
The fight of Boko-haram in Nigeria is a fight of religion though they did not come directly to 
say is a religious fight. If not for the political involvement, I believe Boko-haram should have 
ended. But because of politics, the weapon they are using, my annual salary may not be able 
to buy one. 
Interviewer-- What do you mean by politics? 
..... I mean the government of the day, there are some group of people sponsoring the people. 
Using it against other religion and other political believe and ideology. When Goodluck was 
there as a president, he was a Christian and they do not want him. So let me say the other 
opponents were using it against him so they could say that, during his tenure in office, there 
was no peace. 
Interviewer-- So you are trying to say that, it has something to do with politician’s base on 
region and the likes 
.....Yeah 
Interviewer-- Do you think this also explain the Niger Delta Avengers also coming up now that 
Buhari who is from the North now the president? 
..... Yeah, the name Avengers. You know if somebody has not wrong you, you won’t be think 
of vengeance but if otherwise, you want to avenge. This group was form so as to fight against 
the government because when Goodluck was there who the group, Boko-haram was from 




Interviewer-- And the Nigeria government, what do you think about the Nigeria government? 
..... In what way 
Interviewer-- You just made mention that Boko-haram movement and political violence in 
Nigeria has something to do with region base politics and politician’s base on the situation we 
are having in Nigeria and how they are running the country base on how it has to do with 
political violence and how they are managing it 
..... Well the government for now I cannot really say much about them. 
Interviewer-- Not just Buhari government but Nigeria government as a whole.  Your 
perception 
.....  Well what I perceive about the government of the day is that, they are not fighting for 
the ordinary citizens. They are fighting for themselves. They are after themselves. After a lot 
of manifestos, that I will do this and that, immediately they get powered or get into office, 
they begin to serve themselves and their pocket. How they can acquire money to the extent 
that their 5th generation cannot finish spending it. They are after their pick stand not the 
masses. 
Interviewer-- Why do you think this is so? 
..... The reason is because, the level of poverty in this country and the standard of living is very 
high and unfortunately it is on a continuous rise and the government does not have a plan set 
out to help the masses. 
Interviewer-- Why do you think the government of the day takes to corruption and do not 
care about her citizens. 
..... The wealth we have in this country is enough to care for the ordinary citizen. Whether 
you are working or not. You should be able to live an average life. But today people are dying 
of hunger. No job, insecurity. All we hear is that someone has embezzled some amount of 




Interviewer--Thank you very much ma 
Interviewer-- As a final question, what do you see as the way forward? 
..... The way forward for Nigeria is that, we should pray for good leaders, if we have a good 
leader i.e. if the head is not corrupt, the whole body will be whole. We know that corruption 
is in every society, at least a little level of corruption. If we have a good leader, that will be 
able to stand steadfastly against corruption, we be able to rise to the level we feel that we 
belong to a good country. Where someone that is not working we be able to eat and live an 
average life. 
Interviewer-- So you think corruption can be tackled in Nigeria. You think political violence 
could be resolved? 
..... Hmmm. I don't believe that corruption is the cause of political violence. It is not as a result 
of corruption. Corruption is another thing while political violence is another thing entirely. 
Political violence can start as a result of power tussle while corruption is occupying a public 
office and diverting the funds met to other purpose for personal use. Therefore I don't agree 
political violence has anything to do with corruption. The reason for corruption and political 
violence are different except if violence erupt as a result of agitation on public embezzlement 
by politicians. That one is understandable. 
Interviewer-- Any final word you may want to say? 
..... You made mentioned of whether we can have peace in Nigeria? I just believe the current 
crisis of insecurity and violence will end soon and peace will be possible. There is no total 
peace anywhere. The place I believe there will be total peace is in heaven. Peace itself varies, 
we have societal peace, mental peace whereby you have rest of mind. No worries and fear of 
terror. Peace in the society is possible and it is what the government should pursue to achieve. 
Interviewer-- You’re thought on the Christians Muslim relationship in the country 
..... The relationship between Christians and Muslims in this country is hypocritical in nature. 




serving the same God but we are not. So the relationship between Christians and Muslims is 
not so cordial. The way I see it, even in public office, you are discriminated according to your 
religious belief. 
Interviewer- Thank you very much for your time 
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